COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Administrative Resources, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance
M2010-01199-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell T. Perkins

This case involves judicial review of the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance’s denial of a staff leasing company license. The trial court reviewed the denial of the license under the common law writ of certiorari standard and upheld the decision. Finding that the denial was unsupported by substantial and material evidence, we vacate the decision of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Benedicta Kurunwune Obi v. George Obi
M2010-00485-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Philip E. Smith

The trial court granted the wife a judgment of divorce after the husband failed to respond to requests for discovery and a motion to compel. After the judgment became final, the husband, who had been represented by counsel earlier in the proceedings, filed a pro se Rule 60 motion for relief, arguing that he was deprived of proper notice because the address on the certificates of service appended to each unanswered motion and notice was not accurate, with the result that he did not receive the motions and notices. The trial court denied the husband’s Rule 60 motion, but since husband’s address was incorrect on the certificates of service, we conclude the trial court erred and should have granted the husband relief from the parenting plan and child support provisions of the judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order as to those provisions and remand the case for further proceedings.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Benedicta Kurunwune Obi v. George Obi - Concurring
M2010-00485-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement
Trial Court Judge: Judge Philip E. Smith

I concur with the majority’s decision; however, I would assess costs of this appeal against Mr. Obi (“Husband”), not Mrs. Obi (“Wife”), in that this appeal was a result of Husband’s omissions. Further, I write separately to state that I believe, upon proper application pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37 by Wife on remand, the trial court may consider imposing monetary sanctions against Husband in the form of expenses and/or attorney fees.

Court of Appeals

Odell Binkley v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
M2010-02477-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

The appellant sought a special exception to establish a waste transfer facility. The Metro Council, pursuant to its authority under the Metropolitan Code, disapproved of the proposed location. The appellant sought a writ of certiorari and the trial court dismissed the appeal. The appellant appealed to this court. We affirm the trial court.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Victor W. Isaac, M.D. v. The Center for Spine, Joint, and Neuromuscular Rehabilitation, P.C.
M2010-01333-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell T. Perkins

In this employment contract dispute, the plaintiff seeks to recover a bonus from his former employer. He asserts the defendant breached the contract by failing to pay a bonus as provided in the employment agreement; alternatively, he asserts a claim for promissory fraud. The trial court summarily dismissed plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Following a bench trial on the promissory fraud claim, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant and ordered plaintiff to pay defendant $64,471.86 in attorney fees pursuant to the employment agreement. We affirm and remand with instructions that the defendants be awarded reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred on appeal.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Young Bok Song v. Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, et al.
M2010-01198-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell T. Perkins

The petitioner, Young Bok Song (“Song”), a prisoner serving a 65-year sentence resulting from convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, filed a petition for declaratory judgment, requesting that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) be directed to release to him copies of its investigative records from his criminal case. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds of sovereign immunity and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Song appeals. We affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Chelsey D. Crews v. Jessie C. Staggs
M2010-01624-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Lee Bailey, III

Primary residential parent appeals determination that the parties rotate the federal tax exemption for their minor child on a yearly basis. At the time the determination was made, the trial court had not determined the amount of child support to be paid by the alternate residential parent in accordance with the child support guidelines. We reverse the decision and remand for reconsideration of the award of the exemption.

Maury Court of Appeals

In Re Estate of Eloise J. Storey Peggie Sherrill Huber v. Lawrence G. Yohanek, CPA, a/k/a Larry G. Yohanek, Sharron S. Yohanek, and John Gary Storey
W2010-00819-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Karen D. Webster

This lawsuit was filed by the decedent’s daughter against other family members alleging undue influence, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. After the decedent suffered a stroke, the family members, as attorney in fact and signatory on the decedent’s bank accounts, made gifts from the decedent’s assets to  themselves and to other family members. After the decedent died, the plaintiff daughter filed this lawsuit, alleging that the defendant family members wrongfully depleted the decedent’s assets during her lifetime so as to deprive the plaintiff of her specific bequest in the decedent’s will. The defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment on various grounds. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion finding, inter alia, that the plaintiff did not submit evidence to support several of her claims, and that several claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The Plaintiff now appeals. On appeal, we apply the Tennessee Supreme court’s revised analytical framework for summary judgment motions, requiring the defendant movants to either conclusively establish facts supporting an affirmative defense or negate an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim. Applying this standard, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Jerry Alan Richards v. Tina Lou Richards
E2010-00521-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Vance

This is a post-divorce case where both parties sought to modify the existing custody arrangement. At the time of the divorce, the parties agreed to equal co-parenting time. Upon the mother’s request for modification, the court designated her as the primary residential parent and awarded the father standard co-parenting time. The trial court also ordered the father to pay child support and certain outstanding expenses incurred by the mother toward the child’s care. Further, the mother was awarded her attorney fees. In the initial appeal, we found that a material change in circumstances had not been proven. Accordingly, we reversed the trial court’s modification of the original custody arrangement and reinstated the initial permanent parenting plan. We also vacated the trial court’s order as to child support, the payment by the father of expenses incurred by the mother, and the award of attorney fees to the mother, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The matter was reheard, with the parties stipulating that there has been a material and substantial change in circumstances. The trial court again named the mother primary residential parent, with the father having co-parenting time every other weekend and on an alternating two-week schedule in the summer. The father appeals. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Sevier Court of Appeals

Jeffrey D. Key, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Randall Eugene Key et al v. Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc. et al.
E2010-00752-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment to the defendant hospital in a medical malpractice wrongful death case. The trial court struck as untimely the materials filed by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The responsive materials were filed less than five days before the date originally scheduled for a hearing on the defendant’s motion; however the hearing was continued for several months. Having struck the plaintiff’s filings, the court held that the motion negated violation of the standard of care and causation and granted the motion as unopposed. The plaintiff contends on appeal that the defendant did not negate either violation of the standard of care or causation; that the materials responsive to the motion should not have been stricken; and that, if the materials filed in opposition to the motion are considered, the plaintiff presented issues of material fact for trial. We vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Blount Court of Appeals

Joshua D. Schaffer v. State of Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
M2010-01805-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia C. Bonnyman

This appeal involves subject matter jurisdiction over a petition for a writ of certiorari. The petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. The respondent, the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, denied the inmate’s request for parole. The inmate thereafter filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the chancery court challenging the Board’s decision as illegal, arbitrary, and fraudulent. The chancery court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the inmate did not file a verified, notarized petition within the sixty-day jurisdictional time limit. We affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

In the Matter of: Brandon C. S. (d/o/b 10/1/2002), a Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age
W2010-01015-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Russell

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father on the grounds of persistence of conditions and severe child abuse. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Crye-Leike, Inc. v. Sarah A. Carver
W2010-01601-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Arnold B. Goldin

This is a dispute over a real estate sales commission. The seller entered into a six-month exclusive listing agreement with a realty company. The agreement expired on August 21, 2007, one day before the eventual purchasers were shown the property. The realty company filed suit to recover a commission asserting it caused the property to be shown to the purchasers prior to August 21 and, in the alternative, the parties orally  and through their actions extended the listing agreement to August 30, 2007. The trial court concluded the realty company was not entitled to a commission under the plain language of the listing agreement because the property was not shown or submitted to the purchasers prior to August 21 and the parties did not extend the agreement to August 30. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Crye-Leike, Inc. v. Sarah A. Carver - Concurring
W2010-01601-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Arnold B. Goldin,

I concur in the majority opinion in this case, but write separately to emphasize that the Court’s interpretation of the term “shown” in the Agreement is limited to the facts and the proof in this case. Given the evolving importance in the real estate market of the realtor’s online presentation of property and the fact that properties are sometimes purchased by buyers who never view the property in person, with different proof, the term “shown” could be given a more expansive interpretation. However, with the proof submitted to the trial court and no contractual definition of the term “shown,” I agree with the majority’s result and reasoning.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Leonard Gamble v. Sputniks, LLC et al.
M2010-02145-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: C.L. Rogers, Judge

The trial court determined that the insuror of a bar was liable under its commercial general liability policy and liquor liability policy for injuries to a bar patron. We have concluded that this occurrence is excluded under the assault and battery exclusion of the commercial general liability policy but is covered by the liquor liability policy.

Sumner Court of Appeals

The Estate of Pauline Vernuse Butler v. Paul V. Peeples, Sr.
E2010-01991-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey M. Atherton

The representative of this Estate filed a "Motion to Marshal Assets" alleging that a California resident held assets of the Estate and had refused to turn them over to the Estate. The Trial Court summarily ordered the California resident to surrender any assets held and turn them over to the Estate. Paul V. Peeples, the California resident, filed a Motion in Probate Court that the Court had no personal jurisdiction over him, along with his affidavit. His Motion was denied. He appealed to this Court and we hold that he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court and reverse the orders against him and dismiss him as a party to the probate estate action.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Timothy C. Russell v. Suzanne Colette Landry Lyubimov
E2010-02541-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II.

On May 2, 2011, a show cause order was entered in this case, directing appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant responded to the show cause order, but the argument in the response does not establish good cause for maintaining this case in this court. The Order entered by the Trial Judge on November 8, 2010, demonstrates that there are issues yet to be resolved in the Trial Court before a Tenn. R. App. P. 3, appeal will lie. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the cost of the appeal is assessed to Timothy C. Russell.

Sevier Court of Appeals

Donna Clark v. Sputniks, LLC et al.
M2010-02163-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge C.L. Rogers

The trial court determined that the insuror of a bar was liable under its commercial general liability policy and liquor liability policy for the death of a bar patron. We have concluded that this occurrence is excluded under the assault and battery exclusion of the commercial general liability policy but is covered by the liquor liability policy.

Sumner Court of Appeals

Larry Hendricks v. Tennessee Board of Probation & Parole
M2010-01651-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia C. Bonnyman

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari alleging that the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole acted arbitrarily and illegally in denying him parole. After reviewing the record, the chancery court concluded that the Board acted lawfully, and it dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals, and we affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Betty Saint Rogers v. Louisville Land Company, et al.
E2010-00991-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri S. Bryant

.Betty Saint Rogers (“Plaintiff”) sued Louisville Land Company and Joe V. Williams, III (“Defendants”) alleging claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, the Tennessee statutes governing cemeteries, outrageous conduct, and breach of contract, among other things. After a non-jury trial, the Trial Court entered its final judgment awarding Plaintiff a judgment of $250.00 for breach of contract, $45,000.00 for intentional infliction of emotional distress, $250,000.00 in punitive damages, $37,306.25 in attorney’s fees, and $556.42 in discretionary costs. Defendants appeal to this Court. We find and hold that Plaintiff did not prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, and we, therefore, reverse the judgments for intentional infliction of emotional  distress and punitive damages. We also find and hold that because Plaintiff abandoned her statutory claim, she was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the statute, and we reverse the award of attorney’s fees. We further find and hold that Plaintiff did prove breach of contract, and we affirm the award of damages for breach of contract, and the remainder of the Trial Court’s final judgment.

Bradley Court of Appeals

Byron Avenue 3501, LLC v. Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, TN
M2010-01652-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell T. Perkins

The purchaser of historic property appeals the Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission’s denial of a demolition permit based on economic hardship. The Commission’s denial was affirmed by the chancery court. We find that the Commission’s denial was not supported by material evidence and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to return the matter to the Commission for a new hearing.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Cory Tyler Meeks v. Kimberly Ann Meeks
M2011-00986-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

This is an appeal from a divorce decree entered by the Circuit Court for Grundy County on March 14, 2011. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

Grundy Court of Appeals

Johnathan Leonard Sullivan v. Tracy L. Brooks
M2009-02510-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Nolan Goolsby

Mother appeals trial court’s decision to change the parties’ nonmarital child’s surname to that of the father. Finding that the father failed to meet his burden of proving that a name change was in the child’s best interest, we reverse.

Putnam Court of Appeals

Kathleen Anne Dilley v. James Kevin Dilley
M2009-02585-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clara W. Byrd

In this divorce case the father appeals the trial court’s naming of the mother as the primary residential parent, the calculation of the mother’s income for purposes of child support, and the trial court’s valuation and division of marital assets. We find the record supports the trial court’s decision to name the mother the primary residential parent. We further find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s valuation and division of the parties’ marital assets. An equitable division of marital assets does not require an equal division between the parties, and the court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. The trial court did not err in calculating the parties’ incomes for child support purposes. We conclude the mother is entitled to an award of some of the attorney’s fees she incurred in this appeal. We affirm the trial court in all respects and remand the case for a determination of the amount of the mother’s attorney’s fees on appeal to be paid by the father.

Wilson Court of Appeals

Kenneth W. Taylor v. Lawrence County, Tennessee Election Commission et al.
M2010-02406-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Lee Holloway, Jr.

Unsuccessful sheriff candidate sued to void the August 5, 2010 Lawrence County sheriff’s election based on the ineligibility of one of the five candidates. The trial court found the challenged candidate ineligible but declined to void the election. On appeal, we find the plaintiff guilty of gross laches in waiting to file suit to the prejudice of the defendants. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order.

Lawrence Court of Appeals