Elizabeth Kay Tomes v. Michael Joe Tomes
In this divorce case, Wife appeals the trial court’s determination that she was not entitled to an award of alimony. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award alimony and affirm the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
1963 Jackson, Inc., et al. v. Lloyd De Vos, et al.
This appeal arises from Lessee’s rental and operation of a hotel owned by Lessor. Lessee sought Lessor’s consent to an assignment of the lease to a third party. Not only did Lessor withhold consent to the assignment, Lessor terminated the lease based on conditions at the hotel that he deemed to violate the lease. Lessee sued alleging that Lessor wrongfully terminated the lease and unreasonably withheld consent to the assignment. The trial court determined that Lessee had not breached the lease and that Lessor unreasonably withheld consent to the assignment. The trial court awarded Lessee $150,000 in damages for Lessor’s unreasonable withholding of consent to the assignment. Lessor appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Tamara J. Harness v. Gerald Scott Harness
This appeal arises from a dispute over the finality of a judgment and notice in a child support matter. Tamara J. Harness (“Plaintiff”) and Gerald Scott Harness (“Defendant”) have a history of litigation related to their divorce. On November 18, 2009, Defendant simultaneously filed separate petitions to modify his spousal support and child support obligations. The Chancery Court for Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”) confirmed the findings and recommendations of the magistrate with respect to child support on April 29, 2011 . After a hearing, the Trial Court set aside its April 29, 2011 modification of Defendant’s child support. Defendant appeals, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court erred in addressing for a second time his petition to modify child support when that issue allegedly had been resolved by the magistrate’s findings and recommendations as confirmed by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court’s order of confirmation was interlocutory rather than final, and that the Trial Court did not err in revisiting the child support issue. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Alexander A. Stratienko, M. D. v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, et al
Over nine years of litigation in both state and federal courts has stemmed from a 2004 incident (“the Incident”) wherein Alexander A. Stratienko, M.D. (“Plaintiff”) pushed Van Stephen Monroe, Jr., M.D. while in a staff break room at Erlanger Hospital (“the Hospital”) in Hamilton County, Tennessee. In this appeal, Plaintiff raises issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting partial summary judgment to Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, in not allowing another amendment to the complaint and additional discovery, in excluding claims at trial relative to an administrative hearing, and in holding that Plaintiff failed to prove at trial intentional interference with business relations. We find no error in the Trial Court’s judgments and, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Artist Building Partners and Howard Caughron v. Auto-Owners Mutual Insurance Company
This appeal involves a dispute between an insurer and its insured following a fire loss at a commercial building. The case was resolved by a series of motions for partial summary judgment. The issues on appeal involve the amount of damages owed by the insurer for the insured’s lost business income during the period of restoration of the building following the fire. The insurer relies upon two separate provisions of the insurance policy to argue that its obligation to pay for lost business income was limited to either six or, at most, twelve months. The trial court denied the insurer’s motions for partial summary judgment and granted the motions for partial summary judgment filed by the insured, holding that the insurer’s obligation to pay was not limited to either a six-month or a twelve-month period. The insurer appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of Jordan F.J.
This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. The trial court granted Appellee/Father’s motion for involuntary dismissal at the conclusion of Appellants’ proof. Because the trial court failed to make the required findings of fact and conclusions of law under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2), and because we are unable to determine the trial court’s reasoning from the record, we vacate and remand. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Freda Boyce and Marvell Boyce v. LPP Mortgage LTD
This case involves the application of the doctrine of res judicata. The parties previously engaged in litigation in the General Sessions Court regarding possession of a foreclosed property. The homeowners attempted to assert that the mortgage company did not have proper title to the property prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings. The parties and the trial court all apparently concluded that the General Sessions Court lacked jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of the title based on Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-18-119. Accordingly, the General Sessions Court entered judgment in favor of the mortgage company. The homeowners subsequently filed an action in the Chancery Court, alleging that the mortgage company committed fraud in foreclosing the property because it had not acquired proper title to the property. The Appellee, having hired a new attorney, asserted that the issue should have been alleged as a defense to the General Sessions Court action, and was, therefore, barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Chancery Court agreed and dismissed the homeowners’ action on the basis of res judicata. We affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jacob H. C.
Father of child born out of wedlock appeals the parenting time and child support provisions of the parenting plan and the denial of his request that the child’s surname be changed from the Mother’s to the Father’s. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Father’s request that the child’s surname be changed, vacate the parenting time and child support provisions of the parenting plan, and remand the case for the court to make findings relative to those provisions of the plan. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Atira S. M.
Mother and step-father filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s father on the ground of abandonment for failure to support and failure to visit the child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A) and § 36-1-113. The trial court found the petitioners proved both grounds for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interest. Father appealed. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
John Scott Terry v. Tina Lynn Terry
This is a divorce case in which Wife asserts the trial court erred in failing to award her alimony. Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award spousal support, we affirm. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Le-Jo Enterprises, Inc. v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. et al.
Plaintiff, a supplier of customized lamps that were used exclusively in Cracker Barrel restaurants, filed this action for breach of express contract and breach of contract implied in fact and at law against Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (“Cracker Barrel”), and its subsidiary CBOCS Distribution, Inc. (“CBOCS”). The plaintiff alleged in the complaint that both defendants were bound by the Supply Agreement entered into between the plaintiff and CBOCS, and that both defendants breached the contract by failing to purchase 120 days of floor-stock inventory after cancellation of the Supply Agreement or discontinued use of the “Approved Products” identified in the agreement. Defendants filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the basis that the Supply Agreement expired on July 31, 2011, and that, thereafter, the parties conducted at-will transactions not governed by the Supply Agreement. The trial court granted the motion dismissing all claims against both defendants finding,inter alia: 1) there was no contract between the plaintiff and Cracker Barrel; 2) the Supply Agreement between the plaintiff and CBOCS terminated by its own terms on July 31, 2011, and there was no written extension; 3) there was no contract implied in fact; and 4) there was no contract implied at law. We affirm the dismissal of all claims against Cracker Barrel because Cracker Barrel was never a party to the contract and the complaint failed to state a claim against Cracker Barrel upon which relief could be granted. As for the claims against CBOCS, we have determined that the factual allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state claims against CBOCS for breach of express contract, contract implied in fact and contract implied at law. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of the claims against CBOCS and remand the claims against CBOCS for further proceedings. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Willard Harrison Iman, Jr. v. Megan Blanchfield Iman
This case involves post-divorce modification of a parenting schedule. Mother sought modification of the schedule after moving to Florida to be nearer to Father and the minor child. The trial court considered the case and modified the schedule to allow Mother more time with the child. Father appeals, arguing that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to hear the dispute, that the trial court should have declined jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens, that Mother failed to prove a material change in circumstances, and that the modification was not in the child’s best interests. We affirm the trial court’s rulings with regard to jurisdiction, application of the forum non conveniens doctrine, and a material change in circumstances. However, because the trial court failed to make a finding that modification was in the child’s best interests, we vacate the remainder of the order and remand to the trial court for the entry of an order containing appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether modification is in the child’s best interests. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Ruby Hailey, As Administrator of the Estate of Beatrice Jackson v. Wesley of the South, Inc., d/b/a Wesley at Dyersburg
Plaintiff’s Complaint was dismissed for failure to comply with the requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s second Motion to Alter or Amend, and Plaintiff appealed to this Court. We dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Plaintiff’s failure to timely file an appropriate notice of appeal. Plaintiff then filed a third Motion to Alter or Amend in the trial court, which the trial court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed a second appeal to this Court. We dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Lawrence D. Sellick et al v. Gene S. Miller, et al.
This is the second appeal of this property dispute involving the Parties. The Sellicks initially brought suit to determine whether the Millers had obtained an easement to use Farm Road for the benefit of Parcel 5.07. The Sellicks also complained that concrete slabs encroached upon the agreed-upon Farm Road easement for the benefit of Parcel 5.02. This court held that the Millers did not have an easement to use Farm Road for the benefit of Parcel 5.07. Upon remand, the Parties reached a settlement agreement in which the Millers agreed to a removal of the portion of their driveways on Parcel 5.02 that encroached upon Farm Road. Shortly thereafter, the Millers filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the Sellicks had violated the agreement. The Sellicks responded in kind by filing their own petition for contempt. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a mutual restraining order, found Mr. Miller in contempt for failing to remove a gate as agreed, ordered Mr. Sellick to undertake repairs to the driveways owned by the Millers, and disposed of the remaining issues between the Parties. The Sellicks appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Michaela V. et al
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Michaela V.; Michael V., Jr.; and Tyler V., the minor children (“Children”) of Michael V., Sr. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on August 22, 2008. On January 5, 2011, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. Following a bench trial held on October 12, 2011, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Children by willfully failing to provide financial support during the four months preceding the filing of the petition. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley Hayes v. Barrie Cunningham
Singer brought action for breach of contract against musical tribute show Producer. Producer did not attend trial and his counsel moved to withdraw immediately prior to trial. The court heard Singer’s evidence and entered judgment in Singer’s favor. Producer retained new counsel and moved for a new trial on the basis of excusable neglect. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial and Producer appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marlin Financial & Leasing Corp. v. Lucius E. Burch, III
This appeal arises from a dispute over the enforcement of guaranty agreements in light of a bankruptcy. Marlin Financial & Leasing Corp. (“Marlin”) sued Lucius E. Burch, III (“Burch”) in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) alleging breach of contract, conversion, and, unjust enrichment. Marlin asserted that Burch owed money under certain guaranty agreements he had signed for leases entered into by Marlin. After a trial, the Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Marlin appeals to this Court. We hold that, given the Bankruptcy Court’s orders deeming all claims related to the leases at issue satisfied, the Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
C.L. Gilbert, Jr. v. Izak Frederick Wessels, M.D.
This Court granted an extraordinary appeal in this health care liability action to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to waive the contiguous state requirement for a testifying expert witness set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated §29-26- 115(b). Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Carole Hoke Johns v. Sam N. Johns, Jr.
This appeal involves the latest in a series of attempts by Mother to recover child support arrearages owed by Father. In this particular case, Mother sought to register and enforce in Tennessee a 2007 Arkansas judgment for approximately $47,000 in child support arrearages. The trial court entered an order registering the Arkansas judgment in Tennessee. However, it granted a declaratory judgment motion filed by Father, declaring that the Arkansas judgment was unenforceable in Tennessee due to the ten-year statute of limitations for enforcing judgments found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-110. Mother appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Markum Douglas v. Peggy J. Lowe, et al.
Plaintiff purchased landlocked property and filed suit against adjoining landowners to establish an easement for a private road and for utilities pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 54-14-101, et seq. After the jury of view returned its verdict form selecting a certain route for the easement, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, which the trial court granted. Defendants filed a motion to set aside the order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, which the trial court denied. Defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Hayden C. G-J
Former unmarried partner of the child’s adoptive mother seeks visitation with the child. Because the former partner has no biological or legal relationship with the child, we affirm the trial court’s finding that she does not have standing to seek visitation. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. William L. Gibbons, et al. v. Clayton R. Smart, et al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of penalties and interest on ad valorum taxes owed by a funeral home business after the business was placed in receivership. The Appellant/Shelby County Trustee filed a claim with the Appellee/Receiver to recover delinquent taxes, penalties and interest. The trial court denied the penalties and interest, but allowed the Receiver to pay the base taxes. The Trustee appeals. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Betty L. Graham v. Lake Park Condo-Signal View
This consolidated appeal concerns Plaintiff’s ownership interest in condominium units. Plaintiff filed several complaints concerning the alleged mismanagement of her property. The complaints at issue in this case were dismissed by the trial court, which found that the applicable statute of limitations had passed and that several of Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Sharyn Bovat v. Nissan North America
This civil action is the progeny of a criminal proceeding in which Plaintiff was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for criminal trespass and stalking following an incident that occurred at the headquarters of Nissan North America. Plaintiff was convicted of criminal trespass; however, the stalking charge was dismissed because a corporation is not defined as a “person” under the stalking statute. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action against Nissan North America asserting claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process pertaining to the stalking charge. Nissan filed a motion for summary judgment and a statement of undisputed facts that was supported by the affidavit of the Williamson County Deputy District Attorney General who investigated and prosecuted the criminal proceedings. Plaintiff filed a response opposing Nissan’s motion for summary judgment; however, she failed to file a statement of disputed facts or any affidavit or deposition testimony to dispute the facts relied upon by Nissan as Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03 requires. After setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 56.04, the trial court summarily dismissed the complaint upon the findings that Nissan presented competent evidence to negate essential elements of Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiff failed to create an issue of disputed material fact regarding any of the grounds relied upon by Nissan. We have determined that the record supports the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, we affirm the summary dismissal of the complaint. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Discover Bank Issuer of Discover Card v. Layton Howell, III
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on Sworn Account, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 245-107, for unpaid credit card charges against the credit card holder. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment that was accompanied by a statement of the material facts as to which Plaintiff contended there was no genuine issue for trial, and each fact was set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph as the rule required, with a specific citation to the record. Defendant filed a response objecting to the motion; however, Defendant failed to demonstrate that the facts Plaintiff relied upon in making the motion for summary judgment were, in fact, disputed as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03. As a consequence, the facts relied upon by Plaintiff were undisputed and the trial court determined that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the amount owed. We affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals |
