Thomas L. Grimes, et al. v. Helen Cornell
This appeal involves a will contest in which the trial court found that a will executed in 2005 was the product of undue influence and, as a consequence, admitted a will executed by the testator in 2004 to probate. The proponent of the 2005 Will appeals the finding of undue influence as well as the dismissal of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and award of attorney’s fees to Plaintiffs to be paid from the estate. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark H. Ruth v. Robin M. Ruth
This appeal is before the Court due to the failure of appellant to respond to a Show Cause Order in this Court as to why the appeal should not be dismissed as premature. Appellant failed to respond to this Show Cause Order, and we order this appeal dismissed as premature. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
David G. Young, et al. v. City of LaFollette
This case stems from the suspension and later termination of David G. Young (“Young”) from his position as City Administrator for the City of LaFollette (“LaFollette”). Young filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Campbell County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court ruled in favor of Young and annulled the LaFollette proceedings that resulted in Young’s suspension and termination. The Trial Court also awarded Young, as the prevailing party, certain discretionary costs. LaFollette appeals. We hold that LaFollette did not act fraudulently, illegally, or arbitrarily in its termination of Young’s employment. We reverse. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Darby Burgess, Ind. and as Administratrix/Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert E. Darby, Deceased et al. v. Harris Morgan Deere et al.
The plaintiffs have appealed from an order upholding a settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and two of the defendants. Because the order appealed does not resolve the plaintiffs’ claims against all the defendants or the two defendants’ cross claim, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Patti Zakour a/k/a Patti Smith v. UT Medical Group Inc.
The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to set aside the judgment arising from a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiffs in this medical malpractice/wrongful death action. It also conditionally granted Defendant’s alternative motion for a new trial. In light of Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Danny A. Stewart v. Gayle Ray, Commissioner, TDOC et al.
Danny A. Stewart, a prisoner serving multiple sentences, some concurrently and some consecutively, filed a petition for certiorari naming as respondents the Commissioner of the Department of Correction and heads of various other agencies allegedly responsible for determining his eligibility for parole (collectively referred to as “TDOC”). He alleges TDOC is incorrectly calculating his eligibility for parole in that it is basing its calulation on the aggregate consecutive sentences of 42 years, whereas the correct method is to calculate eligibility on each separate sentence so that he would start serving his next consecutive sentence as an “in custody” parolee of his earliest consecutive sentence. The trial court dismissed the case based on Stewart’s failure “to exhaust his administrative remedies,” i.e., by seeking a “declaratory order from TDOC before filing the present action.” Stewart appeals. We vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Tylon L.D.
This is a termination of parental rights case pertaining to Tylon L.D. (“the Child”), the minor child of Pamela D. (“Mother”). Eighteen months after the Child was placed in her care, the Child’s prospective adoptive parent, Carman E. (“Foster Mother”), filed a complaint seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights and asking to adopt the Child. After a trial before Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson, II (“the trial court”), the court terminated Mother’s rights upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds existed for terminating her parental rights and that termination was in the Child’s best interest. 1 Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Wayford Demonbreun, II v. State of Tennessee
This petition was filed as a common law writ of certiorari in the circuit court of Davidson County to challenge the validity of the petitioner’s 1998 felony convictions in the criminal court of Davidson County. The circuit court dismissed the writ finding it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition and that the claims pertain to actions governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure for which there is no relief under a common law writ of certiorari. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Janice Davis Boelter and Richard Davis v. Jackie Curtus Reagan, et al.
Decedent executed a will in 1988 which could not be found upon her death. Decedent’s stepchildren sought to establish a copy of the 1988 will as Decedent’s last will and testament, but the trial court found that they had failed to rebut the presumption that the will had been destroyed and revoked. We find that Appellants failed to prove that Decedent did not revoke her will. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s involuntary dismissal of Appellants’ claim as well as its order that Decedent’s Estate be administered as an intestate estate. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Maston G. Lyons, III, et al. v. Kimberly G. Leffew, et al.
Plaintiffs appeal from the denial of a second Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion. Eight months after the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute, Plaintiffs filed the first of two Rule 60.02 motions alleging they did not receive notice of the motion to dismiss their case and that they did not receive the order dismissing the case. The trial court denied the first Rule 60.02 motion and plaintiffs did not appeal that ruling. Plaintiffs then filed a second Rule 60.02 motion, asserting the same grounds as in the first motion. The trial court denied the second Rule 60.02 motion, which is the ruling at issue in this appeal. We have determined the issues presented in the second motion are res judicata because no new issues were presented in the second motion and, therefore, affirm the trial court. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
Lonnie E. Roberts, et al. v. Claude Russell Bridges, a/k/a Leon Russell, et ux.
This appeal involves the enforcement of a restrictive covenant. A group of neighbors filed suit seeking permanently to enjoin a musician and his wife from using their property for nonresidential purposes. The trial court ruled in favor of the neighbors after a bench trial, prohibiting the homeowners from parking a tour bus, two panel trucks, and several employee vehicles on their property and ordering the homeowners to remove a portion of a parking lot and driveway built to accommodate the vehicles. The court later awarded discretionary costs to the neighbors. We reverse the grant of injunctive relief requiring the homeowners to remove a portion of the parking lot and driveway but affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Dana Moulton, et al. v. Delores Moulton, et al.
In this action plaintiff alleged she was injured when the roof on the deck at defendant's house fell upon her, causing injuries. Defendant denied any responsibility for plaintiff's injuries and moved for summary judgment. The Trial Court, in sustaining the summary judgment motion, held that none of the parties knew of any defect in the patio roof, and there was no evidence in the record of what actually caused the collapse of the roof. The defendant possessed no constructive notice of any defective condition causing the collapse. Plaintiffs have appealed and we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Anne Lavoie and Jodee Lavoie v. Franklin County Publishing Company, Inc.
These consolidated actions are before this Court on a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. We are asked to consider whether, as a matter of law, a plaintiff is barred from maintaining a suit against an employer under a sole theory of respondeat superior where the plaintiff settles her claim against the employee, executes a release of all claims as to the employee, but reserves her claim against the employer in a court order dismissing the employee with prejudice. We hold that the plaintiff’s suit is barred. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, summary judgment is granted to the employer, and the case is dismissed. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Joshua Cooper, et al. v. Logistics Insight Corp., et al.
This appeal arises out of a personal injury lawsuit, wherein plaintiff filed suit for injuries suffered in the course of his employment. Plaintiff's employer was allowed to intervene to assert a subrogation lien to recover workers’ compensation benefits paid to plaintiff. Plaintiff settled his claim against the defendants, and an order of voluntary dismissal was entered. The intervenors moved to set the case for trial, asserting that the settlement between plaintiffs and defendants was negotiated without the consent of the intervenors and did not take into account plaintiff’s future medical expenses, for which intervenors would be responsible. The trial court granted the intervenors’ motion to set the case for trial, but subsequently dismissed the intervening petition, finding that the settlement resolved all claims against the defendants and that the intervening petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Finding that dismissal of the intervening petition was error, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jean Garman v. Guy Garman
This is a divorce case. Wife appeals the trial court’s order concerning: (1) the valuation of Husband’s medical practice; (2) the division of certain marital debt; and (3) the award of transitional alimony, rather than alimony in futuro, and the amount thereof. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. Clifton Cattron, Jr., and Civil Service Commission
This is an appeal from the decision of the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission reversing the decision to terminate Clifton Cattron’s employment with the City of Memphis. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the Civil Service Commission’s decision that the City of Memphis lacked a reasonable basis for terminating Mr. Cattron’s employment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Randall C. Hagy v. State of Tennessee, et al.
A show cause order was entered in this case on January 31, 2011, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based upon the untimely filing of the notice of appeal. The appellant has failed to respond to the show cause order. The record supports that the notice of appeal was filed untimely. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Greg Lance v. Randall York, District Attorney General, 13th Judicial District
This is an appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition for access to public records under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 10-7-505. The trial court dismissed the petition upon its finding that: (1) the Appellee records custodian responded to Appellant’s records request; (2) the fee charged to Appellant was reasonable and in compliance with those set by the open records counsel; and (3) Appellant had, in fact, received the records that he requested. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Shaolin P. et al.
The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to provide support and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans. Because we have concluded that the Department of Children’s Services failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father’s failure to pay support was willful or that the Department’s efforts to help Father find housing were reasonable, we reverse the juvenile court’s decision. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Marshall H. Murdock, v. State of Tennessee, et al.
Petitioner brought this action styled: "Petition for Declaratory Judgment", naming the Tennessee Department of Corrections and the Tennessee Board of Paroles as defendants. The Trial Judge, responding to a Motion to Dismiss, dismissed the Department of Corrections on the grounds that it was not a proper party to challenge a parole board decision. The Trial Court then treated the Petition as a common law writ of certiorari, and held that the writ was not timely filed. Petitioner has appealed to this Court and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Bryce L.H. and Alexis D.H.
In this action to terminate the parental rights of the mother to the two minor children, the Trial Court, after hearing evidence, held that the statutory grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence, and that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother's parental rights be terminated. The mother appealed and on appeal we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Harold B. Schaffer v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
Appellant was found guilty of a disciplinary offense while in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. The chancery court granted Appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari, and, finding no entitlement to relief based upon the administrative record, it dismissed the petition. Appellant appeals, and we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Williams, et al. v. Tennessee Farmers Life Reassurance Company, et al.
Defendant insurance company denied benefits under policy of life insurance, alleging the decedent made material misrepresentations in her application for insurance. The trial court found the decedent did not make misrepresentations on her application, and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant insurance company appeals. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Creative Label, Inc. v. David Tuck, Weakley County Assessor of Property, et al.
The trial court affirmed the determination of the State Board of Equalization that taxpayer’s leasehold interest in tax-exempt property belonging to an Industrial Development Board was not exempt from ad valorem taxation where the parties had executed a payment in lieu of taxes agreement under Tennessee Code Annotated § 7-53-305 as it existed during the relevant tax period. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
CNX Gas Company, LLC v. Miller Petroleum, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves a business transaction for the assignment of oil and gas leases. The parties are sophisticated in the oil and gas industry and include CNX Gas Company, LLC (“CNX”), Miller Petroleum, Inc. (“Miller”), Atlas America, LLC (“Atlas”), and Wind City Oil & Gas, LLC (“Wind City”). CNX and Miller entered into a binding Letter of Intent (“LOI”) for the assignment of oil and gas leases owned by Miller. Prior to signing the LOI, CNX knew that the leases were the subject of pending litigation between Miller and Wind City. The letter of intent outlined the details of the transaction and a closing date. On the closing date, Miller refused to close the transaction with CNX, claiming that it did not have possession of the leases. Approximately one week later, Miller entered into a similar deal for the assignment of those leases with Atlas. The transaction between Miller and Atlas was worth substantially more than the transaction with CNX. Thereafter, CNX sued Miller for breach of contract; CNX also sued Atlas and Wind City for inducement to breach a contract. Miller and Atlas filed motions for summary judgment following discovery that involved depositions. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment finding that the LOI permitted Miller to opt out of the closing. CNX appeals. After reviewing the record, we find the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. The LOI only provided CNX with the option to opt out of the transaction. Accordingly, we reverse. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals |
