E. Jay Mounger et al v. Charles D. Mounger, Jr. et al
The plaintiffs, in their capacity as executors of their mother’s estate, filed this action against their brother alleging that he caused the estate to lose the sale of a valuable piece of lakefront property by maliciously asserting a meritless claim to a portion of the property. The defendant represented himself in a jury trial. The jury awarded the estate $6,000,000. The defendant appeals the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Rose Baker v. Jeffrey D. Baker - Concur
We have determined that we have no means of reaching the issue of the validity of the Agreed Order itself. I believe that the appropriate procedure to challenge the agreement at this point in time is by petition for post-conviction relief, which Mother is pursuing. Nonetheless, we are troubled by the procedure used herein that resulted in an original punishment of six months incarceration for Mother. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Rose Baker v. Jeffrey D. Baker
In this post-divorce dispute, the mother of the parties’ children appeals from an August 2010 order wherein the trial court revoked her probation for eighteen counts of criminal contempt and imposed the maximum sentence of 180 days. Pursuant to an April 2010 Agreed Order, Mother pled guilty to eighteen counts of criminal contempt and was sentenced to 180 days in jail; however, the entire sentence was suspended and she was placed on probation subject to revocation should she fail to comply with a plethora of conditions of probation. In July 2010, Father filed a Petition to revoke Mother’s probation. Following a hearing, the trial court found Mother in violation of her probation and ordered her to serve 180 days in jail. Mother appealed alleging that the Agreed Guilty Plea Order is void because the trial judge failed to conducta hearing before accepting the guiltyplea as required byBoykin v.Alabama, 395 U.S. 239 (1969) and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b). This is not a direct appeal of the Agreed Guilty Plea Order, but a collateral attack of that order and, although this modest record suggests that the trial court may not have engaged Mother with the in-person colloquy required by Boykin and Rule 11(b), the record fails to establish that important fact. Thus, the Agreed Guilty Plea Order is not void on its face. However, the August order, specificallythe reasonableness of the sentence of 180 daysin confinementforviolating terms of probation, is on direct appeal. Considering the unique facts of this case, we find an effective sentence of 180 days is clearly excessive in relation to Mother’s acts and omissions while on probation and modify the sentence to provide for a total period of confinement of thirty (30) days. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Cole Bryan Howell, III, et al v. Cheryl Ryerkerk, et al
The issue appealed in this case is the failure of the trial court to grant a continuance requested by the Appellant. After two prior continuances were granted, the Appellant again moved for a continuance, supporting the request with documentation indicating that the Appellant was undergoing diagnostic testing the day before the scheduled trial date. The trial court denied the continuance. When the Appellant failed to proceed with the trial the following day, the trial court dismissed for failure to prosecute. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Glenn Davis, et al v. Charles Bowers, et al
Glenn Davis and Lisa Davis (“Plaintiffs”) sued Charles Bowers and Wilda Bowers (“Defendants”) and Greene County, Tennessee (“Greene County”) seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment with regard to whether a passageway of approximately 198 feet in length on the north end of Duncan Lane was a private driveway or a public road. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that the 198 foot section was not part of the public road. Defendants appeal raising issues regarding the purported dedication of the 198 feet, and the admission of evidence at trial. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah C. Jannerbo v. E. Mattias Jannerbo
This appeal arises from the divorce of Sarah C. Jannerbo (“Wife”) and E. Mattias Jannerbo(“Husband”). Wife sued Husband for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce. Following a trial, the Trial Court, inter alia, divided the marital estate and awarded Wife periodic alimony. Husband appeals, arguing that the Trial Court erred in awarding both the type and amount of alimony that it did. Husband also argues that the Trial Court erred in its classification and division |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Charles B. Chappelle et al. v. Edward Lee Burch et al.
Plaintiffs appeal from trial court’s finding that their neighbors, the defendants, were not in violation of an Agreed Order, which stated that the neighbors’ land could be used only for residential purposes or for commercial use as a stable and for pasturing of horses, but for no other purpose. Plaintiffs contend that horse shows conducted on the property violated the terms of the Agreed Order. The trial court found that horse shows were an aspect of the commercial stabling business in Sequatchie County and, therefore, did not violate the terms of the Agreed Order. We affirm. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Brandon Adams v. Morgan County Correctional Complex, et al
Petitioner, who is incarcerated, was charged with possession of a cell phone and pled guilty. He filed a Writ of Certiorari after punishment was levied against him, contending that he understood his punishment would be five days of punitive segregation and a $5 fine, but the punishment meted out was suspension of visitation privileges for six months. The Trial Judge upheld the suspension and dismissed the Petition, finding that petitioner pled guilty and waived his right to appeal, and the writ was filed after the sixty day time frame had elapsed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen William Newsome et al. v. Kevin Darrell Porter
The issue in this appeal of a parental termination proceeding is whether the trial court erred in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the minor child. We agree with the father that the trial court was required by Rule 13 of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules to appoint a guardian ad litem. Because the court failed to do so, the trial court’s decision must be vacated. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Morgan Phillips v. Stephanie J. Rountree
In this divorce appeal, Husband challenges the trial court’s classification and division of the marital property and debts and its order requiring him to provide wife with his residential address. We find no error in the division of the marital estate, but agree that the trial court acted prematurely by including in the divorce decree a requirementthathusband provide wife with his residential address. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Clarence Andrew Elcan v. Amanda Hart Elcan
In this post-divorce dispute, the trial court granted father’s petition to modify the parenting plan and denied mother’s subsequent petition to modify the parenting plan. We affirm the trial court’s decisions. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Brandon Adams v. Morgan County Correctional Complex, et al. - Dissenting
I cannot concur in the majority opinion. The petitioner alleges that he entered his guilty plea and signed the waiver of right of appeal as a part of an agreement with prison officials that his punishment would be five days of punitive segregation and a five dollar fine. He alleges that, instead of the promised punishment, his visitation privileges were suspended for six months. It seems to me that, if he can prove all of this, his plea and waiver of right of appeal would be rendered invalid. If this be the case, his right to appeal would remain intact. I also believe his petition filed July 13, 2010, was timely as I believe the time for filing did not begin to run until Commissioner Ray’s May 20, 2010, decision. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Anne Osesk v. Michael W. Osesek
Husband filed a petition to terminate or modify the amount of alimony in futuro he was obligated to pay, asserting that a post-divorce decrease in his income as well as the fact that Wife secured employment after the divorce constituted substantial and material changes in their circumstances which warranted the elimination of or a reduction in the amount of alimony. The trial court held that, while the loss of Husband’s job was not anticipated, there was nota substantialand materialchange of circumstances because Husband had otherassets from which to continue to make the alimony payments; the court accordingly dismissed the petition and awarded Wife her counsel fees. Husband appeals the dismissal of the petition and award of attorney fees to Wife. We affirm the holding that Husband’s assets are available to satisfy his alimony obligation and the award of attorney fees to Wife. We vacate the dismissal of the petition and remand for further consideration. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
James Garry et al. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Company et al.
In this easement boundary dispute, property owners seek damages against a gas company for trespassing and nuisance. The gas company possesses three separate utility easements for natural gas pipelines on the property at issue, which easements include the right to perform maintenance and other work on the pipelines. When the gas company undertook major repairs to the pipelines in 2006, the property owners filed this action, alleging the gas company exceeded the boundaries of the utility easements and trespassed. The trial court granted summary judgment to the gas company based on the affidavit of an employee of the gas company. We find the affidavit fails to establish the employee’s personal knowledge of material facts stated therein, specifically the boundaries of each easement; accordingly, we reverse and remand. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Stanley A. Gagne v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
Plaintiff brought suit against defendant, his insurance company, claiming a burglary loss. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds the statute of limitations had run, but plaintiff argued that under contract law the statute of limitations is six years. The Trial Court enforced the one-year statute of limitations contained in plaintiff's policy of insurance and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court which held that the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the policy was applicable to this claim. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Zachary G., et al
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed Zachary G. and Kaleb M. (collectively the “Children”) from Heather M. (“Mother”) and Elmus G. (“Father”). The Children were adjudicated 1 dependent and neglected and placed with Rhonda S. (“Grandmother”). Years later, the Children were placed in foster care and two new permanency plans were entered. DCS then petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Following a hearing, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights, finding that Mother had abandoned the Children, that Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plans, and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Children. Mother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra K. Williams v. Ronnie Lloyd Williams
This appeal concerns the post-divorce modification of alimony in futuro. Ronnie Lloyd Williams (“Husband”) sought a reduction in his alimony obligation owed to Sandra K. Williams (“Wife”). Husband alleged that Wife’s income had increased since the divorce, resulting in an unanticipated substantial and material change in circumstances. Following a hearing, the trial court reduced Husband’s alimony obligation from $750 per month to $500 per month. Wife appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court, vacate the trial court’s judgment and terminate Husband’s alimony obligation. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Wayne Buckner v. Melissa Brunson (Buckner)
The parties’ final decree of divorce provided that they would equitably share in the sale proceeds of a business that they had sold. After a few months, the wife filed a petition for contempt and/or additional relief, alleging that the husband was not making the payments in compliance with the final decree. The trial court found that husband was in contempt to the extent that he failed to make payment in full on one occasion, but it declined to find the husband in contempt for most of the matters asserted. The wife filed a motion to alter or amend, which was denied. The wife appeals. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Vivian Kennard v. Arthur M. Townsend, IV, M.D., et al.
This case is before us upon mandate from the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration of our previous opinion, Kennard v. Townsend, No. W2010–00461–COA–R3C, 2011 WL 1434625 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 14, 2011), in light of the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011). In our previous review of this medical malpractice case, we upheld the trial court’s exclusion of Appellant’s medical expert under the locality rule, and further affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against the Appellant. Because the qualifications of Appellant’s expert were not considered in light of Shipley, and because the admission of expert testimony is a matter of discretion in the trial court, we vacate the orders excluding the testimony of the Appellant’s expert and the grant of summary judgment, and remand for reconsideration in light of the Shipley decision. Vacated and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald and Sherry Windrow v. Middle Tennessee Electric Membership Corporation
This appeal involves a nuisance claim. The plaintiff landowners filed a nuisance action against the defendant electrical cooperative, alleging that the cooperative’s electrical substation, built near the plaintiffs’ home, constituted a nuisance. The electrical cooperative filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the landowners’ claim was in actuality a claim for inverse condemnation that was time-barred, and that they were precluded from asserting a tort claim for nuisance. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiff landowners now appeal. We reverse. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Knoxville v. Boyce McCall
This is a case involving a prescriptive easement The City of Knoxville filed a petition for an injunction against the Appellant, alleging that he was obstructing a public alley that was created by a valid prescriptive easement on his property. The Appellant answered, denying that the City of Knoxville had any right to use his property as an alley and asserting a counterclaim for damages and attorney fees. The trial court found a valid prescriptive easement, and enjoined the Appellant from blocking the alley. The Appellant appeals. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jim Hammond, Sheriff of Hamilton County, et al v. Chris Harvey, et al
Six sergeants (collectively “the Sergeants”) employed by Jim Hammond, the Sheriff of Hamilton County (“the Sheriff”), filed a grievance with the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office Civil Service Board (“the Board”) complaining that there is an unlawful disparity in pay among the 19 sergeants on the force. The Board found a disparity and ordered the Sheriff “to equalize their pay and if all [s]ergeants do the same job that they should be paid the same if there is no written criteria to establish standards.” The Sheriff appealed 1 to the trial court by petition for a writ of certiorari. The court (1) held that the Board was without authority to order the Sheriff to equalize the pay of the 19 sergeants and (2) declared the Board’s decision “null and void.” The Sergeants appeal. We modify the trial court’s judgment and remand to the Board with instructions. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Carl Robin Geary, Sr.
This appeal presents the issue of whether a widow who signed a prenuptial agreement is entitled to an elective share of her husband’s estate. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the widow signed the prenuptial agreement knowledgeably. Given the validity of the prenuptial agreement, we affirm the trial court’s decision denying the widow an elective share. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Treasure D.I.
This appeal involves a child support arrearage. The father sought a retroactive modification of the child support order and forgiveness of the arrearage upon learning that he was not the biological father of the child. The trial court held that it was impermissible to modify the valid child support order. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Alyson Leigh Amonette Eberting v. Jeffrey Jennings Eberting
After fourteen years of marriage, Alyson Leigh Amonette Eberting (“Wife”) sued Jeffrey Jennings Eberting (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Judgment for Divorce on August 12, 2010, which, inter alia, awarded Wife a divorce, distributed the marital property, entered a Permanent Parenting Plan, awarded Wife transitional alimony, and awarded Wife attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. Husband appeals raising issues regarding the valuation of his orthodontic practice, the parenting plan, and the award of Wife’s attorney’s fees. Wife raises issues concerning the overall property division, and the amount of attorney fees and expenses awarded to Wife as alimony in solido. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
