Lee Ann Braswell v. Leslie Graves, et al.
Plaintiff/Appellant appeals from the trial court’s grant of Defendants/Appellees’ Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12 Motion to Dismiss for failure to secure service of process. Finding that Defendant/Appellees’ evidence clearly and convincingly rebuts the process server’s testimony, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Monica White Mueller v. David Edmond Mueller
This appeal concerns the trial court’s findings regarding child custody and rehabilitative alimony in a divorce action. Following a bench trial, the chancery court ruled that the mother would be the minor child’s primary residential parent. The father was awarded standard visitation pursuant to the Permanent Parenting Plan. The chancellor also awarded the mother rehabilitative alimony for a period of three years. The father has appealed the rulings of the chancery court to this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Allene Story v. Malcolm Eugene Lanier
This case primarily involves a dispute over the proper characterization of property held by the parties during a thirty year relationship. The parties lived together during their relationship, but never married. Mary Story filed suit against Malcolm Lanier, alleging that a marriage by estoppel existed between the parties, or in the alternative, that an implied partnership was created, justifying the equal division of all bank accounts, personal property, and real property owned by the parties. The chancellor granted Mr. Lanier’s Motion to Dismiss Ms. Story’s marriage by estoppel claim but allowed her to proceed on an implied partnership theory. Following a bench trial, the chancellor found that an implied business partnership existed in a restaurant purchased by Mr. Lanier in 1974 but not in any real property or bank accounts. Both parties have appealed the chancellor’s rulings regarding the division of the parties’ assets. Ms. Story also appeals the chancellor’s denial of prejudgment interest, the finding that no resulting or constructive trusts existed as to the real property and bank accounts, and a ruling regarding Mr. Lanier’s pleadings. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decisions of the chancery court. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
Conlee Engine Rebuilders, Inc. v. City of Memphis
This appeal arises out of an inverse condemnation action brought by Appellant against Appellee. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, contending that Appellant’s claim was time barred by the applicable statute of limitation. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion, and Appellant now seeks review by this Court. For the following reasons, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Kurts (Parrish) v. Gregory Parrish
This case involves the trial court’s denial of an upward deviation in child support. The chancery court issued a final decree of divorce which incorporated the Permanent Parenting Plan approved by the parties. Pursuant to the plan, the mother was designated the primary residential parent and the father was given overnight visitation. The plan also ordered the father to pay the mother child support pursuant to the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. When the father failed to make child support payments and exercise his visitation rights under the plan, the mother filed a petition for contempt. She also asked the trial court for an upward deviation in child support due to the father’s failure to exercise his rights to overnight visitation. The mother also asked the chancellor to award her litigation costs associated with bringing the petition. The father filed a counter-petition, asking the court for a downward deviation in his child support obligation due to his recent loss of income. The trial court originally granted a downward deviation to the father finding that a significant variance existed, but subsequently reinstated the original child support award. The mother filed this appeal, alleging the chancellor erred in refusing to grant her an upward deviation in child support and in not awarding her litigation expenses. For the reasons contained herein, we reverse in part and affirm in part the decision of the chancery court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of the Estate of Lizzie Tomlin Daughrity, Deceased
This case involves a claim filed by the Tennessee Bureau of TennCare against the estate of an elderly decedent to recover certain benefits paid to the decedent to cover nursing home expenses during her lifetime. The executor filed an exception to the claim arguing that it was filed outside the four (4) month limitations period found in sections 30-2-306(c) and 30-2-307(a) of the Tennessee Code. The chancery court issued an order barring the bureau's claim on the grounds that is was untimely filed. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Jason Jenkins
This is a suit for personal injuries brought by the mother of a mentally challenged 17 year old boy occurring when his teacher attempted to transfer him from one chair to another and tripped over a nearby rocker. Neither his teacher nor the Defendant Nurse who immediately attended to him after the accident detected the fractured leg. Young Jason Jenkins died from causes unrelated to the accident, and his suit was revived against Defendants, Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson County, Mary Ann Armbrister, and Lisa Morrow. The case was voluntarily dismissed as to Defendant teacher Ms. Armbrister, and a settlement was reached between Plaintiff and Metropolitan Government of Davidson County. The trial court sustained a Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of Ms. Morrow from which Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the action of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Cookeville, Tennessee v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Board, et al.
This appeal concerns the rule-making authority of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation under the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. The City of Cookeville, seeking to expand its treatment works facility, obtained a permit from the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation which placed nitrogen limits on the City's effluent emissions into Pigeon Roost Creek in Putnam County, Tennessee. The city filed a declaratory judgment action with the Chancery Court of Davidson County asking the court to find as follows: (1) the section 303(d) list created by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, which listed Pigeon Roost Creek as organically enriched, amounted to an improperly promulgated rule in violation of the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, and (2) the organic enrichment criteria contained in the section 303(d) list amounted to an improperly promulgated Water Quality Standard, which in turn constitutes an improperly promulgated rule, that the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation used to impose restrictions on the city's permit. The parties each filed motions for summary judgment with the chancery court. The chancellor granted the city's motion, finding that the section 303(d) list containing the organic enrichment criteria amounted to improperly promulgated rules as a matter of law. The state appealed the chancellor's ruling to this Court and, for the reasons contained herein, we dismiss this case as non-justiciable. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jo Ann Harris v. Billy Harris
This is a petition to modify alimony. The parties were married for over forty-one years. In 1998, the wife filed a petition for legal separation. In October 1998, the trial court entered a final decree of legal separation, incorporating the terms of the parties’ property settlement agreement. In that agreement, the husband agreed to pay the wife alimony in futuro of $1,300 per month. In October 2001, the husband filed a petition to modify his alimony payments, based on the deterioration in his health, which hindered his ability to pay, as well as the wife’s receipt of social security benefits and income from investments that diminished her need for alimony. The trial court concluded that, since the 1998 decree, there had been no substantial or material change in circumstances that was not foreseeable when the decree was entered. Consequently, the husband’s petition to modify alimony was dismissed. The husband now appeals. We affirm. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Woodrow Jerry Hawkins v. Mary Burton, et al.
Following an unlawful detainer action in general sessions court, Appellant was lawfully evicted pursuant to a writ of possession. Appellant did not appeal the judgment. Appellant filed a subsequent action in general sessions court alleging wrongful eviction. The general sessions court dismissed the action. Plaintiff appealed to circuit court, which affirmed dismissal based on the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Crye Leike, Inc. et al., v. Richard Scott Over
This case arises out of the sale of real estate located in Madison County, Tennessee. Appellants filed this action to recover a real estate commission under a theory of unjust enrichment. The trial court below granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, and Appellants now seek review by this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Margaret Estelle Mitchell v. Ray Allen Lea State of Tennessee ex rel. Katherine A. Yarbrough v. William R. Johnson
This is a consolidated appeal involving two Title IV-D child support cases. In each case, the mother had custody of the children, and the father was subject to a court order requiring monthly child support payments. The mother in each case received State assistance, and consequently the father was required to make the child support payments through the State’s central collection and disbursement unit. Years later, after significant child support arrearages had accrued, the father in each case filed a motion to modify the child support order and requested that the court terminate his child support obligation. Each mother joined in the father’s request, confirming that she no longer wanted the State to enforce the father’s child support obligation. In each case, the State objected, asserting that the mother had assigned to the State her right to the child support payments when she accepted public assistance benefits. The trial court dismissed each case and forgave each father’s outstanding child support arrearage. The State now appeals. We reverse, in both cases, concluding that the trial court erred in retroactively modifying its child support orders and in terminating the cases before the State had been reimbursed for public assistance benefits received by the mothers. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rose Construction Company, Inc. v. Raintree Development Company, L.L.C.
This is the second appeal of this case. In June 1999, an arbitration panel determined Rose Construction was entitled to damages under the parties’ contract. The trial court vacated the arbitration award. On appeal, this Court reversed and confirmed the arbitration award in its entirety. The Tennessee SupremeCourt denied Raintree Development’s application for permission to appeal, issued a mandate, and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of judgment. The trial court entered judgment for Rose Construction as ordered by this Court. Raintree Development again appeals. We affirm. We also hold this appeal frivolous and award Rose Construction damages for a frivolous appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Pickwick Electric Cooperative v. Alcorn County Electric Power Assication (sic)
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of an injunction against Appellant to remove its electrical lines and facilities from McNairy County. The trial court found that Appellant was a “nonconsumer owned electric system” and, as such, subject to injunction under T.C.A. §65-34-103. Finding that Appellant is, in fact, an “electric and community service corporation,” we hold that Appellant is not subject to injunction under T.C.A. §65-34-103. We reverse and remand. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Dwayne S. Byrd, Julie Dichtel Byrd, J. Wilson Roop, Jr. - Getwell West Residents Assoc. v. City of Memphis, et al.
This case involves a dismissal for failure to prosecute. In January 1988, the plaintiff residents filed this lawsuit against the defendant municipal officials for allegedly enacting an unconstitutional and unreasonable annexation ordinance. In 2003, after the case had been on the trial court’s docket for fifteen years with little activity, the trial court clerk filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. In June 2003, the trial court granted the clerk’s motion and dismissed the case. The plaintiff residents now appeal. We affirm, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case. The caption of the case lists 17 Plaintiffs. However, the first 1 two named Plaintiffs, Dwayne and Julie Byrd (“the Byrds”), are now counsel to the Plaintiffs and are not real parties in interest. The suit was originally filed when the Byrds were law students and residents of Getwell West. Subsequently, the Byrds moved out of Getwell West, but entered appearances on behalf of the other Plaintiffs after they became licensed to practice law. 2On November 14, 1995, the trial court entered an order dismissing the case for lack of prosecution. Apparently, however, that order was inadvertently entered, and two weeks later the trial court set that order aside. -2- Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court is Affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gary L. Turnage v. Judith Washka Turnage
This is a child support case involving the allocation of private school tuition. The trial court ordered the father to pay one-half of the minor children’s private school tuition. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Moss v. Board of Probation and Parole
This action arises out of Appellant's parole hearing proceedings. Subsequent to his original parole hearing, Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Davidson County Chancery Court. Upon Appellant's motion for summary judgment and Appellee's motion to dismiss, the trial court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss and denied Appellant's motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Jane Holt v. Billy Dale Holt
Linda Jane Holt ("Plaintiff") and Billy Dale Holt ("Defendant") were divorced in June of 2002. As part of the divorce judgment, Plaintiff was ordered to sell the marital residence and give $20,000 of the proceeds to Defendant. Defendant filed a petition for contempt in July of 2003, claiming Plaintiff had not sold the house. Plaintiff answered and filed a counter petition claiming Defendant had violated a permanent restraining order contained in the divorce decree by writing letters to her and their daughter. The Trial Court ordered Wife either to sell the house within four months or the Court Clerk would sell it at public auction. The Trial Court also ordered that Defendant be permanently restrained from sending Plaintiff and the parties' daughter letters or other written correspondence. The Trial Court also ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs in connection with the petition for contempt and the counter petition. Defendant appeals the award of attorney's fees and costs. We vacate the award of attorney's fees and affirm the award of costs. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Clark Dunlap, et al., v. City of Memphis
Eight full-time Memphis police officers, all of them former officers with the Memphis Police Reserve, sued for declaratory judgment finding that time they served in the Memphis Police Reserve should be credited toward the thirty years of service required in order to receive an automatic promotion to the rank of Captain under Section 67 of the Memphis Charter. Plaintiffs argued that designation of reserve officers as “part-time employees” in Article III, Section 28-56 of the Memphis Code, entitles them to receive such service credit. The Shelby County Chancery Court denied their request for declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas W. Gilland v. Janet Faye Gilland
The parents in this child support proceeding have three children – twins conceived during their marriage and one child conceived after their divorce. Because of pre-2003 jurisdictional restraints, proceedings to set child support were simultaneously pending in both the Circuit Court for Davidson County and the Juvenile Court for Davidson County. The juvenile court awarded the mother a $23,273.50 judgment for retroactive child support for the youngest child and based the father’s prospective child support obligation on his ability to earn $40,000 per year. The circuit court, without considering the juvenile court’s order, calculated the father’s child support for the twins based on $25,761, the imputed annual income in the Child Support Guidelines, and then increased the amount because of extraordinary medical expenses of one of the twins. The mother has appealed the circuit court’s decision to base the father’s child support for their two older children on $25,761 per year rather than on $40,000 per year. The father has appealed both judgments. He asserts that the juvenile court erred by basing his child support for the parties’ youngest child on a $40,000 annual income and by failing to grant him requested credits against his retroactive child support. He also complains that the circuit court erred by increasing his child support because of the medical expenses of one of the twins and the combined effect of the two judgments which require him to pay This is not expressly stated in the order but it is stated in the parenting plan. 1 -2- 53% of his net income in child support, rather than 41% as provided in the Child Support Guidelines. We have determined that the juvenile court’s judgment for retroactive child support should be vacated because the father is entitled to credit for his voluntary child support payments. We have also determined that the father’s child support obligation for all three children should be based on $40,000 per year and that the combined amount of child support obligation should be 41% of his net income, with an upward adjustment for the extraordinary medical expenses of one of the twins. Finally, based on the 2003 statutes affecting the jurisdiction of the juvenile and circuit courts, we have determined that the proceeding in the juvenile court should be transferred to the circuit court and that all future matters regarding these children should be adjudicated in the circuit court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Brent G. Johnson v. Kimberly S. Johnson
Brent G. Johnson ("Father") and Kimberly S. Johnson ("Mother") were married with their only child, a daughter, being born in October of 2000. The child was born with a rare metabolic disorder resulting in developmental delays, among other things. The parties separated shortly after their daughter was born. Mother then moved to West Virginia with the parties' daughter. Father filed for divorce and Mother counterclaimed also seeking a divorce. Both parties sought to be designated as the primary residential parent of their young daughter. At a hearing to determine temporary custody, the parties reached an agreement whereby Mother would return to Tennessee within three months and Mother would be designated as the primary residential parent pending the trial. The Trial Court entered an order setting forth this accord and establishing Father's visitation schedule pending Mother's return. Mother reneged on her agreement, refused to return to Tennessee, and then set about to systematically and intentionally prevent Father from having any meaningful co-parenting time. The Trial Court later entered a final judgment designating Mother as the primary residential parent, but requiring Mother to return with the child to Tennessee and to stop interfering with Father's co-parenting time. Mother appeals claiming the Trial Court was without authority to order her to return to Tennessee. The Trial Court's order designating Mother as the primary residential parent is affirmed if Mother voluntarily returns to Tennessee. If Mother chooses not to return, the Trial Court's judgment designating Mother as the primary residential parent is vacated, and the Trial Court is instructed to determine which parent then should be designated as the primary residential parent consistent with the best interest of the minor child, with the understanding that should primary residential custody remain with Mother in West Virginia, Mother will continue to do her best to prevent Father from having any meaningful relationship with his daughter. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
Sodexho Management, Inc., v. Ruth E. Johnson
This dispute arises from the assessment of the “contractor’s use tax” against Sodexho Management, Inc. for its use of personal property owned and utilities provided by David Lipscomb University. Sodexho used the university’s property to provide food service for the tax-exempt university. The Commissioner assessed a use tax on the value of the personal property and utilities provided by the university because the university, as an exempt organization, had not previously paid sales tax. The pivotal issue is whether Sodexho operated the food service as an agent of the tax exempt university or as an independent contractor. The Chancellor held that Sodexho was an agent of the its burden of proof to establish that it was an agent of the university and thus is liable for the use tax. Tenn. R. App. P.3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and Remanded |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Allstate Insurance Company, v. Wesley Scott Grimes, et al.
This declaratory judgment action was filed by Allstate Insurance Company which seeks a ruling that its named insureds under a homeowners' insurance policy had no coverage and that Allstate had no duty to defend an action brought by a third party seeking damages resulting from the intentional and criminal acts of their son who resided in their home. The insureds' adult son shot his girlfriend at the home of his parents. She filed a tort action against the son and his parents alleging inter alia that the parents failed to render aid after the shooting. The policy excludes intentional and criminal acts by an insured. The son was an insured because he resided in the home with his parents. The policy also contains a "joint obligations clause" that excludes coverage for injury which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts of any insured. Upon summary judgment the trial court held that the parents were not covered and that Allstate had no duty to defend the parents in the underlying tort action. We reverse finding the claim that the parents failed to render aid after the shooting constitutes a claim of separate and independent acts of negligence by the parents to which the exclusion and joint obligations clauses do not apply. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Richard H. Devaughn v. Fayette Mullins, et al.
The trial court determined that the boundary line separating the parties’ properties was established by an old fence line. We affirm. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, v. Jennifer Simpson Blackwell, in the matter of: J.S. Jr. (DOB 6/21/1996)
This case involves the termination of Mother’s parental rights. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of (1) persistent conditions and (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Additionally, the trial court determined that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interest. Mother appeals the decision of the trial court. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Henry | Court of Appeals |
