James Lewis Jackson v. John N. Jewell et al.
Wilson County appeals from the trial court’s denial of its Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion to set aside an agreed order of compromise and settlement based upon its contention that the agreement would violate a policy of the Wilson County Road Commission and that it “forgot” the policy when entering into the agreed order. The county also appeals from the trial court’s finding that it was in contempt of the agreed order and must comply with the order within six months, the trial court’s denial of its request to stay the judgment, and the trial court’s award of $750 in attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Betty C. Goff Cartwright v. Jackson Capital, et al.
This appeal involves various claims by a beneficiary of several trusts against his sister and her husband, who serve as the trustee and co-trustee of some of the trusts. The defendants/trustees filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming that they had followed the terms of the trusts and paid the beneficiary all distributions to which he was entitled pursuant to the trust documents. In response, the beneficiary asserted that the trust documents were void either because they were fabricated, or because he executed them due to undue influence. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, and the beneficiary voluntarily dismissed all of his remaining claims. The beneficiary appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Haun Scarbrough v. Gary Lynn Scarbrough
Wife appeals the trial court’s classification of property and its division of marital property following the parties’ divorce. She also argues that Husband failed to demonstrate his need for spousal support and that the award exceeds Husband’s actual need. We affirm the decision of the chancery court. We find it appropriate to award Husband his attorney fees incurred on appeal, and we remand to the trial court for a determination of such fees reasonably incurred. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Bellanti and Albert Bellanti v. City of Memphis
Plaintiff was severely injured when a padlock, which was allegedly thrown from a City of Memphis mower, broke through her vehicle window. Plaintiff and her husband successfully sued the City. On appeal, the City argues, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying its motion to amend its answer to assert the affirmative defense of the Public Duty Doctrine. Because the trial court’s order denying the City’s motion to amend fails to explain the basis for its denial, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court for entry of a reasoned explanation of its actions regarding the City’s motion to amend its answer. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donna F. Smith Thompson v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to continue and awarded summary judgment to Defendant Bank. We affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn A. Duke v. Harold W. Duke
In this divorce action, Father appeals certain provisions of the parenting plan, the award of rehabilitative alimony and award of counsel fees to Wife, and the finding that he was in criminal contempt. Mother appeals the valuation and division of marital assets, the failure of the court to require that payments to Mother be secured, rulings with reference to certain pre-trial matters, and the classification of alimony. We remand the case for further consideration of the amount of Father’s annual contributions into the children’s educational accounts; we affirm the judgment in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn A. Duke v. Harold W. Duke - Dissenting in Part
I disagree with the majority’s analysis of the requirements for rehabilitative alimony. All types of alimony are statutory, and the legislature’s definitions must be applied. The legislature has stated that it intends that an economically disadvantaged spouse be rehabilitated, through an award of rehabilitative alimony, whenever rehabilitation possible. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(2). |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dakota L.M.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services sought to terminate the parental rights of Brandon M. and Anthony T. to their minor child. The trial court terminated Brandon M.’s parental rights, finding that there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination based upon, abandonment, substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans, and persistence of conditions and that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Brandon M. appeals the court’s best interest determination. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re The Matter of Cheetah Lounge, Inc., dba "The Cheetah Lounge" et al. v. Sarasota County
After a subpoena duces tecum was served on Chattanooga attorney Scott D. Bergthold (“the Attorney”) requiring him to appear for a deposition in Hamilton County and to produce documents regarding ordinances enacted by Sarasota County, Florida (“the County”)pertaining to “adult businesses,” he filed this action as a motion for a protective order pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-9-201, et seq. (Supp. 2011). The Attorney asserted, on behalf of himself and the County, that the information sought was protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine and that the discovery was overly broad and unduly burdensome. The trial court granted the protective order and quashed the subpoena. The subpoena had been issued and served at the request of Cheetah Lounge, Inc., dba “The Cheetah Lounge” and Sarasota Eateries, LLC (“the Adult Clubs”) as a part of their discovery in a Florida case wherein they challenged the constitutionality of the subject ordinances. The Adult Clubs appeal. While this matter was pending oral argument before us, the County filed motions asking that this Court consider dual facts, i.e., (1) that, following the entry of the trial court’s judgment, the Florida court dismissed the underlying case and (2) that court later denied the Adult Clubs’ motion to rehear. We directed the parties to brief the issue of whether this ancillary matter is rendered moot by the dismissal of the underlying action. We now hold that this case is moot. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Harriet Tubman Development/CHA v. Reginald Locklin
The Chattanooga Housing Authority (“CHA”) evicted its tenant, Reginald Locklin (“the Tenant”), after two of his sons were involved in an incident with neighbors. The eviction was accomplished by order of the trial court giving CHA possession of the property. The Tenant appeals arguing that CHA, which is a public housing authority (“PHA”), made the decision to evict him and his family arbitrarily and without due process. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ethin E.S., et al.
Donna J.S. (“Mother”) appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her minor children, Ethin E.S. and Mary J.C. (collectively “the Children”). The younger child, Ethin, was born drug-exposed and required intensive care for treatment of his withdrawal symptoms. As a result, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) became involved. In the weeks after Ethin’s birth, a protective order was entered and DCS took temporary custody of the Children. Following a two-day bench trial, the court found that there are multiple grounds for terminating Mother’s rights and that termination is in the best interest of the Children, both findings by the court said to be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Mother challenges both of these determinations and, in addition, contends that DCS failed to provide reasonable efforts to assist her toward reunification with the Children. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Janice Riddle v. Keith Carlton
Former client filed a pro se complaint for legal malpractice against her former attorney. She had previously filed a complaint against the attorney with the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, and that matter had been resolved in the attorney’s favor nearly two years before she filed the malpractice complaint. The trial court dismissed the complaint for malpractice, finding it barred by the one-year statute of limitations for such claims. The former client appealed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
JRM Investments, Inc. v. National Standard, LLC
The circuit court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Barna v. Preston Law Group, P.C. et al.
Plaintiff appeals from the summary dismissal of his legal malpractice claim against his former attorney who represented him during an arbitration of a securities dispute. Finding that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendants negated an essential element of Plaintiff’s claim, causation, we affirm the summary dismissal of the action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Douglas Stogner v. Roseann Stogner (Sullivan)
In this post-divorce proceeding, Mother appeals the trial court’s order enjoining the parties from allowing their child to be in the presence of a friend of Mother’s. Father appeals the trial court’s calculation of the number of days he exercises parenting time for purposes of determining his child support. Finding that the court erred in its calculation of the number of days of Father’s parenting time, we vacate the award of child support and remand for a redetermination. We affirm the trial court’s issuance of the injunction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rozbeh Zaire v. Amir Roshan-Far
This appeal arises out of a lawsuit in which plaintiff sought recovery on claims of fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation with respect to the purchase of real property; the trial court awarded judgment to plaintiff only on the claim for negligent misrepresentation only. Both parties appeal. We affirm the judgement in all respects |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Caroline Tippens-Florea v. Johnathan Matthew Florea
Following a short marriage, the parties were divorced. The issues raised in this appeal by the husband pertain to the marital classification and valuation of the husband’s gun collection, the award of one year of transitional alimony to the wife, and the award of $15,000 for the wife’s attorney’s fees. For her part, the wife contends the husband has not paid the judgment for her portion of the marital estate, $8,065.94, and that she is entitled to post-judgment interest. We find no error with the valuation of the marital estate or the award of transitional alimony and attorney’s fees and, thus, affirm the trial court. As for the wife’s claim for postjudgment interest on any portion of the marital estate which the husband has not paid, it is an issue for the trial court to determine whether the husband has failed to timely pay any portion of the judgment and, if so, to award post-judgment interest pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 47-14-121 & -122. The wife also seeks to recover attorney’s fees she incurred on appeal. We find she is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ted A. Puckett v. Ray Lyons
This is an appeal from an order entered by the Circuit Court for Bedford County denying the appellant leave to proceed in that court on a pauper’s oath. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Consumer Advocate & Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney General of Tennessee v. Tennessee Regulatory Authority
This is an appeal from an order of the Tennessee RegulatoryAuthority(“TRA”). The appeal was filed by the Consumer Advocate and Protection Division of the Office of Tennessee’s Attorney General. It challenges the TRA’s authority to allow a gas company to recover attorney fees that were incurred in a proceeding before the TRA that did not involve ratemaking, and the TRA’s authority to order that the attorney fees be recovered from asset management funds. We conclude that the TRA has the authority to order that such litigation fees be recovered as any other reasonable and prudent operating expense of the utility, and that the TRA acted within its authority in ordering that the fees be paid out of asset management funds. The TRA’s decision, therefore, is affirmed. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Franklyn Nathaniel Morgan v. Kandi Tonyelle Morgan
Franklyn Nathaniel Morgan (“Father”) filed this divorce action after his spouse, Kandi Tonyelle Morgan (“Mother”), was hospitalized because she had ingested an overdose of medication. Father was given temporary custody of the parties’ daughter who was four years old when the parties separated. Mother then obtained temporary custody based on proof that the Father allowed the marital residence to become filthy and dangerous. After a hearing, the court entered a temporary parenting plan based on “week-about” parenting. After a trial, the court made Mother the primary residential parent during the school year and Father the primary residential parent during the summer. The court also awarded Father parenting time during the spring break and two-thirds of the Christmas break. The court further ordered that Father would pick up the child after school and exercise parenting time from then until he went to work at 6:00 p.m. on his workdays, or until 7:00 p.m., when Mother got off from work on her workdays. Mother had 252 parenting days and Father had 113. The court set Father’s child support according to the Child Support Guidelines (“the Guidelines”), but allowed Father a downward deviation of $30 per month based on the extra parenting time after school, which the court found was not taken into account by the Guidelines. Mother appeals. We modify the judgment to designate Mother the sole primary residential parent. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth E. Diggs v. LaSalle National Bank Association, et al.
This is an appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court found that the Appellant’s claim sounded in fraud. However, the trial court ruled that the Appellant failed to plead fraud with particularity and dismissed. Affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Emily N.I., et. al.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Teresa O. and Harrison O. Teresa O. was the mother of three children, while Harrison O. was the father of two of those children. The trial court terminated Teresa O.'s parental rights to all three children and terminated Harrison O.'s parental rights to his two children. Teresa O. and Harrions O. appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Al H. Thomas, on Behalf of Himself and the Citizens and Taxpayers of the City of Memphis v. Joseph Lee, III, Robert L. J. Spence, Jr., and Halbert E. Dockins, Jr.
This appeal involves a lawsuit by a taxpayer. The taxpayer filed this action on behalf of the citizens of the municipality to prevent a disputed disbursement of funds, naming as defendants the municipality, the municipality’s utility district, and three private citizens. By the time the initial hearing in this matter took place, the only defendants who remained in the suit were the three private citizens. Finding that the taxpayer lacked standing to pursue this action, the trial court dismissed the case. The taxpayer then filed a motion to alter or amend, seeking to continue to pursue the lawsuit, pursuant to Bennett v. Stutts, 521 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn. 1975). The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend. The taxpayer appeals. We affirm, finding the exception in Bennett v. Stutts inapplicable. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Janice Lacroix, et al. v. L.W. Matteson, Inc., et al.
Deceased, a resident of Iowa, an employee of plaintiff, delivered materials to the State of Tennessee, and while the materials were being unloaded sustained injuries which resulted in his death, which arose out of the course and scope of his employment. His widow could claim benefits either under the Iowa worker's compensation laws or the State of Tennessee worker's compensation laws, which contain essentially similar provisions. The widow claimed benefits under the Iowa worker's compensation law, and the employer under both laws was entitled to seek subrogation recovery for benefits paid from the alleged third party tort feasors. The State of Iowa would not have jurisdiction over some of the alleged tort feasors, and the employer brought his subrogation action in the State of Tennessee under the Tennessee worker's compensation statutes. Defendants moved for summary judgment and the Trial Court concluded that since the claimant elected to sue under the Iowa worker's compensation statutory scheme, that the employer could not rely on the Tennessee worker's compensation statutes to maintain its action in Tennessee, and dismissed plaintiffs' action. On appeal, we hold that the employer was entitled to employ the Tennessee worker's compensation statute in an effort to recover subrogation benefits against the third party tort feasors. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Ronnie Summey v. Monroe County Department of Education, et al.
This appeal arises from an employment dispute between Ronnie Summey (“Summey”) and the Monroe County Board of Education (“the Board”). Summey worked as head football coach and as a teacher at Sequoyah High School (“Sequoyah”) in Monroe County. Summey sued the Board in the Chancery Court for Monroe County (“the Trial Court”), alleging, among other things, breach of contract and violation of various constitutional rights stemming from when Summey was relieved as head coach and offered a new assignment in the school system. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the Board, finding that it was Summey who had breached the contract when he refused to accept the new assignment. Summey appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals |
