Roy Hugh Rushing, II v. Jill Marianne Rushing
This is a post-divorce child custody case. The parties were divorced by a final decree which incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). The MDA provided, among other things, that the parties would have joint custody of their two minor children, and that the mother would be the primary residential parent. The MDA also stated that the father would provide life insurance on the children’s lives, and that the maternal grandmother would arbitrate the parties’ disputes. Approximately two years later, the mother filed a motion for contempt, claiming that the father had failed to provide the required life insurance on the children’s lives. In response, the father filed a motion to increase his residential time with the children and also sought court approval to provide term-life insurance as opposed to whole-life insurance on the children’s lives. In addition, the father asked the court to strike the MDA provision stating that the maternal grandmother would be the final arbiter of the parties’ child rearing disputes. The trial court denied the mother’s motion for contempt and granted the father’s motion for modification of the MDA. The mother now appeals. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of James A. Champion, Deceased
This appeal challenges the chancery court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear a will contest. The petitioner daughter filed a petition to probate the last will and testament of her father. Other siblings filed an objection to probate, alleging that their father did not have the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the will. After a hearing, the chancery court rejected the siblings’ claims and admitted the will to probate. Later, the siblings filed another petition contesting the will, again challenging testamentary capacity and, in addition, alleging undue influence. The chancery court certified the will contest to the circuit court. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the petitioner, finding that the issues raised by the siblings had been addressed in the former proceedings and were res judicata. The siblings then filed a Rule 60 motion in chancery court to set aside the order probating the will. The motion was denied. The siblings now appeal, arguing that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the will contest. We affirm, finding that the chancery court had concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court to adjudicate a will contest. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Bill Fox et al. v. State of Tennessee
In this premises liability action,Debby Fox (“the plaintiff”)1 and her husband, Bill Fox, filed a claim against the State of Tennessee (“the State”) for damages sustained by the Foxes when the plaintiff was injured as a result of a fall from a stage during a play rehearsal on the campus of the University of Tennessee at Knoxville (“UT”). The claims commission found in favor of the State, holding (1) that the plaintiff failed to prove her claim of negligence and (2) that she was guilty of 100% of the fault in the accident. The plaintiff and her husband appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the evidence preponderates against the claims commission’s determinations. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Seiller & Handmaker, L.L.P. and Glen Cohen v. Kelly Finnell
This is an action to enroll a foreign judgment. A Tennessee resident was represented by a Kentucky lawyer in a Kentucky lawsuit. When the Kentucky lawyer pursued collection of his fees, the Tennessee client filed a bar complaint against him in Kentucky. The bar complaint was dismissed, and the Kentucky lawyer filed a malicious prosecution lawsuit in Kentucky against the client, and obtained a judgment. In this action, the Kentucky lawyer seeks to enroll the Kentucky judgment against the Tennessee client. The client asserts that the judgment should not be enrolled in Tennessee because it falls under the public policy exception to the full faith and credit clause of United States Constitution. The client bases this argument on Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 27.1, which prohibits any lawsuit based on a bar complaint, asserting that the enrollment of a foreign judgment based on this cause of action would violate Tennessee public policy. The trial court held that the Kentucky judgment was entitled to full faith and credit and domesticated the judgment. We affirm the decision of the trial court, finding that the enrollment of the foreign judgment does not violate Tennessee public policy. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Donna Cottingham v. William B. Cottingham
This appeal concerns an order of the Williamson County Chancery Court finding William B. Cottingham in criminal contempt of court for failure to pay court-ordered child support and alimony. Mr. Cottingham appeals the order of the chancery court sentencing him to 170 days in jail for failure to comply with court orders concerning child support and alimony. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jean Ann Trudeau, et al. v. Department of Labor and Workforce Development for the State of Tennessee, et al.
This is an age discrimination case. In October 2001, a thirty-seven year old woman interviewed for a job position at the defendant’s Career Center. She was recommended for hire for the job. Subsequently, the defendant Career Center began accepting applications for a second job position, similar to the first. The forty-five year old aunt of the first applicant submitted an application for the second job position. The second job position was never filled. The forty-five year old job applicant filed a lawsuit, alleging that she was not hired due to age discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Career Center. We affirm, finding that the forty-five year old applicant failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Clarence Mumford v. Board of Education of The City Of Memphis
Board of Education of the City of Memphis suspended tenured teacher and assistant principal without pay pending an investigation of child abuse by the Department of Children’s Services. After teacher was reinstated, he sought to recover lost wages under T.C.A. §49-5-511. Trial court found that teacher was entitled to recover but that such recovery should be offset by wages earned during the period of suspension. We affirm as modified herein. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Bledsoe and Nannie Bledsoe v. Randall Buttry and Grange Insurance Company
James A. Bledsoe and wife, Nannie, sued Randall Buttry and Grange Insurance Company (uninsured motorist carrier) for damages sustained in a motor vehicle crash. The Bledsoe's claim the jury verdict was insufficient and that the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Smith, Executor of the Estate of Ethel Rogers Smith v. Jerry Smith
The Trial Court held that the confidential relationship between defendant and deceased voids the transaction because deceased did not have independent advice. On appeal, we reverse. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Bowdoin Grayson Smith v. Ginger Lee Marenchin Smith
Bowdoin Grayson Smith (“Father”) and Ginger Lee Marenchin Smith (“Mother”) were divorced in 1996. Mother was granted sole custody of the parties’ four minor children, and Father was granted visitation and ordered to pay child support. Two years later, Father filed a petition for joint custody and later a petition to modify child support. After a hearing, the Trial Court found that Father had failed to prove a material change in circumstances and denied the petition for joint custody; modified the visitation schedule; granted Father telephone and e-mail contact with the children at specified times; found that Mother had proved monthly expenses of $7,500 were reasonably necessary to provide for the support and needs of the children, but that Father would be responsible for paying only $5,000 in monthly child support with Mother responsible for the remainder; and granted Mother attorney’s fees. Mother appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in finding that only $7,500 per month was reasonably necessary for the support of the children and in holding that Father would be responsible for only $5,000 of these expenses. Father raises additional issues claiming the Trial Court erred in dismissing the petition for joint custody and in awarding Mother attorney’s fees. We affirm, in part; modify, in part; vacate, in part; and remand solely for the collection of the costs below. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony and Melinda K. Colston v. Citizens Tri-County Bank
Following Appellees’ default on promissory note secured by a deed of trust, Appellant Bank placed a hold on Appellees’ accounts and instigated foreclosure proceedings. Despite the fact that Appellees cured the default, Appellant Bank continued its hold on accounts and failed to stop publication of foreclosure notice. Although Appellees failed to prove damages, trial court found Bank negligent and awarded nominal damages to Appellees. We reverse. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Grey Cummings v. Pepper Lynne Werner Cummings
The trial court granted the husband a divorce on the ground of the wife’s adultery and made various rulings regarding the parenting arrangement for the parties’ one year old son, child support, property division, and award of attorney’s fees. The parties have appealed most of the those rulings. Although we affirm the equal sharing of residential placement, we find the six month alternating schedule is not in this child’s best interests. We also find other parts of the plan must be vacated in view of recent holdings by the Tennessee Supreme Court. Therefore, we vacate the parenting plan and remand for entry of a new permanent parenting plan addressing the residential schedule, the designation of primary residential parent, allocation of decision-making authority, and child support. In the interim, we reinstate the trial court’s pendente lite arrangement, as modified, and establish interim support. We affirm the division of property, modify the allocation of debt, and modify the award of attorney’s fees. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Linda C. Gorrell v. Tyree B. Harris, IV
This is a child support modification case. The child involved was born out of wedlock to the parties on June 13, 1996. Mother brought suit in the Juvenile court of Davidson County in July of 1996 seeking to establish paternity of the father and to establish child support. Both parties were represented by counsel, and on May 30, 1997, the juvenile court entered an Order of Compromise and Dismissal. The parties settled the case by Settlement Agreement under which Mr. Harris agreed to pay to Ms. Clark (now Gorrell) the sum of $20,000 cash for any and all claims against Mr. Harris through June 30 of 1998, including her child support claims as to the minor child. From June 13, 1998 forward, Mr. Harris agreed to pay $12,000 per year as child support together with medical insurance until the child reached age 18. On February 23, 2001, Mother filed a Petition to Modify the child support in order to bring it in compliance with Child Support Guidelines. The trial court held the Settlement Agreement to be void and set prospective child support but declined to either award retroactive child support or to order an upward deviation in child support because of failure of the father to visit the child. We affirm the ruling of the trial court that the Settlement Agreement is void, modify prospective child support, reverse the trial court on retroactive child support, deny an upward deviation as to retroactive support, but grant such deviation as to future support. The case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
First Tennessee Bank, N.A., Executor, Estate of Glenn P. Webb, Sr. v. Barbara Webb Stanfield, Paul W. Stanfield, Jr., Alicia M. Stanfield, et al.
The Chancellor construed a will and granted plaintiff summary judgment. Defendants insist the will is ambiguous. On appeal, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In re: D.N.G., S.D.P., et ux, J.A.S.P., v. R.L.G. and K.S.R.
The Trial Court terminated the mother’s parental rights to the four year old child. On appeal, we |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
J. Howard Johnson, et al., v. Michael R. Allison, et al.
The parties entered into an option contract for the sale and purchase of a piece of land. The bargained-for option had a limited duration, with the buyer entitled to extend the option for additional consideration if it exercised that right within an agreed-upon time frame. The buyer paid for several extensions, but did not exercise the option before the final option deadline had passed. The sellers subsequently refused to sell, and the buyer sued for breach of contract and specific performance. The sellers filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Begley v.State of Tennessee and Tennessee Department of Transportation
In May of 2000, a car being driven eastbound on Interstate 40 (“I-40”) in Knox County by Jeremy Roark left the travel lane and crossed the rumble strips onto the inside shoulder of the road where it collided with a Tennessee Department of Transportation (“TDOT”) truck parked during routine litter pick-up. Mr. Roark was killed in the accident and the TDOT employee operating the truck that day, Kenneth Siler, was injured. Susan Begley, Mr. Roark’s mother (“Plaintiff”), brought suit against the State of Tennessee. The case was transferred to the Claims Commission (“the Commission”) and was tried. The Commission held, inter alia, that a reasonable person standard applied and that it was not reasonable for the TDOT truck to be parked on the shoulder. The Commission assessed 45% of the fault for the accident to Mr. Roark and 55% to the State and awarded Plaintiff a judgment for $300,000. The State appeals claiming the Commission lacked jurisdiction, there was insufficient evidence that each element of the negligence cause of action had been met, and there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. Roark was less than 50% at fault. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Begley v.State of Tennessee, and Tennessee Department of Transportation - Dissenting
Assuming arguendo that the State’s parked vehicle was a contributing proximate cause of the accident, the Commissioner’s and the majority’s approach by focusing almost exclusively on the defendant’s parked vehicle and its location, led them in my view to the wrong conclusion. The majority is unable to point to any specific regulatory or statutory violations by the defendant. In contrast, the deceased violated numerous statutes, as well as common law violations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-101 et seq., Operation of Vehicles - Rules of the Road. |
Court of Appeals | ||
C. Dwight Graham, et al., v. The General Sessions Court of Franklin County, et al.
Professional bondsmen sued the general sessions court, the general sessions judge, and the sheriff, seeking a declaratory judgment that an order of the general sessions court concerning bonds for some offenses is invalid as contrary to the statutes of the State of Tennessee and the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants, and plaintiff appeals. We reverse. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Montgomery v. Sonja K. Schedin
Gary Robert Montgomery ("Plaintiff") and Sonja K. Schedin ("Defendant") were engaged to be married. After the engagement ended, Plaintiff filed a Writ of Possession in the General Sessions Court claiming Defendant refused to allow him to retrieve his personal property. At issue in the General Sessions Court was who was entitled to a boat and trailer, an ATV, an engagement ring, a trailer, and a 1998 Chevy pick-up truck. Plaintiff claimed Defendant bought the ATV for him as a gift, and that she also gave him $13,500 as a gift to buy the truck. After the General Sessions Court entered its judgment concluding, among other things, that the money was loaned to Plaintiff and was not a gift, Plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court likewise concluded the money was loaned to Plaintiff and was not a gift. Plaintiff appeals. We modify the judgment of the Circuit Court and affirm the judgment as modified. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Vickery Transportation, Inc. and Grammer Industries, Inc. v. Hepaco, Inc.
This case arises out of an action seeking declaratory relief concerning the validity of an arbitration clause in a contract between the parties. Appellee filed a complaint in the Chancery Court at Haywood County for a determination of whether a contract, and, therefore, the arbitration clause in the contract, were invalid because the contract was one of adhesion or executed under duress. The trial court, upon Appellees’ motion to stay arbitration, ordered that the arbitration proceedings should be stayed because there was no agreement to arbitrate. Appellant filed its appeal to this Court, and, for the following reasons, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
William Anthony Bacigalupo v. Mary Darlene Raines Blacknall Bacigalupo
This case arises from the divorce proceedings of Husband and Wife. Husband filed for a divorce from Wife, citing inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable differences as grounds for a divorce. Wife filed her answer and counterclaim, stating she was entitled to a divorce on the basis of inappropriate marital conduct and adultery. The trial court granted Wife a divorce, established Wife as the primary residential parent of Child, divided the parties’ marital property, set alimony payments Husband must pay to Wife, imposed a lien on Husband’s property to secure the property division and support payments, and awarded Wife a portion of her attorney’s fees incurred as a result of the proceedings. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Steven R. Ouzts v. Michael L. Womack, Victoria A. Raub, Frank Donato, Remax-Elite, Steven Boysen, Crye-Leike, Inc., and McAnally Inspection Svc., Inc.
This case involves alleged fraud in the sale of real estate. The sellers completed a residential disclosure statement indicating that the subject property had no flooding problems. The sellers then bargained to include language in the deed disavowing any previous representations concerning the property’s condition. The buyer accepted these terms. After the buyer took possession, the property flooded. The buyer filed suit against the sellers, alleging fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation. The sellers filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. We affirm, holding that the buyers are bound by the unambiguous terms of the contract for sale and the deed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Monte Panitz, et al., v. F. Perman & Company, Inc., et al.
Shareholders seek to inspect certain records of corporation of which they are shareholders, as well as records of two other corporations (“the subsidiaries”): a second corporation which is the wholly-owned subsidiary of the corporation in which Plaintiffs hold shares, and another that is the wholly owned-subsidiary of the second corporation. Defendants maintain that plaintiffs do not have any right to inspect the records of corporations in which they are not shareholders, but agreed to allow inspection of limited records of two subsidiaries as a courtesy, contingent upon plaintiffs signing a confidentiality agreement. Plaintiffs maintain that they have an unqualified right to inspect records of all three corporations under T.C.A. 48-26-102. The trial court found that the confidentiality agreement was reasonable and entered an order requiring defendants to produce certain records, dating back to 1991, for inspection and copying. It further held that, in light of defendants’ agreement to allow limited inspection of records of subsidiaries, it need not rule on issue of whether plaintiffs were entitled to inspect records of subsidiaries. We affirm as modified herein. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Morgan Johnson v. Dorothy Lynn Johnson (Holt)
Kenneth Morgan Johnson (“Father”) and Dorothy Lynn Johnson (“Mother”) were divorced in 1998. The parties have two minor children and initially agreed to equal co-parenting time and that neither party would seek child support from the other. A house owned by Father was severely damaged if not destroyed by fire, and the proceeds from a fire insurance policy were deposited with the Trial Court in a separate lawsuit. After Father was sentenced to be incarcerated for seven years for federal drug violations, Mother filed a petition claiming entitlement to the insurance funds being held by the Trial Court because the minor children were in need of support. The Trial Court concluded Mother should be paid $1,034 per month out of the fire insurance proceeds as child support for the parties’ two minor children. Father appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in determining the amount of child support he should be required to pay each month out of the fire insurance proceeds. We affirm the decision of the Trial Court. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals |
