Randal Louis Murdaugh v. Svetlana Nicolaevna Shketik (Murdaugh)
In this divorce case, the husband filed for divorce approximately five months after entering into marriage with the wife, an immigrant who had come to the United States from Latvia on a religious work visa. The husband resided in Madison County, Tennessee, and the wife and her son spent a majority of the duration of the marriage living in Cincinnati, Ohio, where the wife worked for a church and her son attended school. The chancellor awarded the wife temporary support and held a bench trial. The chancellor granted the parties a divorce based upon stipulated grounds and awarded the wife 25% of the value of the parties’ marital property, as well as attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Melvin Perry v. Bruce Westbrooks, et al.
Appellant challenges trial court’s order dismissing Appellant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The record reveals that the court reached its decision in a lawful manner. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Cheryl Brown Giggers, et al. v. Memphis Housing Authority, et al.
This appeal involves a wrongful death action arising from the fatal shooting of a tenant at a public housing property. The decedent was in the manager’s office of the apartment complex when another tenant, who was involved in an altercation with a security guard on the premises, obtained a rifle from his apartment and began shooting at the security guard. The decedent was struck and killed by a bullet fired by the other tenant during the incident. The plaintiffs, the surviving children and sister of the decedent, sued the defendant owner and operator of the public housing property, asserting claims for wrongful death through negligence and breach of contract per the lease agreement. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Willis B. Amos, et al. v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the lump-sum payments made to Appellants upon their retirement were not for performing personal services; but instead, were in lieu of the employee using his/her accrued vacation time. Although the payments were indeed made in lieu of the employee using his/her accrued vacation time, the payments were compensation for the employee performing personal services during his/her employment.
|
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Willis Bruce Amos, et al. v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
This appeal involves a declaratory judgment on the issue of whether pursuant to the Metro Code, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, should have included lump-sum payments for accrued vacation time in the calculation of pension benefits for retired employees, or in the alternative, whether the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee should be estopped from excluding lump-sum payments for accrued vacation time from the calculation of pension benefits for retired employees. On appeal, the Appellants claim that the trial court erred in finding that: 1) pursuant to the Metro Code, lump-sum payments should be excluded from the calculation of pension benefits for retired employees, 2) the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee is not estopped from excluding the lump-sum payments from the calculations, and 3) denying certification of this matter as a class action. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cassandra Rogers v. State of Tennessee
Following a car accident, Claimant/Appellant filed a Complaint with the Tennessee Claims Commission. The Complaint stated that Claimant/Appellant did not have sufficient facts to state definitively a claim for negligence against a Tennessee State Trooper. The State filed a motion to dismiss, which the Commission granted. Claimant/Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of: M.A.W.
The trial court dismissed Father’s petition to modify child custody upon determining no material change in circumstances had occurred. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ann M. Honeycutt v. Wilkes, Mccullough & Wagner, and Barbara McCullough, Individually
This appeal involves a legal malpractice claim that a client brought against her former attorney after this Court issued a decision terminating the client’s receipt of alimony. The attorney had represented the client in her divorce case. When the parties executed their marital dissolution agreement, the attorney allegedly provided erroneous advice to the client about a provision that would terminate her alimony if she cohabited with an unrelated male. Subsequent to the divorce, the client’s ex-husband filed a petition to terminate his alimony obligation because the client was living with another man. Although the client initially retained this same attorney to defend against the petition, she later discharged her and retained other counsel. The trial court ruled in the client’s favor, but on appeal, we reversed and terminated the alimony obligation. The client then sued her former attorney, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the attorney based upon the one year statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Accredo Health Incorporated, et al. v. David Patterson
The trial court dismissed this lawsuit upon determining that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant, a Texas resident. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mike Campbell v. Country Homes, Inc., et al.
On this appeal, it is alleged the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing appellant’s complaint for failure to obey an order compelling discovery and for refusing to vacate that order. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Terre Jo Fields v. James R. Fields, Jr.
Husband was found in civil contempt and incarcerated. He was further enjoined from being selfemployed. He appeals only the injunction which we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Ann McCracken Sizemore v. Steven Douglas Sizemore and Nancy Ann McCracken Sizemore v. Steven Douglas Sizemore
Nancy Ann McCracken Sizemore (“Wife”) initially sued her spouse, Steven Douglas Sizemore (“Husband”), for divorce in the Washington County Circuit Court. She subsequently filed a notice of voluntary dismissal in that case. On the day the notice of nonsuit was filed in Circuit Court, Wife filed a divorce complaint in the Chancery Court for Washington County. The parties proceeded to trial in that court. The Chancery Court granted Wife a divorce, divided the parties’ marital property, and ordered Husband to pay Wife child support and alimony. Following the entry of the Chancery Court’s judgment, Husband filed a counterclaim in the Circuit Court proceeding – the one that had been dormant since Wife filed her notice of voluntary nonsuit some two years earlier. He argues that the case in Circuit Court was still pending because that court had not entered an order dismissing Wife’s complaint. The Circuit Court dismissed Husband’s counterclaim, stating (1) that Husband had waived his right to have the parties’ divorce case tried in Circuit Court by fully participating in the trial in Chancery Court; and (2) that Wife’s notice of nonsuit had “effectively dismissed the case” in Circuit Court. On appeal from the Chancery Court case, Husband contends that (1) the Chancery Court “never had jurisdiction” because the complaint in Circuit Court was pending when the -2- Chancery Court purported to assume jurisdiction; (2) the Chancery Court erred in not allowing him to obtain a transcript of the divorce hearing; (3) the Chancellor was biased against him and should have recused himself; (4) the Chancery Court erred in ordering him to pay child support for the parties’ disabled adult son; (5) the Chancery Court erred in its division of the parties’ marital property; (6) the Chancery Court erred in awarding Wife alimony; (7) the Chancery Court erred in imputing $100,000 per year of income to Husband; and (8) the Chancery Court erred in finding him in contempt. On appeal from the Circuit Court, Husband argues that the court lacked authority to dismiss his counterclaim. We affirm the judgments of both courts. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scotty Henry Pace, Jr.
The appellant’s former girlfriend obtained an order of protection against the appellant in June of 2003. In August of 2003, the former girlfriend filed warrants alleging two separate violations of the order of protection by the appellant. The general sessions court found the appellant guilty of criminal contempt for both violations and sentenced the appellant to ten days in jail for each offense. The appellant appealed to the circuit court, which held a hearing and affirmed the convictions. Because the appellant has failed to include in the appellate record the June 2003 order of protection which he was found to have violated, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa McWherter v. JACOA Alcoholism Center
This is a negligence case. The defendant is a treatment facility for drug and alcohol addictions. The plaintiff was an inpatient at the defendant facility, undergoing substance abuse treatment. The plaintiff was admitted on referral from her probation officer. As part of her treatment, the plaintiff participated in experiential therapy designed to teach through experiences. For one exercise, a group of patients were organized into a team and a rope was tied between two posts, with a mattress on one side. The team was asked to devise a plan for getting all team members over the rope, without touching it. The plaintiff’s team decided to “toss” the female members of the team over the rope. The plaintiff was thrown over the rope once without injury. However, the team had to repeat the exercise. During the second attempt, the plaintiff was tossed over the rope, but this time her foot missed the mattress and she broke her ankle. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against the defendant facility. The facility moved for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be held liable because the plaintiff voluntarily chose to engage in the exercise despite an obvious risk of injury. The trial court granted the motion. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse and remand, finding that the defendant facility had a duty of care to the plaintiff and that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the extent to which the plaintiff felt compelled to participate in the exercise and as to whether the fault attributable to the plaintiff is greater than the fault attributable to the defendant facility. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, v. P.W.K., In Re: J.B.K. DOB: 11/25/02
The parties stipulated statutory grounds for termination of parental rights, and the Trial Court found that it was in the child’s best interest that the father’s parental rights be terminated. On appeal, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Lilliane Kambu v. Jean Katera
The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce, ordering the husband to pay child support and alimony in futuro. The husband has appealed arguing the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding the wife alimony. We modify the alimony award and otherwise affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Suzy Whitley v. Sam Lewis
This appeal involves a claim in juvenile court to recover child support payments. The mother of the child at issue told the respondent that he was the child’s father. In reliance on this, the respondent signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, and the juvenile court entered an agreed order setting child support and establishing the respondent’s child support arrearage. Over two years later, the respondent learned that the child might not be his, and he petitioned the juvenile court for a paternity test. His petition was granted, and the test showed that he was not the biological father of the child. The juvenile court set aside the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity based on fraud, relieved the respondent of any future obligation to pay child support, and forgave all past child support arrearages. Subsequently, the respondent filed a petition against the mother, seeking damages because the mother had fraudulently induced him into signing the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. The juvenile court granted the respondent’s petition against the mother, awarding him damages consisting of the child support erroneously paid, the cost of paternity testing, and attorney’s fees. The State, on behalf of the mother, now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the juvenile court erroneously forgave the respondent’s accrued child support arrearages, and that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent’s petition against the mother for damages. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald C. Howse v. Tennessee Department of Correction
In 1982, appellant prisoner was sentenced to one twenty-five year determinate sentence and four five-to-ten-year indeterminate sentences, to run consecutively. In 2003, appellant filed a declaratory judgment action in the Davidson County Chancery Court, alleging that he had been wrongfully denied the possibility of custodial parole. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant appeals such ruling. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Ruff v. Raleigh Assembly of God Church, Inc.
On remand pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-3-128, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendant with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for assault. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas R. Jones, Jr. v. Heather L. Rusch-Jones - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to address two matters. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas R. Jones, Jr. v. Heather L. Rusch-Jones
Following a short marriage of less than four years, Thomas R. Jones, Jr. (“Father”) filed a complaint for divorce from Heather L. Rusch-Jones (“Mother”). Mother filed a counter-claim also seeking a divorce. Both parties sought to be the primary residential parent of their young daughter. While this case was pending, both parties filed competing petitions for orders of protection. Father’s petition was granted; Mother’s was not. Following a very lengthy trial, the Trial Court designated Father as the primary residential parent and awarded Mother supervised and restricted co-parenting time. The Trial Court awarded Mother a limited amount of alimony. Mother appeals raising numerous issues, including a challenge to the Trial Court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent and the amount of alimony she was awarded. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Lee T. Myers v. Sandra Brown
This case involves the third and fourth appeals (consolidated) of successive petitions to modify custody. The mother and father of the child at issue were never married. The mother was designated the primary residential parent for the child, and the father was given designated parenting time and ordered to pay child support. In 2002, the father filed a petition to modify custody. The trial court denied the father’s petition, and the decision was affirmed by this Court (“E.J.M. I”). During the pendency of that appeal, the father filed a second petition for a change of custody based on facts that arose after his first petition was denied. A hearing on this petition was conducted shortly after this Court issued its decision in E.J.M. I. A juvenile court judge held that, though he might otherwise change custody to the father, he was bound by the appellate decision in E.J.M. I to give final decision-making authority to the mother. Nevertheless, joint custody was ordered. The father now appeals that decision. Shortly after that, the father filed another petition to modify custody, based on facts that arose after the decision to award joint custody. Another juvenile court judge conducted a hearing, heard testimony, and reviewed the entire record. After doing so, the juvenile court judge strongly criticized the father’s litigiousness and, in light of the pending appeal of the joint custody award, dismissed the father’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The father appeals that decision as well. Both appeals were consolidated, but the appeal was dismissed due to a procedural defect (E.J.M. II). The procedural defect was cured, and we now hear the consolidated appeal. We reverse the conclusion by both juvenile court judges, holding that the trial court has jurisdiction and authority to modify custody even while an appeal is pending, so long as the modification is based on new facts and changed conditions that arose after the trial court judgment that is the subject of the appeal. The cause is remanded for a decision on the father’s petitions to modify custody. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald F. Fleming v. Jim Murphy, et al
The plaintiff buyer, a Texas resident, became aware of a used car for sale in Memphis through an internet advertisement. The plaintiff contacted the defendant who had prepared the internet advertisement for the seller, and who provided him with the phone number of the defendant seller. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Aaron Walker v. Tennessee Department of Correction
An inmate of the Department of Correction appeals dismissal by the trial court of his Petition for Writ of Certiorari of a Department of Correction Disciplinary Proceeding. The trial court upheld the action of the Department of Correction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Demetrica Bell v. Cathy Ann Bell
Wife appeals from the trial court’s final decree of divorce, alleging various deficiencies in the proceedings. Based on the limited record before us, which includes Wife’s specific waiver of most of the issues she now raises, we affirm the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |
