Debra Ann Williams vs. George Jay Williams, IV
Debra Ann Williams ("Mother") and George Jay Williams, IV ("Father") were divorced in 1998. Mother was designated the custodial parent of the parties' two minor children. In 2003, Father filed a Petition for Modification and Contempt seeking, in part, a change in custody or visitation, and relief from the requirement that Father carry life insurance or, in the alternative, that Mother also be required to maintain life insurance. Mother filed a counter claim requesting, in part, increased child support and the right to claim the tax exemption for both children. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order holding, inter alia, "that there has been no change in circumstances which would justify the modification of the final judgment" as requested by Father and dismissing Father's petition for modification. The Trial Court, however, increased child support in accordance with the guidelines and held that for purposes of calculating child support under the guidelines, Father was not entitled to a reduction in his annual earnings for state income taxes he may pay. Father appeals raising issues regarding custody, visitation, life insurance, child support, and attorney's fees. We reverse as to the award to Mother of the tax exemption for one child, and affirm as to all other issues. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Justin L. Thurman v. Justin E. Harkins, et al.
This case involves a question of whether an insurance policy covers the injuries sustained by the plaintiff under the facts of this case. The original suit filed by plaintiff against Justin Harkins, Andrew Keon, and James Keon was settled out of court, leaving Great River Insurance Company, an unnamed defendant. After granting the plaintiff’s motion for declaratory and partial summary judgment on whether the plaintiff was a covered insured under the policy, the parties agreed to send the matter to arbitration. The arbitrator returned an award in favor of the plaintiff, and the trial court confirmed the award but reduced the amount, accounting for the insurance policy’s limit. The trial court also awarded the plaintiff pre-judgment interest but stated that the total award to the plaintiff could not exceed the limit in the insurance policy. Great River Insurance Company appealed to this Court, and the plaintiff filed a cross-appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Alfonzo Silvestre Arze vs. Mary Anne Bracken Arze - Dissenting
In Tennessee, a determination of child support is statutory. Jones v. Jones, 870 S.W.2d 281 (Tenn. 1994).1 Accordingly, I would approach resolution of this appeal by resort to the applicable statutes. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Alfonzo Silvestre Arze vs. Mary Anne Bracken Arze
Alfonzo Silvestre Arze (“Father”) and MaryAnne Bracken Arze (“Mother”) were divorced in 2000. The divorce was based upon stipulated grounds of irreconcilable differences, and the parties submitted a marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) to the Trial Court for approval. The terms of the MDA were agreed upon through mediation. At the time of the divorce, Father was employed as a physician with gross earnings of approximately $150,000. Mother was unemployed. Due to the significant disparity in income, Father agreed to pay Mother $2,000 in child support even though he was not obligated legally to do so since he was the primary residential parent for the parties’ four children. When the oldest child turned eighteen, Father reduced his child support payments by twenty-five percent, $500. After Mother challenged Father’s unilateral reduction in child support, the Trial Court entered an order which required Father to pay child support in an amount consistent with the Child Support Guidelines (“Guidelines”). We conclude that because Father was not legally obligated under the Guidelines to pay any child support, the payment of $2,000 was purely a contractual obligation which was not governed by the Guidelines. We also conclude that Father was within his contractual rights when he reduced the child support payments by $500 when the oldest child became emancipated. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
John Jay Hooker v. Senator Lamar Alexander, et al.
Appellant was an independent candidate for election to the United States Senate in the November 5, 2002, election in which he was defeated by the present incumbent Lamar Alexander. He seeks to have the election declared void on the basis that Alexander used his own money and accepted campaign contribution in support of his candidacy. He alleges that such self financing arrangements and campaign contributions financing violate the qualifications clauses and the equal protection and due process clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions. Named as defendants were Lamar Alexander, Attorney General Paul Summers and the Lamar Alexander for Senate Committee. All defendants filed Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motions to dismiss, which motions were granted by the trial judge. We affirm the actions of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
J & M, Inc. v. Clarence D. Cupples and Crete Carrier Corp.
Plaintiff sued for damages incurred to correct condition of roadway caused by defendants' motor vehicle which destroyed a section of guardrail. Defendants appeal from Judgment awarding damages to plaintiff on grounds damages were not proved. On appeal, we affirm. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
City Of Johnson City vs. Dorian Jones
Dorian Jones ("the defendant") was cited to the Municipal Court of Johnson City for a violation of the Animal Control Ordinance ("the Ordinance") of the City of Johnson City ("the City"). The City contends that the defendant failed to have his dog "under control." Following a finding of guilt and the imposition of a $50 fine and costs, the defendant appealed to the trial court. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered its judgment, in which it held that the defendant violated the Ordinance. The trial court dismissed the defendant's appeal and decreed that "the fine of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) . . . be reinstated and is hereby upheld and affirmed." The defendant appeals to us, contending that he was entitled to a jury trial. He also argues, in legal effect, that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's judgment. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Billy K. Pomeroy v. Illinois Central Railroad Company
Plaintiff, a switchman/brakeman for Illinois Central Railroad Company, filed a claim for damages arising from injuries allegedly caused by the railroad’s failure to maintain a track switch. The jury allocated 100% fault to the railroad and awarded Plaintiff $500,000 in damages. The trial court denied the railroad’s motion for a directed verdict, remittitur, or new trial. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William Tassell, et al. v. U.S. Bank, Inc.
William and Shirley Tassell's ("Plaintiffs") purchase of a house in 1998 was financed through U.S. Bank, Inc. (the "Bank"). After Plaintiffs fell behind in their payments, the Bank filed a detainer warrant and began the foreclosure process. Plaintiffs claim they made a payment bringing their mortgage current and they made this payment one day before their house was to be sold at foreclosure. Plaintiffs claim the Bank, nevertheless, proceeded with the foreclosure sale thereby forcing them to file this lawsuit seeking to have the foreclosure set aside. The Trial Court denied Plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order and refused to interfere with the foreclosure proceedings, noting that no valid appeal had been taken in the detainer action. Plaintiffs appeal. We dismiss this appeal because there is no final appealable judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Julie Duff Petty vs. Randy Neal Petty
In this divorce case, Mother was declared to be the primary residential parent and Father's overnight co-parenting time was required to be exercised at his parents' home with them present. This restriction was prompted by presentation of evidence that Father haded computer internet sites exhibiting material of a sexual nature and had placed a personal advertisement on an internet site in an apparent effort to attract sexual partners. Father appeals. Absent proof that Father's actions presented any risk of harm to his children, we modify the judgment of the trial court and the parenting plan to delete the requirement that Father's overnight visitation be supervised by his parents at their home. We further modify the parenting plan to the extent that it does not require mutual decision-making. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Douglas McPherson v. Shea Ear Clinic, P.A.
The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Having reviewed the complaint, we disagree and reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Citadel Investments, Inc., v. White Fox Inc., F/L/A The Jones Group, et al.
This is an action on a promissory note against two stockholders of a now insolvent closely-held corporation, who it is alleged, guaranteed payment of a note owed by the corporation. The alleged guarantee arises out of a stock purchase agreement. Liability hinges on the construction of the stock purchase agreement and whether parol evidence is admissible. The trial court found the agreement unambiguous and barred parol evidence. The defendants insist the agreement is ambiguous and that evidence of negotiations leading up to the execution of the agreement and the intent of the parties should have been admitted. We find the agreement is ambiguous and therefore parol evidence should have been considered. We also find that the defendants are entitled to a new trial on the merits because they have been deprived of the substantial right to introduce evidence of contract negotiations and the intent of the parties at the time the Agreement was executed. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Earl A. Crow, III v. Daniel R. LeDoux, et al.
Earl A. Crow, III, brought this action against his landlords, Daniel R. LeDoux and wife, Katherine Marie LeDoux (collectively "the defendants"), for injuries sustained by him in a fall caused by an allegedly defective heating grill in his apartment. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiff's knowledge of the condition of the grill was at least co-extensive with that of the defendants, and that, as a consequence of this fact, no liability attached. The trial court agreed and granted the defendants' motion. The plaintiff appeals. We vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Debra L. Ogelsby v. Mark D. Bridges
Debra L. Ogelsby ("Mother") and Mark D. Bridges ("Father") are the natural parents of Holly Bridges ("the child"). By an order entered in 1986, Mother was awarded custody of the child and Father was charged with a duty of support but with no amount being set. In 1998, the child started living with Father. At that time, Father, motivated by the fact the child was now living with him, filed a petition to terminate his support obligation. His petition was granted. In 1999, the child left Father and again took up residence with Mother. The child was emancipated by marriage in 2000. In 2002, the State of Tennessee ("the State"), on behalf of Mother, brought this action seeking retroactive child support for the period from 1999 through 2000. Father argues that the trial court was prohibited from awarding retroactive child support prior to June 11, 2002, the date upon which the State filed its petition. The trial court held that Mother was entitled to retroactive child support since there was no active order for child support in place at the time the petition was filed. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Roger M. Ralph, et al. v. Robert Pipkin, et al.
Plaintiffs in this action, Roger Ralph and Kem Ralph, were sued in federal court for patent infringement and breach of contract. Their farmer’s liability insurance carrier, Grange Mutual, denied coverage and refused to defend. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Lauderdale County Chancery Court against Grange Mutual seeking a declaratory judgment, a judgment for breach of contract, and specific performance. They also filed a complaint for professional negligence and breach of contract against their insurance agent, Pipkin Insurance Agency/Mr. Robert Pipkin. The trial court granted Grange Mutual’s motion to dismiss and awarded the Pipkin Insurance Agency/Mr. Pipkin summary judgment. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy McPeak v. Virginia Thomas
Defendant appealed from the Trial Court's Judgment in favor of plaintiff. On appeal, appellant argues the Trial Court erred in ruling for appellee and appellee should be estopped from gaining possession of the property in dispute. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Alliance for Native American Indian Rights in Tennessee, Inc. et al. v. Gerald F. Nicely et al.
This appeal involves the effect of a highway improvement project on ancient Native American graves. After discovering the graves during construction, the Tennessee Department of Transportation filed petitions in the Chancery Courts for Williamson and Davidson Counties seeking permission to disinter the remains and reinter them in another location. Despite prevailing in protracted litigation with Native American organizations and individuals, the Department voluntarily dismissed both petitions after deciding to bury the remains in place, to encapsulate them in reinforced concrete, and to continue construction on top of the encapsulated graves. A Native American organization and several Native American individuals filed this suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting that the Department's actions violated their equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the Native American parties appealed. Construction continued while the appeal was pending because the Native American parties failed to request the trial court or this court to stay the construction during the appeal. Before oral argument in this appeal, the Department completed the construction project, including the reinterment of the remains and encapsulation of the graves in concrete. In light of these later developments, we have determined that this appeal is now moot and should be dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara C. Watts, et al. v. Randall Lovett, et al.
In this appeal, the defendants argue that the trial court erred in the amount of money it awarded the plaintiffs for damages incurred by the plaintiffs when a truck owned by the defendants and operated by the defendants’ employee struck the plaintiffs’ garage. The sole issue at trial was the proper amount of damages the plaintiffs should receive for injuries to their property. The plaintiffs introduced evidence showing that the market value of their property as a whole - their residence, garage and acreage - depreciated as a result of the fact that the color of brick necessary to restore the garage to its original condition is no longer available. Considering this evidence, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs a judgment in the amount of $8,000.00. The defendants contend that the trial court erred in its award and that the proper measure of damages should have been solely the cost of repairing the garage, which the defendants’ expert estimated to be approximately $2,000.00. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Louis Hudson Roberts v. Mary Elizabeth Todd Roberts
This is an appeal by the former wife from the denial of her Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 Motion to Strike or Modify a Marital Dissolution Agreement relative to marital property. We modify and affirm the action of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond P. White, et al. v. Hickman County, Tennessee
In these consolidated cases, certain property owners in Hickman County, Tennessee, challenged the way Hickman County imposed and administered solid waste disposal fees, asserting the improper use of disposal fees to retire debt incurred in closing a previous landfill and further asserting collection of fees beyond what was necessary for the operation of the solid waste department. Judge R.E. Lee Davies granted a partial summary judgment to the County, and following trial on the merits on the remaining issue, Judge Timothy Easter rendered judgment for Defendant, Hickman County. We affirm the actions of both of the trial judges. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Rhonda Leigh Jones Robinson v. Russell Raynor Robinson
This is a divorce case about dissipation of marital assets and custody. Throughout the marriage, the wife took care of the children while the husband provided financial support. The husband was the owner and operator of several automobile businesses. After the wife filed for divorce, the husband’s automobile businesses failed, resulting in the husband’s father purchasing the businesses. After a lengthy trial, the trial court found that the husband intentionally dissipated marital assets, including the automobile businesses. The wife was designated the children’s primary residential parent. The husband appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the husband dissipated the businesses by failing to preserve them, and the designation of the wife as primary residential parent. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jeanette Jenkins, et al. v. Billy Gene Robertson
Billy Gene Robertson (“Defendant”) listed property for lease with Jeanette Jenkins, the listing agent, and Eilene1 McInturff, the broker, (“Plaintiffs”) of Realty World-Barnes Real Estate. Defendant signed a contract agreeing to pay a 10% commission to the broker. Plaintiffs located a party who leased Defendant’s property. Defendant made some commission payments to Plaintiffs, but then stopped making payments claiming, in part, that the time period for making commission payments under the contract was unclear. Ms. McInturff, as the broker, attempted to assign her rights under the contract to Ms. Jenkins and Ms. Jenkins sued Defendant for the commissions. Defendant objected that Ms. Jenkins did not have standing because she was not the broker. The Trial Court allowed joinder of Ms. McInturff, and the case proceeded to trial. After trial, the Trial Court entered an order holding, inter alia, that Defendant owed Plaintiffs commissions over the life of the lease and also that Plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment against Defendant in the amount of $37,688.35, which included the award made on Plaintiffs’ claim for commissions owed to the date of the judgment, an award of attorney’s fees, and an award of discretionary costs. Defendant appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Franki Ann Rolen, Individually and as the Administratrix of the Estate of Jewell V. Ingram et al. v. Wood Presbyterian Home, Inc.
This action involves claims brought regarding the decedent Jewell Ingram against Wood Presbyterian Home, Inc., alleging that Ingram was injured while in defendant's care, and also that her treatment by defendant ultimately contributed to her death. Plaintiff proposed a jury form which asks that the jury determine whether defendant was guilty of negligence which caused Ingram's death, but also asked the jury to find whether defendant was guilty of negligence which caused injury to Ingram. The jury form submitted by the Trial Judge, however, asked whether defendant was at fault for the death of Ingram, and directed that if the answer to that question was no, the jury should return a verdict for defendant. The jury answered the question in the negative, and announced a defendant's verdict. Plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Trial Court's Judgment for defendant as to the wrongful death claim, but remand for a new trial on the issue of damages for injuries sustained prior to decedent's death. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Lendel L. Conley v. Jo Ann Conley
In this divorce case, the wife raises the issues of whether the trial court erred in ruling it had jurisdiction based on the husband’s domicile in Bledsoe County, Tennessee; whether the trial judge erred in refusing to recuse himself from the trial of the case; and whether the court erred by failing to equitably divide the marital estate. The husband argues on appeal that the trial court should have classified certain assets that it held to be marital property as his separate property. We modify the division of marital property to increase the amount awarded to the wife, and affirm the court’s judgment in all other respects. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed as Modified; Case Remanded |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
Lendel L. Conley v. Jo Ann Conley - Concurring
I write separately to further address the trial court’s judgment with respect to the |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals |
