John Jay Hooker v. Phil Bredesen, et al.
Defendants appeal the refusal of the Chancellor to impose Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions against Plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Jay Hooker v. Phil Bredesen, et al. - Dissenting
The trial court specifically found that the complaint herein was “duplicative of matters already settled and litigated by rulings of superior courts.” Nonetheless, the court decided sanctions were not appropriate due to the ambiguity created by the Special Master’s determination the case could proceed under the order limiting the cases filed by the plaintiff. The majority opinion agrees that the lawsuit’s clearance under the screening order and the Attorney General’s failure to challenge the result of that screening justify the refusal to impose sanctions. Thus, the test applied by the trial court and the majority of this court is whether the complaint complied with the screening order. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sherry Kay Hepler v. Donald Merle Hepler
This is a petition to modify custody. When the parties divorced in 2000, the mother received primary custody of the parties' three children. After the mother sought an increase in the father's child support obligation, the father filed this petition to obtain primary custody of the children, alleging a material change in circumstances. The father later amended his petition to include allegations of physical abuse by the mother. The trial court declined to modify custody, finding the evidence insufficient to justify modification. We vacate the ruling of the trial court and remand for written findings on the abuse allegations, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-106(a)(8). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
George R. Caldwell, Jr., et ux v. PBM Properties
George R. Caldwell, Jr. and Angie R. Caldwell ("Plaintiffs" or "Mr. Caldwell" as appropriate) sued PBM Properties ("Defendant") for nuisance claiming that during Defendant's development of Blue Grass Heights Subdivision ("Blue Grass"), Defendant denuded the land altering water runoff and causing Plaintiffs' property to flood. The case was tried before a jury and the jury found that Defendant was 100% liable to Plaintiffs for a temporary flooding nuisance. The jury awarded Plaintiffs $3,820.50 in damages. Plaintiffs appeal claiming that the evidence supported a finding of permanent nuisance, the nuisance had to be abated on Defendant's property to be considered abated, and, the jury did not award the proper amount of damages. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Joseph Owen Boote, Jr.
This appeal involves a dispute stemming from an effort to probate a will and two codicils in solemn form. The testator’s widow filed a petition to probate these instruments in solemn form in the Chancery Court for Marshall County. Prior to the entry of an order admitting the will and two codicils to probate, the widow discovered that a third codicil she believed to have been destroyed had, in fact, not been destroyed by her late husband or in his presence and that her late husband’s lawyer had made a copy of this codicil before destroying it himself. Accordingly, she filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking to admit the third codicil to the probate in solemn form along with the will and the other two codicils. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order admitting the will and the first two codicils to probate in solemn form without mentioning the declaratory judgment petition. The testator’s daughters moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment petition, and the testator’s widow filed a motion for postjudgment relief from the order admitting the will and the first two codicils to probate in solemn form. Following a series of hearings, the trial court dismissed the declaratory judgment petition and denied the motion for post-judgment relief. The testator’s widow appealed. We have determined that the order admitting the will and the first two codicils must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings regarding the third codicil. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Martha M. Boote v. Helen Boote Shivers, et al.
This appeal involves a challenge to an antenuptial agreement. Following the death of her husband, the decedent's wife filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Marshall County to have her husband's will and two codicils admitted to probate in solemn form. She later discovered that a third codicil that would have dramatically increased her share of the estate had not been properly revoked. When the trial court rebuffed her efforts to have the third codicil admitted to probate, she filed a petition to dissent from the will and to seek an elective share of the estate and one year's support. The decedent's daughters opposed the petitions based on an antenuptial agreement the wife had entered into with the decedent, and the wife challenged the enforceability of the antenuptial agreement. Following a bench trial, the court set aside the antenuptial agreement after finding that the decedent's wife did not enter into the agreement knowledgeably and without duress. The decedent's daughters appealed. We have determined that the antenuptial agreement is enforceable. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
AT&T Corporation, Network Systems Division v. Loren Chumley, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
AT&T sued the Commissioner of Revenue of Tennessee to recover sales tax paid on central office equipment for the years 1995 and 1996 asserting that the equipment qualifies for exemption as industrial machinery. Determining that the outcome of the case was controlled by AT&T v. Johnson, 2002 WL 3124708 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002), the Chancellor held that the industrial machinery exemption was not applicable. We affirm the judgment of the Chancellor. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Peter Keenan and wife, Jan Keenan v. The City of Kingston, Tennessee and Jim Pinkerton (in his capacity as City Manager of City of Kingston)
Petitioners' Writ of Certiorari was dismissed as being moot because petitioners had moved outside defendants' jurisdiction. On appeal, we affirm and remand with instructions. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Arrow Electronics v. Adecco Employment Services, Inc.
Plaintiff/Appellant, a computer distribution company, sued Defendant/Appellee, a temporary employment service, for damages resulting from a temporary employee’s allegedly negligent act. The trial court found in favor of the Defendant/Appellee on the grounds that Plaintiff/Appellant had not met its burden of proof to show negligence. We affirm on the grounds that the temporary employee was the loaned servant of the Plaintiff/Appellant and, as such, Defendant/Appellee is not liable for the negligent act of the temporary employee. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State ex rel. Walter J. Davis v. ABC Brentwood Locksmith Service, et al.
Appellant is a defendant in a delinquent tax suit by Williamson County for business personal property taxes for the year 2000. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff because the defendant had not utilized his available administrative remedies, and Defendant appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Sherrye Hampton-Cross, et al. v. State of Tennessee, et al.
This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Claims Commission. Student of the University of Memphis was struck by two vehicles while crossing the street from the University-owned parking lot to the University campus. Student and husband filed suit in the Claims Commission against the University and the State, claiming that Defendants negligently created or maintained dangerous conditions on state controlled real property. The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Claims Commission granted the motion. We affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rodney Wilson, et al. v. Gerald W. Pickens
The trial court determined Plaintiffs had standing to bring this malpractice action against their attorney and that they properly filed the action within the statute of limitations under the discovery rule. The trial court apportioned fault between Plaintiffs, Defendant, and nonparty Shelby County. The court awarded Plaintiffs damages for costs incurred, but did not award damages for lost property value. We affirm the trial court’s determination that Plaintiffs had standing and brought their action within the limitations period. We reverse the trial court’s finding regarding causation, and hold Plaintiffs were at least 50% at fault in this case. Judgment for Plaintiffs is reversed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Andre Matthews v. Shelby County Government
Appellant filed suit against the county alleging violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, and the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Approximately three years later, Appellant filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief from the order of dismissal. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry L. Cowan v. Tennessee Board of Paroles, et al.
This appeal involves a prisoner's challenge to a decision of the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole. After the Board denied the prisoner parole and scheduled his next hearing for the year 2016, the prisoner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The Chancery Court dismissed the petition on the grounds it was not timely filed and was not verified. We affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jason Simms v. Insurance Company of North America
The issue in this case is whether the trial court correctly granted the Defendant Insurance Company of North America ("ICNA") summary judgment based on its finding that the claimant, Jason Simms, failed to follow the loss provisions of the insurance policy and that ICNA's agent did not possess authority to waive the loss provisions. We hold there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding the apparent authority of ICNA's agent, and therefore vacate the summary judgment and remand for trial. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Gary John White, Jr., et al. v. Jerry Kelvin Farley
This appeal involves the parental rights of a father to his eight-year-old daughter. When the child was approximately 17 months old, the mother moved with the child to Ohio. The father did not know their whereabouts for many months. In the parties' divorce, the mother was awarded custody of the child and the father was awarded specific visitation privileges. The father failed to exercise his visitation rights and failed to visit or support the child for more than four months. The mother, who had remarried, filed a petition to terminate the father's rights on the grounds of abandonment. Father presented proof at trial of his meager earnings due to a physical impairment, limited education and the loss of his job. Father also presented proof that he had tried to contact the child by telephone but was unable to do so. The trial court declined to terminate the father's parental rights because there had not been proof by clear and convincing evidence of abandonment or that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest. After a careful review of the record and the applicable law, we agree with the trial court that the father's lack of visitation and support was not willful and that termination of the father's parental rights was not in the child's best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Craig Alan Dunn v. Matrix Exhibits, Inc.
In this suit by an employee, Craig Dunn, against his former corporate employer, Matrix Exhibits, Inc., for breach of written employment contract, the trial court entered judgment for Dunn based upon a finding Matrix anticipatorily breached the employment agreement. The trial court awarded Dunn three of six categories of damages he sought but denied the other claimed damages based upon a finding Dunn’s proof of the amount of such damages was speculative. Both parties appealed. Finding Matrix in actual breach of the employment contract, we affirm the award of damages for moving expenses, car allowance, and salary, but reverse the finding that Dunn’s proof of damages for 5% of Matrix’ value was too speculative, and award Dunn an additional $282,500. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tina M. Lunsford v. Robert W. Lunsford
This case arose from the divorce of Tina M. Lunsford and Robert W. Lunsford, his untimely death, and a dispute between the estate of Robert W. Lunsford and Tina M. Lunsford as to the right to a pre-retirement death benefit provided by the Young Men’s Christian Association Retirement Fund in which Mr. Lunsford participated. Even though Tina M. Lunsford was the designated beneficiary of the death benefit at the time of Mr. Lunsford died, the trial court determined the intent of the parties evidenced by their marital dissolution agreement was to divest Tina Lunsford of any interest in his retirement plan. The trial court, by qualified domestic relations order, directed the death benefit be paid to the contingent beneficiaries and Tina M. Lunsford appealed. Because of the specific language of the marital dissolution agreement, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Trista Larue Denton, et al. v. Christopher Lorn Phelps
Orders of Protection were either largely ignored or scornfully defied by the defendant with the sometime quiescense of the plaintiff who was possibly afflicted with the Stockholm Syndrome. Her father intervened and presented a motion for contempt against the defendant which resulted in the defendant's conviction of eleven (11) instances of criminal contempt. The defendant refused to attend the trial because of his later asserted and ill-based fear that he would not have a fair trial, and he was tried in absentia. Days later, he was tried and convicted of another nine (9) discrete violations of the Order of Protection. The defendant assails the first convictions as violative of his constitutional rights. In light of State v. Far, 51 S.W.3d 222 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 2001) "that a trial in absentia [is allowable] only when the defendant is first present at trial" the eleven (11) convictions at the first trial are reversed. The nine (9) convictions at the second trial are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Dan Mitchell d/b/a Eagle CDI v. John Owens, and wife Rose Marie Owens
Plaintiff filed an action to compel arbitration. Defendant filed an action for damages. The Trial Court combined the actions and denied arbitration and the parties proceeded to trial and final judgment. The Trial Court inter alia held that plaintiffs waived issue of arbitration. On appeal, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Alfred O. Wooden, et al. v. Evelyn Hunnicutt, et al.
Testator's two children, individually and as co-administrators of testator's estate, brought a suit against alleged transferee to whom testator purportedly conveyed real property, seeking to set aside the deed evidencing such transaction on the grounds of forgery. The Chancery Court for Robertson County, Tennessee, Judge Carol A. Catalano, held that the signature of testator was forged and set aside the deed. The Court affirms the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis, a Municipal Corporation v. The Civil Service Commission of the City of Memphis, et al.
The City of Memphis terminated the employment of Jack Vincent, a police officer. The Civil Service Commission reversed, and Memphis appealed to the Shelby County Chancery Court under a writ of certiorari. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the Commission, and Memphis appeals. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Martin Edward Malone vs. Lynettte Diane Berger Malone
The Trial Court, while finding a material change in circumstances, refused to change custody of the minor child on the ground that it would not be in the best interest of the child. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Jay Scott McLean v. Bourget's Bike Works, Inc.
This appeal involves a dispute arising from the sale of a used motorcycle. After discovering that the motorcycle was not new, the purchaser filed suit and then settled with the dealer from whom he had purchased the motorcycle. Later, the purchaser filed suit against the motorcycle's manufacturer in the Circuit Court for Davidson County alleging that the motorcycle's aluminum frame was defective. The trial court granted the manufacturer's summary judgment motion and dismissed the purchaser's products liability and Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims. The purchaser has appealed. We have determined that the manufacturer was entitled to a summary judgment on grounds other than those relied upon by the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Edwin Bennett, et al. v. Trevecca Nazarene University
Plaintiffs, certified low voltage electricians, filed a personal injury action against university for negligently informing them that university's switchgear cabinet was low voltage, when in fact, it was high voltage, for failing to provide a conspicuous high voltage warning sign on the high voltage switchgear and for obscuring the manufacturer's identifying product plate. Plaintiffs suffered injuries as a result of university's alleged negligence. The Circuit Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, Judge Walter C. Kurtz granted university's motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs appealed. The decision of the trial court is reversed and case remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
