Tom Spears and Dana Spears v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
Owners of an insured vehicle that was damaged by fire filed suit against their insurance company for breach of contract, failure to pay insurance claim in good faith, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Insurer filed a counter-complaint alleging that one of the insureds had no right of recovery under the policy because she had no insurable interest in the vehicle and that the other insured was barred from seeking recovery under the policy because the insured failed to answer questions under oath when asked by the insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: S.E.J. Donald Jordan v. Donald Roberson
This case involves competing adoption petitions filed by a child’s maternal and paternal grandparents after the child’s father was sentenced to death for killing the child’s mother. The trial court simply compared the relative fitness of the two sets of grandparents and granted the adoption petition of the paternal grandparents. We conclude that the trial court erred in giving equal weight to both petitions because the paternal grandparents did not meet the requirements set forth in Tennessee’s adoption statutes. We also conclude that the maternal grandparents were fit persons to have the care and custody of the child, that they are financially able to provide for the child, and that adoption is in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the chancery court and remand for entry of an order granting the adoption petition filed by the maternal grandparents. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Thuy-T-Lam d/b/a Nail Paradise v. Tuan Ngoc Buile a/k/a David Le
The appellant-defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his Motion for Summary Judgment and the modification and enforcement of his non-competition agreement with appellee-plaintiff. We affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant-defendant’s motion for summary judgment; we affirm the trial court’s ruling modifying the territorial restrictions in the non-compete agreement; we further modify the terms of the non-competition agreement in order to be consistent with Tennessee’s public policy; and we reverse the trial court’s institution of a permanent injunction against the appellantdefendant. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Georgia O'Keeffe Foundation (Museum) v. Fisk University
At issue in this appeal are the respective rights of three parties concerning charitable gifts of 101 pieces of art given, subject to conditions, to Fisk University in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The collection has an estimated present value in excess of $60 million. Four of the pieces, including the painting Radiator Building - Night, New York, were the property of Georgia O’Keeffe and given to the University by Ms. O’Keeffe. The other ninety-seven pieces were part of a much larger collection formerly owned by Alfred Stieglitz, Georgia O’Keeffe’s late husband. The ninety-seven pieces were gifted to the University by Ms. O’Keeffe as executrix of the estate and/or as the owner of a life estate in the ninety-seven pieces. All 101 pieces were charitable, conditional gifts that were subject to several restrictions, two of which are at issue here; the pieces could not be sold and the various pieces of art were to be displayed at Fisk University as one collection. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Georgia O'Keeffe Foundation (Museum) v. Fisk University - Concurring
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Emma Lou Hale vs. Gerald D. Hale and Bonnie F. Hale
Plaintiff sought a partition by sale of property she owned as a tenant in common. The defendants sought a partition in kind. The undisputed proof showed that the parcels were more valuable if sold together than if they were divided and sold separately. The trial court ordered the property sold. The defendants appealed. We affirm. |
Van Buren | Court of Appeals | |
State Of Tennessee, Department Of Children's Services v. Ruth Sails, Sylvester Pollard, Kenny Jones, and Unknown Fathers
This is a termination of parental rights case. The appellant mother of four children has a history of mental illness and substance abuse. The children were taken into state custody based on the mother’s lack of safe and stable housing and her drug abuse. The children were then placed together in the home of their maternal grandmother and ultimately stayed in State custody for over eight years. For the first several years, the children’s permanency plans required the mother to obtain drug treatment, attend parenting classes, seek treatment for her mental health issues, and provide a stable home for the children. At various times, these goals were accomplished, but at other times they were not. In 2006, the state petitioned the trial court to permit the mother to regain custody of the children, indicating that the mother had fulfilled her responsibilities. Around the same time, however, the mother tested positive for illegal drugs. Soon thereafter, the state filed the instant petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights. After a trial, the trial court granted the petition for termination based on the ground of persistent conditions, finding that the State had made reasonable efforts to assist the mother and that the children’s best interest would be served by termination. The mother as well as the children’s guardian ad litem now appeal the termination. We reverse, finding that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to assist the mother, particularly with respect to her underlying mental illness, and dismiss the petition to terminate her parental rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State Of Tennessee, Department Of Children's Services v. Ruth Sails, et al. - Dissenting
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond Clay Murray, Jr. v. Jes Beard
This is the second appeal in a legal malpractice case filed by Raymond Clay Murray, Jr. (“the Client”) against Jes Beard (“the Attorney”). In the first appeal, we affirmed the Trial Court’s sanction against the Attorney for discovery abuse which prohibited the Attorney from introducing any expert testimony at trial. However, a majority of this Court reversed the Trial Court’s issuance of a default judgment as a further sanction against the Attorney. We also affirmed the Trial Court’s determination that the amount of the Client’s damages totaled $16,697.38. We remanded the case on the sole issue of liability. On remand, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted the Client’s motion for summary judgment and found the Attorney 100% at fault for the Client’s damages. The Trial Court then denied the Attorney’s motion for summary judgment, found that motion was filed in violation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11, and awarded an additional $1,374.94 in damages. The Attorney appeals raising several issues. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in all respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Herbert Jones v. Lemoyne-Owen College and Cheryl Golden
This is a breach of contract case. The plaintiff college professor was asked by his employer college to teach a summer class. The class was cancelled after the professor had taught only two class sessions. The college said that the class was cancelled due to low enrollment; this reason was disputed by the professor. The professor filed a lawsuit against the college for breach of express contract, breach of contract implied in fact, breach of contract implied in law, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional interference with contractual relations. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant college on all of the professor’s claims. The professor appeals, arguing that he was denied discovery and that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. We affirm the challenged discovery rulings and the grant of summary judgment as to the claims for breach of express contract, breach of contract implied in fact, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional interference with contractual relations, and as to the claim for breach of contract implied in law with respect to the second class taught by the plaintiff. We reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the claim for breach of contract implied in law with respect to the first class taught by the plaintiff. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Steven LaRue vs. Laura Michelle LaRue - Concurring
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Union | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Steven LaRue vs. Laura Michelle LaRue
In this divorce action the Trial Court awarded primary custody of the children to the mother, refused to allow overnight visitation with the father until the children were one year old, and ordered standard visitation with the father. The father appealed, insisting that the Trial Court erred in applying the “tender years doctrine” and also erred in awarding standard visitation of the children. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
Jamie C. Runions v. Tennessee State University, et al
A woman enrolled in a nursing program at Tennessee State University received a grade of D in one of her courses and was dropped from the program. She appealed to the provost of the university, who led her to believe that she had been, or would be, reinstated. She learned that this was not so when she returned to class and the instructor physically escorted her from the classroom. She brought suit against the university and four of its employees, including the provost, asserting claims of battery, conspiracy to commit battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court dismissed her suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Cornelius v. State of Tennessee, Department Of Children's Services
This appeal arises from a dependency and neglect proceeding finding the minor child, B.C., dependent and neglected under Tennessee Code Annotated 37-1-102(b)(12), and specifically on the ground of severe child abuse on the part of the Appellant/Mother. The trial court sustained the petition to adjudicate dependency and neglect filed by the Appellee Department of Children's Services. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Millennium Taxi Service, L.L.C. v. Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport Authority
Millennium Taxi Service, L.L.C., filed suit against the Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport Authority (“CMAA”) seeking a declaration that CMAA regulations prohibiting unregistered taxicabs from picking up passengers curbside at the Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport were unconstitutional. Millennium further sought injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of the challenged regulations. In its counterclaim, CMAA asserted that Millennium had repeatedly and flagrantly violated its regulations and requested that Millennium be permanently enjoined from engaging in any further violations. The court granted in part and denied in part summary judgment to CMAA upon finding that the challenged regulations had a rational basis and did not discriminate unreasonably against unregistered taxis. Millennium appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Kerney, et al vs. Gary Endres, et al
Eric Kerney and wife, Cassandra Kerney, brought this suit to enjoin the operation of a beauty salon by defendant Susan Endres in the home owned by her and her husband, Gary Endres. The Kerneys and the Endreses are adjoining homeowners in the Plantation Manor Subdivision in Kingsport. The properties are subject to a restrictive covenant limiting their use to residential and forbidding commercial use. Following a bench trial, the court found the salon was merely incidental to the residential use and, as a consequence, did not violate the restriction. The court did, however, enjoin any expansion of the business. Plaintiffs appeal. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Mike Ellis v. Pauline S. Sprouse Residuary Trust, et al.
This matter is before us on remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court for consideration of issues we pretermitted in our earlier opinion, which decision the High Court reversed. In our earlier judgment, Ellis v. Sprouse, E2006-01771-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 3121666 (Tenn. Ct. App, E.S., filed October 26, 20007), we held that plaintiff Mike Ellis (“the Farmer”) did not exercise his lease option on farmland owned by Kerry M. Sprouse 1 (“the Landlord”) by actions taken after the lease expired. As a result of that holding, we ruled that the portion of the judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding lost farming profits of $82,000 could not stand. We further held that the punitive damage award of $30,000 had to be retried since – at the time of our decision – it was based solely upon a compensatory damages award of $534 for the Landlord’s trespass – a trespass that was not contested on appeal. In Ellis v. Sprouse, 280 S.W.3d. 806 (2009), the High Court held that the Farmer had indeed exercised his option to renew the lease by continuing to hold over and making his lease payments after the initial term had expired. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to this Court with “directions to consider and decide the issues that were pretermitted in [our] earlier opinion in this case.” We now have considered those issues, and, with respect to them, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. In light of the Supreme Court’s opinion and our opinion on remand, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed in toto. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Dan Stern Homes, Inc. v. Designer Floors & Homes, Inc., et al.
Appellants, a flooring company hired to install hardwood flooring at a home being built by Appellee, appeal the judgment of the trial court finding them liable for breach of contract and breach of warranty and awarding damages to Appellee. Appellants were hired to install hardwood flooring at a home being built by Appellee. After installation of the floors, problems developed; Appellants tried to correct the problems on numerous occasions to no avail. Appellee hired another subcontractor to refinish the hardwood flooring and to resolve the problems associated therewith. Appellee subsequently brought action against Appellant to recover amounts paid to subcontractor and the trial court awarded Appellee full measure of damages sought. We modify and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: A.L.B, d/o/b 09/16/1998, M.L.B.,Jr. d/o/b 12/24/2000, and M.L.B d/o/b 04/19/2002
Father appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating his parental rights. The trial court found that the father had committed severe child abuse, that the father failed to comply with the obligations and responsibilities outlined in the permanency plans, and that conditions which led to the removal of the children still persisted. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Leon Fraire et al. v. Titan Insurance Company et al.
The issue on appeal is whether Titan Insurance Company, which issued a “no-fault” automobile insurance policy to a Michigan resident, is entitled to be reimbursed for “personal protection insurance benefits” paid to its insureds for injuries sustained in a vehicular accident in Tennessee. After the insureds entered into a substantial settlement agreement with the tortfeasors in this civil action, which compensated them in addition to the benefits paid by Titan under the no-fault policy, Titan intervened seeking reimbursement of the benefits it paid. Titan contended that it was entitled, pursuant to Michigan’s No-Fault Insurance Act to reimbursement of the benefits remitted. The insureds, relying on the “made whole doctrine,” contended they had not been made whole by the settlement with the tortfeasor; therefore, Titan was not entitled to reimbursement. The trial court held that the made whole doctrine applied and that the insureds had not been made whole by the settlement; therefore, Titan was not entitled to reimbursement in any amount. Under Michigan’s No-Fault Insurance Act, specifically Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3116(2), (4), the right of the no-fault insurer to reimbursement of “economic” benefits paid for the benefit of its insureds is not dependent upon whether its insureds have been made whole by a settlement with the tortfeasor. Therefore, Titan’s right to reimbursement of economic benefits paid is not dependent on whether its insureds were “made whole.” Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and we remand with instructions for the trial court to determine the extent to which Titan is entitled to be reimbursed. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Carey Faulkner v. City of Bartlett
The appellant, a former police officer, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the chancery court alleging that her due process rights were violated when the City of Bartlett terminated her employment. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the appellant was an employee-at-will, and therefore, she had no protected property interest in her job. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Alex Friedmann v. Corrections Corporation of America
*NOTE: Opinion filed pursuant to 09-15-2009 Order granting rehear, wherein original opinion filed 08-05-2009 was withdrawn. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Wallace v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al
Petitioner seeking review of disciplinary action taken by warden of prison appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of certiorari. Finding the trial court did not err, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corporation v. Loren L. Chumley, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
Plaintiff is subject to excise and franchise taxes in the State of Tennessee. For the five year period at issue the Commissioner issued a variance pursuant to the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act which has been adopted by Tennessee. The variance enabled the Commissioner to alter the taxing formula and increase the amount of revenue assessed to plaintiff. Plaintiff filed this action in Chancery Court and the Chancellor voided the variance. On appeal, we hold that the Commissioner properly exercised her discretion in issuing the variance. We reverse the Chancellor and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Wendell P. Baugh, III, et al. v. Herman Novak, et al.
This case arises out of a business agreement between the parties. Plaintiffs executed a note to purchase a company. The note contained a stock transfer restriction. Subsequently, Plaintiffs entered into a business agreement with Defendants. The subject of that agreement is disputed in this lawsuit, but Plaintiffs contend that Defendants purchased one-half of the company and executed an indemnity agreement to indemnify Plaintiffs for one-half of the note on the purchase of the company. After operating for nearly ten years, the company failed. At trial, Plaintiffs sought to enforce the indemnity agreement, and Defendants counterclaimed to recover $73,000.00 that they paid to Plaintiffs before they allegedly executed the contract. The trial court found in Plaintiffs’ favor. Defendants now appeal claiming that the trial court made several evidentiary errors, that the contract is unenforceable because it violated the statute of frauds, that parol evidence regarding the terms of the contract was inadmissible, and that the corporation cannot continue its existence and sell stock after dissolution. We reverse the trial court’s determination based on our finding that the contract is unenforceable as a matter of public policy. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |
