Elizabeth LaFon Western Vinson v. James Gerald Vinson
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. Father challenges numerous rulings by the trial court, regarding both parenting issues and financial issues. We affirm in part, as modified, we reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Ragland, et al. v. Roy Morrison
This appeal arises from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellants claimed that Appellee was liable for injuries caused by dogs that Appellee allegedly owned and allowed to run loose in the Appellants’ neighborhood. The trial court’s order fails to state the legal ground upon which the court granted the motion for summary judgment. Further, there is no indication in the record of the trial court’s reason(s) for granting the motion. Because Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04 mandates inclusion of the trial court’s legal ground in the order on the motion for summary judgment, we vacate and remand. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Margie R. Huskey et al v. Rhea County, Tennessee
In this negligence action, the trial court, following a bench trial, found the defendant 51% at fault and the plaintiff 49% at fault for a severe injury plaintiff, Margie R. Huskey, suffered to her left arm at the Rhea County Convenience Center. The trial court assessed total compensatory damages at $298,376.65, which it reduced by 49%, awarding $152,172.09 to Ms. Huskey. The court further assessed damages of $25,000.00 for loss of consortium in favor of plaintiff, Norman Huskey, which it likewise reduced by 49%, awarding $12,750.00. The County raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by finding the County liable for negligence; (2) whether the injured plaintiff was at least 50% at fault and therefore barred from recovery; and (3) whether the damages awarded were excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
George R. Vraney, M.D. v. Medical Specialty Clinic, P.A.
This is a breach of contract case. Appellant, a medical doctor, was hired by Appellee Clinic under terms outlined in an employment agreement. After four years employment, the relationship between the parties reached an impasse and Appellant made plans to leave the Clinic to open his own practice. When the parties could not agree concerning payments due under the contract, the instant lawsuit was filed by Appellant, claiming that the Appellee had breached the contract. Appellee counter-sued for breach of contract, breach of duty of loyalty, and conversion, claiming that the Appellee had retained certain of his accounts receivable and had limited his work schedule in contravention of the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee on the breach of contract and duty of loyalty claims, and set damages pursuant to the report of the Special Master. Appellant appeals. We conclude that remaining questions of law and fact preclude the grant of summary judgment, but that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s claim for unpaid vacation time and properly referred the issue of damages to the Special Master. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Court of Appeals | ||
James Glen Kirk v. Gloria Taylor Kirk
This appeal involves the trial court’s disposition of Wife’s post-judgment motions and redivision of marital property. Following the trial court’s entry of the final decree of divorce, Wife filed several post-judgment motions seeking relief from the final decree based on Husband’s misrepresentation and concealment of assets prior to the trial court’s division of the marital estate. After an extensive period of discovery, the trial court agreed with Wife and concluded that she was entitled to a new division of marital property and relief from the final decree under either Rule 59 or Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court further ordered Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees and expert fees. Husband appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Daniel Fry v. Yuriko Shinoda Fry
Husband and Wife were divorced in 2000 and Wife was awarded one-half of the retirement benefits Husband earned from the military during the parties’ ten-year marriage. Wife has been unable to collect her portion of these benefits because the language of the court’s decree does not satisfy the requirements of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. §1408, et seq. Shortly after the divorce was granted, Wife filed a Rule 60 motion to amend the court’s Final Decree of Divorce to comply with the Act, which the trial court granted. Husband appealed because the trial court made substantive changes to Wife’s award beyond what was necessary to comply with the Act. The Court of Appeals agreed with Husband on appeal and issued a mandate directing the trial court to amend its Final Decree using language meant to comply with the Act’s requirements to enable Wife to receive her portion of Husband’s retirement benefits directly from the military. Wife still has not been able to collect her portion of Husband’s retirement benefits and filed another Rule 60 motion seeking to amend the Final Decree again to comply with the Act’s requirements. The trial court denied Wife’s motion and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. Wife presents extraordinary circumstances entitling her to relief pursuant to Rule 60.02(5). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
3L Communications L.L.C. v. Jodi Merola, Individually, and d/b/a NY Telecom Supply
Appellee/Buyer purchased certain telecommunications equipment from Appellant/Seller. Upon inspection, Appellee discovered the equipment was defective and rejected the goods. Appellant contends that the returned goods were never delivered and that Appellee bears the risk of loss under the Tennessee Uniform Commercial Code. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Appellee/Buyer, finding that, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 47-2-510, the risk of loss remained with Appellant/Seller. Appellant appeals this finding, as well as the award of prejudgment interest and attorney fees in favor of Appellee. We reverse the award of attorney fees. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Dominique Johnson v. South Central Correctional Facility Disciplinary Board, et al.
This case involves a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed by a pro se inmate. The Defendants/Appellees filed motions to dismiss the Petition, arguing that the Petition was untimely and that it lacked the required verification pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-8-104. The trial court dismissed the Petition without ruling on the inmate’s motion for an enlargement of time to respond to the motion to dismiss. The inmate appealed. On appeal, the Appellees argue that the inmate’s Notice of Appeal was untimely. We conclude that the inmate’s Notice of Appeal was timely filed. In addition, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to rule on the inmate’s pending motion was harmless, as the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction to consider the petition by the inmate’s failure to verify the truth of the petition. Affirmed and remanded. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Allison N.A., et al
This is a termination of parental rights case regarding Allison N.A., David M.B., and Raven H.B. (“the Children”), the minor children of Rebecca A.B. (“Mother”) and Jerry W.E.B. (“Father”). Mother and Father are divorced and reside in different states. Mother and the Children resided in Tennessee in a home with Mother’s then-boyfriend, Troy R. (“Boyfriend”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the Children, then ages eight, four and three, respectively, from Mother’s care after Boyfriend was arrested for a physical assault against the youngest child. Relatives, with whom the Children were first placed, proved not to be able to care for them. DCS obtained custody and the Children entered foster care. Thereafter, they were adjudicated dependent and neglected. Father was located and he was notified of the Children’s situation. He did not seek custody. More than a year after the Children were placed in foster care, DCS filed a petition to terminate both parents’ rights. After a trial, the court granted the petition based on its finding that multiple grounds for termination exist as to both parents and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Both findings were said to be made by clear and convincing evidence. Mother and Father appeal. We affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Cecilia Gonzalez v. Mauricio Gonzalez
This case involves the propriety of the trial court’s dismissal of a Rule 60.02 Motion to Set Aside a Final Judgment. The trial court previously dismissed Mother’s Petition for Divorce, after finding that the marriage was void due to Mother’s preexisting marriage in Chile. Mother subsequently filed a Rule 60.02 Motion, with supporting documentation purporting to show that she was never legally married in Chile. The trial court refused to set a hearing and dismissed the Rule 60.02 Motion. We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing Mother’s Rule 60.02 Motion. Reversed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of John J. Goza v. James M. Wells, III, et al.
The trial court dismissed this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm and grant Appellees’ request for damages for a frivolous appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nicole Goeser, et al. v. Live Holdings Corporation, et al.
A patron at a sports bar shot and killed a man without threat or warning. The widow of the murdered man and his daughter filed separate lawsuits which were later consolidated, naming the owner of the bar as defendant, and claiming that the victim’s death was the result of inadequate security on the premises. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment contending that he did not violate any duty owed to the plaintiffs, because the shooting that occurred was completely unforeseeable under the circumstances. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Amelia M.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Amelia M., the minor child (“Child”) of James M. (“Father”) and Bethany L. (“Mother”). On September 14, 2011, Mother filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father, which was subsequently joined by Mother’s new husband, William H. (“Stepfather”). Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit her and willfully failing to provide financial support in the four months preceding the filing of the petition. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
Billy W. Huffman, et ux v. Whitney Nichole Huffman
This appeal arises from a dispute over grandparent visitation. Whitney Nichole Huffman Lewis (“Mother”) is the mother of the minor child Isaiah Huffman (“the 1 Child”). Billy W. Huffman and Lora D. Huffman (“the Grandparents,” collectively), father and stepmother of Mother, filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”) to establish visitation rights with the Child. The Child had visited often with the Grandparents, but Mother ended the visits after a falling out with Mr. Huffman. Following a trial, the Trial Court denied the Grandparents’ petition after finding there was no significant relationship between the Grandparents and the Child and that there was no risk of substantial harm to the Child. The Grandparents appeal to this Court. We find and hold that while the Grandparents and the Child did have a significant existing relationship, the Grandparents failed to prove that cessation of this relationship would pose a danger of substantial harm to the Child. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley King v. Wilson and Associates, PLLC, US Bank, Bank of America, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,Inc.
This appeal involves a self-represented litigant’s continued efforts to occupy property which is the subject of foreclosure proceedings. After dismissal of his second action regarding the property, the appellant files this appeal. We dismiss the appeal for failure to file a brief that complies with the appellate rules and conclude that this is a frivolous appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1-122. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Raleigh Court Condominiums, Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. E. Doyle Johnson Construction Co., et al
Homeowners’ association filed suit against general contractor because of drainage issues alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and breach of the implied warranty of “good and workmanlike” construction. The trial court found in favor of homeowners’ association. The general contractor appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sheila Dunlap v. Laurel Manor Health Care, Inc.
Sheila Dunlap (“plaintiff”) brought this action alleging liability for the wrongful death of her daughter (“deceased”) on the part of the nursing home operated by Laurel Manor Health Care, Inc. (“defendant”) where deceased was living. Although the allegations of the complaint were couched in terms of ordinary negligence, the trial court determined that the cause of action was one for medical malpractice. The court dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122, which requires the filing a certificate of good faith with a medical malpractice complaint. We hold that the plaintiff’s claims that the nursing home failed to properly administer medication and a medical device prescribed by a physician, and failed to monitor the medical condition of the deceased at all times prior to her death, sound in medical malpractice. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy L. Wilson v. Hank E. Sledge, Jr., et al.
The trial court dismissed this action for professional malpractice based upon the running of the statute of limitations. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kelly Weed v. First Acceptance Insurance Company of Tennessee
This appeal involves the interpretation of an exclusionary clause in an automobile casualty insurance policy. The policy excluded coverage for a loss resulting from an accident occurring while the vehicle was being driven by an unlisted driver who “is a regular or frequent operator of” an insured vehicle. Caleb Jenkins, who was not listed in the policy as a “driver,” was involved in an accident while driving the vehicle of Kelly Weed (“Insured”). Insured brought suit after First Acceptance Insurance Company of Tennessee, Inc., (“Insurer”) denied her claim. Insurer moved for summary judgment, alleging that Jenkins was a regular and frequent operator of Insured’s vehicle. Based on Insured’s statement that Jenkins was a “fairly regular” driver of her vehicle who had been driving it once or twice a week for six months, the trial court denied coverage and granted Insurer summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that the policy excluded coverage because Insured’s admission establishes that Jenkins was a “regular or frequent operator” of her vehicle. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
James M. Bowley, et al v. Richard Lane, et al
James M. Bowley and Barbara A. Bowley (“Plaintiffs”) sued Richard Lane, Alvin Butler, and Danny Nicholson (“Defendants”) alleging defective construction of a log home built by Defendants for Plaintiffs. After trial, the Trial Court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict finding and holding, inter alia, that Defendants had breached the implied warranty of habitability, and that Plaintiffs had sustained $50,000 in damages as a result of this breach. Defendants appeal to this Court raising an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in approving the verdict and denying their motion for new trial or for remittitur. Plaintiffs also raise an issue alleging that the evidence does not support the verdict. We find and hold that material evidence supports the jury’s verdict, and further find no error in the Trial Court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for new trial or for remittitur, and the Trial Court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial or for additur. We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Stacy Christina Knellinger v. Mark Steven Knellinger and Becki Knellinger
In this post-divorce action, Father filed two petitions asserting several counts of criminal contempt against Mother based on alleged violations of the Parenting Plan. Father also petitioned the court to modify the Parenting Plan to name him the primary residential parent and grant him sole decision-making authority over the children’s educations, non-emergency healthcare, and extracurricular activities. Mother then filed a petition seeking to permanently enjoin Father’s new wife (“Step-mother”) from participating in certain activities with the children, such as signing their school report cards, volunteering at the school, and sending home notes in their lunch boxes. After a three-day hearing, the trial court found Mother guilty on three counts of criminal contempt, and assessed a $150 fine (fifty dollars per count), which the court required her to pay toward counseling with Father. The trial court denied Father’s Petition to Modify the Parenting Plan, finding there was no material change of circumstances affecting the children’s interest, a finding which Father does not appeal. The trial court also denied Mother’s petition for a permanent injunction against Step-mother, finding it was unnecessary. Both parties were required to pay their own attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Mother’s request for a permanent restraining order against Step-mother. However, we have determined the trial court erred in finding Mother guilty of criminal contempt, and we reverse all three convictions. Finally, we find Mother is entitled to her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court in defense of Father’s Petition to Modify the Parenting Plan, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), and remand for a determination and award thereof. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Lasonya Morrow v. Ray Anthony McClain
A man and woman lived together for six years and worked jointly on a number of business ventures during that period, but never married. After their relationship ended, the woman filed a complaint for a division of property, under the theory that the parties had entered into an implied partnership. The trial court heard conflicting testimony as to the respective contributions of each party to the acquisition, improvement and preservation of the properties at issue. The court declined to find that a partnership had existed between the parties, but ruled that the woman had an interest in all the real property acquired during the relationship. The court awarded her one parcel which the parties owned as cotenants in common and an additional $50,000 based on the value of her interest in the other properties. The man argues on appeal that the trial court overestimated the woman’s contributions during the relevant period and underestimated his own contributions. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Wilma Ann Vance v. Donah Howard Arnold
The trial court dismissed Husband’s post-judgment motion based on its conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We reverse. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Fred Barnes v. Herbert Hamm
This appeal concerns the circuit court’s dismissal of an appeal from the general sessions court. We dismiss the appeal for failure to comply with Rule 29 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sandeep Gadhok v. Zameer Merchant
The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
