Gerald Farrar v. Michael E. Dyer et al
Gerald Farrar (“the Claimant”) submitted a claim under his homeowner’s insurance policy after his house was badly damaged by fire. His insurer, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“the Company”) denied coverage and filed a declaratory judgment action. The Company alleged that the Claimant had made a misrepresentation on his application – one that increased the Company’s risk of loss. The Claimant filed a counterclaim in which he alleged that the Company’s agent, Michael E. Dyer (“the Agent”), misled him about the meaning of question 13 on the application, the answer to which contains the alleged misrepresentation. Following a bench trial, the court found in favor of the Company and dismissed the Claimant’s counterclaim predicated on the Claimant’s failure to carry the burden of proof. We affirmed the trial court’s judgment in Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farrar, 337 S.W.3d 829 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (“Farrar I”). The Claimant then filed this action against the Agent alleging that the Agent made a misrepresentation about the meaning of question 13 that caused him to give an incorrect answer on the application. The complaint also named the Company as a defendant “principal” responsible for the Agent’s actions. The trial court dismissed the case on summary judgment, holding that Farrar is a bar to this second action. The Claimant appeals. We affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
De Lano Parker v. Shelby County Government Civil Service Merit Board and The Shelby County Sheriff's Department
Appellee corrections officer’s employment with the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office was terminated for appearing in a video in which he stated that he had been a gang member. The Civil Service Merit Board affirmed the termination. The officer filed a petition for judicial review in the Shelby County Chancery Court, arguing that there was not substantial and material evidence to sustain his termination and that the termination violated his First Amendment rights. The trial court ruled that the Civil Service Merit Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence, but vacate and remand to the Civil Service Merit Board for consideration of Appellee’s First Amendment argument. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Christopher L. B.
Mother appeals the finding that termination of her parental rights to her son was in the son’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the termination of her rights. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dixie M. M.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights upon finding that four grounds for termination had been established – the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the provisions of the permanency plan, abandonment by willful failure to visit and support, and failure to establish parentage, and that termination of Father’s rights was in the child’s best interest. We have determined that three grounds for termination were established by the requisite proof and that termination of his rights is in the child’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Phillip A. Corbitt et al. v. Rolanda Amos
The sellers of real estate brought this action against the successful bidder at a real estate auction after the bidder failed to close because she was unable to obtain a loan sufficient to purchase the property. The sellers later auctioned the property for a substantially lower price. It is undisputed that the buyer breached the contract by not closing and that the sellers are entitled to recover certain special damages; the buyer challenges the trial court’s award of $55,300 for the seller’s general damages for their loss of the benefit of the bargain. We have determined the trial court’s decision is not supported by competent evidence in the record and that the sellers failed to prove the fair market value of the property on the date of the breach was less than the contract price. Therefore, we reverse the award of $55,300 for the loss of the benefit of the bargain. We, however, affirm the award of special damages, specifically the expense of conducting a second auction and sale, property taxes paid between the date of the breach and the second sale, and prejudgment interest, which shall be calculated based upon the judgment as modified. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Chas Alan Sandford v. Kristine Elaine Sandford McKee
Husband and Wife were married for eight years when Husband filed for divorce. Husband had purchased 63 acres of real property before marrying Wife and split the property into two parcels. When dividing the property between the parties, the trial court determined the house and ten acres was Husband’s separate property, but the appreciation on that parcel was marital property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B). The trial court determined the remaining 53 acres was Husband’s separate property and that Wife had no interest in that parcel. Wife appealed, claiming both parcels transmuted into marital property during the marriage. In the alternative, Wife argued that the increase in value of the other 53 acres was marital property due to work she performed on a guesthouse located on the 53-acre parcel. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Darion X. Y., Darius D. Y.
Father’s parental rights to his son were terminated on the ground that Father is confined in a correctional facility for more than ten years as a result of a criminal act and that the child was under the age of eight at the time of Father’s sentencing. Father contends that the trial court should have considered the possibility of his receiving parole in determining whether grounds for termination of his rights were present and whether termination was in the child’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Orlando Ladd v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board
Appellant, an inmate with the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his appeal for review of disciplinary actions taken against him by the prison, and affirmed by the TDOC Commissioner. The trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-9-102. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Allison Louise Battles v. Andrew Bruce Battles
This is an appeal of an alimony award. On appeal, Husband contends that the trial court |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Heather Junghanel v. Andres Hernandez
Andres Hernandez (“Father”) filed a petition seeking to terminate his child support obligation. The Trial Court held a hearing and entered an order on March 17, 2011 awarding a judgment against Father of $5,726.47 in child support arrearages but also providing for further hearing for a full review and calculation of arrearages. The case subsequently was heard before a Special Master who found that Heather Junghanel (“Mother”) was entitled to a judgment against Father of $21,976.27 in child support arrearages. Father appealed the Special Master’s report to the Trial Court. The Trial Court found that the March 17, 2011 order was a final order and awarded a judgment against Father of $5,726.47 in child support arrearages. The State of Tennessee ex rel. Mother appeals to this Court arguing that the Trial Court improperly retroactively modified Father’s child support obligation. We find and hold that the Trial Court erred in holding that the March 17, 2011 order was a final order. We vacate the Trial Court’s September 20, 2011 order and remand this case to the Trial Court for a hearing on Father’s objections to the Special Master’s report. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Little v. City of Chattanooga, Tennessee
This action involves requests made by the appellant pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 10-7-501, et seq. and 6-51-108(b), to the appellee city. After not receiving access to certain records to which she felt entitled, the appellant filed this petition. The trial court ruled that the city never refused to disclose the records but it just had not done much as of the time the petition was filed. However, because appellant did not prove that the city acted in bad faith as a result of its slowness in producing the public record requested the appellant was denied an award of attorney’s fees for the filing of the petition. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Gupton, et al. v. Gary A. Davis d/b/a Gary A. Davis & Associates, et al.
This appeal arises from what essentially is a fee dispute between lawyers. A Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) coal ash spill in 2008 damaged the farm of Sandra and Terry Gupton (“the Guptons”). The Guptons signed contingent fee agreements with Gary A. Davis (“Davis”), Stephen Crofford (“Crofford”), and Mary Parker (“Parker”) (“the Defendants,” collectively) to pursue their case. Rebecca Vernetti (“Vernetti”), a lawyer in Davis’s firm who worked on the Guptons’ case, left Davis’s law firm to start her own law firm. The Guptons fired Davis and hired Vernetti. The Guptons later reached an agreement with TVA to sell their farm to TVA, and Vernetti received her fee. The Guptons sued the Defendants in the Chancery Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”), seeking judgment to the effect that they need not pay any fees to the Defendants. The Defendants counterclaimed and also sued Vernetti, arguing that they should be paid as per their original agreement with the Guptons. The Trial Court declined to award the Defendants their original contingency fee, but instead granted a judgment to the Defendants against Vernetti and her law firm on a quantum meruit theory for their legal services to the Guptons. Vernetti appeals, and the Defendants raise additional issues. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Mark T. Wickham v. Sovereign Homes, LLC
Plaintiff homeowner brought an action against Defendant builder alleging, inter alia, breach of warranty and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant builder. We affirm summary judgment on Plaintiff’s breach of warranty claim; reverse summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Consumer Protection Act claim; and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Curb Records, Inc. v. Samuel T. McGraw
A recording company brought this breach of contract action against a recording artist. This appeal involves only the trial court’s decision to deny the recording company temporary and permanent injunctive relief. We find no error in the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Patrick Van Erps v. Heather Jackson
Mother of child appeals the trial court’s designation of Father as primary residential parent and adoption of a residential parenting schedule which gave the parents equal parenting time. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
David A. Paczko et al. v. Suntrust Mortgages, Inc. et al.
Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to enjoin the foreclosure of their residence and to quiet title. They also alleged slander of title and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court dismissed the action upon the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. We have determined that TCPA claims do not apply to allegedly deceptive conduct in foreclosure proceedings, thus the dismissal of the TCPA claim is affirmed. We have also determined that the plaintiffs never denied that they were in default of the Note and Deed of Trust and they admitted that, during the pendency of this action, the property was foreclosed upon and sold, thus they no longer have an interest in the property, which circumstances render the remaining claims moot. We, therefore, affirm the dismissal of this action. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter Of Justice A.F.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The father had a history of domestic violence toward the mother, and there was a protection order requiring the father to stay away from the mother’s older children. Nevertheless, the mother went to work and left the child at issue, a toddler, and her younger sibling in the care of the father. While the mother was at work, the father murdered the infant sibling. After that, the child at issue was found to be dependent and neglected and the mother was found to have committed severe abuse based on her failure to protect the child from the father. The mother did not appeal this ruling. Thereafter, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed this petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights, with grounds of severe abuse already established. After a trial, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights. The mother now appeals only the finding as to the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donta S. Smith v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al.
Inmate filed a petition for certiorari, seeking a review of a decision of the prison disciplinary review board, affirmed by warden and the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, finding him guilty of certain prison disciplinary offenses. The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding it was not filed within sixty days of the entry of the order for which review was sought. Finding no error, we affirm the action of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Chambers v. Gayle Ray, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Correction
An inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a petition for declaratory judgment alleging that the Department failed to credit him with 2,511 days of pretrial credits that were awarded him pursuant to a plea agreement. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly dismissed the petition based upon a finding that the material facts show Petitioner received all pretrial jail credits awarded and due Petitioner. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Melanie T., Bailey T., and Miles R.
Father, who was previously found to have committed severe abuse against his two children, appeals the finding that termination of his parental rights to his biological son was in the son’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the termination of his rights. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
George Woodson and Flora Woodson v. MEG Capital Management, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff was seriously injured during a dog attack by his neighbors’ two dogs. Plaintiff sued, among others, the neighbors’ landlord and an employee of the landlord. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, determining that although the defendants retained sufficient control over the leased property, they lacked notice or knowledge of the dogs’ vicious propensities. We find a question of fact exists regarding defendants’ notice or knowledge of the dogs’ vicious propensities. We affirm in part and reverse in part and we remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Pam Barnett v. Tennessee Orthopaedic Alliance et al.
This medical malpractice action, which had been pending for several years, was summarily |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Amanda Smith v. William R. Walker et al.
In this negligence action, the jury awarded the plaintiff a verdict against one of the two |
Moore | Court of Appeals | |
Club Chalet Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Kimberly Matthews
The defendant appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict holding her liable to her employer for her involvement in a co-worker’s misappropriation of funds. The jury found that the defendant’s involvement included (1) intentional misrepresentations, (2) concealment of facts relevant to the misappropriation, and (3) breach of contractual duties owed to the employer. The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict made at the conclusion of the proof. The motion was based upon the defendant’s assertion that the statute of limitations barred the claim. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
The University Corporation, A California Nonprofit Corporation v. Bruce Wring
This case involves an agreement between the Appellee, a nonprofit corporation, and the Appellant, a real estate agent, whereby the Appellant would acquire foreclosed properties, oversee all necessary repairs and renovations of the properties, and ultimately sell them for the benefit of the Appellee. The Appellee’s executive director was given the authority to act on its behalf in all dealings with the Appellant. As compensation, the Appellant received commissions on the purchase and sale of each property, and a percentage of the repair costs for his oversight of the repairs and renovations of each property. After operating pursuant to the oral agreement for over a year, the parties executed a written agreement for the same purpose. Throughout their relationship, the Appellant acquired approximately eighty-four (84) properties for the Appellee. Subsequently, after discovering that their records did not contain documentation of actual repair costs which the Appellant was required to submit under the written agreement, the Appellee filed a complaint for an accounting. The trial court appointed a Special Master to conduct an accounting. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Special Master filed a report in which he ordered that the Appellant be disgorged of all funds received by virtue of the agreements with the Appellee based on his failure to provide documentation of actual repair costs, and further suggested an award of attorney’s fees and costs in favor of the Appellee. Thereafter, the trial court entered a final order adopting and confirming the Special Master’s findings, and denied the Appellant’s objections to the Special Master’s report. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the Appellant was not required to submit documentation of actual repair costs on the properties acquired pursuant to the oral agreement. We further conclude that the course of conduct between the Appellant and the Appellee’s executive director modified the written agreement, such that the Appellant was not required to submit documentation of actual repair costs. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
