Pamela Kaye Smith v. William Michael Fair
The parties were divorced in October of 1999. The final decree of divorce incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement which provided a formula for establishing the father’s child support obligation. The father subsequently filed a petition to modify his child support obligation, which culminated in the entry of a consent order incorporating a permanent parenting plan utilizing essentially the same formula for establishing the father’s child support obligation found in the marital dissolution agreement. Shortly thereafter, father retained new counsel and filed another petition to modify his child support obligation seeking to have it set at $2,100 a month pursuant to the child support guidelines. In response, the mother filed a motion to dismiss the petition for, among other reasons, failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. At a hearing on the mother’s motion, the father presented several exhibits which were considered by the trial court, thereby converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The trial court dismissed the father’s petition for, among other reasons, failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The father timely filed an appeal to this Court. On appeal, the mother requests her attorney’s fees incurred in defending this appeal. We affirm the trial court’s decision, and we remand this case to the trial court for the entry of an order awarding the mother her reasonable attorney’s fees. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon Lemons, et al. v. Rhonda Cloer, et al. AND Jimmy Darrell Silvers, et al. v. Rhonda Cloer, et al.
These appeals find their genesis in a collision between a Georgia school bus and a CSX freight train in Polk County, Tennessee, just north of the Georgia state line. As a result of the collision, three children were killed and four others on the bus were injured. All of the children were minors. Three wrongful death actions and three personal injury actions – as well as other actions not involved in this appeal – were filed in the trial court. The cases before us named as defendants, Rhonda Cloer, the driver of the bus; the Murray County [Georgia] School District (“the School District”); and other entities. Regarding two of the wrongful death claims against the School District, the trial court held that the claims were barred by the personal injury one-year statute of limitations. As to all of the claims arising out of the collision, the trial court held that the School District’s liability could not exceed $300,000, the total amount of the coverage for one incident under the School District’s vehicle liability policy. We affirm. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Donnie Covey, et al. v. City of East Ridge
Plaintiffs applied to rezone their 1.74 acre tract of land located at 6815 Ringgold Road from R-1 Residential District to C-2 General Commercial District. The Chattanooga-Hamilton County Regional Planning Commission recommended that the Mayor and City Council of East Ridge deny the petition for rezoning. After a hearing, the City Council voted to deny the application. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County, asserting that the City Council erred by declining to grant the rezoning request. Following a hearing, the trial court upheld the decision of the City Council, finding that the City Council had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in rejecting the rezoning application. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
James Torrence, et al. v. The Higgins Family Limited Partnership, et al.
James Torrence and J.T. Lemons (“the plaintiffs”) were lessees of a four-acre tract of land in Polk County. During the original term of the lease, their lessor transferred acreage, which includes the |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Tonya Decker v. William Buster Nance
This appeal involves a default judgment in a paternity action. The trial court granted a default judgment against the defendant even though the defendant had not received his five days’ notice as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55. Citing other grounds, the defendant moved to set aside the judgment, but the trial court denied the motion. Upon review of the record, it is our determination that the default judgment must be vacated and this case remanded for further proceedings. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Willie V. Melvin, III v. Anita Louise Johnson-Melvin - Concurring
I concur with the results of the court’s opinion in this case. However, I write separately to emphasize a point regarding the valuation of marital property that is only briefly addressed in the court’s opinion. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Willie V. Melvin, III v. Anita Louise Johnson-Melvin
Dr. Johnson (“the wife”) and Dr. Melvin (“the husband”) were married in October 1988 while the wife was pregnant with the parties’ first child. That child born in 1989 and the second child born in 1991 are the only minor children of this marriage. Husband filed a complaint for divorce, claiming inappropriate marital conduct. The wife counterclaimed in that action. The actions of the trial court from which the wife appeals, and with which both parties raise issues on appeal, include the Decree of Divorce issued August 6, 2004; the interlocutory order and memorandum entered July 28, 2004; and three post-trial orders and one memorandum. Issues raised on appeal concern distribution of marital property, award of alimony and child support, and refusal to award the wife attorney fees and costs. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: S.L.D.
In this case, the trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her biological child upon grounds that she committed severe child abuse and that termination was in the child's best interest. The mother asserts that clear and convincing evidence was not presented that she committed severe abuse or that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother argues that the judgment of the trial court should be vacated and the case remanded for new trial because of the unavailability of either a transcript of the proceedings below or a statement of the evidence. We vacate the order of the trial court as to termination of the parental rights of the mother and remand for new trial because the record provided this Court is insufficient to allow proper appellate review. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
William Anthony Fisher and Shelby Lynn Hatter Fisher v. Jonathan Young
This a termination of parental rights and adoption case. Before the minor child at issue was born, the biological father was sentenced to ten years imprisonment in a correctional facility. The biological mother and her husband filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the biological father and permit the mother’s husband to adopt the minor child. The trial court granted the petition. We affirm, finding grounds for termination established by the father’s confinement to prison for a ten year sentence when the minor child was less than eight years old, and finding clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the best interest of the child. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re J.J.C., D.M.C., and S.J.K. a/k/a K State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. John Calabretta
This is a termination of parental rights case. This is the second appeal in this matter. In the first appeal, the trial court had terminated the father’s parental rights based on abandonment for failure to support his two children. On appeal, this Court reversed the termination on that ground, but remanded the case for further proceedings on the ground of persistent conditions. On remand, the trial court conducted further proceedings and determined that clear and convincing evidence established persistent conditions that prevented the children’s safe return to the father. The father now appeals. We affirm, finding that the ground of persistent conditions was established by clear and convincing evidence. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Richard S. Parker v. Margaret Mary Brennan
On this appeal, the Appellant challenges the award by the trial court of expenses totaling $2,611.42, for videotaping discovery depositions and other related video services as discretionary costs pursuant to Rule 54.04, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. This amount was awarded in addition to expenses for stenographic transcripts of the same depositions. Finding expenses related to videotaping and video related services not specifically identified as allowable expenses within the rule, we modify the trial court's award to delete those expenses. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Ral Cross, Jr. v. Shelby County, Tennessee
Petitioner/Appellee Cross filed a complaint in federal court against Shelby County and Shelby County Deputy Sheriff Bishoff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The federal court awarded Shelby County partial summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law. The action against Deputy Bishoff was heard by a jury, which awarded Mr. Cross damages and legal fees. Mr. Cross then filed a complaint in Shelby County Circuit Court alleging that, under Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-302, Shelby County was liable for the amount of damages awarded him in the federal court action. The trial court awarded Mr. Cross summary judgment, and Shelby County appeals. We reverse and award summary judgment to Shelby County on the grounds of res judicata. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Millen v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development
The Appellant filed a claim for unemployment benefits which was denied. Appellant petitioned for judicial review in the chancery court and that court affirmed the decision of the Board of Review. Appellant next appealed to this Court and we affirm the court below. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State ex rel. Paula A. Flowers v. Tennessee Trucking Association Self Insurance Group Trust, et al.
Seven members of the Tennessee Trucking Association Self-Insurance Group Trust appeal the post-liquidation assessment against members of the self-insured group to fund a $2.8 million deficit. The self-insured group trust was declared insolvent in 2004 by the Chancery Court, following which the Commissioner of Commerce and Insurance was appointed Liquidator of the Trust. In the capacity of Liquidator, the Commissioner was responsible for administering the Trust, which included making assessments of the members of the Trust to satisfy its financial obligations. The appellants contend the assessment methodology employed by the Liquidator, which modified the proportionate financial obligations of the members, constituted an impermissible modification of the premium structure the members agreed upon. The trial court determined the only proscription upon making assessments was a requirement the methodology be equitable. Finding the methodology utilized by the Liquidator was equitable, the trial court approved the assessments. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Saturn Corporation v. Ruth Johnson, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
Saturn Corporation appeals the Chancery Court’s entry of summary judgment in the Commissioner’s favor. Saturn filed its action in Chancery Court seeking a refund of a percentage of franchise and excise taxes paid in fiscal year 1999-2000. In this de novo review of the trial court’s judgment, we hold that the exemption claimed does not apply to the taxpayer, that the exemption as applied does not violate the equal protection provisions of state and federal constitutions, and affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
US LEC of Tennessee, Inc. v. Tennessee Regulatory Authority
This appeal involves a dispute between two telecommunications services providers in the Chattanooga market. A privately owned provider filed a complaint with the Tennessee Regulatory Authority asserting that a competing provider owned by a municipal electric utility was receiving an illegal cross-subsidy because the electric utility was permitting the provider to use its name without compensation. One of the Authority’s hearing officers conducted a hearing and then filed an initial order concluding that the provider owned by the electric utility was not receiving a crosssubsidy in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-52-402 (2005). After the initial order became final, the private provider filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 12 petition for review with this court. We have concluded that the provider’s uncompensated use of the electric utility’s name is not a cross-subsidy prohibited by Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-52-402. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Fain Dalton, v. Linda Faye Dalton
In this divorce case, the appellant (wife) has appealed from the final divorce decree and division of marital assets by the Circuit Court for McMinn County.
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Court of Appeals | ||
Charles C. Wiley v. Clarence Williams, et al.
The issues presented in this appeal are whether the trial court erred in dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint based on the doctrine of prior suit pending, and its determination that the Chancery Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a claim for unliquidated damages for personal injuries. We hold that the doctrine of prior suit pending is not applicable in this case, because Plaintiff’s claims in this case involve neither the same parties nor subject matter identical to that in the prior lawsuit filed in Probate Court, and because the Probate Court would not have had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims filed in Chancery Court, had they been raised there. We further hold that, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Flowers v. Dyer County, 830 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. 1992) and its progeny, the Chancery Court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for unliquidated damages for personal injuries, and we instruct the Chancery Court to transfer this claim to Circuit Court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Luther Kirkwood v. Shelby County Government, d/b/a Shelby County Sheriff's Department, Jail Division
Employee of Shelby County Sheriff’s Department sought review of Civil Service Commission’s order upholding employee’s termination. The Chancery Court, Shelby County remanded the issue to the Civil Service Merit Review Board, and held that the Board’s failure to require any live testimony of Shelby County employees who made accusations against the former employee was a violation of employee’s due process rights to cross-examine his accusers, and that the obligation to call the accusers is that of the employer and not that of the employee. The matter came before this Court on a Rule 9 application for Interlocutory Appeal to consider only (1) whether the Civil Service Merit Review Board’s failure to require any live testimony of Shelby County employees who made accusations against former employee was a violation of former employee’s due process rights to cross-examine his accusers, and (2) whether the obligation to call the accusers is that of the employer, Shelby County, or that of the employee. We hold that the Civil Service Merit Review Board’s failure to require any live testimony of Shelby County employees who made accusations against former employee was not a denial of the employee’s due process rights due to the fact that the employee waived the opportunity to confront or cross-examine his accusers. Further, we find that there exist no obligation on the part of Shelby County to call the employee’s accusers, only that Shelby County must meet its burden of going forward and establishing a prima facie case against the employee. The chancery court order is vacated, and the order of the Civil Service Merit Board is |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Trustmark National Bank v. Alvis Miller
Trustmark National Bank (“Trustmark”) obtained a judgment of replevin in Mississippi for a truck in the possession of Alvis Miller (“Appellant”). Prior to the Mississippi hearing, Trustmark properly served Appellant with notice, and Appellant filed a hand-written statement informing the court that he had a possessory lien on the truck for repairs made by Appellant. Despite this, the Mississippi court held that Trustmark’s lien had priority over Appellant’s possessory lien. When Trustmark sought to enroll the Mississippi judgment in Tennessee, Appellant argued that Tennessee courts should not extend full faith and credit to the Mississippi judgment because under Tennessee law, common law possessory liens have priority over prior recorded interests. The trial court enrolled the judgment and Appellant appealed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Steve Davis v. Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, et al.
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court properly granted summary judgment to the appellees on the appellant’s claims of malicious harassment and malicious prosecution. When it granted summary judgment to the appellees, the chancery court found that the appellant did not have a cognizable claim for malicious harassment because his claim was not based on race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry and that the appellant’s claims for malicious prosecution failed because the appellees had not initiated the prosecution and probable cause existed to prosecute the appellant. On appeal, the appellant asserts that the statute granting a civil cause of action for malicious harassment is not limited to cases based on race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry and that no probable cause existed to prosecute the appellant. Further, the appellant argues that if he has stated a cognizable claim for malicious harassment, the appellees are not entitled to any absolute or qualified immunity for their actions. Additionally, although the appellees won on this issue at trial, the appellees have appealed whether section 39-17-309 of the Tennessee Code standing alone gives rise to a private cause of action. We affirm. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Ivy Joe Clark, et al. v. Joyce Ann Shoaf, et al.
Husband sued for personal injury damages and Wife claimed damages for loss of consortium. The jury awarded Wife damages in an amount greater than damages awarded to Husband for the underlying personal injury claim. Appellant asserts the award to Wife is inconsistent and unsupportable as a matter of law. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ahmed Usso and Genet Ayele v. Bryan Winston - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion “that the plaintiffs acted in good faith and diligence, and are entitled to a refund of their earnest money.” I agree fully with everything in the majority’s opinion except this final conclusion. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Ahmed Usso and Genet Ayele v. Bryan Winston
Plaintiffs sued to recover earnest money tendered with a contract to purchase realty. Defendant counter-sued for breach of contract and damages. The Trial Court Ordered the return of the earnest money to plaintiffs. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Lawrence Lee Brown v. Kelly Sue Brown
This appeal involves a post-divorce dispute regarding child support and related issues. The trial court awarded Wife/Appellee all of her attorney’s fees and expenses, and couched one-half of that award as additional child support pursuant to T.C.A. §36-5-103(c)(2005). Husband/Appellant appeals asserting that the trial court erred in categorizing the attorney’s fees as child support and on the ground that the attorney’s fees are excessive. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
