The Estate of Eldora Burkes, by and through its Administrator, C.T.A., Calvin Burkes v. St. Peter Villa, Inc., d/b/a St. Peter Villa Nursing Home
This appeal involves an award of discretionary costs after a voluntary dismissal. The plaintiff estate filed a lawsuit against the defendant nursing home, alleging abuse and neglect of the plaintiff’s decedent. The defendant nursing home filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to exclude the plaintiff’s expert. The motion for summary judgment was denied, but the motion to exclude the plaintiff’s expert was granted. The plaintiff then filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. Consequently, the trial court entered an order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice. After entry of this order, the defendant nursing home filed a motion for discretionary costs, pursuant to Rule 54.04(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted the motion, and entered an order assessing the costs against the plaintiff estate. The plaintiff estate now appeals, arguing that the defendant nursing home was not entitled to an award of discretionary costs because it obtained no relief on the merits of the case and therefore was not a “prevailing party.” We affirm, finding that Rule 54.04(2) expressly authorizes the trial court, in its discretion, to award discretionary costs to a defendant in a lawsuit that is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of William Reynolds, Jr., Deceased
This appeal involves a sale of equipment, made by a decedent to his friend, eleven days before he died. The administrator of the decedent’s estate filed a complaint to set aside the sale alleging fraud, undue influence, and inadequate consideration. Following a bench trial, the trial court set aside the sale and ordered the estate to reimburse the purchase money to the buyers. We reverse. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of William Reynolds, Jr., Deceased - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case.
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Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan Patrick Hayes v. Deborah Ingrid Hayes
The Trial Court denied the husband Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 relief from a default judgment in the divorce case. We grant a new trial as to equitable division of marital property. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
James E. Rasberry v. Orman Campbell, O.D., et al.
Plaintiff brought suit to enforce a contract for the sale of real estate contending that one of the selling heirs was the authorized agent of the remaining heirs to enter into the agreement. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits and the Plaintiff countered with his affidavit. Finding no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court granted the motion and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond Clayton Murray, Jr. et al v.Jes Beard, Esquire - Dissenting and Concurring
I concur in the majority’s decision except that I, respectfully, dissent from the majority’s holding “that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the [Plaintiff’s] amended motion and limiting the trial to the issue of damages only.” I believe the Trial Court acted well within its discretion in ordering this sanction. As discussed by the majority, Rule 37.04 clearly is authority for a trial court’s “rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party” because that party failed to serve answers or objections to interrogatories. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02(C). That is exactly what the Trial Court did here. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond Clayton Murray, Jr. et al v. Jes Beard, Esquire
This is a legal malpractice case. Raymond Clayton Murray, Jr. (“the Client”) sued his former attorney, Jes Beard (“the Attorney”), in connection with the Attorney’s representation of the Client in the latter’s action to modify child support. In the present case, after the Attorney failed to answer interrogatories regarding his experts, the Client filed a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37 seeking to prevent the Attorney from offering any expert testimony. The court entered an order granting the Client’s motion and barring the Attorney from introducing expert testimony at trial. The Client subsequently filed a second motion for Rule 37 sanctions, this time seeking a default judgment against the Attorney. The motion sought this further sanction as punishment for the Attorney’s alleged failure to cooperate in the discovery process. The court granted this motion and announced its decision in a fax to counsel on the day before trial. An order was never entered memorializing this ruling. The Attorney filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied. After a hearing solely on the issue of damages, the trial court entered a judgment against the Attorney for $16,697.38. He appeals. After review, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted a default judgment against the Attorney as a Rule 37 sanction. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial, but solely on the issue of liability. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, v. Unitrac Railroad Materials, Inc.
Plaintiff sought to recover payment of workers compensation benefits via subrogation against the defendant. The Trial Court entered Judgment for defendant. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Davidson County v. Alfred O. Hibler, II
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) brought this action alleging that Alfred O. Hibler, II, had failed to report earned income as required in order to avoid a reduction in the amount of his Metro disability pension, resulting in significant pension overpayments to Mr. Hibler. The income in dispute consisted of distributions of excess earnings of an S corporation owned by Mr. Hibler. The issue is whether this income is properly characterized as “earned income,” defined by the Metro Code as including “wage or salary – not rent, interest, dividends or capital gains.” After a trial, the trial court ruled that the distributions, labeled “draws” by the S corporation, were not earned income required to be reported to Metro for purposes of calculating Mr. Hibler’s disability pension, and dismissed the action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Janette Direnzo Frazier v. Russell Keith Frazier
The trial court found Defendant/Petitioner to be in contempt; denied his petition to modify alimonyupon finding no change in material circumstance; ordered him to pay back alimony, plus 10%interest; awarded Plaintiff/Respondent’s attorney’s fees. On appeal, Defendant/Petitioner asserts thetrial court erred in failing to find a material change in circumstance. We vacate in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Blackburn & McCune, PLLC, v. Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc., et al.
Blackburn & McCune brought suit alleging it was fraudulently induced to enter an administrative services contract with Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc. The trial court dismissed the suit based upon a forum selection provision contained in an Attorney Provider Agreement executed by the parties. Blackburn & McCune has appealed. Based upon our interpretation of the forum selection clause, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gordon H. Thompson, et al. v. John W. Logan
Defendants appeal the trial court’s award to plaintiff of damages under an agreement wherein defendants and plaintiff were sharing brokerage commissions generated by plaintiff’s clients. The trial court found the term “retirement,” which governed whether plaintiff was entitled to a five (5) year pay out, was ambiguous and resorted to consideration of extrinsic evidence. We reverse and hold that the term is not ambiguous and that plaintiff is not entitled to payment under the retirement provision of the agreement. We also find that the defendants are not precluded by Tenn. R. App. P. 3(f) from raising the post-judgment imposition of discovery sanctions against them. However, we decline to reverse the sanctions decision since the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding them. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joshua L. Carter v. George Little, et al.
The Northwest Correctional Complex Inmate Disciplinary Board convicted a prisoner of disciplinary infractions. The prisoner filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari alleging the Board committed several procedural violations related to the disciplinary hearing, including violation of the prisoner’s due process rights. In this appeal we must determine whether the chancery court properly granted the Board’s motion to dismiss the prisoner’s petition. The chancery court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the prisoner did not verify his petition. The prisoner contends that the petition was verified because, along with the petition, he filed a verified inmate trust fund certification balance form and a verified affidavit of indigency. We affirm. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Jeffery Edgeworth v. Stacy Brawley Edgeworth
The parents, who have three minor sons, were divorced in 2003, and they entered an agreed parenting plan whereby the mother was designated the primary residential parent and the father was ordered to pay child support. The father experienced an increase in income the following year, and the mother petitioned the chancery court for an increase in his child support obligation, to which the father agreed. In early 2006, the father left his job for a similar job with his stepfather and brother which provided him with less income. The father petitioned the chancery court for a downward modification of his child support obligation, citing his decreased income. The mother then sent the father a notice of her intent to relocate from Memphis to Franklin, Tennessee, because of an employment opportunity. After hearings, the chancery court denied the mother’s petition for relocation. The chancery court instructed the parties’ attorneys to calculate child support according to the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines using income amounts that it had imputed to the mother and father, and without providing any basis as to how it had determined these figures. At a later hearing, the chancery court set a child support amount in excess of what the parties had determined according to the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines, which amount was ordered to include the father’s contribution to the children’s private school tuition. The chancery court did not include the child support worksheets in its order, nor did it provide written findings supporting its decision to deviate. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Towe Iron Works, Inc. and David L. Towe, Sr., v. Donald W. Towe, Sr., Shirley F. Towe, Richard L. Towe, Sr., Jewel M. Towe, and Carolyn E. McMurray, Personal Representative of the Estate of Willayne Towe and Trustees of any Trust thereunder
In this action to enforce an option to purchase contained in a lease between plaintiff/lessee and the children of the deceased lessor, the Trial Court, while finding the terms of the lease had been breached by the lessee, held that the plaintiff had properly exercised the option to purchase the property. Defendants have appealed and we reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Charles and Ann Halford v. Harold R. Gunn
The plaintiff-buyers entered into an installment sales contract in 1991 in which they agreed to purchase real property owned by the defendant-seller. The contract provided that upon the plaintiffs’ payment of the purchase price, the defendant would provide a deed conveying the property to them free of encumbrances. In 2002, a general sessions judgment was entered against the defendant in an unrelated case, and the defendant appealed that judgment to the circuit court, where that case currently remains pending. The judgment was filed as a lien on the real property in 2002. In late 2004 or early 2005, the plaintiffs had made all necessary payments on the real property, and the defendant conveyed the property to them by warranty deed. While attempting to sell the real property in 2005, the plaintiffs discovered the existence of the 2002 judgment lien on the property, and they placed funds in escrow in order to satisfy their intended purchaser that the lien would be removed or paid. The plaintiffs filed a warrant in general sessions court against the defendant, alleging that he was liable for breach of the covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed. The general sessions court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed to the circuit court. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and sought an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. The circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment, but denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees. On appeal, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a determination of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred below and on appeal. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
BEP Services, Inc. v. Carefirst Foundation, Inc. f/k/a Provident Foundation, Inc.
Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment to defendants in its suit filed on the theory of equitable subrogation. The trial court found that the undisputed facts established that plaintiff acted as a volunteer and proved no fraud, accident or mistake. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Terrie Lynn Hall Hankins v. James Michael Hankins
In this case, the plaintiff wife filed for divorce from the defendant husband in December of 2003. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: M.A.B, D.C.M, M.A.M, M.I.M, D.Z.M and W.M.E.M.
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to six of her children based upon the persistence of conditions that led to removal of the children from Mother’s care by the Department of Children’s Services and upon finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Steven D. Tutt v. Tennessee Dept. of Corrections
An inmate convicted of rape of a child filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment, asking the Chancery Court to find that he was entitled to earn sentence reduction credits so he could be released from prison before the end of his fifteen year sentence. The Chancery Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the statute under which he was convicted required him to serve 100% of his sentence, undiminished by any sentence reduction credits. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Curtis N. Robinson, et al. v. Baptist Memorial Hospital - Lauderdale
This appeal arises from a medical negligence case in which a jury verdict was entered in favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees and against Defendant/Appellant Hospital. The Hospital appeals on numerous grounds including: (1) whether the trial court erred in allowing certain evidence in alleged contravention of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 26.05 and 37.03, (2) whether the trial court erred in not granting the Hospital’s motion for new trial on the grounds of alleged inappropriate and inflammatory comments and arguments by opposing counsel; and (3) whether there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Duke Bowers Clement v. Janet Leigh Traylor Clement
This is the second appeal of a divorce case. In the first appeal, this Court determined that the trial court erred in the valuation and distribution of the parties’ marital residence, and concluded that the equity in the marital residence should be divided equally between the parties. The cause was remanded to the trial court to consider a method of payment. Before the matter was considered by the trial court on remand, the parties agreed to sell the property. After the property was sold, they divided the proceeds equally. The wife then filed a petition in the trial court disputing the amount she received. She also sought post-judgment interest from the date of the final divorce decree. The trial court denied the wife’s petition. The wife now appeals for a second time. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald M. Floyd, et al. v. Prime Succession of TN, et al.
This lawsuit was filed by the husband and children of Gail Lavan Floyd, who died in March 2000. T. Ray Brent Marsh (“Marsh”) and the company managed by him, Tri-State Crematory, Inc. (“Tri- State”), are the only remaining defendants. The instant case is one of many civil actions filed against Marsh and Tri-State following the discovery of over 300 bodies on the company’s premises. The bodies were to have been cremated, but were not. Criminal charges were brought against Marsh in Georgia and Tennessee. He pleaded guilty to many of the charges. Following Marsh’s sentencing, he was noticed, for the second time, to give a deposition in the instant action. At an earlier deposition, he had invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. As to the present notice, the trial court concluded that Marsh could no longer invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege because, in the court’s judgment, he is no longer facing criminal prosecution. The court ordered Marsh to give a second deposition and further ordered that he could not refuse to answer any question posed to him at the deposition if his refusal was predicated upon the Fifth Amendment. We granted Marsh’s Tenn. R. App. P. 9 application for an interlocutory appeal. We affirm in part and vacate in part. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Tonya L. Merrick v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, being of the opinion the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Farmer v. David Hersh
This is a defamation case. The defendant owned a minor league baseball team which played for the City of Jackson, Tennessee. In 2002, the plaintiff, the mayor of Jackson, was negotiating with the defendant team owners to purchase the baseball team on behalf of the city. Soon the plaintiff mayor and the defendant owner became embroiled in a lawsuit related to the sale of the team. Two years later, the plaintiff mayor filed the instant lawsuit, alleging that the defendant team owner had defamed him by telling the media that the mayor was attempting to “steal” the team. After some discovery, the defendant team owner filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. At the hearing on the motion, the trial court noted that matters outside the complaint had been submitted to the court, and it therefore treated the motion as one for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the statement allegedly made by the defendant team owner was not defamatory, and that the plaintiff mayor had not presented sufficient proof of damages. The plaintiff mayor now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the statement allegedly made is mere hyperbole and not defamatory as a matter of law. |
Madison | Court of Appeals |
