Clementine Newman v. Karla Davis, Commissioner of Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, and Memphis Light, Gas, and Water
This is an appeal from the trial court’s order, affirming the decision of the Designee of the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development that Appellant/Employee was not qualified for unemployment benefits. Because there is substantial and material evidence in the record, and a reasonable basis in law, to support the Commissioner’s Designee’s decision, we affirm the order of the trial court. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dog House Investments, LLC v. Teal Properties, Inc., et al
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff Lessee in this action for breach of contract and promissory fraud. It also awarded Plaintiff punitive damages and prejudgment interest at the rate of eight percent per annum. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Derrick Johnson, et al. v. Jerry R. Floyd, M.D., et al.
This case is before us upon mandate from the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration of our previous opinion, Johnson v. Floyd, No. W2012-00207-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2500900 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2012), in light of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Rajvongs v. Wright, --- S.W.3d ----, 2013 WL 6504425 (Tenn. 2013). Based on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stanley L. Summer v. Nancy J. Summer
This is an appeal from a final judgment of divorce entered on March 19, 2007. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until December 2, 2013, more than (30) days from the date of entry of the final judgment to which it is directed. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Conrad Ernest Frye v. Katrina Annemarie Smith Kimball
This case arises from a dispute between family members over the proper distribution of assets from two separate trusts. Appellant contends that the grantor of one of the trusts revoked a modification of the trust prior to her death pursuant to a settlement agreement with Appellant. The trial court declined to give effect to a settlement agreement because it was never signed by the parties prior to the grantor’s death. Additionally, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its interpretation of various provisions in each of the trusts. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Eli Tom Orr v. Tennessee Department of Safety
A person whose property was seized, and subsequently forfeited, pursuant to a drug arrest challenges the actions of the Department of Safety. In light of the nine-year delay in the filing of a petition for review, we find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of the action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Haas & Wilkerson, Inc v. Geren Rides, Inc, et al v. Azalea City Amusement
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for return of personal property. Because the order does not resolve all the claims between the parties we dismiss for lack of a final judgment. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Mark A. Shempert, et al.
The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of the doctrine of prior suit pending and entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff under-insured/uninsured motorist insurance carrier. We hold that the action was barred under the doctrine of prior suit pending where the subject matter of the current lawsuit, namely, insurance coverage, was asserted by Plaintiff insurance carrier as a defense in an action previously filed by Defendant insured and pending in the circuit court. Summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff insurance carrier is reversed. This action is remanded to the trial court for dismissal in accordance with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Firstbank v. Horizon Capital Partners, LLC, et al
This appeal concerns FirstBank’s request for a deficiency judgment against Defendants following a foreclosure sale of real property. FirstBank filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there were no issues of material fact remaining. Defendants objected, asserting that the property sold for an amount materially less than the fair market value. The trial court granted FirstBank’s motion, finding that Defendants failed to prove that the foreclosure price was materially less than the fair market value. Defendants appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Davis Holmes v. Maria Elizabeth Holmes
In this divorce action, the sole issue on appeal is the propriety of the trial court’s permanent parenting plan regarding the parties’ three children. Concerning co-parenting, the parties were alternating weeks with their children during the pendency of the divorce. At trial, the parties agreed to continuation of this schedule, which provided each party equal co-parenting time with the children. The issues announced for trial regarding the children were (1) which parent should be named primary residential parent and (2) which parent would have final decision-making authority. The trial court, however, chose to implement a “divided” custody arrangement, wherein father was awarded primary custody and decision-making authority during the school year while mother was awarded primary custody and decision-making authority during the summer. Mother appeals. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth B. Turner v. Selina C. Gaviria
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of Defendant in this action to recover amounts allegedly due under an oral loan agreement. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the matter for findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Deidra Kay Minor v. Melvin Richard Nichols
This appeal involves the interpretation of a marital dissolution agreement. In the parties’ divorce, the wife was awarded the marital home and the associated debt on the home. In the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, the husband was required to pay alimony in an amount that covered half of the wife’s monthly mortgage payments. The alimony payments were to be made for fifteen years or until the mortgage on the marital home was “paid off in full.” The husband stopped making his alimony payments and the wife filed a contempt petition against him. While the contempt petition was pending, the wife fell behind on her mortgage payments and the house was sold in foreclosure. The husband then filed a petition to terminate his alimony obligation. After a hearing on both petitions, the trial court held the husband’s failure to pay alimony constituted willful contempt of court. Interpreting the marital dissolution agreement, however, the trial court also held that the husband’s alimony obligation ended when the marital home was sold in foreclosure, because at that point the mortgage was “paid off in full.” The wife now appeals. We decline to interpret the parties’ marital dissolution agreement in a manner that would terminate the husband’s alimony obligation if the foreclosure resulted from his contemptuous failure to pay alimony to the wife. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Victor R. Peterson v. Kathleen A. Peterson
This is the second time this divorce case has been before this Court. Victor R. Peterson (“Husband”) filed the first appeal. We remanded the case to the trial court because we were “unable to determine what property was awarded to [Kathleen A. Peterson (“Wife”)] as . . . equitable division of property and what property was awarded as alimony in solido.” Peterson, 2012 WL 1413890 at *3. On remand, the trial court classified the parties’ property, valued all of the marital property except for some miscellaneous personal property, decreed a division of the marital property, and awarded Wife $10,000 in alimony in solido. Wife appeals. She argues that the division of marital property is not equitable and that the alimony award is inadequate. We affirm. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Ilie Nita v. Olga Nita
In this divorce appeal, husband challenges the trial court’s decisions regarding the primary residential parent, rehabilitative alimony, the division of the marital estate, and the award of attorney fees. With the exception of the designation of alimony as “rehabilitative,” we find no error in the trial court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elliot H. Himmelfarb, M. D. Et Al. v. Tracy R. Allain
Physicians filed an action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process against Patient after Patient voluntarily dismissed her medical malpractice lawsuit against them. Following a change in the applicable case law, Physicians voluntarily dismissed their malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims. Patient moved for attorney fees under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.03(2) as a sanction against Physicians for their failure to admit a matter requested under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 36.01. Patient also sought discretionary costs. The trial court found that Physicians had reasonable grounds to believe they might prevail on their claims, but granted Patient a partial attorney fee award. We reverse the award of attorneys fees and affirm the award of discretionary costs. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of the Estate of Dennis R. Woolverton
This is a will contest. The alleged will was signed by three witnesses. At the hearing on the will contest, two of the three witnesses and a notary public testified about the signatures on the purported will. The trial court held that the document was the decedent’s validly executed will and admitted it to probate. On appeal, the contestant of the will argues that the will proponent failed to satisfy the statutory requirement of proof from all living witnesses, if to be found, because the third witness to the will did not appear or testify. We hold that the proponent of the purported will was required to either submit the testimony of all living witnesses or show that a living witness whose testimony was not proffered was not to be found. However, because the trial court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the availability of the third witness, as required under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, we must vacate the trial court’s decision and remand. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Acuff International, Inc. v. Sanyo Manufacturing Corporation
This case involves issues of breach of contract and negligence. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the Defendant/Appellee manufacturer. Because the trial court’s order does not contain sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to satisfy the requirements of Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby J. Byrge, et al v. Parkwest Medical Center, et al
After taking a non-suit, Bobby J. Byrge, individually and as next of kin for the decedent Julia Kay Byrge, and the Estate of Julia Kay Byrge (“Plaintiff”) filed a second healthcare liability suit against Parkwest Medical Center (“Parkwest”) and Dr. John C. Showalter, M.D.1 Parkwest filed a motion to dismiss, and after a hearing, the Trial Court granted Parkwest’s motion finding and holding that Plaintiff’s suit was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals to this Court asserting that his suit was not barred as he was entitled to rely upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105, the saving statute. We affirm finding and holding, as did the Trial Court, that Plaintiff’s first suit was not timely filed because Plaintiff did not comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, and, therefore, Plaintiff could not rely upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105 to save his second suit. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Billy A. Mathes v. Dr. Edmond Lane et al
The plaintiff, a state prison inmate, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his health care liability action against the defendant doctor and his complaint against the warden of the facility where he was treated by the doctor. The trial court granted the defendant doctor’s motion to dismiss based upon the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the requirements of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act (“TMMA”). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-115 to -122 (Supp. 2013). The trial court also granted the warden’s motion to dismiss upon finding that the plaintiff’s complaint contained no factual allegations against the warden. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Clint Dewayne Graham v. Nycole Alexandria Vaughn
The father of a nine year old girl filed a petition seeking to legitimate the child, requesting that he be named primary residential parent, and asking that the mother be prevented from moving to Florida with the child. In her answer, the mother asked to be named as the child’s primary residential parent and, having already moved,to be allowed to remain in Florida with the child. After trial, the court ruled that there was no reasonable purpose in the mother’s proposed relocation and that the mother was to return to Tennessee with the child; the court entered a permanent parenting plan which designated the mother as primary residential parent and also ordered the father to pay a portion of the mother’s attorney fees. The mother appeals the court’s disposition of the petition to legitimate; the father appeals the award of fees to the mother. We affirm the decision to award fees to the mother, but vacate the award and remand for a redetermination of the amount; we affirm the court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals | |
Rock Ivy Holding, LLC v. RC Properties, LLC et al
This multi-faceted business dispute, which arises in principal part from the real estate collapse of 2008, involves five limited liability companies, eight individuals who are either members or officers of the respective companies, 530 acres of undeveloped real estate, and $7 million of secured notes that were personally guaranteed by six of the individuals. Over the course of two years, SunTrust Bank, the holder of the notes, agreed to extensions of the original maturity date; a final extension was granted until August 7, 2008. A call for capital contributions was approved but it produced insufficient funds to payoff the debt.Thereafter, two of the individuals, one of whom was the president of Rock Creek, and both of whom personally guaranteed a portion of the debt, formed another entity which then acquired the notes from the bank. Rock Creek Development, LLC (“Rock Creek”), which owned the real estate, then agreed to sell a substantial portion of its property to pay off the balance owing on the notes. In an attempt to stop the sale, Rock Ivy Holding, LLC (“Rock Ivy”), one of three members of Rock Creek, filed this derivative action for itself and on behalf of Rock Creek against Rock Creek’s members: RC Properties, LLC; Linked, LLC; two officers of Rock Creek; and several individuals who were members of the defendant companies. The complaint alleged, inter alia, various conflicts of interests by the individual defendants and various breaches of statutory and contractual duties by members and/or officers. Pursuant to an agreed order, the sale proceeded, the net proceeds were held in the registry of the court, and the remaining claims went to trial. After eights days of a bench trial, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02 at the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief.The trial court granted the motion and dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims. Thereafter, several defendants filed various motions to recover their respective attorneys’ fees and expenses. Some of the motions were based on Tenn.Code Ann.§ 48-249804, which pertains to derivative actions, and others were based on indemnification provisions in Rock Creek’s Operating Agreement. The trial court granted some of the fee requests and denied others. In this appeal, Rock Ivychallenges the dismissal of its claims and the assessment of attorneys’ fees.Two individual defendants appeal the denial of their claims for attorneys’ fees. The holder of the notes appeals the denial of its claim for “default interest” and penalties. We affirm the trial court in all respects except for the trial court denying the claim for default interest on the notes. We have concluded that the holder of the notes is entitled to recover default interest from the time the notes were declared to be in default. Accordingly, this issue is remanded for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marty Nix v. Tennessee Civil Service Commission
This administrative appeal arises from the termination of a state trooperfrom his employment with the Tennessee Department of Safety for filing a meritless sexual harassment claim against a fellow employee. Finding substantial and material evidence in support of the decision to terminate the trooper, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jeena P., et al.
Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights for failure to support. We find no need to address this issue because mother did not appeal the trial court’s findings of several other grounds for termination. Mother also disputes the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Alvin Evans v. FedEx Express
Plaintiff filed an action against his employer alleging discrimination in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant employer on the basis that the action was barred by the contractual limitations period contained in the employment agreement executed by the parties. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jonathan S. C-B.
This is the second appeal in an ongoing custody dispute. Mother was initially designated primary residential parent of the child. Later, Father filed a petition alleging Mother was interfering with his parenting time and trying to turn the child against him. Mother then alleged Father was abusing their child, which allegations were determined to be unfounded. During that litigation, Father successfully demonstrated a material change in circumstances and became the primary residential parent; following that award, Mother filed the first appeal and this court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The present appeal arises from Father’s petition requesting a modification of the parenting plan and to, inter alia, suspend Mother’s parenting time; subsequently,Mother filed her counter-petition requesting, inter alia, change of custody, along with renewed allegations that Father was physically and sexually abusing their child.The trial court dismissed Mother’s counter-petition and granted in part and denied in part Father’s petition. Mother appeals contending the trial court erred in dismissing her counter-petition; she also contends the trial court erred in excluding rebuttal testimony from her expert witnesses. Father appeals contending the award of attorney’s fees and expenses was inadequate; he also contends this appeal is frivolous and that he should be awarded damages. We affirm the trial court in all aspects and, although we do not find Mother’s appeal frivolous, we find Father is entitled to recover, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), his reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal because this action involves custody of the parties’ child. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
