Jada Flack v. Curtis McKinney
This appeal arises out of dependency and neglect proceedings in which custody of the minor child was awarded to the father. The mother appealed, but she failed to provide this Court with a transcript or statement of the evidence. Due to our inability to review the evidence, we affirm the decision of the lower court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Archie Story v. Civil Service Commission of the State of Tennessee, et al.
A highway patrolman was terminated for allegedly deploying a tire deflation device without prior authorization in violation of General Order 412 and for untruthfulness regarding such. On appeal, the trooper argues that his partial extension of the device did not constitute a “deployment.” Thus, he contends he did not violate General Order 412, nor was he untruthful when he denied deployment. We affirm the ALJ’s finding that the trooper “deployed” the device in violation of General Order 412 and that he was untruthful about doing so. Accordingly, we find there existed substantial and material evidence to support his termination. Additionally, we find that the trial court did not err in denying the trooper’s request to admit additional evidence and to supplement his brief. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ricky Lynn Hill v. Tennessee Department of Corrections
Inmate appeals the grant of summary judgment to the Tennessee Department of Corrections in declaratory judgment action wherein inmate sought to be given credit on his sentence for work performed while housed in county jail. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John L. Houston v. Rhey Houston, et al.
The order of the trial court entered November 29, 2010, from which the appellant John L. Houston seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Angelia Lynette Maupin v. Paul Wayne Maupin
The order of the trial court entered February 16, 2011, from which the appellant Angelia Lynette Maupin seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth E. Ramsey
The order of the trial court entered February 9, 2011, from which the appellant Kenneth E. Ramsey seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Santiago Toscani v. Nader Rahbe
The order from which the appellant Nader Rahbe seeks to appeal was entered on Wednesday, January 5, 2011. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Tuesday, February 8, 2011, the 34th day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, the motion of the appellee to dismiss is granted. This appeal is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Stabler v. Ramie Stabler-Marston
The order from which the appellant Ramie Stabler-Marston seeks to appeal was entered on February 24, 2010. Notices of appeal were filed by the appellant on October 18, 2010, and October 20, 2010. Because neither of the notices of appeal was timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Cadlerock, LLC v. Sheila R. Weber
The plaintiff, an assignee to a foreign judgment, filed a petition to domesticate the judgment pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-6-101 et seq. The defendant objected to the enrollment of the foreign judgment because it was assigned. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to domesticate the foreign judgment and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals. Our review of the record reveals that the plaintiff properly followed the statutory requirements to enroll a foreign judgment. Accordingly, the trial court erred. We reverse. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy H. Wright v. James Charles Wright
In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court granted the father sole custody and decision making authority over the parties’ minor children. The mother appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court on all issues. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Emily L.
In this Petition to terminate the parental rights of the father to two minor children, the Trial Court, following an evidentiary hearing, terminated the parental rights of the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment and held that it was in the best interests of the children that the father's parental rights be terminated. The father appealed, and upon our review we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: D.L.
In this Petition to terminate the parental rights of the father to two minor children, the Trial Court, following an evidentiary hearing, terminated the parental rights of the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment and held that it was in the best interests of the children that the father's parental rights be terminated. The father appealed, and upon our review we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
The Bank of Fayette County v. Simon M. Woody, Jr., d/b/a Royal Kingdom Builders
This is an action by the bank to recover against the debtor for defaulting on a loan. The plaintiff bank made a loan to the defendant debtor for the purchase of real property, and the property was pledged to secure the loan. The debtor defaulted on the loan, the property was sold, and the proceeds were applied to the debt. The bank filed this lawsuit against the debtor for the deficiency. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the bank. The debtor now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to grant him a continuance in order to obtain counsel. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Bruce Colston v. Melinda Kay Colston
In this post-divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to pay an alimony arrearage of $86,000.00. We affirm the judgment for the arrearage and remand the case for reconsideration of the requirement that Husband pay the arrearage at $1,500.00 per month. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Epps v. Civil Service Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, and the Metropolitan Action Commission
This appeal arises out of a dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari in which review was sought of the denial of a grievance filed by an employee of the Metropolitan Action Commission’s Head Start program. The grievance was initially denied by the Executive Director of the Metropolitan Action Commission. The employee then appealed the grievance to the Metropolitan Civil Service Commission, which assigned the appeal to an administrative law judge; after a hearing, the administrative law judge denied the grievance. Upon further appeal, the Civil Service Commission overturned the administrative law judge’s decision and held in favor of the employee; the Civil Service Commission transmitted its decision to the Board of Commissioners of the Metropolitan Action Commission as a recommended final order. The Board of Commissioners rejected the recommended decision and voted to deny the grievance. When the employee sought to appeal the Board of Commissioner’s decision to the Civil Service Commission, that Commission responded that it had no further authority to hear the appeal because the employee was not an employee in classified service and because the Metropolitan Action Commission had final authority on grievance decisions involving employees of the Head Start program. The employee then sought review by writ of certiorari in chancery court, which found that the employee was not a civil service employee and was, therefore, not entitled to a second appeal to the Civil Service Commission; the court also found that the Metropolitan Action Commission had conformed to the applicable grievance process. On appeal, the employee asserts that she was employed in a civil service position and entitled to the grievance process set forth in the civil service rules. Finding that the grievance procedure applicable to employees in the classified service is not applicable to the employee and that the Action Commission properly exercised final authority on the grievance, we affirm the action of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Denise Jeremiah and Timothy Jeremiah v. William Blaylock
The plaintiff home buyer and defendant home seller entered into an agreement to repair a drain at some future date because it had been improperly piped out of the buyer’s house. When the time for performance came, the drain was not moved, resulting in damages to the buyer’s home. The buyer sued for breach of contract. The circuit court granted a directed verdict to the defendant on the ground that there was no consideration to support the contract. We find that the mutual promises made by the parties constituted adequate consideration. We accordingly reverse the trial court and remand this case for such further proceedings as necessary. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Jordan Ashton Danelz v. John Gayden
This is a parentage action in which an adult child seeks retroactive child support from his biological father. The juvenile court dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we vacate the judgment of the juvenile court for failure to join a party pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 19, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Faye Roland Camp v. Randy Coleman Camp
This post-divorce appeal involves recusal of the trial judge. In the initial divorce proceedings, the trial judge recused himself based in part on friendship with the parties. A special judge was appointed to hear the case. The special judge tried the divorce, divided the parties’ property, and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. Several years later, the husband filed a petition to terminate or modify his alimony obligation. The trial judge who had previously recused himself declined to do so for the post-divorce proceedings. After a hearing, the trial judge terminated the husband’s alimony obligation. The wife appeals, arguing that the trial judge should have recused himself and that he erred in terminating the alimony. We reverse the trial court’s decision on recusal, and therefore vacate the trial court’s ruling on the husband’s petition to modify. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Marla H., Individually and as Next Best Friend to her Daughter Moriah F. H. v. Knox County, et al.
This is an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The mother of a middle school student filed suit against Knox County, the Knox County Board of Education, and the City of Knoxville after her daughter viewed graphic photographs of her dead father during a presentation on the dangers of drunk driving. The trial court found the City of Knoxville liable for the student’s emotional injuries because the school resource officer who distributed the photographs intended to evoke an emotional response. We conclude it was generally foreseeable that providing graphic accident scene photographs to seventh grade students could cause serious or severe emotional harm in a student related to a victim depicted therein. Thus, the school resource officer owed a duty to exercise reasonable care when displaying the photographs to a class that potentially included students related to the victims. The evidence, however, preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the school resource officer failed to exercise reasonable care. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sally Jo Witty v. Christopher Cantrell et al.
Sally Jo Witty is a teacher employed by the Blount County School System. She filed this action after her request to draw pay from a pool of donated sick leave was denied. She named as defendants the trustees appointed to administer the pool (collectively “the Trustees”). She also sued the Blount County Board of Education (“the School Board”) and alleged it is vicariously liable. She demanded the full monetary value of the requested sick leave and also asked for damages to compensate her for the mental suffering resulting from the “wrongful” decision to deny her benefits. The trial court held that the Trustees were an independent body for which the School Board could not be held vicariously liable. It also held that the Trustees were immune from liability in their individual capacities and that the action filed against the Trustees in their official capacity was a petition for writ of certiorari that was not timely filed. Therefore, it dismissed the complaint. Witty appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and vacate it in part. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Lynn Davis v. Jack E. Scariano, Jr., M.D. et al.
The plaintiff, Deborah Lynn Davis, appeals from a grant of summary judgment to the defendants, Dr. Jack E. Scariano, Jr., and his group, West Knoxville Neurological Associates. Except when the context requires otherwise, we will refer to the defendants collectively as “Dr. Scariano.” Davis sued Dr. Scariano alleging medical malpractice and fraud related to the doctor’s treatment of her and to the billing of her account. Dr. Scariano moved for summary judgment. After granting Davis several continuances, the trial court heard the motion and granted it based on Dr. Scariano’s filings and the plaintiff’s failure to present evidence establishing a disputed issue of material fact. Davis appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re T.C.E.
This is a biological father’s appeal from a judgment terminating his parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence (1) that he had abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit during the four-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate; (2) that he had not substantially complied with his obligations under a court-approved permanency plan despite reasonable efforts to reunite him with the child; and (3) that termination is in the best interest of the child. We affirm. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
Keilah Gonzalez-Bonilla v. Eduardo Mendez
Keilah Gonzalez-Bonilla (“Mother”) and Eduardo Mendez (“Father”) are the divorced parents of a minor child (“the Child”). At the time of the divorce, Mother was named the primary residential parent of the Child, and Father was granted visitation. After the divorce, Mother relocated and a revised permanent parenting plan was entered on August 3, 2007. In December of 2007, Father filed a petition seeking a change in custody of the Child alleging that a material change in circumstances had occurred. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order on August 4, 2009 finding and holding, inter alia, that there had been a material change in circumstances since February 5, 2007, that custody would be changed with Father to be the primary residential parent, and that the joint decision making would be changed and Father shall have the decision-making authority. Mother appeals to this Court. We find that the proper date from which to determine whether there had been a material change in circumstances is the date the previous order was entered, i.e., August 3, 2007, and that a material change in circumstances sufficient to justify a change in custody had not been proven. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s order changing custody, and remand this case to the Trial Court for reconsideration of its orders regarding child support in light of this Opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Senior Housing Alternatives, Inc. v. Bernard Global Loan Investors, LTD.
Senior Housing Alternatives, Inc. (“the Borrower”) filed this action against Bernard Global Loan Investors, Ltd. (“the Secured Party”) asking the trial court to enjoin the Secured Party from foreclosing on a deed of trust that secured several notes on which the Borrower had defaulted. In essence, the Borrower’s complaint alleges that its original lender had defrauded the Borrower and inflated the balance owed on the notes and that the Secured Party had knowledge of the fraud when it took ownership of the notes and deed of trust. The complaint alleges that the merits of the case are at issue in a federal district court in Georgia. Despite expressing reservations about the Borrower’s ability to prevail on the merits, the trial court granted it a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo in an order entered February 15, 2010. The court noted that developments in the federal court action could affect the equities and set a hearing for August 13, 2010, to “review the entire matter.” Two days before the hearing date, the Secured Party filed a brief, with supporting affidavits, asking the court to dissolve the injunction. The court heard proof at a status conference and thereafter issued a memorandum opinion explaining that it was dissolving the injunction because, among other things, the court did not believe the Borrower could prevail on the merits. The Borrower appeals from the order dissolving the injunction and dismissing the complaint. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Venus L. Lowery v. Larry G. Womble, II
In this child-support matter, Father appeals the trial court’s determination of his parenting time and income for the purpose of setting his child support obligation. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals |
