Kenneth E. King v. Anderson County, Tennessee
Kenneth E. King was arrested for driving on a revoked license. He was put in a cell with several violent criminals. At his arraignment, the court ordered him released. The person charged with processing the release delayed his release by simply doing nothing. While awaiting his release, Mr. King was assaulted by one of his cellmates. He sustained serious injuries, including partial loss of vision in one eye. He filed this action against Anderson County (“the County”). After a bench trial, the court found the County 55% at fault and King 45% at fault for provoking the assault. It determined that the total damages were $170,000 reduced to $93,500 to account for King’s comparative fault. The County appeals. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Martha R. Scent v. Chester Shoemaker, et al.
Martha Scent filed a declaratory judgment action against multiple defendants to establish her rights with respect to a deed of trust that granted her a lien on a tract of land. In addition, Scent sought to establish that “her” signature on a release of her deed of trust is a forgery. The trial court granted Scent partial summary judgment voiding and nullifying the release of her trust deed. The case proceeded to a bench trial with the focus on the priority of trust deeds as between Scent and the defendant Ellen W. Hood. Based upon the application of the doctrine of merger, the court ruled that Scent held the priority position. The court awarded judgment in her favor and Hood appeals. We affirm. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Joseph Warwick, Sr. v. Katherine Dodge Gribben Warwick, et al.
Edward Joseph Warwick, Sr. (“Husband”) sued his former spouse, Katherine Dodge Gribben Warwick (“Wife”); her attorney, David W. Noblit (“Counsel”); and Noblit’s law firm (collectively “Defendants”). Husband alleges that, since the time of the parties’ divorce, Wife and Counsel had conspired against him in an effort to destroy him and gain access to his separate funds. Husband claims the Defendants are guilty of fraud on the court, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a civil conspiracy, for which he seeks eight million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed Husband’s complaint. The court stated “that the[] causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations or that the complaint failed to state a claim, or both.” Husband appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Oak Ridge Land Company, LP., v. Richard H. Roberts, Commissioner Of Revenue For The State of Tennessee
The Department of Revenue conducted an audit on plaintiff's partnership, and as a result franchise and excise taxes of $317,659.72 plus interest of $59,525.59 were assessed against plaintiff. Plaintiff brought an action contesting the assessments, and since the Commissioner had relied on Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1320-6-1-.20 to make the assessment, the plaintiff charged the Rule was inconsistent with the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-2006. The Trial Judge held the regulation was in conflict with the code section to the extent that the Rule attempted to restrict the deduction for charitable contributions made to only the book basis, rather than the fair market value, and the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on that issue and an abatement in the assessment of $303,049. The Court also found that the plaintiff was in error in not including certain real property in calculating the net worth under the ruling of Crown Enterprises, Inc., v. Woods, and that the defendant was entitled to a judgment of additional tax in the amount of $14,610.72. Both parties appealed. On appeal, we reverse the Trial Court's Judgment regarding excise tax and we remand for a Judgment on the excise tax as assessed by the Commissioner. The Trial Court's Judgment regarding the franchise tax is affirmed. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Lura M. McBride v. Farragut Board of Zoning Appeals, et al.
This is an appeal from a judgment in a certiorari review action where the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The trial court found that a proposed construction project involving the petitioner’s property was not covered by the local zoning ordinance, and, therefore, the petitioner was not required to seek a variance from the local board of zoning appeals in order to obtain a building permit. The respondents appeal. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
U.S. Bank, N.A., as Servicer for the Tennessee Housing Development Agency v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
U.S. Bank, N.A. (“Bank”) had a mortgage on a residence which was insured against fire loss by Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”). When the owner of the residence failed to pay the mortgage, the Bank commenced foreclosure proceedings. Thereafter, the owner filed for bankruptcy which stayed the foreclosure proceedings. After the residence was destroyed in a fire, the Bank filed a claim to recover the insurance proceeds. Tennessee Farmers refused to pay the claim. As a result, the Bank filed suit against Tennessee Farmers alleging breach of contract, bad faith refusal to pay an insurance claim, and unfair or deceptive practices under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the Bank, concluding that the Bank's failure to give Tennessee Farmers notice of the foreclosure proceedings did not invalidate the insurance coverage. On appeal to this Court, we reversed, finding that the Bank’s commencement of foreclosure proceedings amounted to an increase in hazard under the policy and the Bank’s failure to provide notice precluded coverage. After granting the Bank’s application for permission to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this Court, and held that commencement of foreclosure proceedings did not constitute an increase in hazard under the terms of the insurance policy or the applicable statutory provisions, and therefore, the Bank was not required to give notice to Tennessee Farmers. U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 277 S.W.3d 381 (Tenn. 2009). Subsequently, on remand from the Supreme Court, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the Bank for the amount due on the mortgage plus accrued interest. The trial court further awarded the Bank attorney’s fees and costs based on its finding that Tennessee Farmers’ interpretation of the policy, that the Bank was required to provide them with notice of the commencement of foreclosure proceedings, amounted to bad faith and an unfair act or practice under the TCPA. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we reverse and remand. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Apollo Hair Systems of Nashville, Inc. v. Micromode Medical Limited et al.
Plaintiff, a retail business specializing in hair restoration and related services that leased “beauty equipment” from a third party lessor, filed this action against the manufacturer of the “beauty equipment” and the distributor of the products asserting claims for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff obtained a monetary judgment against the distributor, however, the trial court summarily dismissed all claims against the manufacturer. Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of its claims against the manufacturer. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Delwin L. Huggins, John P. Konvalinka et al. v. R. Ellsworth McKee, et al.
This appeal arises from a dispute over setoff claims related to a bankruptcy proceeding. Delwin Huggins (“Huggins”) sued R. Ellsworth McKee (“McKee”) and Alternative Fuels, LLC (“AF”) (McKee and AF as “the Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Huggins filed for bankruptcy. Konvalinka later purchased the claims asserted by Huggins in this lawsuit. The Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that, even if Konvalinka’s claim for damages was successful, McKee had an offset far in excess of these damages which rendered any further proceedings useless. The Trial Court agreed with the Defendants and dismissed the case. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Fork Union Medical Investors Limited Partnership; Goochland Medical Investors Limited Partnership; Life Care Centers of America, Inc. v. HR Acquisition of Virginia Limited Partnership; HRT Holdings, Inc.
This is a dispute over a claim for rent reimbursements in a lease agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the undisputed facts showed that a limitation of remedy provision in the lease relieved the defendant from any liability. We affirm the judgment of the court below. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Darla Bullock, as next of kin and sole surviving heir of Linda H. Lobertini v. University Health Systems, Inc.
This is an appeal in a medical malpractice case. The original plaintiff, the decedent, filed the initial malpractice action against the defendant, but the case was dismissed after the decedent passed away during the pendency of the suit. Her sole surviving heir re-filed the action without complying with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 122, which require a plaintiff who files a medical malpractice suit (1) to give a health care provider who is to be named in the suit notice of the claim sixty days before filing the suit, and (2) to file with the medical malpractice complaint a certificate of good faith confirming that the plaintiff has consulted with an expert who has provided a signed written statement that there is a good-faith basis to maintain the action. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, and the trial court dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
William H . Thomas, Jr. v. Tennessee Department of Transportation et al.
Petitioner challenges the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation denying his application for a billboard permit because his proposed location was within 1000 feet of another permit location. He contends the Department erroneously deviated from its regulation requiring permit applications for locations within 1000 feet of each other to be considered on a “first come first served” basis, insisting he submitted a “complete” application before the applicant who was granted a permit for the nearby location. The Chancery Court summarily dismissed the petition, finding it constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the Department’s decision to grant a permit to the other applicant. The court also found that the Department complied with its rules in issuing the permit to the other applicant and denying the petitioner’s application because petitioner’s location was less than 1000 feet away from the other applicant’s location. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI Limited Partnership, et al. v. Carl Mabry
Appellant takes exception to the trial court’s order, enforcing a settlement agreement. ollowing a judicial settlement conference, the parties signed a written agreement, which contemplated the execution of more formal settlement documents. When the formal documents were presented to Appellant, he refused to sign. Upon Appellees’ motion, the trial court enforced the settlement and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Federal National Mortgage Association v. Brett Stokes
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant, occupant of the property which had been foreclosed. Plaintiff held a deed of ownership. Plaintiff sued for possession and for damages for unlawful detainer of the property. The Trial Court granted plaintiff summary judgment for possession and damages for unlawful detainer pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-120. On appeal, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
James Lueking, et al., v. Cambridge Resources, Inc., et al.
In this case the Trial Court entered a "Final Judgment". The Judgment did not resolve defendant's Counter-Claim. On appeal, we hold we are without jurisdiction to consider the Appeal and dismiss the Appeal. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Advantage Personnel Consultants, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Commerce et al.
This matter involves a disagreement between an insurer and an insured over the proper classification of employees for the purpose of workers’ compensation insurance. The decision of the Department of Commerce and Insurance was in favor of the insurer. The insured appealed to the trial court, which affirmed the Department. We find that the decision of the Department of Commerce and Insurance is supported by substantial and material evidence and affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tamala Teague, as successor personal representative of the Estate of Lola Lee Duggan v. Garnette Kidd, et al.
This appeal involves a claim filed by the Administrator of Decedent’s estate to recover monetary assets that were misappropriated from Decedent prior to her death. Administrator alleged that the Kidds depleted Decedent’s monetary assets, thereby breaching a confidential relationship they held with her. The trial court agreed and issued a judgment against the Kidds with prejudgment interest. We affirm the judgment against Wife as modified but reverse the judgment against Husband. The case is remanded. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Stonebridge Life Insurance Company, Gwendolyn R. Williams v. Onzie O. Horne, III
This is an interpleader action resulting from competing claims to the proceeds of a life insurance policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Insured’s mother, finding that, because she was the only named beneficiary of the policy, she was entitled to the proceeds. Insured’s husband appeals, arguing that, because Insured’s mother was only named as a contingent beneficiary, the default provisions of the policy remained in effect, resulting in him being the primary beneficiary of the policy. Husband also appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his bad faith claim against the insurer. We affirm the dismissal of the bad faith claim, but conclude that the contract at issue is ambiguous and the issue in this case is not properly decided on summary judgment. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Hanson v. J.C. Hobbs Company, Inc.
This case arises out of the sale of a tractor. The plaintiff purchaser bought a tractor online from the defendant company, which specializes in the sale of tractors. The company advertised the tractor as having many fewer hours of use than it actually had. After taking possession of the tractor and learning the tractor’s true condition, the purchaser filed this lawsuit against the company, alleging breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, rescission, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the purchaser, and awarded compensatory damages and attorney fees. The company now appeals, arguing inter alia that the evidence does not support an award of compensatory damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We affirm. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dylan P.
The trial court determined that the minor children in this case were dependent and neglected upon finding that one of the children was the victim of severe child abuse. Mother appeals. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Maurice M. Acree, Jr., et al. v. Nancy Acree, et al.
In this action a Petition was filed and a conservator was appointed for Dr. Maurice M. Acree, |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Christopher A. D.
The mother brought a petition to modify support and for contempt, alleging that the father |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Margaret L. Swift
This appeal involves the interpretation of a will. The named residuary beneficiary predeceased the testatrix. The executrix of the decedent’s estate argued that a survivorship requirement in the will applies to the named residuary beneficiary, so her interest lapsed. The issue of the residuary beneficiary argued that the survivorship requirement did not apply to the residuary beneficiary, so Tennessee’s anti-lapse statute operates to pass the beneficiary’s interest to her issue. The trial court held for the executrix, construing the will so as to apply the survivorship requirement to the residuary beneficiary. We agree with the trial court’s interpretation of the will, and so affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Margaret L. Swift - Dissenting
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sherman Lane Pierce, et al. v. James H. Delashmitt, et al.
Sherman Lane Pierce and Cathryn Pierce (“the Pierces”) own real property in Meigs County, Tennessee. James H. Delashmitt and Minnie C. Delashmitt (“the Delashmitts”) own real property that adjoins the Pierces’ property. The Pierces sued the Delashmitts alleging, among other things, that the Delashmitts had trespassed upon the Pierces’ property and attempted to fence off a portion of the Pierces’ driveway. The Delashmitts answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim asserting that the Pierces had trespassed on the Delashmitt’s property. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the Pierces had adversely possessed a portion of the disputed property. The Pierces appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding and holding that the Pierces failed to prove adverse possession as to the entire disputed area. The Delashmitts raise an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding and holding that the Pierces adversely possessed any portion of the disputed property. We affirm. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
Anna Ruth Collins (Eisenberg) v. The Estate of Harvey L. Collins
This is an action to collect child support ordered in the parties’ 1965 divorce decree. The Trial Court held that the ten year statute of limitations contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3- 110(2) acted as a bar to this action and dismissed the case. Anna Ruth Collins (Eisenberg) appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
