Kermit L. Moore, Jr., et al v. State of Tennessee, et al.
Plaintiffs, eight Shelby County registered voters, filed an action for declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of the 2012 Senate Reapportionment Act on the ground that it divides more counties than necessary in contravention of Article II, Section 6, of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and subsequently granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The facts are not disputed and we hold that, as a matter of law, the Act is not unconstitutional. We affirm judgment in favor of Defendants. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donna F. Thompson v. Lynn Ward
Homeowner appeals the trial court's order dismissing her complaint against the Deputy Circuit Court Clerk of Crockett County. The complaint alleged that the Deputy Clerk failed to properly issue a writ of possession regarding the homeowner's real property. The trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: Lazaria C.R.H.
This appeal arises from the transfer of a child custody case to Texas. The lower court issued an order naming Mother primary residential parent of the parties’ child and granting Father certain visitation rights. According to Father, Mother did not allow Father visitation with the child despite the court’s order. Father filed a petition seeking to hold Mother in contempt. At a preliminary hearing on the matter, the lower court dismissed Father’s petition and ruled that all further proceedings in the matter be held in the court of appropriate jurisdiction in Texas, where Mother was supposedly living. Father appealed. After reviewing the record, we have determined that the lower court’s findings do not support its decision; we therefore vacate the order of the lower court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Carlton J. Ditto, et al
This appeal involves the purchase of property at a tax sale. MERS filed suit against Purchaser to invalidate his purchase of property because it had not received notice of the sale even though it was listed as a beneficiary or nominee on the deed of trust. Purchaser claimed that MERS was not entitled to notice because MERS did not have an interest in the property. Purchaser also alleged that MERS failed to properly commence its lawsuit because it did not remit the proper funds pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-5-2504(c). The trial court refused to set aside the tax sale, holding that the applicable notice requirements were met and that Purchaser was the holder of legal title to the property. MERS appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas R. Meeks v. Carrie Gasaway, et al.
A bail bondsman filed suit against an attorney over title to several pieces of land. The suit went to trial before a jury, but the parties settled before a verdict was announced. The attorney subsequently sued the bail bondsman’s attorneys for malicious prosecution and other torts. The defendant attorneys filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that the parties’ agreement to settle the underlying case negated one of the elements of a malicious prosecution claim, “a final and favorable termination” of the underlying suit in favor of the defendant. The motion also argued that the complaint did not sufficiently allege the elements of the other causes of action. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff attorney had failed to state a claim for relief under any of the causes of action. We affirm the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer L. Al-Athari and Haider Al-Athari v. Luis A. Gamboa and Morgan Southern, Inc.
A woman driving a passenger vehicle was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a tractor trailer. The woman and her husband filed a complaint alleging negligence and loss of consortium against the other driver and against the owner of the tractor trailer. The Plaintiffs did not comply with the deadlines set out in the Scheduling Order and, as a result, they were precluded from introducing medical testimony or records in support of their claims. On the day set for trial, the Plaintiffs told the court they were not prepared to try their case and wanted to go home. The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice, with the option of filing a new complaint within a year, and the Plaintiffs appealed. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, and, accordingly, affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia Bearden v. Gregory Lanford, M.D. And Neurological Surgeons, P. C.
In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a neurosurgeon, negligently penetrated her spinal cord with a surgical instrument while performing a cervical fusion at two levels of her neck leading to partial paralysis and other neurological problems. She was ultimately diagnosed with a condition called Brown Sequard Syndrome. The issues were tried before a jury; however, several of the claims were dismissed on directed verdict. The remaining claims went to the jury which rendered a verdict on behalf of the defendant-neurosurgeon. The plaintiff raises numerous issues on appeal, the substance of which may be divided into three categories. First, she contends error associated with the directed verdict, the verdict form, and the jury instructions. In this regard she contends, inter alia, that the trial court erred in directing a verdict as to res ipsa loquitur because she presented the testimony of three expert witnesses of the defendant’s specific acts of negligence. The plaintiff also contends the court erred by dismissing all but three of her claims upon a directed verdict. Second, the plaintiff argues she was denied a fair trial due to inappropriate argument and misconduct. Third, she argues a host of errors secondary to evidentiary rulings. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jere Eugene Pierce v. Larry A. Paschall, et al.
This is a property boundary dispute. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and found that Defendant did not acquire disputed property bordering the western edge of Plaintiff’s property and the eastern edge of Defendant’s property by adverse possession. The trial court also found that Defendant did not demonstrate laches. We affirm. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
Connie June Tipton Stout v. Jackie Harold Stout
This action involves the proper adjudication of the parties’ interests in certain marital retirement assets post divorce. The sole issue raised is whether the trial court properly retained jurisdiction over the retirement assets pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”). Based on prior precedent, we find that the trial court did properly retain jurisdiction, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s decision in this case. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Rene Annette Fields v. Jimmy Glenn Fields
This is a post-divorce case. Jimmy Glenn Fields (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s order (1) denying his motion for a reduction in alimony and (2) granting the counter-motion of Rene Annette Fields (“Wife”) for an increase in alimony. Following a bench trial, the court held that Husband had failed to demonstrate his inability to return to work as a material change in circumstances justifying a decrease in his court-ordered alimony obligation of $1,100 a month. Rather, the court found that the proof demonstrated that Husband had the ability to pay, and that Wife had a need for, increased support. The court increased Husband’s obligation to $2,000 per month. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Rene Annette Fields v. Jimmy Glenn Fields concurring and dissenting
I do not take issue with any of the law as set forth in the majority’s opinion. I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s denial of the Appellant’s request to reduce the amount of the alimony. I do, however, respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion affirming the Trial Court’s decision to increase the amount of the alimony. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Earlene Gregory v. Michael Melhorn, et al
Earlene Gregory brought this action against Michael Melhorn and his wife, Cynthia Melhorn, sellers of a house and real estate, alleging that the defendants falsely stated in their Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure statement that they were unaware of any defects in the exterior walls or basement or any flooding or drainage problems. The contract for sale of the property, executed and signed by plaintiff and defendants, provided that the warranty deed was to be made in the name of Earlene Singleton Gregory. During discovery, the parties discovered that the deed actually listed the plaintiff’s three sons as grantees. After defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing because she did not own the property, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to include a claim for reformation of the deed to reflect her intention at the time of sale, i.e., to retain a life estate in the property with a remainder interest in her sons. Plaintiff also filed a motion to allow her sons to intervene as plaintiffs on the ground that they held legal title to the property. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motions and granted defendants summary judgment, holding that plaintiff lacked standing because she did not own the property. The court further held that the proposed intervening plaintiffs, even if allowed to intervene, would lack standing because they were not parties to the contract. We vacate the trial court’s summary judgment. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiff to amend her complaint under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.01, and by refusing to allow the plaintiff’s sons to intervene, as was their right under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.01. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Anne Payne v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
Winston Payne brought this action against his former employer, CSX Transportation, Inc., under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), alleging that CSX negligently exposed him to asbestos, diesel fumes, and radioactive materials in the workplace causing his injuries. The jury returned a verdict finding (1) that CSX negligently caused Payne’s injuries; (2) that CSX violated the Locomotive Inspection Act or safety regulations regarding exposure to asbestos, diesel fumes, and radioactive materials; and (3) that Payne’s contributory negligence caused 62% of the harm he suffered. The jury found that “adequate compensation” for Payne’s injuries was $8.6 million. After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court, sua sponte, instructed the jury, for the first time, that, under FELA, its finding that CSX violated a statute or regulation enacted for the safety of its employees meant that plaintiff would recover 100% of the damages found by the jury. The court sent the jury back for further deliberations. It shortly returned with an amended verdict of “$3.2 million @ 100%.” Six months after the court entered judgment on the $3.2 million verdict, it granted CSX’s motion for a new trial, citing “instructional and evidentiary errors.” The case was then assigned to another trial judge, who thereafter granted CSX’s motion for summary judgment as to the entirety of the plaintiff’s complaint. The second judge ruled that the causation testimony of all of plaintiff’s expert witnesses was inadmissible. We hold that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, sua sponte, on a purely legal issue, i.e., that the jury’s finding of negligence per se under FELA precluded apportionment of any fault to the plaintiff based upon contributory negligence, an instruction given after the jury had returned a verdict that was complete, consistent, and based on the instructions earlier provided to it by the trial court. We further hold that, contrary to the trial court’s statements, the court did not make any prejudicial evidentiary rulings in conducting the trial, and that its jury instructions, read as a whole, were clear, correct, and complete. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting a new trial. We remand to the trial court. We direct the first trial judge to review the evidence as thirteenth juror and determine whether the jury verdict in the amount of $8.6 million is against the clear weight of the evidence. If it is not, the trial judge is directed to enter judgment on that verdict. If, on the other hand, the trial judge finds that the larger verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, the court is directed to enter a final judgment on the jury’s verdict of $3.2 million. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is rendered moot by our judgment. However, in the event the Supreme Court determines that our judgment is in error, we hold that the grant of summary judgment was not appropriate. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Dominion Enterprises, F/K/A Trader Publishing Company v. Dataium, LLC, et al.
This case involves litigation between two business entities: Dominion Enterprises, f/k/a Trader Publishing Company (“Dominion”), the former employer of six of the seven individual defendants, and Dataium, LLC (“Dataium”), a company subsequently formed by those defendants. Dominion filed a complaint against the defendants, alleging numerous causes of action, including breach of covenants not to compete, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of loyalty, breach of a non-solicitation agreement, and civil conspiracy. The trial court found that Dataium and two of the individual defendants were liable for breach of contract but dismissed Dominion’s other claims. Dominion appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Eimile A.M.
This case is before us once again after remand to the Trial Court for specific findings relative to the Trial Court’s termination of the parental rights of Christopher M. (“Father”) to the minor child Eimile A.M. (“the Child”). Upon remand the Trial Court entered its findings of fact. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to the Child. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence was not proven of grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102 for willful failure to visit or willful failure to support. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In re: T. W.
This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the then minor child T.W. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found T.W. to be an unruly child. T.W. some time later filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss regarding the order finding T.W. to be an unruly child, citing constitutional, procedural, and jurisdictional defects. The Juvenile Court denied the petition to vacate. T.W. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We reversed the Circuit Court on appeal, and remanded for the Circuit Court to hear the appeal of the denial of the petition to vacate. T.W. filed an amended petition to vacate and later a motion for summary judgment. The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that T.W.’s claims could not be redressed by a Tenn. R. Juv. P. 34 petition to vacate. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. T.W. appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re: B. R.
This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the then minor child B.R. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found B.R. to be an unruly child. B.R. some time later filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss regarding the order finding B.R. to be an unruly child, citing constitutional, procedural, and jurisdictional defects. The Juvenile Court denied the petition to vacate. B.R. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We reversed the Circuit Court on appeal, and remanded for the Circuit Court to hear the appeal of the denial of the petition to vacate. B.R. filed an amended petition to vacate and later a motion for summary judgment. The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that B.R.’s claims could not be redressed by a Tenn. R. Juv. P. 34 petition to vacate. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. B.R. appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re: A. W.
This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the then minor child A.W. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found A.W. to be an unruly child. A.W. some time later filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss regarding the order finding A.W. to be an unruly child, citing constitutional, procedural, and jurisdictional defects. The Juvenile Court denied the petition to vacate. A.W. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We reversed the Circuit Court on appeal, and remanded for the Circuit Court to hear the appeal of the denial of the petition to vacate. A.W. filed an amended petition to vacate and later a motion for summary judgment. The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that A.W.’s claims could not be redressed by a Tenn. R. Juv. P. 34 petition to vacate. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. A.W. appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re: M. R.
This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the minor child M.R. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found M.R. to be an unruly child. M.R. some time later filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss regarding the order finding M.R. to be an unruly child, citing constitutional, procedural, and jurisdictional defects. The Juvenile Court denied the petition to vacate. M.R. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We reversed the Circuit Court on appeal, and remanded for the Circuit Court to hear the appeal of the denial of the petition to vacate. M.R. filed an amended petition to vacate and later a motion for summary judgment. The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that M.R.’s claims could not be redressed by a Tenn. R. Juv. P. 34 petition to vacate. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. M.R. appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Robin Morrow Elliott, et al v. Michael R. Morrow
In this real property dispute, the plaintiffs, three siblings, brought a complaint against the defendant landowner, a fourth sibling, alleging that he was trespassing on an approximately 15-acre parcel of land deeded to them by their mother and requesting that the trial court declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the disputed acreage. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, finding that despite an ambiguity in the relevant deed, the parties’ mother intended to convey the disputed acreage to the defendant as part of a larger 28.33-acre parcel in 1988. The plaintiffs appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
Reid R. Crumpton v. Patricia G. Grissom, et al
Reid R. Crumpton (“Plaintiff”) sued Patricia G. Grissom (“Affiliate Broker”), Ashley Carpenter, and Mary Bea Corbitt (“Managing Broker”) in connection with a real estate sales contract for real property containing both a house and a business. The Managing Broker filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, in part, that she was not personally involved in Plaintiff’s purchase of the real property at issue and had no knowledge of the details of the transaction, and, therefore, could not be held liable for the actions of the Affiliate Broker. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order granting the Managing Broker summary judgment and making its judgment final pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment to the Managing Broker. We find and hold that Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 62-13-101, et seq. creates a duty on the part of the Managing Broker, and that the Managing Broker failed to show that she met the standard of care sufficient to satisfy her duty. We, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment to the Managing Broker, and remand this case for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Leigh Czerniak v. Anthony Kyle Czerniak
Petitioner in a divorce proceeding filed a motion to disqualify the trial court alleging that the court made comments and exhibited conduct at a hearing which indicated that the court was biased against her and that she could not receive a fair trial. The trial judge denied the motion and the petitioner then filed this interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B. We affirm the denial of the motion to disqualify. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Shonda M. Mickel v. Eric and Willene Cross d/b/a Willene's Home Repair, LLC
This case involves a complaint for damages alleging breach of contract, fraud, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff on several of the claims and awarded damages. Almost a year after the final order was entered, the defendants filed a motion to set aside the order pursuant to Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, but the trial court denied the motion. The defendants now appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Stacy Harris v. Gaylord Entertainment Company, et al.
Musicologist and journalist plaintiff filed a complaint alleging companies that host media events interfered with her business relationships by refusing to issue her press credentials to the events Defendants host. Plaintiff also alleged Defendants invaded her privacy bycasting her in a false light when a representative made a statement to Plaintiff indicating she had not been invited to a particular media event. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint upon Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Deonne Stamps v. Roy Denton Stamps, Jr.
In this divorce action, Wife appeals the denial of her Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion to alter or amend the final decree of divorce. We vacate the order denying the motion and remand the case for the court to enter a supplemental order stating its basis for denying the motion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |
