Joyann E. Butler v. James Michael Butler
In this divorce proceeding, Wife appeals the trial court’s decision not to enforce the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement, the trial court’s distribution of the marital assets, and the trial court’s failure to sanction Husband for failure to comply with the discovery rules. After Wife filed for divorce, the parties executed a Martial Dissolution Agreement. The trial court, however, refused to enforce the Marital Dissolution Agreement because some of Husband’s property was damaged while within Wife’s exclusive control. The trial court admitted as evidence Wife’s attorney’s statement that he would not permit Wife to damage husband’s property. We affirm that attorney’s statement was properly admissible parol evidence and the trial court properly denied Wife’s motion to enforce the Martial Dissolution Agreement. Wife also argues that the trial court failed to equitably distribute the marital assets and that the court erred by failing to sanction Husband for discovery violations. This Court affirms the trial court’s division of marital assets, as modified, and its order denying Wife’s request for sanctions. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James E. Dyer, et al. v. Hill Services Plumbing and HVAC
This appeal arises from a dispute between an employee and employer over life insurance coverage under a group insurance policy. The facts of this case are relatively straightforward; the procedural history, however, is surprisingly complicated. Ultimately, we dismiss for lack of a final judgment and remand to the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Eller Media Company v. City of Memphis, et al.
This appeal concerns the value of property taken by the City of Memphis under its eminent domain power. The condemned land was subject to a leasehold interest held by the Appellant. The Appellant used the land as a site for a billboard, which it rented to advertisers. After taking possession of the land, the City compensated the owner, but not the Appellant. Appellant sought compensation for its property interest, and designated an expert witness to offer proof on its value. The City objected to the expert’s methodology, and asked the trial court to exclude his testimony. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that the expert’s methodology was prohibited by this Court’s decision in State ex rel. Comm’r v. Teasley, 913 S.W.2d 175 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Without the expert’s testimony, Appellant could not present proof on the value of its property interest and accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment for the City. Finding that the trial court erred when excluding Appellant’s expert, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Melody Young v. Donald Gregory Godfrey
This appeal involves an order entered by an Alabama court in 1996 regarding child custody and support. The trial court modified the order to require the father to pay future and retroactive child support. We vacate the portion of the order dealing with modification, because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the order, and remand for further proceedings. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Exel Transportation Services, Inc. v. Inter-Ego Systems, Inc. d/b/a Pinnacle Loudspeakers a/k/a Pinnacle Speakers
This appeal involves a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff transportation company has its principal place of business in Tennessee. It provided transportation services and financing to the defendant foreign corporation. The defendant eventually defaulted on payments due to the plaintiff. After negotiations by telephone, fax, and email, the parties agreed to a payment plan to bring the defendant’s account current. They executed a letter agreement confirming the arrangement. Subsequently, the Tennessee plaintiff realized that a substantial amount of the services it had rendered to the defendant foreign corporation were inadvertently not included in the letter agreement. The Tennessee plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Tennessee against the foreign corporation, seeking rescission or reformation of the agreement. The defendant foreign corporation filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the defendant foreign corporation had not purposely availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Tennessee and did not have sufficient contacts with Tennessee to be subjected to jurisdiction in this state. We affirm, finding that the circumstances do not support the exercise of either general or specific jurisdiction |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Autumn Laine McDaniel v. Kevin Eugene McDaniel
This is a divorce case. The parties were married in 2004, had one child in early 2005, and separated in late 2005. The wife filed a complaint for divorce soon after, and the husband counterclaimed for divorce. During the separation, the wife was the primary residential parent. The wife took various prescription medicines for several conditions, and had previously been addicted to pain medication. At the time of trial, the husband was cohabiting with a young woman whom he began dating when she was seventeen years old. During a substantial portion of the husband’s scheduled parenting time, the parties’ minor child was in the care of either the husband’s parents or the husband’s paramour. At trial, the wife testified as to the amount of her annual income, but proffered no documentary proof or other evidence. The trial court designated the wife as the primary residential parent, reduced the husband’s residential parenting time, and used the amount of income to which the wife testified to set the husband’s child support obligation. The husband appeals. He argues that the trial court erred in designating the wife as the primary residential parent, in reducing his residential parenting time, and in failing to impute to the wife the income level set forth in the child support guidelines. We affirm. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Rhonda Lynn G. (Pickle) Wheeler v. Jackie David Pickle
This appeal involves child support in the form of funds to be deposited into a savings account. The parties had two children and divorced. The mother was the primary residential parent. The father was ordered to pay some child support, below the guideline amount, directly to the mother. In addition, he was ordered to open and fund a savings account to be used to pay the children’s uninsured medical expenses. The order also stated that, once the children reached majority, any amounts left in the savings account were to be disbursed to the children. The father never opened or funded the savings account. The mother sought an award for the amounts that were supposed to have been deposited in the savings account. The trial court granted such an award in favor of the mother, and the father appeals. He argues that the amount that he was ordered to deposit into a savings account for uninsured medical expenses could not have been considered child support because the unused funds were to be disbursed to the children after they reached majority. He also argues that child support payments he made after the children reached majority should have been credited against any arrearage related to the savings account. We affirm, finding that the amounts ordered to have been placed in the savings account were part of the father’s child support obligation, and that the trial court did not err in declining to grant the father credit against the award based on child support paid after the children reached majority. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Regina F. Anderson v. Alfred Anderson
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in granting, and then failing to set aside, its Order of Judgment against Appellant. Appellant contends that he did not receive notice that his case was set for trial, as the court clerk failed to enter his address into the computer system, although it was provided in his Answer. In his Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Appellant sought relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.01. However, in his brief, Appellant argues that the Judgment should be set aside pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 55.02, 60.01, and 60.02. Because Appellant did not raise Rule 55.02 before the trial court, and because a default judgment was not issued against Appellant, Rule 55.02 relief is inappropriate. Moreover, although Appellant raised Rule 60.01 before the trial court, the error alleged by Appellant is not a “clerical error” within the meaning of Rule 60.01. Finally, Appellant did not seek Rule 60.02 relief by motion, as required by the Rule, nor did he raise Rule 60.02 before the trial court . Thus, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. Additionally, we decline to find Appellant’s appeal frivolous or to require Appellee to pay the costs associated with this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Regina F. Anderson v. Alfred Anderson - Dissenting
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in granting, and then failing to set aside, its Order of Judgment against Appellant. Appellant contends that he did not receive notice that his case was set for trial, as the court clerk failed to enter his address into the computer system, although it was provided in his Answer. In his Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Appellant sought relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.01. However, in his brief, Appellant argues that the Judgment should be set aside pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 55.02, 60.01, and 60.02. Because Appellant did not raise Rule 55.02 before the trial court, and because a default judgment was not issued against Appellant, Rule 55.02 relief is inappropriate. Moreover, although Appellant raised Rule 60.01 before the trial court, the error alleged by Appellant is not a “clerical error” within the meaning of Rule 60.01. Finally, Appellant did not seek Rule 60.02 relief by motion, as required by the Rule, nor did he raise Rule 60.02 before the trial court . Thus, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. Additionally, we decline to find Appellant’s appeal frivolous or to require Appellee to pay the costs associated with this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ivy Joe Clark and Vicky Clark, Individually and as Husband and Wife v. Joyce Ann Shoaf, et al.
This dispute concerns the extent to which Appellant/Unnamed Defendant insurance carrier is liable for damages under Plaintiff/Claimant’s uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance coverage where Defendant’s motor vehicle insurance carrier became insolvent during the pendency of the appeal of the matter. The trial court held Appellant insurance carrier was liable for the judgment rendered in Plaintiff’s favor up to the amount of Plaintiff’s uninsured motorist coverage. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sherrill Johnson, Individually and as next friend and mother of Victoria Johnson, a minor v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
A bystander in a parking lot was injured by a ricocheting bullet fired by a police officer. The officer and a fellow officer had been confronted in the parking lot by an armed assailant who fired his handgun at or towards the officers. The bystander, contending that one of the officers was negligent when he fired his weapon in self-defense, sued the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial judge dismissed the case on summary judgment. We find that the police officer acted reasonably under the circumstances confronting him, and we therefore affirm the trial judge. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re C.C.S. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Williamson County
Mother appeals the Circuit Court’s finding her in criminal contempt for violation of a court order and the Circuit Court’s total suspension of contact between her and the child. Finding the criminal contempt to be proper, we affirm. Finding the total suspension of mother’s visitation was not the least drastic measure available, we reverse and remand for the court to determine whether the prior visitation schedule should be revised. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Huey Strader v. Charles Traughber, Chairman of the Tennessee Board of Probation & Parole
Huey Strader, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Corrections, filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Davidson County Chancery Court, seeking review of the decision of the Board of Probation and Paroles revoking his parole, alleging that the Board acted arbitrarily and illegally by relying on hearsay evidence and on a confidential witness statement, in violation of his constitutional rights to due process and rules applicable to parole revocation proceedings. The trial court denied relief. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the Chancery Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Skinner v. Karen Thomas
This is a post-divorce case where Father petitioned for modification of the child custody order based on alleged material change in circumstances. The Williamson County Circuit Court partially granted the petition finding a material change in circumstances, but that a change in custody from Mother to Father was in the best interest of only one of the children, leaving custody of the other child with Mother. Both Father and Mother assert error by the trial court. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand this case for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Kaye Kemp Parish, et al. v. Jerry Donald Kemp, et ux.
This case comes to us as an intra-family dispute over the validity of a nonagenarian’s inter vivos gifts and will devises. After this Court held that there was a presumption that Defendants had unduly influenced the decedent, the trial court found upon remand that the Defendants had overcome this presumption and, therefore, upheld the will conveyances and inter vivos gifts to the Defendants. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Defendants rebutted this presumption of undue influence, we affirm the trial court’s determinations. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Shelby County Sheriff's Department v. Mark Lowe
The Shelby County Sheriff’s Department terminated the employment of Deputy Mark Lowe for violations of Department policies with respect to personal conduct, adherence to law, truthfulness, consorting with persons of bad or criminal reputation, and compliance with regulations regarding its code of ethics. The Civil Service Merit Board found Deputy Lowe guilty of the charges, but determined the punishment was excessive and modified it to a three-month suspension without pay followed by a one-year probationary period. Upon review, the chancery court affirmed the decision of the Civil Service Merit Board. The Sheriff’s Department appeals. We vacate the order of the chancery court for lack of jurisdiction and dismiss. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Electric Power Board a/k/a Nashville Electric Service ("NES") v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
A terminated Nashville Electric Service employee filed a complaint with the Human Rights Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. NES filed a declaratory judgment action claiming the Metropolitan Charter prevented the Human Rights Commission from investigating the complaint. The chancery court agreed with NES. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cathy Lakeland Allen v. John Fox Allen, Jr.
This is a petition to modify alimony. In the parties’ divorce decree, the husband was ordered to pay the wife alimony in futuro based in part on the wife’s chronic, incurable health condition. About six years later, the husband filed this petition to reduce or terminate his alimony obligation, arguing that (1) the wife’s health condition had not declined as was originally anticipated, and (2) his income had decreased and the wife’s income had increased. The trial court denied the husband’s petition, concluding that a material change in circumstances had not occurred. The husband now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the trial court did not err in finding that the husband did not prove a material change in circumstances and in denying his petition to modify his alimony obligation. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy Kyle, et al. v. J.A. Fulmer Trust
This appeal concerns a purchase option in a lease of a tract of land in Shelby County, Tennessee. Executed in 1950, the lease had an initial term of 50 years and six months. In 1953, the Lessee exercised its option to renew, allowing possession for an additional 50 years through 2050. In 2001, the Lessee attempted to exercise its option to purchase the leased property. Lessor then sought a declaratory judgment determining the validity of the purchase option, and if valid, the value to be paid for the Lessor’s interest in the property. The trial court found that the Lessee properly exercised the purchase option and that the value of the Lessor’s interest should be based upon the property as unencumbered by the remaining 50-year lease term. We affirm the trial court’s finding regarding the purchase option, but reverse its determination of the value of the Lessor's interest in the property. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jeremy Shane Johnson vs. State of Tennessee - Concurring
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jeremy Shane Johnson vs. State of Tennessee
Petitioner had entered a plea of delinquent to firing a weapon within the city limits and illegal possession of a firearm in Juvenile Court, and subsequently sought relief in a Post-Conviction Petition in the Trial Court. The Trial Court dismissed the Petition on the grounds that petitioner was not in custody of the Department of Children’s Services at the time he filed the Petition for Relief. On appeal, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Annette Cecilia Blakes v. Nicholas J. Sims
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred: (1) in modifying the Parties’ Final Decree of Divorce absent proof of a material change in circumstances affecting the best interest of the Parties’ child; (2) in making temporary modifications to the Final Decree of divorce absent clear and convincing proof that the child was being harmed or would be harmed in the situation that existed when the modifications were made; and (3) in finding that Father’s motives for relocating were vindictive, and in its concerns about Father’s willingness to comply with future court orders or to provide for the child. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of : The Estate of Allen Crawford Roberts, Deceased
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the probate court erred when it granted Appellee’s motion for a directed verdict. The probate court found that Appellants, in their proof in chief, did not satisfactorily make out a prima facie case of the Antenuptial Agreement’s validity under the statutes and appellate opinions of Tennessee as Appellants failed to establish that there was a satisfactory disclosure of Mr. Roberts’ assets. On appeal, Appellants contend that the motion for a directed verdict was improperly granted as reasonable minds could conclude that the Antenuptial Agreement was presented to, read, and understood by Appellee at execution and that the Antenuptial Agreement constituted a full and fair disclosure as required by Tennessee law. Although Appellants have urged an incorrect standard of review, we find, after a de novo review of the evidence, that Appellants made out a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. We reverse and remand to the probate court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Emily N. Williams v. Charles Cliburn
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her personal injury action as barred by the savings statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. The trial court measured the period for refiling the action from the date of entry of an Order of Non-Suit which had been sent to the court by facsimile rather than from the date of entry of the hard copy of the order. We find that the trial court correctly held that the operative date for purposes of the Tennessee savings statute was the date of entry of the first order received and signed by the court, but that Plaintiff was not given notice of entry of the order, as his counsel had requested. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of this action and remand for further proceedings. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Doris Jones And Billy Jones v. Lisa June Cox
This is a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellant/Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Appellees/Plaintiffs’ complaint for legal malpractice. Appellant, a licensed attorney, represented the Appellees in a lawsuit following an automobile accident. Appellant failed to effect service of process on the party-defendant to that suit. Appellees retained other counsel and filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against Appellant. Appellees’ new counsel made a strategic decision to withhold service of process on Appellant pending the outcome of the underlying case. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3) for intentional delay of service of process. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed. We reverse and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals |
