Saundra Kay (Pace) Mason v. James E. Mason
This is a divorce case. The parties had a long-term marriage, with one minor child born of the marriage. The wife was designated as the primary residential parent, and the husband was required to pay alimony and child support. The wife appeals the amount of child support, the alimony award, and the trial court’s denial of her request for attorney fees. The husband argues that he was entitled to relief from his pendente lite child support payments while he was out of work recovering from several surgeries. We reverse the trial court’s holding on the husband’s pendente lite child support, affirm the remainder of the trial court’s holding, and remand. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Mills, et al. v. John H. Booth, II, et al.
On November 8, 2008, James Turlington and his wife, Altha Turlington, were killed in an automobile accident after their car tuned left in front of a vehicle being driven by John H. Booth, II (“Booth”). Initially, it was believed that the Turlington vehicle was being driven by Altha Turlington. It was determined two days later that the Turlington vehicle was being driven by James Turlington. An accident reconstructionist later concluded that while the Turlington vehicle did turn in front of the Booth vehicle, the Turlington vehicle would have had sufficient time to complete its turn without any collision taking place if Booth had not been speeding. A complaint was filed on November 10, 2009, by Altha Turlington’s daughter, Patricia Mills. The Trial Court determined that the statute of limitations began to run on the day of the accident, that the discovery rule could not be used to extend when the statute of limitations began to run, and the complaint had not been filed within the applicable one year statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Joe Lee v. Charles E. Ridenour, Trustee, et al.
In December of 2008, Robert Joe Lee (“Plaintiff”) sued Charles E. Ridenour, Trustee, and FSG Bank National Association (“FSG Bank”) seeking, in part, a declaratory judgment with regard to two trust deeds, and an injunction preventing FSG Bank from foreclosing on the real property named in the trust deeds. After a trial, the Trial Court entered a Final Judgment on February 25, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that the trust deeds created a valid enforceable lien on the named real property, and dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Dawn Ann Davis (Goodwin) v. Daniel Pace Goodwin
In this divorce case, Wife appeals the trial court’s division of marital property. She asserts that the parties’ marital residence is her separate property and that the trial court erred in awarding Husband a share of the net proceeds following its court-ordered sale. Wife contends that she purchased the property during the marriage with her separate, premarital funds, that it was titled and financed in her name only, and that she paid the mortgage, taxes, and insurance on the property. We agree that the trial court erred and conclude that the marital residence is Wife’s separate property. However, because the property increased in value during the marriage, we remand to the trial court to determine whether Husband substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation. Reversed and Remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Estate of Curtis Rinda, Terry Abernathy, Administrator
Appellant, the Estate of the Decedent herein, appeals the Chancery Court of McNairy County’s denial of the Estate’s exception to a claim for Decedent’s funeral expenses. Decedent’s brother, the Appellee herein, held a power of attorney for his father (who is also Decedent’s father). Appellee exercised the power of attorney to arrange Decedent’s funeral and to pay for that funeral with the father’s funds. The claim, which was filed in Appellee’s name only, was excepted by the Estate, on grounds that Appellee had no standing to file the claim because he did not, in fact, pay the funeral expenses. The trial court allowed the claim, but held that it was payable to the father. The Estate appeals. We find that the existence and amount of the claim are supported by the record, and that Appellee’s power of attorney authorized him : (1) to bind the father to the funeral contract, (2) to pay the funeral expenses from the father’s funds, and (3) to file a claim against the Estate, on behalf of the father, to recoup those expenses from the Estate. The decision reached by the trial court is affirmed. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony C. Brown v. Tennessee Department of Safety
Petitioner filed an appeal to the Commissioner of the Department of Safety to challenge the seizure of his Chevrolet Suburban incident to his arrest for drug related charges and the subsequent forfeiture of his vehicle. An Administrative Judge issued an initial order, finding the Department had carried its burden of proof and established that Petitioner’s vehicle was being used to facilitate the sale of illicit drugs and ordering that Petitioner’s vehicle be forfeited. The Commissioner’s designee affirmed the forfeiture. Petitioner then filed a petition for judicial review with the Davidson County Chancery Court which affirmed the forfeiture by the Department. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Calvin Gray Mills, Jr., and wife, Linda Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc.
Plaintiffs initially filed suit against Royal Group, among others. In its answer, Royal Group alleged the comparative fault of Aaron Rents, Inc. Because the one-year statute of limitations had run, Plaintiffs utilized Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119’s ninetyday window to amend their complaint to add Aaron Rents as a defendant. However, in its answer, Aaron Rents then identified Fulmarque, Inc. as a comparative tortfeasor. Plaintiffs again amended their complaint to add Fulmarque as a defendant, but summary judgment was granted to Fulmarque based upon the running of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the parties disagree as to whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 authorizes successive ninety-day windows in which additional defendants may be named. We are asked to interpret whether the term “applicable statute of limitations” as used in the statute, and appearing in the phrase “or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations,” refers only to the one-year limitation period for personal injury or to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day window. We find that the term does not simply refer to the one year limitation period for personal injury, but also to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day window. Therefore, because Aaron Rents was “named in an a amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations[,]” and because Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name Fulmarque within ninety days from Aaron Rents’ identification of Fulmarque in its answer, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Fulmarque. Bearing these principles in mind, we find that the term “applicable statute of limitations” as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119, and appearing in the phrase “or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitation,” does not refer simply to the one-year limitation period for personal injury, but also to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day window. As such, because Aaron Rents was “named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations[,]” and because Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name Fulmarque within ninety days from Aaron Rents’ identification of Fulmarque in its answer, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Fulmarque based upon a running of the statute of limitations. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed, and this cause remanded for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Cooper, Individually and of Behalf of the Heirs at Law of Leslie Phillipsen v. Thomas N. Tabb, M.D., Individually, Thomas N. Tabb, P.C., and Perinatal Associates, P.C.
This medical malpractice case involves the reconsideration of an order granting a new trial. The patient, in her second trimester of pregnancy, presented at the hospital with abdominal pain and bleeding. Her treating physician consulted with a maternal-fetal specialist physician. The patient suffered a placental abruption, and the fetus died in utero. Later that day, the patient developed a blood-clotting disorder. She died that evening. The patient’s husband filed this lawsuit against the treating physician, the hospital and its employees, and the maternal-fetal specialist physician. A settlement was reached with all of the defendants except for the maternal-fetal specialist, and a jury trial was held as to only the specialist. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant specialist. The trial court granted the plaintiff husband’s motion for a new trial. Three years later, the defendant specialist filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider its order granting a new trial. Upon reconsideration, the trial court granted the motion and reinstated the jury verdict. The plaintiff husband now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider its initial order, and that the trial judge’s remarks, taken as a whole, indicate he was not satisfied with the jury verdict. Accordingly, we remand for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John F. Johnson v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
Certiorari proceeding in which an inmate seeks reversal of trial court’s affirmance of disciplinary board proceeding finding inmate guilty of solicitation of staff in violation of Tennessee Department of Correction policy and grant of judgment on the record to the Tennessee Department of Corrections. Petitioner asserts that the decision of the disciplinary board was unsupported by material evidence and was procedurally defective. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Independent Colleges & Universities Association Benefit Consortium, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Commerce & Insurance, et al.
In this appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission, taxpayer, a self-funded multiple employer welfare arrangement, seeks a refund of taxes paid under protest, asserting that the tax was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and that the tax is uncertain and ambiguous. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Deana Elizabeth Church v. Thomas Neal Church
This appeal involves post-divorce modification of alimony. When the husband and wife were originally divorced, the husband was ordered to pay alimony in futuro. At the time of the divorce, the wife was undergoing treatment for a life-threatening illness. After the divorce, the wife’s treatment resulted in a dramatic improvement in her health. Meanwhile, the husband lost his job and ultimately found employment at a reduced level of compensation. Citing his decreased income and the wife’s improved circumstances, the husband sought modification or termination of his alimony obligation. The trial court found a material change in circumstances, but nevertheless denied the husband’s petition to modify. The husband appeals. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re The Estate of Sepal Flogene Boren Emberton, Deceased
This is an appeal from the probate court’s award of $66,107.14 to Decedent’s Estate for the value of property Decedent’s husband did not return to the Estate following her death. The Administrators of the Estate appeal the court’s failure to award the Estate the value of certain jewelry the husband allegedly converted. The husband appeals the court’s valuation of the property he failed to return to the Estate. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s findings, we affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Ann Barnett v. Elite Sports Medicine, et al.
In this case, we are asked to decide whether an amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122, which became effective July 1, 2009, and requires the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to file a certificate of good faith at the time of filing suit, was properly applied to an action initiated prior to the effective date of the amendment, voluntarily dismissed and refiled after the effective date. We also consider whether the requirement that the plaintiff file a certificate of good faith applies to an action for medical battery. We affirm the judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy Sue Farley v. Ricky Farley
Wife filed a complaint for divorce. Husband did not file an answer. Wife sought and received a default judgment. Husband filed a motion to set aside the default judgment based on excusable neglect as a result of depression. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Soles4Souls, Inc. v. Donelson Cedarstone Associates, LP et al.
In a landlord-tenant dispute, the tenant plaintiff claims that before the parties entered into a lease for commercial property, the landlord defendants misrepresented estimated operating expenses that the plaintiff was expected to pay as part of its rent pursuant to the lease terms. The plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of its claims for fraud and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We find that the defendants misrepresented estimated operating expenses after entering into the initial lease with the plaintiff but before entering into an agreement for expansion space. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court on the plaintiff’s claims for fraud and violation of the TCPA and remand for determination of an appropriate remedy for damage the plaintiff suffered after agreeing to lease the expansion space. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Sutherland v. Cherry Lindamood et al.
An inmate filed suit, claiming that he was discriminated against in job assignments and that his First Amendment rights were violated in that he was retaliated against for making complaints. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Jackie Sabaski et al. v. Wilson County Board of Education et al.
Parents of disabled child sued county board of education and several employees for assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligent failure to train employees. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). We conclude that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement does not apply to the plaintiffs’ state law claims. We further conclude that the plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a valid claim for negligent failure to train because the IDEA provides the exclusive remedy for such claims, but their claims for assault and battery and false imprisonment are not precluded by the IDEA. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Zula Gray v. Joe Bednarz, Jr.
Plaintiff appeals a jury’s determination that she was 60 percent at fault for the injuries she sustained. We find there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Therefore, we affirm the judgment entered in accordance with the jury’s findings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Brown, An Incompetent, by and through next friend Angela Anderson v. State of Tennessee
Appellant, who was not placed on fall observations until after his fall, suffered a fall while under the care of the Western Mental Health Institute. A CAT scan performed three days after the fall revealed no hemorrhaging, however, a repeat scan performed approximately one month later revealed a subdural hematoma for which Appellant subsequently underwent two surgeries. Appellant, by and through his next friend, filed suit against the State in the Claims Commission alleging medical negligence. Following a trial, the Claims Commission found that a Western nurse breached the standard of care in completing the initial fall risk assessment, but that Appellant had failed to prove that such breach was a proximate cause of his fall. Additionally, the Commission found that Appellant had failed to prove that Western’s failure to later place Appellant on fall observations was a proximate cause of his fall. Finally, the Commission found that Appellant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Western’s failure to order repeat brain imaging prior to January 26, 2006, was a breach of the standard of care. We affirm the judgment of the Commission. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
Karim Skaan v. Federal Express Corporation, Inc.
Plaintiff/Appellant filed an action alleging breach of contract and retaliatory discharge. Defendant moved for summary judgment on both claims, and asserted the action was barred by a contractual limitations provision in the application for employment. The trial court awarded summary judgment to defendant with respect to the retaliatory discharge claim, and denied summary judgment with respect to defendant’s assertion that the matter was time-barred. Plaintiff appealed. We dismiss this appeal for failure to appeal a final judgment where the trial court has not entered an order adjudicating or otherwise disposing of plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, and plaintiff has failed to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Cheryl Brown Giggers, et al. v. Memphis Housing Authority, et al.
This is the second appeal of this wrongful death action, arising from a fatal shooting of a tenant at a Memphis public housing property. This Court granted Appellant, Memphis Housing Authority’s, Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal to address the trial court’s denial of summary judgment in favor of the Appellant. Finding that Appellees’ “failure to evict” claim is preempted by 47 U.S.C. §1437, and that Appellant retains its sovereign immunity under the discretionary function exception to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, we reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellant. Reversed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Adoption of Jeffrey T., et al.
In April of 2008, Lowell Shelton and Stella Shelton (“the Sheltons”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Jeffrey T. (“Father”) and Lisa T. (“Mother”) to the minor children, Jeffrey T. and Justin T. (“the Children”), and to adopt the Children. After a trial, the trial court entered an order on May 7, 2010, that, inter alia, terminated the parental rights of Father to the Children, and granted the adoption of the Children by the Sheltons. Father appeals to this Court raising issues regarding res judicata, whether the trial court erred in not requiring a home study, and whether the final order of adoption conformed to the statute, among others. We affirm. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Kentavious M. (d.o.b. 03/29/2007), A Minor Child Under Eighteen (18) years of age
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated the parental rights of the mother on the grounds of persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the terms of the permanency plans, and mental incompetence. The mother appeals, arguing that the Department of Children’s Services did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her with the child, the requirements of her permanency plans were not reasonable and related to the conditions that required her child’s removal, and the alleged failure to appoint her a guardian ad litem in the prior dependency and neglect proceedings precluded termination of her parental rights for persistence of conditions. Finding no error in the decision of the trial court, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tommie Hampton v. City of Memphis, Tennessee
Plaintiff was injured when Defendant Madden drove his vehicle at a high speed and in the wrong direction on an exit ramp of I-40/240 and collided head-on with plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Defendant Madden and against the City of Memphis pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act. In his complaint, plaintiff asserted Memphis City police negligently pursued Defendant Madden, and that this negligence proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court found plaintiff’s injuries were caused solely by the acts of Defendant Madden and entered judgment in favor of the City of Memphis. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joyce Via v. Larry Edward Oehlert, Sr.
This appeal arises out of a complaint to dissolve a partnership. The plaintiff alleged that she and the defendant, an unmarried couple, acquired real property through joint efforts. She further alleged that she contributed to the improvement of the property and an increase in its value, giving rise to a partnership for profit and a right to a distribution of the partnership’s assets following dissolution. The defendant denied that a partnership existed and counterclaimed for damages and attorney’s fees arising out of the plaintiff’s refusal to vacate the property following their break-up. At the ensuing bench trial, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the plaintiff’s claims. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, specifically finding that the plaintiff was unable to prove the existence of an express or implied partnership for profit between the parties. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals |
