Cynthia Rose McPherson v. Craig John McPherson
This appeal involves a continuing post-divorce dispute regarding child support and related issues. Seven years after the divorce, the former husband filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Marshall County requesting the court to recalculate his child support obligation and to re-establish visitation that had been suspended earlier because of non-payment of child support and failure to abide by the court's orders. The former wife responded by requesting that her former husband be held in contempt for failing to comply with the earlier court orders. Following a bench trial, the court entered an order finding the former husband in "civil" contempt. The court sentenced the former husband to a mandatory ten-day jail sentence and ordered that he remain incarcerated until he paid a portion of his child support arrearage and other financial obligations. The court also recalculated the former husband's child support obligation and ordered the resumption of visitation. On this appeal, the former husband takes issue with the contempt judgment, the earlier suspension of his visitation, and the denial of his request to claim the children as dependents for income tax purposes. While we have determined that the judgment of contempt cannot stand because it is procedurally defective, we find that the remainder of the trial court's August 22, 2003 order is legally and factually sound. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Grace Holt Wilson Swaney v. Randall Phelps Swaney
This action stems from a divorce case. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the circuit court applied an inappropriate standard when disposing of a husband’s motion to dismiss his wife’s complaint for divorce for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The wife asserts that, by considering evidence outside the pleadings, the circuit court converted the husband’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and that the circuit court failed to apply the standards under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when considering the husband’s converted motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. Further, we decline to award damages to Appellee for frivolous appeal. Likewise, we decline to award Appellant attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Norma E. Shearon v. Jack E. Seaman
This is a legal malpractice action. The client filed this lawsuit against her former attorney, asserting legal malpractice for his failure to re-file a lawsuit under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Act within one year after he took a voluntary non-suit of the lawsuit. The trial court granted the former attorney's motion for summary judgment, finding the client's evidence in the underlying workers' compensation action insufficient to establish the damages element of the legal malpractice action. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Cheryl Markley Mock v. Benjamin Franklin Decker
This is a Title IV child support case. The child involved in this action was born in September 2000. The parents were never married. The child lived with the mother, and the mother began receiving financial assistance from the State when the child was born. In February 2002, the child was legitimated as the natural child of the father. In February 2003, the State, on behalf of the mother, filed a petition against the father for child support payments. In May 2003, the father was ordered to pay child support, plus a monthly amount toward his child support arrearage. The mother filed a petition for rehearing by the juvenile court judge, arguing that the established arrearage was too high, and asserting that she no longer wanted child support from the father because the two were reunited. In November 2003, a hearing was conducted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated the father’s monthly child support obligation and gave him a credit toward the child support arrearage for payments that had been made directly to the mother. The State filed a motion to alter or amend the decision, which was denied. The State now appeals. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: M.J.H. Mal Hooker v. Tonia Smith Johnson
This is a petition in juvenile court to modify custody. In November 1997, the juvenile court issued an order granting the mother primary residential custody of the parties’ daughter, and granting the father liberal visitation. In October 2001, the father filed a petition to modify his visitation. The father’s petition was later amended to add a request for joint custody. In November 2001, the juvenile court entered an order rescheduling the matter for a later date and granting the father visitation with the child for a full week on alternating weeks, pending the hearing. The mother tried to obtain a rehearing of that order, but was unable to do so because of numerous procedural problems. In July 2004, a final hearing was conducted. The juvenile court determined that no material change in circumstances had occurred since the November 1997 order, and that the child’s best interest would not be served by granting the parties joint custody. The juvenile court slightly modified the visitation schedule for the father set forth in the November 1997 order. From that order, the father now appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Julie Ann Nahon v. Isaac Nahon
Plaintiff Julie Nahon (“Plaintiff”) filed for divorce from Defendant Isaac Nahon (“Defendant”). The parties later entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) whereby Defendant agreed to obtain a loan and pay off certain marital debts. Four days later, Defendant repudiated the MDA after failing to obtain his anticipated loan. Plaintiff sought to enforce the MDA as a contract. The trial court held that the MDA was a valid and enforceable contract, and subsequently incorporated the MDA into the parties’ Final Decree of Absolute Divorce. Defendant appealed. Defendant subsequently failed to adhere to the financial obligations set forth in the Permanent Parenting Plan and MDA. As a result, Plaintiff filed several contempt petitions against Defendant. The trial court eventually entered an Order on Petition for Contempt against Defendant which granted Plaintiff final and enforceable judgments against Defendant for all delinquent obligations under the Permanent Parenting Plan and MDA. Defendant now appeals both the final divorce decree and the Order on Petition for Contempt. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse in part and affirm in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lorna McGuire Townsend v. James Ross Townsend
This is a divorce and child custody case. After thirteen years of marriage, the wife filed a complaint for divorce and sought custody of the couple’s two minor children, alleging irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. The husband admitted irreconcilable differences, but argued that the wife had committed the inappropriate marital conduct. After a lengthy trial, the trial court designated the wife as primary residential parent, ordered the husband to pay child support, divided the marital property, ordered the husband to pay the wife $70,000, awarded the wife attorney’s fees, and taxed the costs of the litigation against the husband. The husband appeals. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Patsy C. Cate v. James Daniel Thomas
This case arises out of an ejectment action filed by Appellee against Appellant. Appellee claims ownership of the disputed property under a 1990 Warranty Deed and Appellant asserts that this Deed should be set aside due to fraud. The trial court found that the 1990 Deed was valid and that Appellant was a tenant at will on the property. The trial court further found that Appellant was in arrears on rent and that Appellee had a right to possession of the property and rents. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Kim Brown v. Carlton Brown
In the divorce action, the Trial Court awarded wife a divorce, alimony, child support, and divided marital property and debts of the marriage, and awarded fees for the wife's attorney. The husband's issues on appeal are valuation and division of property, alimony, attorney's fees and amount of child support. We affirm the Trial Court's Judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Christine V. Jones v. Cullen A. Ray
The plaintiff and the defendant were riding double on a motorcycle with the defendant in front. The parties were proceeding south on the Natchez Trace Parkway in Williamson County when a deer came from the left and struck the side of the motorcycle, causing the plaintiff to sustain multiple fractures of her left leg. The plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier, who was served with process in the case, moved for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s suit. The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Petersen, Individually and as a Natural Parent of the Minor Child, Rachel Petersen, Deceased et al. v. Genesis Learning Centers and Therapeutic Interventions, Inc.
This is an action to enforce a settlement agreement. In the underlying lawsuit, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendant foster care provider for the wrongful death of their daughter. The defendant had an insurance policy with “withering” limits, in which the policy limits are reduced by the amount expended in defending the lawsuit. The week before trial, counsel for the defendant sent a letter to counsel for the plaintiffs offering to settle the case for the remaining policy limits which, at the time, were $575,000. The plaintiffs asked the defendant to allow the offer to remain open for forty-eight (48) hours. The defendant agreed, but the defendant’s trial preparation continued. Two days later, the plaintiffs accepted the defendant’s offer. By that time, the policy limits had eroded to $450,000. The plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement in the amount of $575,000. The trial court granted the motion. The defendant now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the parties’ correspondence does not reflect a meeting of the minds on the settlement amount. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Derrick Lawrence, et al. vs. Trees N Trends
Derrick Lawrence and Kim Lawrence ("Plaintiffs") sued Trees-N-Trends (the "Store") alleging outrageous conduct and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. While Plaintiffs were shopping at the Store, a customer reported to the Store's manager that Plaintiffs had a gun and intended to commit a robbery. The Store's assistant manager, Whitney Finnell ("Finnell"), called 911 indicting there was a possible armed robbery but then clarifying that the report was based solely on information provided by a customer. Plaintiffs purchased some items and were confronted by police officers as they exited the store, made to lie on the pavement, and were handcuffed while the officers ascertained whether Plaintiffs were armed. Plaintiffs were not armed. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to the Store, and Plaintiffs appeal claiming there are genuine issues of material fact. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Allstate Insurance Company v. Arveal Drummer d/b/a Tripplite
Allstate brought this subrogation action to recover amounts it paid to its insured for damages to a computer and printer following a power surge against which a surge protector manufactured by TrippLite allegedly failed to protect. The trial court denied TrippLite’s Rule 41.02 motion for involuntary dismissal and entered judgment for Allstate. TrippLite appeals. We affirm. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. D.M.E. and R.W.E., in the Matter of: R.W.E., Jr., A.E.E. and D.D.E., Children Under 18 Years of Age
The Trial Court terminated the parental rights of both parents to the three minor children. On appeal, we affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Consumer Financial Services (Management) Inc., G. Ronald Hall, and Jacquelene O'Rourke Hall v. Consumer Financial Services Management, L.L.C. and Gabriel, L.L.C.
This is a contract action. The sellers sold to the purchasers a loan company dealing in sub-prime residential loans and mortgages and third-party finances, as well as equity interests in a related limited liability company. After closing the transaction, numerous financial and operational problems became apparent. The purchasers attempted to rescind the transaction, as the business foundered. Eventually, the sellers took back the business and sued the purchasers for breach of contract. The purchasers filed a counter-complaint, alleging that the sellers fraudulently induced the contract through multiple oral and written misrepresentations. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the sellers had committed fraud in inducing the contract. The purchasers were granted rescission of the sale agreement, as well as compensatory damages. The trial court dismissed the sellers' breach of contract complaint. The sellers appealed. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Deane Elizabeth Church v. Thomas Neal Church
The Trial Court granted the parties' divorce, divided the marital property, awarded alimony and fees. Issues on appeal are division of marital property, alimony award and fees. We affirm the Trial Court's Judgment, with modifications. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: D.A.J.
Romina Jessica Clifton (“Mother”) and Dwight Cain Jemison (“Father”) are the parents of a six year old daughter. In 2004, Father filed a petition to modify custody of the child by seeking to be designated the child’s primary residential parent. Following a hearing, the Juvenile Court concluded that there had been a material change in circumstances and that it was in the child’s best interest to designate Father the primary residential parent. The Juvenile Court also set forth Mother’s coparenting schedule as well as her monthly child support payments. Mother appeals challenging the propriety of the Juvenile Court’s decision to designate Father the primary residential parent as well as the amount of her child support. We affirm the designation of Father as the primary residential parent but modify the amount of Mother’s monthly child support. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: E.B., T.B., T.B., and R.B.
This is a dependency and neglect action. The four children at issue were in the custody of a nonparent. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition in juvenile court for protective custody of the children, alleging physical abuse. After an evidentiary hearing, the Juvenile Court concluded that the children were dependent and neglected, and transferred custody to the children’s biological mother. The non-parent temporary custodians appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court determined that the evidence was insufficient to conclude that the children were dependent and neglected. The circuit court then ordered that custody of three of the four children should remain with the biological mother, and that custody of the remaining child should be transferred back to the non-parent custodians. The biological mother appealed. We conclude that, once the circuit court found that the children were not dependent and neglected, it no longer had subject matter jurisdiction to determine the custody of the children. Therefore, we vacate the custody determination of the circuit court. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Annette Hale v. Lincoln County, Tennessee et al.
In this appeal we are called upon to review a trial court's grant of summary judgment to a county in a lawsuit filed by an injured motorist pursuant to section 29-20-203 of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff was unable to prove, as a matter of law, that the county had actual and/or constructive notice of the condition of the roadway at the time of the plaintiff's accident. The plaintiff appealed to this Court. We hold that the plaintiff established that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the condition of the roadway constituted a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition, and whether the county had actual and/or constructive notice of such condition. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Peter Plotitsa v. Mila Plotitsa
This is an appeal from a final order granting the parties an absolute divorce and dividing the marital property. The Final Order also incorporated a permanent parenting plan for the parties’ minor child. Husband appeals and asserts, inter alia, that the division of marital property is inequitable and that the chancellor abused his discretion. We affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of L.L.C., Aaron Michael Darnell v. Nathan Ted Cook
This appeal involves a petition for adoption and termination of the biological father’s parental rights filed by biological mother and her current husband. There is no transcript of the trial proceeding, and the record contains a statement of evidence filed by the biological father and objections thereto with an additional statement of the evidence filed by the petitioners, neither of which were signed by the trial court. The statements are different in several respects. The trial court granted the adoption and termination of the biological father’s parental rights on the ground of willful abandonment, but failed to make specific findings of fact as required by T.C.A. § 36-1-113 (k) (2005). The biological father has appealed. We vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Richard L. Leath, et al. v. David Leath
This case concerns the payment of income taxes, including penalties and interest, incurred by an estate. The trial court held that the taxes and interest due were to be prorated among the various heirs, devisees and distributees in proportion to the amount of the distribution that each party received. The trial court further held that all penalties on the taxes were to be paid by David Leath, executor of the Estate of Richard L. Leath, individually. Lastly, the trial court ordered that the court costs were to be paid one-half by the executor and one-half by the other heirs and distributees. The parties appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Edward Greenamyre - Concurring/Dissenting
The majority has provided a well reasoned opinion, based upon a strict interpretation of In |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Edward Greenamyre
This appeal involves a dispute regarding the fate of specific bequests in a will prepared by a college professor without the assistance of counsel. The professor’s mental capacity declined after he prepared the will, and the Chancery Court for Putnam County appointed a conservator for the professor who, with the court’s approval, auctioned off his personal property, including property subject to specific bequests in the professor’s will. After the professor died, his executrix petitioned the trial court to construe several provisions of his will. The trial court heard the matter without a jury and, relying on In re Estate of Hume, 984 S.W.2d 602 (Tenn. 1999), concluded that several of the specific bequests had been adeemed by extinction. The trial court also concluded that the parties attorney’s fees and the court costs should be paid from the intestate funds in the estate. On this appeal, one of the beneficiaries of an adeemed bequest takes issue with the court’s conclusion that she was not entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the property bequeathed to her and that she was not entitled to recover all of her attorney’s fees. The professor’s sole surviving heir at law takes issue with the trial court’s decision to award this beneficiary any attorney’s fees. We have determined that the trial court’s decision regarding the fate of the specific bequests of personal property is correct but that the trial court erred with regard to the award of attorney’s fees. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Richard A. Demonbreun v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals of The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
The Metropolitan Davidson County Board of Zoning Appeals ("the BZA") granted Richard A. Demonbreun ("the Landowner") a special exception permit to use his residentially-zoned property as a special event site. The Landowner filed a petition for writ of certiorari and supersedeas, challenging the validity of several restrictions imposed upon the permit. The trial court held that several of the restrictions were unsupported by material evidence, and thus, according to the trial court, were arbitrarily imposed by the BZA. The BZA appeals the trial court's determination with respect to the conditions found to be arbitrary. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
