Gwynne Barton, et al., v. Roy Gilleland, et al.
The limited partners ("the plaintiffs") of Henry Manor, Ltd., a Tennessee limited partnership ("the Partnership"), brought this declaratory judgment action against (1) Roy J. Gilleland and J. Cleve Smith, the Partnership's former administrative general partners, and (2) the trust created by the Partnership's former, and now-deceased, managing general partner, Glen R. Claiborne. The plaintiffs seek relief related to the Partnership's property, as well as an accounting and an order for distribution of proceeds. In 1992, Claiborne and his wife formed the G & P Claiborne Trust ("the Trust"), to which they transferred, among other assets, Claiborne's beneficial interest in the Partnership. Claiborne died in 1997. The apartment complex owned by the Partnership, which was its primary asset, was sold in 2000. Subsequently, Gilleland and Smith sought a percentage of the proceeds from the sale pursuant to the terms of the partnership agreement. The plaintiffs aver, among other things, (1) that Gilleland and Smith are not entitled to any of the proceeds from the 2000 sale, as they resigned from the partnership in 1982, and (2) that the Partnership was dissolved in 1992 when Claiborne transferred his interest to the Trust. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial court held that Gilleland and Smith are entitled to share in the proceeds of the 2000 sale; that the Partnership did not dissolve until the death of Claiborne in 1997; and that the plaintiffs are not required to pay capital contributions that came due in 1983 and 1984. We agree with the trial court that Gilleland and Smith are entitled to share in the sale proceeds under the terms of the original partnership agreement. We further agree with the trial court that the Trust's claim against the plaintiffs for unpaid capital contributions is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Although we disagree with the trial court's judgment that Claiborne did not violate the partnership agreement by transferring a part of his interest in the Partnership to the Trust in 1992, we hold that the transfer, while a violation of the agreement, does not constitute an event of dissolution. We affirm the trial court's judgment that the Partnership did not dissolve until 1997. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
C. W. McMahan v. Barbara Jean Greene
This is a boundary line dispute. C. W. McMahan (“the plaintiff”) and Barbara Jean Greene (“the defendant”) owned adjacent tracts of land. Both parties received their respective tracts through a complicated chain of title. When a dispute arose as to the location of the boundary line, the plaintiff brought this action seeking to clear title. Following a bench trial, the trial court found for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Alvin A. Moore
Separate petitions for the appointment of conservator were filed, one by the two nieces of the disabled person and the other by a daughter. Notwithstanding the statutory preference given to the daughter, the probate court determined that it was in the best interest of the disabled person to grant the petition filed by the nieces. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Dale Baruchman In the Matter of: B.B. (d/o/b 11/16/90) and H.B. (d/o/b 3/2/89)
This is a parental termination case involving a mother with a documented history of severe mental illness. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her minor son in February 2002, alleging the grounds of persistent conditions and failure to substantially comply with the permanency plans. The department filed an amended petition in August 2002, seeking to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her minor daughter based upon the same grounds. In September 2002, the department filed another amended petition alleging as an additional ground for termination the mother’s mental incompetence. Following a hearing over two non-consecutive days, the chancery court entered an order finding the department had proven all the grounds it alleged for terminating the mother’s parental rights by clear and convincing evidence, and terminating the mother’s parental rights would be in the children’s best interest. While we disagree with the trial court’s finding that DCS proved each ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm the chancery court’s decision to terminate the mother’s parental rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Judith D. Pickern v. Robert M. Pickern
This is an appeal from a finding of contempt following the enrollment of a foreign decree. The issue presented is whether Mr. Pickern could be held in civil contempt of court for his failure to pay alimony upon the enrollment of the foreign decree when a petition for contempt had not been filed. Following a hearing, the trial court enrolled the foreign decree, found Mr. Pickern in willful contempt of court, awarded Ms. Pickern judgment for the alimony arrearage and her attorney’s fees, and ordered the sale of Mr. Pickern’s real property to satisfy the alimony arrearage unless he paid the judgment within ninety days. We hold that the trial court properly enrolled the foreign decree, but its actions were premature regarding the civil contempt because no petition had been filed seeking this relief. Therefore, we affirm the enrollment of the foreign decree and the judgment for the alimony arrearage, but vacate the finding of civil contempt and the award of attorney’s fees. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
John William Thomas v. Norma E. Pino-Rutkowski
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of John William Thomas ("Plaintiff") in the amount of $190,095, of which $53,295 was for relocation expenses and increased rent. Plaintiff was injured when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Norma E. Pino-Rutkowski ("Defendant") while Defendant was backing out of a parking space. Due to his poor eyesight, Plaintiff does not have a driver's license and has to walk to work. Plaintiff claimed he was required to move much closer to work because he could no longer walk as far as he could before being injured. Plaintiff sought as part of his damages his relocation expenses and the $300 in his increased monthly rent. Defendant claims on appeal that Plaintiff was required to specifically plead these damages and because he failed to do so, that portion of the jury's verdict cannot stand. Defendant also claims the Trial Court erred when it allowed Plaintiff's granddaughter to testify and when it told the jury that "although the law in Tennessee may require insurance, you are not to consider the presence of insurance in this case." We agree with Defendant, and we vacate the judgment in its entirety and remand for a new trial. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Randy E. Rice, Personal Respresentative of the Estate of James Neil Rice v. Andrew Johnson Bank, et al.
James Neil Rice ("Mr. Rice") applied to Mountain Life Insurance Company ("Mountain Life") for a credit life insurance policy to cover the principal amount of a loan made to him by Andrew Johnson Bank ("the Bank"). When Mr. Rice died, Randy E. Rice, Personal Representative of the Estate of James Neil Rice ("Plaintiff"), made demand upon Mountain Life and the Bank to tender the policy proceeds to satisfy the loan. When Mountain Life and the Bank refused this demand, Plaintiff filed suit. Both Mountain Life and the Bank filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted the motions for summary judgment holding, inter alia, that no contract of insurance existed because Mr. Rice's application never was approved or accepted by Mountain Life and, therefore, no insurance policy was issued to Mr. Rice. Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment. We vacate and remand. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Don Smith Ford, Lincoln-Mercury v. Doug Bolinger, et al
Don Smith Ford, Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. sued Doug Bolinger based upon theories of negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("the TCPA"). The plaintiff averred that the defendant failed to disclose substantial body damage to his vehicle, which vehicle the defendant traded to the plaintiff in connection with his purchase from the plaintiff of a new Ford Explorer. The defendant denied the plaintiff's allegations and filed a third-party complaint against previous owners of the vehicle, Gary Hoese, dba Gary's Used Cars ("Hoese") and East Gate Motors, Inc. ("East Gate"). The defendant's third-party complaint is based upon alleged common law violations and upon the theory that Hoese and East Gate violated the TCPA in failing to disclose the condition of the vehicle's title. The trial court found that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for negligently misrepresenting the condition of the vehicle and awarded it damages in the amount of $17,085. In addition, the trial court dismissed the defendant's third-party claims against Hoese and East Gate and, without stating the basis of its action, awarded attorney's fees to them, as well as to the plaintiff. The defendant appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in finding him liable for negligent misrepresentation; that the trial court erred in failing to hold Hoese and East Gate liable to the defendant; and that the trial court's awards of attorney's fees was improper. We vacate the trial court's fee awards to the plaintiff, Hoese, and East Gate pending further proceedings in the trial court. The balance of the trial court's judgment is affirmed. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Richard E. Miller v. Bernard Stone, et al.
Richard E. Miller, in his capacity as an officer and director of Duncan Electric Company, Inc. ("Duncan Electric"), brought this action against the company's other directors, Bernard Stone and Greta B. Lindsay (collectively "the defendants"), alleging that they had breached certain fiduciary duties owed to him. Stone and Lindsay each moved for summary judgment on the basis that a settlement agreement and release entered into by the parties in a prior and separate lawsuit barred the plaintiff's present action. The trial court granted the defendants' motions and ordered the plaintiff to pay their attorney's fees. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Apollo Hair Systems of Nashville v. First Lady International Corporation, d/b/a New Image
This case involves a contract dispute between a retail seller and manufacturer of hair replacement products. The parties entered into an exclusive dealing contract, whereby the manufacturer agreed to sell four models of hair replacement units exclusively to the retailer within a geographically defined area of Tennessee. In return, the retailer agreed to purchase all hair replacement units from themanufacturer and paya $10.00 premium for the units purchased. The manufacturer subsequently sold hair replacement units to a competitor of the retailer in Tennessee. The retailer filed a complaint against the manufacturer for inducement of breach of contract, pursuant to section 47-50-109 of the Tennessee Code, and breach of contract. The manufacturer moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion as to both causes of action alleged in the complaint. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alley-Cassetty Coal Co., Inc. v. Ruth Johnson, Commission of the Tennessee Department of Revenue
This appeal involves a trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Tennessee Department of Revenue. The taxpayer operates a brick and block business on a ten-acre tract of land in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, on which is located a block manufacturing facility and retail sales office. Upon undertaking an audit of the taxpayer, the department inspected the property in Murfreesboro. The department subsequently assessed a sales and use tax liability against the taxpayer for the Murfreesboro property. The department determined that the Murfreesboro property constituted one location, and sales of concrete blocks manufactured at the facility constituted less than fifty-one percent (51%) of the gross sales at this location. The taxpayer filed an action in the trial court alleging it was entitled to a sales tax exemption under section 67-6-206 of the Tennessee Code because it operated two "locations" at the Murfreesboro property under the fifty-one percent (51%) test used by the department. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the department's motion and denied the taxpayer's motion. The taxpayer filed an appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tresa Dorianne Barkley Young n/k/a Tresa B. Floyd v. Steven Glen Young
This appeal involves a wife's petition for civil contempt filed against her ex-husband. The wife sought an order holding the ex-husband in civil contempt for failing to pay alimony in solido pursuant to the divorce decree and commanding him to pay the amount of the arrearage. Following a hearing on Wife's petition, the chancery court entered an order reclassifying the husband's alimony obligation from alimony in solido to rehabilitative alimony due to the parties' cohabitation after their divorce. In addition, the chancery court found that the wife was not entitled to alimony during the periods the parties lived together following their divorce, and the court awarded the wife a reduced sum of rehabilitative alimony. The wife filed an appeal to this Court. We reverse and remand this case to the chancery court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Carol Cantrell v. James Mark Cantrell
This is a divorce proceeding in which the parties accused each other of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court granted both parties a divorce, and custody of the parties' child was awarded to Husband along with child support. Marital property, mostly debts, was allocated in part to Husband and in part to Wife. The trial court declined to assess attorney fees. Wife appealed claiming that she should have been granted the divorce and custody of the child. Wife also claimed that the marital debts were not allocated equitably and that she should have been awarded her attorney fees. We modify in part and affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Janice S. Johnson v. Mark L. Johnson
This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for Davidson County over a dispute regarding custodial accounts established for the benefit of a divorced couple's children. The father moved to dismiss the mother's suit on the ground that the Circuit Court for Williamson County where the divorce had been granted had jurisdiction over the claim. The trial court denied the motion but permitted the father to pursue an interlocutory appeal to this court. The parties have now filed a stipulation for an accelerated civil appeal in accordance with Tenn. Ct. App. R. 13. We granted the interlocutory appeal, and now we vacate the order denying the father's motion to dismiss, and remand the case to the trial court with directions to transfer the case to the Circuit Court for Williamson County. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lorenzo Childress, Jr., D/B/A Southgate Medical Group v. Union Realty Company, Ltd.
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Eddiehue Morris Branch, Deceased
This case arises out of a will contest filed by Appellants. At trial, Appellants alleged that Appellee |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brett W. Woodroof vs. Nathan E. Fisher, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between the biological father, Brett W. Woodroof, who filed a petition to establish paternity of the nine year old child, Taylor Leigh Fisher, and the stepfather, Nathan E. Fisher, with whom the child has lived since she was two years old. The trial court determined that Mr. Woodroof was the natural father and awarded him visitation rights, but did not award him custody. A review of the record indicates that Mr. Woodroof asked for custody initially in his petition to determine parentage, but subsequently withdrew his request in his amended petition, and repeatedly advised the court throughout the lengthy court proceedings that spanned sixteen months that he sought only visitation with the child, and not custody. Mr. Woodroof requested custody only at the end of the trial process, after the testimony of the medical experts and other persons had been presented, and after numerous assertions in court that he was not presently seeking custody. We hold that his request for custody came too late and therefore we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand for further action consistent with this opinion. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Monica McPeek, et al. v. Melinda S. Lockhart
Monica McPeek and Melinda S. Lockhart ("Defendant") were involved in an automobile accident. Monica McPeek and her husband, Eldridge McPeek, ("Plaintiffs" or "Ms. McPeek" and "Mr. McPeek" respectively) sued Defendant. The case was tried and the jury found Ms. McPeek to be 40% at fault for the accident and Defendant 60% at fault and awarded Ms. McPeek damages of $4,000 and Mr. McPeek zero damages. Plaintiffs appeal claiming the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant an additur or a new trial after the jury refused to award loss of consortium damages to Mr. McPeek and that the Trial Court erred by allowing the introduction of certain of Ms. McPeek's medical records. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Easley v. Larry C. Baker and Gary H. Baker d/b/a Legend's Bar and Grill
The unsuccessful Plaintiff, Kevin Easley, appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Larry G. and Gary H. Baker, d/b/a Legend's Bar and Grill. On appeal, Easley argues that the record presents a genuine issue of fact on the question of whether Defendants provided adequate notice of a dangerous condition. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bobbie D. Gray, et al. v. The City of Memphis, Tennessee, et al.
The trial court permanently enjoined the City of Memphis from modifying its health care plan to require enrollees to obtain prescription medications through a mail-order pharmacy plan. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
The Estate of Floyd Olmstead, Deceased and Barbara D. Olmstead, Executrix, v. Betty Jayne Olmstead
In the Divorce Decree Decedent was ordered to pay alimony "until remarriage or death of plaintiff". Decedent's estate refused to pay alimony. The Trial Court held the Decree required the payment of alimony after Decedent's death. On appeal, we reverse and dismiss. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Herman Taylor v. State of Tennessee
This is an action for breach of contract filed by Plaintiff/Contractor against the State, together with a Counterclaim and a Third-Party Complaint against the surety company for Plaintiff/Contractor. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiff as to liability because the State had failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 in answering Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. After much procedural combat, the trial court adhered to its ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissed the Third-Party Complaint against the surety and the Counterclaim of the State against Plaintiff, held that Plaintiff had failed to prove any damages against the State, and sustained the Motion of the State for an involuntary dismissal of Plaintiff's entire claim, taxing the costs to Plaintiff. We find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiff as to liability without considering documentation and evidence submitted by the State subsequent to the initial non-final order granting partial summary judgment as to liability. It follows that the court also erred in dismissing the Counterclaim and the Third-Party Complaint against the surety. The grant of partial summary judgment as to liability is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. RDV
In this action to terminate father's parental rights, the Trial Court refused to appoint counsel for father, despite his claim of indigence. On appeal, we vacate the Judgment and remand for further hearing on the issue of indigency. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Austa La Vista, LLC and Take It Easy, LLC, and Boardwalk Property Owners Association, v. Mariner's Pointe Interval Owners Association, Inc., and Henry Phillips, Individually
In this dispute, plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment as to use of their lake by defendant, payment of fees and injunctive relief. Defendant counter-claimed for a declaratory judgment as to its use of the lake, disputed any obligation to pay fees to the plaintiff, and sought monetary damages and attorney's fees. The Trial Court held that plaintiffs' owned the lake and the master deed provided for maintenance fee and membership fees, that defendant's members were required to pay. But if the defendants' members did not use the lake they would not be required to pay the fees. On appeal, we hold the Court correctly found that the lake was an amenity and that a lake use fee was required to be paid to plaintiffs pursuant to the master deed and exhibits. But the Court erred in holding that defendant owners could choose not to use the lake and not pay the fees. We otherwise affirm the Court's rulings on the issues raised on appeal. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Beatrice Harmon Montgomery vs. Terry Lane Montgomery, et al.
While Beatrice Harmon Montgomery ("Plaintiff") and Terry Lane Montgomery ("Defendant") never married, they lived together for many years beginning in 1969. Plaintiff and Defendant had one child, Brian Montgomery. During their relationship, Plaintiff and Defendant accumulated substantial assets and operated several businesses. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit seeking dissolution of her implied business partnership with Defendant. Brian Montgomery intervened claiming he also was a partner in two of the business ventures. The Trial Court concluded that Plaintiff and Defendant were equal partners in all of their business pursuits, and that Brian also was a partner in two of them. It is this ruling that forms the basis for most of the numerous issues raised on appeal. We reverse in part, vacate in part, affirm in part as modified, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Carter | Court of Appeals |
