Jeannette Cutrer Day Siniard v. Mark Alan Siniard
In this post-divorce case, Jeannette Cutrer Day Siniard ("Mother") sought to modify the parties' residential schedule pertaining to their children. That schedule provided that Caroline Siniard and Wesley Siniard (collectively "the children") would alternate weeks between Mother's home and the home of their father, Mark Alan Siniard ("Father"). The trial court granted Mother's request in part by designating her as the primary residential parent of Caroline. In a subsequent order granting Mother child support, the trial court went further and designated Mother as the primary residential parent of both children. Father appeals, contending, among other things, that Mother failed to show a material change in circumstances warranting a modification of the residential schedule. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Latasha Whittington-Barrett v. Charles Sprinkle
The Chancery Court transferred this action to Circuit Court and plaintiff has appealed the transfer. We affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy D. Simpson Kries, v. Tomothy Maurice Kries
The Trial Court awarded child support from birth of the child to marriage of the parties, subsequent to their divorce. The father appealed. We affirm. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Mechelle R. Elosiebo v. State of Tennessee
The Commissioner found defendant's physician breached the standard of care in the treatment of plaintiff, but refused to award damages. On appeal, we affirm Commissioner's finding of breach, but award damages and remand to enter Judgment. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Jerry Bales v. Dialysis Clinic, Inc.
Action alleged retaliatory discharge for filing workers compensation claim. Employer defended termination on grounds employee was unable to perform his job due to disability. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Fred Simmons Trucking, Inc., v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, and its successors in interest, Hartford Fire Insurance, Co.
In this breach of contract action based on a policy of insurance, the Trial Court determined defendant had breached the contract and awarded compensatory damages, as well as punitive damages. On appeal, we reverse in part, affirm in part, vacate and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
William Eugene Jessup v. Marcia J. Tague
In this dispute between attorney and client, a jury awarded the client damages against the attorney which award was approved by the Trial Court. On appeal, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Ellen Hopson Bell v. William Hall Bell
The matter now before us finds its genesis in a divorce action brought by Ellen Hopson Bell ("Wife") against her husband, William Hall Bell ("Husband"). In her complaint for divorce, Wife sought, inter alia, reasonable attorney's fees. She renewed her request for fees at the conclusion of the divorce trial. Without conducting a hearing, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $5,000, representing one half of her reasonable legal expenses incurred in the divorce. Husband appealed. We subsequently vacated the trial court's judgment, remanding the matter to the trial court for a hearing on the issue of Wife's entitlement to a fee award. The trial court conducted a hearing and subsequently ordered Husband to pay Wife $5,250 as an allowance on her legal expenses. Husband appeals. We affirm and hold that Wife is entitled to her fees and expenses incurred on appeal. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Simmons, et al., v. State Farm General Insurance Company, et al.
Homeowner’s insurance policyholders filed a complaint against an insurance carrier seeking benefits under policy and a declaratory judgment that policy language was ambiguous. Homeowners filed a motion seeking certification as a class action. The insurance carrier filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff Beckwith’s claim for benefits was time barred and plaintiff Simmons’s claim was non-justiciable. The insurance carrier filed separate motions to stay discovery and defer the class certification hearing until after the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The trial court granted the insurance carrier summary judgment against all plaintiffs, thereby disposing of the class certification issue. Homeowners appeal from the order granting summary judgment. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Nicholas Griffith v. Jessica Lynn Griffith
The sole issue before the court in this protracted domestic relations litigation is the finding by the trial court that Appellant was in criminal contempt for failure to make mortgage and tax payments on the marital residence. Appellant asserts on appeal that the trial court did not set a specific deadline for payment and that the uncontested proof shows that Appellant lacked the ability to pay when the debt became due. We reverse the trial court action finding that the evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had the ability to pay. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Randel P. Carlton, et al. v. Mark L. Williams, et al.
Randel P. Carlton, and Julie S. Carlton ("Plaintiffs") purchased a house from Mark L. Williams and Sandra Kay Williams ("Defendants"). Plaintiffs later sued Defendants claiming, among other things, that Defendants knew and failed to disclose that the swimming pool was not in good working order and that the swimming pool encroached onto a sewer easement and neighboring property. Plaintiffs also claimed that Defendants had warranted that all fixtures, including the swimming pool, were free of liens and encumbrances and had breached this warranty. The case was tried on the issue of whether Defendants had warranted that all fixtures, including the pool, were free of liens and encumbrances. The Trial Court found and held, inter alia, that the paragraph of the sales contract relied upon by Plaintiffs contained no warranty and that the owner's affidavit also contained no warranty because it merged into the deed at closing. The Trial Court dismissed the case against Defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm, in part, reverse, in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
City of Elizabethton, Tennessee, v. North American Fibers, Inc. et al.
This appeal arises out of a cause of action filed by a municipality against a corporate landowner for breach of a sewer easement which the municipality purchased as a path for its underground sewer line. The municipality alleged that after construction of the sewer line, the landowner's long- standing practice of depositing fly ash and cinders over the area of the easement rendered the line inaccessible and necessitated the construction of an alternate sewage system for which the municipality requested compensation. The municipality also sought to hold the landowner's president and chief executive officer liable as the alter ego of the landowner. The trial court decreed that the landowner had unreasonably burdened the easement, awarded the municipality compensatory damages, and decreed that although the landowner's president was an alter ego of the landowner, he was not personally liable. On appeal the landowner argues that the municipality's cause of action was barred under the statute of limitations and equitable doctrines of estoppel and laches, that under the rule of practical construction the easement allowed the landowner to dump material over the sewer line, that the trial court erred in its award of damages, and that the court erred in refusing to strike findings with respect to the landowner's president. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as rendered and remand. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Bancorpsouth Bank
This case arises from trial court’s denial of Appellant Bank’s request for equitable subrogation of Appellee Bank’s lien to Appellant Bank’s lien. Because Appellant Bank had knowledge of Appellee Bank’s deed of trust prior to making the loan, Appellant Bank is not entitled to equitable subrogation. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: T.L.M., T.L.J., and T.J.B, Jr.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of the Mother and alleged Fathers of two children under the age of 18. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of C.M.S.: State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Lisa Howell, et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals from the order of the Juvenile Court of Madison County, terminating her parental rights on the grounds of persistence of conditions. Specifically, Mother asserts that the termination of her parental rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that termination is not in the best interest of the children. We reverse and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Deas, Administrator v. State of Tennessee
This case involves a wrongful death action filed against the State of Tennessee in the Tennessee Claims Commission pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(I) and (J). Appellant is the administrator of the estate of the deceased driver of an automobile involved in a collision with another vehicle on a state highway. Following a hearing, the Commissioner ruled that the state was negligent under section 9-8-307(a)(1)(I) in inspecting and maintaining the section of highway at issue, the shoulder of the highway did not constitute a dangerous condition under section 9-8-307(a)(1)(J), the Appellant failed to prove that the condition of the highway was the proximate cause of the decedent’s untimely death, and the Appellant was not entitled to recover because decedent’s negligence in causing the accident was at least fifty percent (50%). The Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court, arguing that the Commissioner’s findings constitute error. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Tareco Properties, Inc. v. Steve Morriss
The assignee of a judgment rendered by a federal district court in Texas attempted to enforce that judgment in Tennessee. The trial court entered an order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff and enforcing the judgment. The defendant subsequently filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion for relief, arguing that the judgment of the federal court was void. The trial court agreed and set aside its previous order. After the Texas federal court that had rendered the original judgment reached the opposite conclusion, the plaintiff filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion asking the trial court to set aside its earlier order setting aside the summary judgment enforcing the Texas judgment. The trial court denied this motion. By final order, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action to enforce the Texas judgment. We reverse the trial court on this issue and also vacate the order of expungement granted to Mr. Morriss related to a holding of criminal contempt. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Crye-Leike. v. Estate of Kenneth Earp, et al.
This case involves a dispute over whether a real estate listing contract was canceled by oral agreement prior to receipt of a full-priced offer from a buyer. Plaintiff real estate agents claim the contract was still in effect at the time of the offer entitling them to their sales commission when Defendant sellers refused to sell their property. The trial court found that the contract was canceled by oral agreement prior to receipt of the offer and dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants counterclaimed for violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and the Tennessee Real Estate Broker's Licensing Act. Defendants counterclaims were also dismissed. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State ex rel. Karl F. Dean v. John Aaron Nelson, et al.
This extraordinary appeal involves the efforts of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County to close an adult business where acts of prostitution and lewdness were allegedly occurring. At the City’s request, the Criminal Court for Davidson County issued an ex parte temporary restraining order immediately padlocking the business. Following a hearing one week later, the trial court entered a second order stating that the temporary restraining order would “remain binding and in effect pending a trial.” The owner of the adult business filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application with this court. We have concluded that the trial court departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings in two respects. First, the court violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-3-106(a) (2000) by issuing the temporary restraining order without five days written notice. Second, the trial court violated Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.03(5) by allowing the temporary restraining order to remain in effect pending the trial. Accordingly, we grant the owner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application and vacate the order padlocking the premises.1 |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Tammy Robbins
This is a termination of parental rights case. Tammy Robbins (“Ms. Robbins”) appeals from the order of the Juvenile Court of Weakley County terminating her parental rights. Specifically, Robbins asserts that the trial court erred the following five respects: in admitting the testimony of a certain expert witness; in disregarding the testimony of another expert witness; in disregarding the testimony of Robbins’s fact witnesses; in refusing to observe Robbins with her children; and in considering, in the termination proceeding, evidence of the State’s earlier removals of the children from Robbins’s custody. Because we find appellant’s assertions to be without merit, we affirm. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Christina K. Yeubanks v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals, et al.
Appellant, the mother of a nine year old girl who died after being seriously injured in an |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. B.B.M.
This appeal involves the Juvenile Court's termination of the parental rights of B.B.M. ("Mother") to her four children. After a trial, the Juvenile Court held there was clear and convincing evidence that DCS had made a reasonable effort to assist Mother to reunite with her children. The Juvenile Court also concluded that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mother's parental rights should be terminated on three separate grounds. Finally, the Juvenile Court held there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest. The record on appeal is lacking in many respects and does not contain even the permanency plans developed by DCS to assist Mother in the unsuccessful attempt to reunite her with her children. We conclude the record, such as it is, does not contain sufficient evidence to support the Juvenile Court's conclusion that there was clear and convincing evidence that DCS had made a reasonable effort to assist Mother to reunite with her children. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is, therefore, reversed. |
Hancock | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Hugh Parchman v. Brenda Parchman
This case involves the validity of a final divorce decree entered by the trial court which incorporated an agreement reached by the parties regarding alimony and property division. The wife subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, or in the alternative to alter and amend the judgment, alleging that the final divorce decree was invalid. The wife alleged that, at the time she entered into the agreement with her husband, she was not mentally competent. The trial court denied the wife’s motion. On appeal, the wife alleges that the trial court erred in denying her post-trial motion, as well as in its division of marital property and award of alimony in the final decree. For the reasons contained herein, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Max Deberry v. Ed Gore, et al.
This case involves an inmate’s petition for a writ of mandamus filed against the Tennessee Department of Correction following an increase in his release eligibility date. The inmate filed the petition asking the trial court to order the department to enforce the sentencing range set forth in the judgment entered as a result of his plea agreement. The department filed a motion to dismiss which the trial court granted. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
R&J of Tennessee, Inc., v. Blankenship-Melton Real Estate, Inc., and Walden Blankenship, Individually
This case involves a lawsuit filed by a secured party against a guarantor seeking a deficiency judgment following a foreclosure sale. The guarantor argued that the secured party was not entitled to a deficiency because he was given inadequate notice and the salewas conducted in a commercially unreasonable manner. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded the secured party a deficiency judgment. We reverse and remand to the trial court for further action consistent with this opinion. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals |
