Shandra Kay Hattaway v. Kevin Todd Hattaway
In this divorce appeal, Husband challenges the trial court’s division of marital property, alimony award, permanent parenting plan, award of discretionary costs, and award of attorney fees to Wife. We have determined that the trial court erred in requiring Husband to pay more rehabilitative alimony than he can afford, in awarding him only 28 days a year in parenting time, and in awarding discretionary costs for expert fees for case preparation. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
James H. Harris, III v. Edward K. White, III
This is a dispute between two attorneys. Attorney 1 hired attorney 2 to represent him. Attorney 2 sued attorney 1 for attorney fees, and attorney 1 counterclaimed for legal malpractice. The trial court granted attorney 2 summary judgment on the attorney fee claim, and a jury found in favor of attorney 2 on the legal malpractice claim. On appeal, attorney 1 challenges both decisions on multiple grounds. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of George H. Steil, II
The only issue in this case is whether a divorced wife was entitled to continue to receive alimony after the untimely death of her former husband. The wife argued that the support award was in the nature of alimony in solido, which is for a fixed total amount that does not abate upon the death of the obligor. She relies upon an Agreed Interim Order that provided that the husband would pay the wife “spousal support in the amount of $500 per month for a period of three years. . . .” The executrix of her former husband’s estate contended that the terms of the Agreed Interim Order were irrelevant, because the order was superseded by the Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA), which was incorporated into the final decree of divorce. The MDA included the $500 per month alimony provision, but provided that the husband’s alimony obligation would end if the wife remarried, and it did not mention the three year period or any other time limitation. The executrix accordingly argued that the MDA award was in the nature of alimony in futuro, which abates upon the death of the obligor by operation of law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(1). The trial court found that the omission of the three year period from the MDA was an inadvertent oversight, that the parties intended the alimony award to be in solido, and that the wife was accordingly entitled to receive support from her former husband’s estate. We reverse, because the MDA establishes the award and provided for alimony in futuro. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Claudine Holland v. Robert Shields Holland
This appeal involves the “spousal impoverishment” provision of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. Mary Claudine Holland and Robert Shields Holland were married in 1967. Robert Shields Holland was placed in a nursing home for health-related problems in 2009. Mary Claudine Holland filed a complaint for separate maintenance in which she sought division of the marital assets and income. The trial court granted her request and filed an order reflecting its decision. The Tennessee Department of Human Services filed a motion to intervene and to set aside the order. The trial court denied the motions. The Tennessee Department of Human Services appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instruction to the court to reconsider the complaint for separate maintenance with the Tennessee Department of Human Services present as an intervening party. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
Beth Proffitt v. Smoky Mountain Woodcarvers Supply, Inc., et al.
This appeal arises from the termination of Beth Proffitt (“Plaintiff”) from employment at Smoky Mountain Woodcarvers Supply, Inc. (“the Corporation”). Plaintiff, a minority shareholder in the Corporation, sued the Corporation, as well as the other shareholders Mac Proffitt and Ray Proffitt (collectively, “the Defendants”) in the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court bifurcated the issues of liability and damages. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to her. After a trial on the matter of liability, the Trial Court found the Defendants liable for breach of fiduciary duty. After the hearing on damages, the Trial Court awarded damages to Plaintiff, including lost salary and bonus. The Trial Court also awarded Plaintiff her attorney’s fees. The Defendants appeal. We find that the Trial Court did not err in finding that the Defendants did breach their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. We, however, reverse the award of attorney’s fees to Plaintiff. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Joshua E.R., Jr.
The trial court terminated parents’ parental rights on the grounds of severe child abuse. We affirm. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
John Leslie Byrnes v. Joyce Marie Byrnes
The parties, John Leslie Byrnes (“Husband”) and Joyce Marie Byrnes (“Wife”), were divorced in 1998. Under the divorce judgment, they were to have equal parenting time with their two minor children. Some six years later, in 2004, Husband filed a petition to change the custody arrangement. The petition was granted ex parte on an “emergency” basis. The ex parte order temporarily placed sole custody of the children with Husband and required Mother to pay monthly child support of $652. For reasons that Wife blames on Husband and the trial court, and Husband blames on Wife, a hearing was not held on the custody and support issues until 2009, more than five years after Husband was named the sole custodian. Eventually, the court entered an order, to which Wife agreed, decreeing that Wife was liable to Husband for a child support arrearage of $20,874.24, a figure that includes interest and Wife’s share of medical expenses. In the same order, the court decreed that Husband was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees in an amount to be determined at a future hearing. That hearing was later scheduled for a date certain. Wife’s counsel did not appear at the hearing on attorney’s fees and the court proceeded, in counsel’s absence, to hold Wife liable for fees of $30,315. Wife filed a motion to set aside the award of attorney’s fees which the court denied. She appeals, challenging the child support arrearage and the denial of her motion to set aside the award of attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Branch Banking & Trust Company v. Townsend, LLC and E. William Henry
This Court issued a Show Cause Order on April 19, 2012 directing appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
The Peoples Bank v. Raymond E. Lacy
Plaintiff Bank brought this action to enforce a Loan Modification Agreement and promissory note. The Bank alleged that defendant had breached the Agreement and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant answered, arguing that the Bank had breached its contract with him and was not entitled to judgment. The Bank moved for summary judgment and the Trial Court determined there was no disputed issue of material fact under the Loan Modification Agreement and the amount owed on the note, granted partial summary judgment to the Bank and ruled the partial summary judgment was final pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 54.02. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's Judgment and remand for trial on defendant's Counter-Claim. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jean Ann Fiorazo Beck v. James Martin Beck
This is a post-divorce action, concerning the Appellant Husband’s obligation to pay alimony in futuro to Appellee Wife. Husband and Wife entered into a marital dissolution agreement “MDA”), which was incorporated and made part of the final decree of divorce. The MDA provided that both parties would exchange tax returns each year and that, if these returns were not proferred, then alimony would be suspended until they were. Wife provided her tax returns after redacting her personal information. Husband concluded that the redaction was breach of contract and, without prior court approval, unilaterally stopped making alimony payments. Because the MDA provision for alimony in futuro lost its contractual nature upon being incorporated into the trial court’s order, and because Husband failed to obtain court approval before he suspended payments, we conclude that he lacked authority to stop those payments. Therefore, the award of arrears was proper. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mahmoud Awad Mohammad v. Nairman Faraj Meri
This post-divorce appeal concerns a one-time, one-week extension of parenting time. The trial court granted the mother’s petition to extend her parenting time from one week to two weeks for a vacation with her family. After the mother’s vacation was over, the father filed his appeal. We dismiss the appeal on grounds of mootness. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Jean Langford v. James Harvey Harrison, Jr., et al.
Following appellant’s petition to eject from real property, appellees counterclaimed seeking a declaration of the boundaries between their properties and those of appellant, sole possession of their properties, a permanent injunction against appellant, and damages for libel or slander of title. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of appellees and find this appeal to be frivolous. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Carlton J. Ditto v. Shapiro and Kirsch, LLP, et al.
In this action, a Show Cause Order was issued by the Court on April 13, 2012, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant responded to the Show Cause and acknowledged that the Notice of Appeal was filed late. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis Allen, et al. v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, et al.
Plaintiffs attempted to challenge annexation Ordinance 4321 via a complaint for declaratory judgment based upon alleged violations of the Open Meetings Act. Summary judgment was granted to the City of Memphis, but this Court reversed the grant and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, a trial was held and judgment entered in favor of the City. Because Plaintiffs failed to file a timely quo warranto action, which was the proper vehicle for Plaintiffs’ challenge, we dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against the City and thus, we affirm the trial court’s upholding of Ordinance 4321. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Dale, single, Brian Lawhorn and wife, Pamela Lawhorn; and William Jenkins and wife, Elaine Jenkins v. B & J Enterprises, et al.
Homeowners filed this lawsuit against various individuals and entities shortly after purchasing their homes, when they discovered that their properties are affected by numerous sink holes. Original defendants identified a surveyor as a comparative tortfeasor, and the homeowners amended their complaint to add the surveyor as a defendant. The surveyor filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the homeowners’ claims were barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-114, which provides that all actions to recover damages against any person engaged in the practice of surveying for any deficiency, defect, omission, error or miscalculation shall be brought within four years from the date the survey is recorded on the plat, or else be forever barred. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs were subsequently granted permission by the trial court and this Court to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Finding that section 28-3-114 governs the homeowners’ claims, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley Herman v. Daniel Herman
Two years after the divorce, Father sought to be named primary residential parent due to Mother’s alleged deteriorating mental health. Father sought discovery of Mother’s mental health records. Mother objected. The trial court ordered production of the records for in camera inspection. Mother filed an appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10, which this court granted. We reverse the trial court’s order. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Lee Coleman v. Andrea Gibson Coleman
In this divorce action the parties engaged in mediation and resolved several issues in the case. The Trial Court entered a Divorce Decree without conducting an evidentiary hearing on the disputed issues remaining. The father appealed to this Court. We affirm that part of the |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kyler R.C.H., et al.
In this case for parental termination, the Trial Court found statutory grounds for terminating the parents' parental rights to their three minor children. Only the father has appealed, and we hold that the evidence preponderates in favor of the Trial Court's finding for grounds of abandonment, as well as termination of parental rights being in the best interest of the children. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Tommy Hinton and wife, Jean Marie Hinton v. Jerry L.Edmonds and wife, Susan D. Edmonds
Adjoining property owners dispute the validity of an Agreement which placed restrictions upon a roadway across one property which provided access to the other property. The trial court, after making specific factual findings, found the Agreement invalid and non-binding upon the parties. We affirm the trial court’s factual findings as well as its ultimate determination of invalidity. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Ann Barrett Goodman v. Jeffery Wayne Goodman
This divorce case deals primarily with child support. The parties entered into a consent order n the amount of child support to be paid. Father subsequently lost his job and sought modification of his obligation. The divorce referee modified the support based on Father’s alleged earning capacity rather than on his actual income. Father appealed the ruling of the referee, but did not file a transcript of the hearing with the trial court. The trial court entered a final decree of divorce, finding all property to be marital, affirming the ruling of the referee, setting permanent child support based on Father’s alleged earning capacity, and awarding attorney fees to Mother. We reverse the judgment setting child support based on Father’s earning capacity and remand for a determination of Father’s child support based on his actual income. Additionally, we vacate the judgment of the trial court awarding Mother $35,000.00 in attorney fees, award Mother $7,675.00 in attorney fees and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the remaining portion of the attorney fees in light of this opinion. This case is affirmed in all other respects. Reversed in part, vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Christina K. Deweese Richmond v. Gregory Alan Richmond
Christina K. Deweese Richmond (“Wife”) and Gregory Alan Richmond (“Husband”) were divorced in June of 1999. In March of 2011, Wife filed a motion to clarify the parties’ Final Decree of Divorce. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered its order holding, inter alia, that Wife was awarded 42.5% of Husband’s disposable military retired pay. The Trial Court also ordered that Husband shall pay to Wife her share of his military retirement accruing from August 2010 through June 2011 in the amount of $4,915.90 less federal taxes. Husband appeals raising issues regarding whether Husband should be entitled to the protection of the unclean hands doctrine and whether Wife waived her rights to past payments of Husband’s military retirement. We find neither unclean hands nor waiver, and we affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI Limited Partnership, et al. v. Bluff City Community Development Corporation, et al.
This is an appeal from the grant of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss in favor of Appellees, an attorney, her professional limited liability company (“PLLC”), a title company, and a law firm. As to the law firm, the trial court found that the causes of action, if any, sounded in legal malpractice and were barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations found at Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-104(a)(2). As to the attorney, the PLLC, and the title company, the trial court found that any causes of action alleged against these Appellees sounded in tort and were claims for unliquidated damages; thus the court held that it lacked jurisdiction under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 16-11-102. After reviewing the Complaint, we conclude that: (1) the trial court did not apply the discovery rule in reaching its conclusion that Appellants’ claims that sound in legal malpractice are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) applying the discovery rule, there is nothing in the pleadings from which to infer that the Appellants’ knowledge of breach or misappropriation on the part of the general partner also means that Appellants knew, or should have known, about any wrongdoing on the part of the law firm, the PLLC, and the attorney; (3) therefore, any claims sounding in legal malpractice, against the law firm, the attorney, and her PLLC, survive the motion to dismiss; however, because there was no attorney-client relationship between the Appellants and the title company, claims for legal malpractice cannot lie against the title company; (4) many of the claims against the law firm, the PLLC, and the title company that sound in tort are not sufficiently pled under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8.01 or, where they sound in fraud, are not pled with particularity as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 9.02; these claims were properly dismissed with the following exceptions: (a) the Complaint does sufficiently plead a cause of action for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty against the title company, the law firm, the attorney, and her PLLC; to the extent that the alleged aiding and abetting was the result of a plan or design by the Appellees, conspiracy may also lie for that tort; (b) the Complaint does sufficiently plead causes of action for misappropriation or conversion and conspiracy against the Appellee attorney, individually, but not against the law firm, the title company, or the PLLC (due to lack of particularity in the pleadings as to these Appellees); (5) because the amounts of the alleged misappropriations are known, the damages sought are not all unliquidated; therefore, the chancery court has jurisdiction. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brandi Nicole Sosebee v. John Charles Sosebee, Jr.
In March of 2011, John Charles Sosebee, Jr. (“Husband”) was found guilty of 69 counts of criminal contempt for violating an order of protection in favor of Brandi Nicole Sosebee (“Wife”). Husband was sentenced to 10 days in jail for each violation, for a total of 690 days. Husband appeals raising several issues including whether he received proper notice that Wife was seeking criminal contempt. We find and hold that Husband did not receive proper notice that criminal contempt was being pursued and should not have been convicted and sentenced accordingly. We, however, hold that the record on appeal supports a finding that Husband violated the order of protection on 69 occasions. We, therefore, modify the judgment to reflect that Husband committed civil contempt, and remand to the Trial Court with direction to set a purge amount and proceed accordingly. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Wilson Reynolds v. Lee Roy Roberson
This appeal involves a contract dispute over the purchase of more than 100 acres of rustic property adjacent to the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Wilson Reynolds offered to purchase the property from Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. for 3 million dollars. The parties formed a contract evidencing their agreement. Following the closing date, Wilson Reynolds filed suit, alleging breach of contract. The trial court ruled that Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. breached the contract and awarded Wilson Reynolds $600,000 in damages plus interest, attorney fees, and other costs. Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. appeals. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Sheila Shults, et al. v. Johnny Richard Talley
A show cause order was entered in this case on April 13, 2012, directing the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant has responded to the show cause order, but the argument presented in the response does not appear to present good cause for maintaining this case in this court. The review of the record reveals that the order to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals |
