Dhananjaya R. Marpaka v. James A. Hefner and Tennessee State University
This appeal involves alleged discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff is a native of India and a practitioner of Hinduism, and is employed as an associate professor at the defendant university. The plaintiff applied for a promotion to full professor. His application for promotion was denied, based on his lack of achievement in either academic research or public service activities. The plaintiff professor filed a lawsuit alleging that the university discriminated against him on the basis of national origin and religion. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, proffering the professor’s lack of research and public service as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying his application for promotion. The plaintiff conceded his lack of research and public service, but asserted that he was denied release time from his teaching responsibilities to engage in such activities. The trial court granted the university’s motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff professor appeals. We affirm, finding that the plaintiff professor cannot show the denial of his application for promotion was discriminatory because he cannot show that he was qualified for such a promotion. We also find the record insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the denial of release time from the plaintiff’s teaching responsibilities was discriminatory. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tetra Tech, Inc. v. Performa Entertainment Real Estate,Inc.
This is a contract action wherein the parties dispute which of two versions of a professional services agreement is controlling. The trial court determined that the contract/counter-offer proffered by Defendant buyer was the contract between the parties, and that there had been accord and satisfaction when Plaintiff deposited Defendant’s check for the payment amount asserted by Defendant. We reverse the trial court’s finding of accord and satisfaction. We further hold that the contract found by the trial court to be the applicable contract is unenforceable where the contract price is indefinite and where there was a lack of mutual assent to essential terms. We hold Plaintiff is entitled to recover in quantum meruit for services rendered and remand for further proceedings to determine that amount. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sammy L. Halliburton v. Town of Halls
This case requires us to inquire whether the Town of Halls was immune under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) for maintaining a baseball field that the plaintiff alleges is a nuisance because one of many balls that flew over the field’s fence into a residential neighborhood injured him. The trial court held that the Town of Halls was immune from liability because it had engaged in a discretionary function and that the baseball field did not constitute a nuisance. On appeal, we find that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Town of Halls had notice of any dangerous condition of the baseball field in Kevan Ward Park, and, thus, we affirm the trial court on the basis that the Town of Halls was immune from liability pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Smith v. State of Tennessee Department of Correction
This is an appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari filed by an inmate |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Murphy, individually, d/b/a/ Cool Flame Lamps v. Resurgence Financial, LLC, Assignee of Wells Fargo Bank
Appellee Bank filed suit against Appellant to collect for charges made to Appellant’s account. The general sessions court entered judgment in favor of Appellee Bank; Appellant, proceeding pro se, appealed that decision to the Circuit Court at Carroll County. The circuit court affirmed the judgment of the general sessions court and Appellant appeals. In the absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence, the trial court’s factual findings are conclusive on appeal, and we affirm. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Anderson, Ed Howell Anderson, and Gary Anderson, v. U.S.A. Truck, Inc., an Arkansas Corporation and Lonzie E. Neal
This is a vehicular accident case. The three plaintiffs, a father and two grown sons, were riding in a truck pulling a trailer. An 18-wheeler driven by the individual defendant rear-ended the plaintiffs. In the days after the accident, all three plaintiffs sought medical treatment for back and neck pain. They filed this lawsuit against the defendants for injuries sustained in the accident. In the jury trial, after the close of the plaintiffs’ proof, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on the issue of punitive damages. At the conclusion of the six-day trial, the jury awarded two of the plaintiffs $10,000 each in damages and awarded the other plaintiff $200,000. Fault for the accident was apportioned 70% to the defendant and 30% to the driver of the plaintiffs’ truck, so the plaintiffs’ awards were reduced by 30%. The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to for additur or for a new trial. The plaintiffs now appeal, claiming that the issue of punitive damages should have been presented to the jury, that the amount of the jury’s awards were de minimus and outside the realm of reasonableness, and that there was no material evidence to support the jury’s verdict. We affirm, finding inter alia that the trial court did not err in directing a verdict on the issue of punitive damages, and that material evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel Claude Cain, et al v. City of Chuch Hill, Tennessee
The State of Tennessee, proceeding on relation of six individuals and one entity (who, for ease of reference, will collectively be referred to as “the plaintiffs”), sought mandamus in 2002 to force the City of Church Hill (“the City”) to extend a sewer line to the individuals’ homes. The individuals are residents of a neighborhood in Hawkins County that was annexed by the City in 1988. They claim that the City failed to adhere to the plan of services adopted as part of the annexation process, and that the plaintiffs are therefore entitled to mandamus under Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-108 (2005). The plan of services adopted in 1988 states that “[a] sanitary sewer system will be provided as soon as economically feasible.” The trial court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment, finding that the long delay in installing a sewer system, which continued at the time of trial, was unreasonable, and that there were no disputed issues of material fact preventing the court from granting mandamus under § 6-51-108. However, the court ordered a trial on the issue of how quickly the City could reasonably install the sewer line. At the conclusion of this limited-purpose trial, the court ordered the City to extend sewer service to the plaintiffs within 16 months. The City appeals. We vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Dawn Haines Huddleston v. Lee Alan Haines
In this custody dispute between parents, the Trial Judge awarded the mother attorney’s fees against the father. On appeal, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: C.M.C. Michelle Marie Chaffin v. Cheryl Leathers et al.
Mother of minor child appeals a juvenile court order rejecting her challenge to the validity of a 2004 order awarding custody of the child to maternal grandparents. Mother argues that the 2004 order is void because she did not receive notice of the proceedings and the order does not contain necessary findings. Mother further argues that the juvenile court erred in failing to give her a full hearing. We have determined that the appealed order arose out of dependency and neglect proceedings and, therefore, must be appealed to the circuit court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Allied Business Brokers, Inc. v. Abed Amro, et al. - Memorandum Opinion
This is the second appearance of the dispute between these parties in this Court. This lawsuit has its genesis in a 1995 general sessions court action wherein Plaintiff/Appellee Allied Business Brokers, Inc. (“Allied’) sought damages for breach of contract. The facts and procedural history of the breach of contract action are recited in Allied Business Brokers, Inc. v. Abraham Musa, et al., No. W1999-00378-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 33191373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2000) (perm. app. denied May 14, 2001), and we find it unnecessary to repeat them here. In Allied Business, we held Defendant Abed Amro (Mr. Amro) was bound by the terms of a brokerage contract that he had signed on behalf of his friend, Defendant Abraham Musa. We remanded the matter to the trial court for entry of a judgment in favor of Allied. Id. at *4. In the meantime, in 1997 Mr. Amro conveyed certain real property to his wife, Nida Amro (Ms. Amro). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William Burse And Wife, June Burse v. Frank W. Hicks, III, et al.
This is a negligence action. Burse filed a complaint against Appellant alleging that Appellant had negligently injured him in an automobile accident. Appellant answered the complaint, in part, by alleging that the accident was caused by the negligence of Appellee. At the time of the accident, Appellee and Burse were standing next to each other while preparing for a Christmas parade. Appellee moved for summary judgment alleging that he owed no duty to Burse and that he was not the cause of the accident. The trial court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment, and this appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
C.S. v. The Diocese of Nashville
This case arose from the sexual abuse of a minor by a Catholic priest. The plaintiff, the victim, claimed the defendant, the priest’s employer, knew of and concealed the priest’s propensity to commit sex crimes against adolescent boys. Approximately thirty (30) years after the abuse, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that such actions constituted outrageous conduct and negligence by the defendant leading to the plaintiff’s abuse. The defendant moved for dismissal of the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the statute of limitations bars such actions brought more than one year after the minor reaches the age of majority. The plaintiff argued the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of plaintiff’s cause of action tolled the statute of limitations. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge to discover his cause of action against the defendant before the statute of limitations expired. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Marie Walls Altman v. Benjamin Altman
The Trial Judge awarded the wife a divorce in this case and ordered the husband to pay periodic alimony in the amount of $5,000.00 a month. The husband has appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court, as modified. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Cindy Goodson Harvey, et al. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, et al.
