Betty L. Hampton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
This is a premises liability case wherein the plaintiff alleges that she was injured when she slipped and fell on spilled baby food while shopping at the defendant's store. After trial of the case before a jury, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the case upon grounds that the plaintiff failed to present proof that the defendant had notice of an unreasonably dangerous condition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Sircy and Anethesiologists Professional Assurance Company v. Jerry Wilson
Workers compensation carrier, intervening Plaintiff in a suit to recover for personal injuries sustained by employee of its insured, appeals the Trial Court’s action in awarding one-third of the proceeds of settlement of damage suit to counsel for the injured employee as attorney fees. Finding no error in the action of the trial court, we affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Greg Davidson, et al., v. Bank of Friendship, Inc. and Theoda Dunn v. Bank of Friendship, Inc.
The trial court awarded judgment to Plaintiffs upon determining that the Bank of Friendship could not foreclose on Plaintiffs’ properties because the Bank had failed to apply proceeds from a sale under a deed of trust to a senior deed of trust. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
John Wesley Green v. Edna L. Green, et al.
Judgment debtor filed motion seeking to enjoin execution sale at which stock owned by debtor in judgment creditor corporation was scheduled to be sold; alternatively, debtor sought to quash the execution, alleging that the stock was exempt property. At execution sale, debtor’s stock was purchased by judgment creditor. Debtor subsequently sought to have execution sale set aside, alleging that there were defects in the manner in which the sale was conducted and asserting that the trial court should have held a hearing on his motion to quash the execution prior to the sale. Following a hearing the trial court denied relief holding that debtor had not pursued his request for injunctive relief and that the motion to quash was moot. Debtor appealed. While this case was pending on appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment against debtor, which led to the monetary judgment the execution sale was held to enforce and remanded for a trial on the merits. Having determined that the resolution of the issues raised in this appeal is subject to factual determinations which are within the scope of the remand, we vacate the decision of the trial court and remand this case for consideration in light of the issues to be determined. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marsha Ricketts v. Sara M. Robinson, et al.
This is an appeal from a jury verdict finding that all parties involved were without fault in an automobile accident. We affirm. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: D.C. and S.C., State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Karen Carey, et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals from the order of the Juvenile Court of Benton County, terminating her parental rights on the grounds of persistence of conditions. Specifically, Mother asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an event that occurred after the Petition to Terminate had been filed, that the termination of her parental rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that termination is not in the best interest of the children. We reverse and remand. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Clinton Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis
At issue in this appeal is the legislature’s authority, under the Tennessee Constitution, to impose mandatory closing times on adult-oriented businesses in order to combat the secondary effects associated with those establishments. Appellants, Clinton Books, Inc. (“Clinton Books”) and Fantasy Warehouse, Inc. (“Fantasy Warehouse”), challenge the constitutionality of T.C.A. § 7-51- 1402 through 7-51-1406 (“the Act”), arguing that the Act violates several rights guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution, among them the rights of religious and expressive freedom, due process, and equal protection of the law. Appellants further contend that the trial court erred in ruling on the merits of their claims during the hearing on a motion for temporary injunction. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bill Gibson, et al., v. Jimmy L. Gibson
Appellants sought the rescission of a quitclaim deed from a mother to her son upon the grounds of undue influence, fraud, and lack of independent advice. The trial court found that the quitclaim was not invalid on any of these grounds. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Dubois v. Radwan Haykal, M.D., et al.
This appeal arises out of a grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees in a medical malpractice action. The trial court held a preliminary hearing, without a jury, to determine if Appellant could establish the essential elements of such an action, particularly the element of causation. After Appellant presented her experts’ testimony regarding causation for Appellant’s medical malpractice action, the trial court granted Appellees’ motions for summary judgment. Appellant filed an appeal to this Court, and, for the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
94th Aero Squadron of Memphis, Inc. v. Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority v. Specialy restaurant Corporation
This appeal involves the termination of a commercial real estate lease agreement. Among a multitude of other claims, Plaintiff, Lessee, contends that Defendant, Lessor, breached the lease by failing to provide lessee with notice of default, sufficient to satisfy the terms of the lease. Additionally, Lessee argues that Lessor violated section 29-18-101, et seq. of the Tennessee Code Annotated (Forcible Entry and Detainer) by re-entering the leased premises without first obtaining a writ of possession. Lessee appeals from the trial court’s final judgment in favor of Lessor. We affirm as modified. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Local 1733, and Willie Joe Alexander
This is a claim against a union for negligence. The plaintiff was a correctional officer at a county correctional facility and a member of the defendant union. The employee was terminated from his job after he was arrested for possession of a controlled substance. The employee sought the union’s assistance in appealing his termination through the county grievance process. After his grievance was preliminarily denied, the union had fifteen days in which to appeal the denial by requesting arbitration of the employee’s case. The employee urged the union to file a request for arbitration, and the defendant union officer agreed to do so. However, the defendant union officer failed to submit the request for arbitration by the deadline, and consequently the request was denied as untimely. The employee then sued the union and the union officer, alleging that the union officer’s conduct was negligent and that it constituted a breach of contract. After a bench trial, the trial court rejected the employee’s breach of contract claim. It concluded that the defendants’ failure to request arbitration in a timely manner was negligent, but that the negligence did not cause the employee’s damages. The employee now appeals. We affirm the dismissal of the breach of contract claim, but reverse the dismissal of the negligence claim, finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s conclusion that the employee failed to prove causation of his damages. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mira Ann (Waller) Mosley v. Charles Raymond Mosley
The parties were married in 1980 with no children born of the marriage. The parties separated a number of times during their marriage. During a period of separation, in April of 1995, the parties signed a contract entitled Marital Dissolution Agreement, which, among other things, settled their rights in property acquired during their marriage. They reconciled in 1997 and lived together for some six months until their final separation, which was followed by Wife’s Complaint for Divorce filed June 11, 2001. The trial court held that the Agreement had been freely executed by both parties and meticulously followed until the time of the divorce Complaint. The parties were divorced by joint stipulation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-129, and following final hearing, the trial court held the 1995 Agreement to be fair and equitable and divided property accordingly. Wife appeals, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Paige Mulkey (Hurd) v. Bradley Warren Mulkey
Rebecca Paige Mulkey (“Mother”) and Bradley Warren Mulkey (“Father”) were divorced in 1996. The parties agreed that Mother would be the primary residential parent of their two minor daughters with Father having reasonable visitation rights. Several years later and after Mother had remarried, Father filed a Petition for Change of Custody claiming the older child had been physically abused by her step-father. The Trial Court temporarily transferred custody of the children to Father and indicated this arrangement would be reviewed periodically. After the older child recanted her allegations of physical abuse, the Trial Court ordered that she be examined by a psychiatrist. An examination was undertaken and the psychiatrist concluded there was no evidence of abuse “of any kind.” The Trial Court later entered a judgment and held that its previous temporary decision to designate Father as the primary residential parent was to be the final determination. Mother appeals claiming the Trial Court erred when it transferred custody of the children to Father because Father failed to prove there had been a material change in circumstance. We agree and reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Paige Mulkey (Hurd) v. Bradley Warren Mulkey - Concurring
The majority Opinion notes that the Trial Court talked to the minor children in camera in the presence of the parties’ attorneys, but no court reporter was present, and a record of that proceeding is not before us. We directed in Rutherford v. Rutherford, 971 S.W.2d 955 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), p. 956: The Trial Judge has discretion to interview children apart from the courtroom setting if he considers it is in the best interest of the child. However, if he elects to follow this procedure, he must examine the child “in the presence of attorneys for each side and in the presence of the court reporter.” Newburger v. Newburger, 10 Tenn. App. 555, 566 (1930), and in order to have a complete record on appeal, a transcript of such evidence must be filed. This procedure was not followed in this case and the failure to follow this procedure is grounds, standing alone, to vacate and/or reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court, as we noted in Rutherford. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Vaccaro Construction Co., Inc. v. Louis L. Schafer and C. Marie Schafer
This is a construction case. The defendant homeowners had an oral contract with the plaintiff contractor to perform renovations on their home. After problems with the renovations arose, including flooding of the home after a rainstorm, the homeowners terminated the contractor. The contractor filed a claim seeking enforcement of a lien on the improved property or payment for the work done on theories of breach of contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. The homeowners counter-claimed that the contractor owed them for the cost of repairing the contractor’s defective work. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the contractor’s work fell well below the applicable standard and awarded the homeowners damages for the repair of the contractor’s defective work. We affirm. |
Sequatchie, Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Bill Fox et al. v. State of Tennessee
In this premises liability action,Debby Fox (“the plaintiff”)1 and her husband, Bill Fox, filed a claim against the State of Tennessee (“the State”) for damages sustained by the Foxes when the plaintiff was injured as a result of a fall from a stage during a play rehearsal on the campus of the University of Tennessee at Knoxville (“UT”). The claims commission found in favor of the State, holding (1) that the plaintiff failed to prove her claim of negligence and (2) that she was guilty of 100% of the fault in the accident. The plaintiff and her husband appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the evidence preponderates against the claims commission’s determinations. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Roy Hugh Rushing, II v. Jill Marianne Rushing
This is a post-divorce child custody case. The parties were divorced by a final decree which incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). The MDA provided, among other things, that the parties would have joint custody of their two minor children, and that the mother would be the primary residential parent. The MDA also stated that the father would provide life insurance on the children’s lives, and that the maternal grandmother would arbitrate the parties’ disputes. Approximately two years later, the mother filed a motion for contempt, claiming that the father had failed to provide the required life insurance on the children’s lives. In response, the father filed a motion to increase his residential time with the children and also sought court approval to provide term-life insurance as opposed to whole-life insurance on the children’s lives. In addition, the father asked the court to strike the MDA provision stating that the maternal grandmother would be the final arbiter of the parties’ child rearing disputes. The trial court denied the mother’s motion for contempt and granted the father’s motion for modification of the MDA. The mother now appeals. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of James A. Champion, Deceased
This appeal challenges the chancery court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear a will contest. The petitioner daughter filed a petition to probate the last will and testament of her father. Other siblings filed an objection to probate, alleging that their father did not have the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the will. After a hearing, the chancery court rejected the siblings’ claims and admitted the will to probate. Later, the siblings filed another petition contesting the will, again challenging testamentary capacity and, in addition, alleging undue influence. The chancery court certified the will contest to the circuit court. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the petitioner, finding that the issues raised by the siblings had been addressed in the former proceedings and were res judicata. The siblings then filed a Rule 60 motion in chancery court to set aside the order probating the will. The motion was denied. The siblings now appeal, arguing that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the will contest. We affirm, finding that the chancery court had concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court to adjudicate a will contest. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Seiller & Handmaker, L.L.P. and Glen Cohen v. Kelly Finnell
This is an action to enroll a foreign judgment. A Tennessee resident was represented by a Kentucky lawyer in a Kentucky lawsuit. When the Kentucky lawyer pursued collection of his fees, the Tennessee client filed a bar complaint against him in Kentucky. The bar complaint was dismissed, and the Kentucky lawyer filed a malicious prosecution lawsuit in Kentucky against the client, and obtained a judgment. In this action, the Kentucky lawyer seeks to enroll the Kentucky judgment against the Tennessee client. The client asserts that the judgment should not be enrolled in Tennessee because it falls under the public policy exception to the full faith and credit clause of United States Constitution. The client bases this argument on Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 27.1, which prohibits any lawsuit based on a bar complaint, asserting that the enrollment of a foreign judgment based on this cause of action would violate Tennessee public policy. The trial court held that the Kentucky judgment was entitled to full faith and credit and domesticated the judgment. We affirm the decision of the trial court, finding that the enrollment of the foreign judgment does not violate Tennessee public policy. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Donna Cottingham v. William B. Cottingham
This appeal concerns an order of the Williamson County Chancery Court finding William B. Cottingham in criminal contempt of court for failure to pay court-ordered child support and alimony. Mr. Cottingham appeals the order of the chancery court sentencing him to 170 days in jail for failure to comply with court orders concerning child support and alimony. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jean Ann Trudeau, et al. v. Department of Labor and Workforce Development for the State of Tennessee, et al.
This is an age discrimination case. In October 2001, a thirty-seven year old woman interviewed for a job position at the defendant’s Career Center. She was recommended for hire for the job. Subsequently, the defendant Career Center began accepting applications for a second job position, similar to the first. The forty-five year old aunt of the first applicant submitted an application for the second job position. The second job position was never filled. The forty-five year old job applicant filed a lawsuit, alleging that she was not hired due to age discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Career Center. We affirm, finding that the forty-five year old applicant failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Bledsoe and Nannie Bledsoe v. Randall Buttry and Grange Insurance Company
James A. Bledsoe and wife, Nannie, sued Randall Buttry and Grange Insurance Company (uninsured motorist carrier) for damages sustained in a motor vehicle crash. The Bledsoe's claim the jury verdict was insufficient and that the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Smith, Executor of the Estate of Ethel Rogers Smith v. Jerry Smith
The Trial Court held that the confidential relationship between defendant and deceased voids the transaction because deceased did not have independent advice. On appeal, we reverse. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Clarence Mumford v. Board of Education of The City Of Memphis
Board of Education of the City of Memphis suspended tenured teacher and assistant principal without pay pending an investigation of child abuse by the Department of Children’s Services. After teacher was reinstated, he sought to recover lost wages under T.C.A. §49-5-511. Trial court found that teacher was entitled to recover but that such recovery should be offset by wages earned during the period of suspension. We affirm as modified herein. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bowdoin Grayson Smith v. Ginger Lee Marenchin Smith
Bowdoin Grayson Smith (“Father”) and Ginger Lee Marenchin Smith (“Mother”) were divorced in 1996. Mother was granted sole custody of the parties’ four minor children, and Father was granted visitation and ordered to pay child support. Two years later, Father filed a petition for joint custody and later a petition to modify child support. After a hearing, the Trial Court found that Father had failed to prove a material change in circumstances and denied the petition for joint custody; modified the visitation schedule; granted Father telephone and e-mail contact with the children at specified times; found that Mother had proved monthly expenses of $7,500 were reasonably necessary to provide for the support and needs of the children, but that Father would be responsible for paying only $5,000 in monthly child support with Mother responsible for the remainder; and granted Mother attorney’s fees. Mother appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in finding that only $7,500 per month was reasonably necessary for the support of the children and in holding that Father would be responsible for only $5,000 of these expenses. Father raises additional issues claiming the Trial Court erred in dismissing the petition for joint custody and in awarding Mother attorney’s fees. We affirm, in part; modify, in part; vacate, in part; and remand solely for the collection of the costs below. |
Smith | Court of Appeals |