Ronald W. Harvey, Jr., was involved in an automobile accident while driving a 1999 Dodge Caravan in the course of his employment with B&W Wholesalers. At the time of the accident, Mr. Harvey and his wife, Cindy Goodson Harvey (collectively “the Harveys”), had an automobile insurance policy with Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Insurance Company”) that listed the Caravan as the covered vehicle. However, the policy included an exclusion for any vehicle “[w]hile used in employment by any person whose primary duties are the delivery of products or services[.]” Insurance Company refused to defend the Harveys in a lawsuit regarding the accident, claiming that the exclusion applies. The Harveys sought a declaratory judgment that the accident was covered by the policy. After a bench trial, the court dismissed the case and declared that the exclusion applied. The Harveys appeal, arguing that “delivery of products or services” was not among Mr. Harvey’s “primary duties,” and that, in any event, Insurance Company should be estopped from denying coverage because it knew how Mr. Harvey intended to use the van and provided coverage anyway. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy George Rogers
The Trial Court held defendant in contempt. On appeal, we affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Christina R. Britt, et al. v. Maury County Board of Education, et al.
The trial court granted the Board of Education’s Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing a cheerleader’s two claims for personal injury under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. We affirm the judgment as to the claim that the Board negligently hired the sponsor of the cheerleading squad. Finding, however, that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the cheerleading squad sponsor’s negligence, we reverse that portion of the judgment. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Georgia-Pacific LLC, et al. v. Swift Transportation Corporation
This appeal involves the indemnity and insurance provisions of a contract, which must be interpreted according to Georgia law. The trial court found that the defendant had no duty to indemnify or insure the plaintiff for a claim based on the plaintiff’s own negligence. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sara K. Ruder v. Joseph R. Ruder
This is a divorce case involving the interpretation of a Prenuptial Agreement. Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision to reimburse certain expenditures made by Wife as “improvements” to the marital home. Wife/Appellee appeals the trial court’s denial of her request for attorney’s fees. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer McClain Swan v. Frank Edward Swan
Jennifer McClain Swan (“Mother”) and Frank Edward Swan (“Father”) were divorced in March of 2006 in Knox County Chancery Court (“Chancery Court”). The parties have two minor children born of the marriage (“the Children”). In October of 2006, Mother obtained first an Ex Parte Order of Protection against Father and then a Bridging Ex Parte Order of Protection from the Fourth Circuit Court for Knox County (“Circuit Court”). Over the next few months, Mother filed multiple petitions for contempt alleging that Father had violated the Order of Protection. After a hearing, the Circuit Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that Father had violated the Bridging Order of Protection a total of forty-four times, that Father would serve time in the Knox County Penal Farm, that Mother had a no-contact Order of Protection against Father for ten years, and that Mother would be allowed to relocate outside the state of Tennessee without having to reveal her address to Father. The Circuit Court also entered a modification of the Chancery Court’s Permanent Parenting Plan that, inter alia, named Mother the primary residential parent and provided that Father would have co-parenting time with the Children only upon the recommendation and approval of Father’s psychologist, the Children’s psychologist, the Guardian Ad Litem, and the Court. Father appeals to this Court. We vacate the Permanent Parenting Plan entered by the Circuit Court and affirm the remainder of the Order of Protection.
|
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Universal Outdoor, Inc., et al. v. Tennessee Department of Transportation
The Tennessee Department of Transportation ordered the removal of a long-existing billboard to permit the expansion of a highway right-of-way. The billboard’s owner removed the sign and reinstalled it on another part of its leasehold, within 30 feet of its original location. The Department refused to renew the permit for the sign or to issue a new permit because its new location did not comply with the requirements of The Billboard Regulation and Control Act of 1972. The owner challenged that decision at an administrative hearing, arguing that it was entitled to maintain the nonconforming billboard at its new location under the “grandfathering” clause of the zoning statute. The administrative law judge disagreed and ordered the billboard’s removal. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge. We affirm the chancery court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Catherine Smith v. Sally Brittingham Smith and John Michael Charles Smith
This is an appeal from an order joining a third party in a divorce action. During the husband and wife’s marriage, husband’s mother gave the couple a substantial amount of money. The wife filed for a divorce in circuit court. Soon after, the husband’s mother filed a lawsuit in chancery court against the husband and wife, alleging breach of an agreement to repay the funds and to grant her a security interest in the marital home. Simultaneously, she filed a lien lis pendens on the marital home. The marital home was sold, and the chancery court transferred the husband’s mother’s lien lis pendens to the proceeds of the sale. The husband allowed a default judgment to be taken against him in his mother’s chancery court lawsuit. Subsequently, the circuit court granted the wife’s motion to join the husband’s mother in the divorce proceedings as a necessary party. Thereafter, the chancery court case was transferred to the circuit court. The circuit court held a trial on the merits; it found no agreement by the wife to repay the monies given to the couple by the husband’s mother, and dismissed her claim against the wife. The husband’s mother was awarded damages against the husband for the full amount of the money loaned, to be paid out of his share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home. The circuit court’s distribution of the martial estate, however, effectively eliminated his share of the proceeds. The husband’s mother appeals, arguing that she was improperly joined in the divorce action, and that the circuit court did not give proper effect to her lien lis pendens against the proceeds from the sale of the marital home. On appeal, we affirm, finding that the joinder was proper and finding no error in the application of the lien against the husband’s share of the proceeds. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Catherine Smith v. Sally Brittingham Smith and John Michael Charles Smith - Order
|
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: A.N.F. (d/o/b 10/24/99), a Child Under Eighteen Years of Age
This opinion involves two consolidated appeals. The first case involves post-divorce petitions to modify a parenting plan, filed by the husband and the wife, regarding custody of two children. The second case was filed by the wife and a third party, seeking to establish the third party’s parentage of one of the two children. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision in the custody case as modified, and we affirm the trial court’s decision in the paternity case. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, et al. v. Good Times, Ltd., et al.
The State of Tennessee (“State”) sued Good Times, Ltd. (“Good Times”) 1 and others with regard to real property deeded to the State by Good Times after the State was sued for inverse condemnation by Good Times’ lessee, Pun Wun Chan d/b/a #1 China Buffet (“China Buffet”). The State claimed that it was entitled to indemnity from Good Times in the inverse condemnation action under its warranty deed. The Trial Court consolidated the State’s case against Good Times with the inverse condemnation action and then bifurcated the trial. The inverse condemnation case was tried before a jury and China Buffet was awarded a judgment against the State. The Trial Court then granted summary judgment to Good Times in the State’s case against Good Times and dismissed the State’s case. The State appeals to this Court. We vacate the grant of summary judgment to Good Times, grant the State summary judgment against Good Times, and remand this case to the Trial Court for a determination of the amount of damages, and for further proceedings as necessary with regard to all other parties and claims. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Vickie Robnett v. Edward H. Tenison, Jr.
The issue is whether a court-ordered easement by necessity for ingress and egress to landlocked property may be terminated on the ground it is no longer necessary because the landlocked owner has an express easement through which that owner has reasonable, although not as desirable, ingress and egress. The trial court denied the petition to terminate the easement by necessity upon a finding it would place an undue burden on the landlocked property owner to have it terminated. We have determined the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, that of undue burden, to deny the petition to terminate the easement at issue. Easements by necessity are dependent on the necessity that created them; therefore, a way of necessity continues only as long as a necessity for its use continues. The fact that the way of necessity would be the most convenient does not prevent its extinguishment when it ceases to be absolutely necessary. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals |
