Paula Ruth Sheffield Hartman, v. Melvin Thomas Hartman, Jr.
Melvin Thomas Hartman, Jr., appeals a divorce judgment rendered by the Circuit Court for Hamilton County, On apeal he insists that the Trial Court erred in its award of certain jewelry to his wife, Paua Ruth Sheffied Hartment, as separate property which was in fact marital preperty. Mr. Hartman also insists that the Trial Court made an inequitable division of the marital estate since the Trial Court refused to consider the tax consequences of awarding Mr. Hartman certain retirement funds in exchange for Ms. Hartman receiving the equity in their home and other real property. Mr. Hartman filed a motion for reference to a Special Master due to the "complex valuation and categorization issues. " |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Mike T. Hunter, v. Damien V. Burke and Donnie Wear, and Joe Guffey, Individually and doing business as J.D. Auto Sales, and Edwin Thompson, A/K/A Edward Thompson
This is a suit for damages arising out of personal injuries sustained by Mike T. Hunter (Hunter) when he was hit by an automobile driven by the defendant Damian V. Burke (Burke). Burke's vehicle ws owned by the defendants Donnie Wear (Wear) and Joe Guffey (Guffey). The trial court directed a verdict against all of the appealing defendants. 1. The jury then awarded Hunter compensatory damages of $270,000. These defendants appealed, raising the following questions for our resolution: |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Lamar Advertising of Tennessee, Inc., v. City of Knoxville
Lamar Advertising of Tennessee (Lamar) appeals from an order of the Chancerty Court of Knox County that upheld the validity of a provision of the kNoxville City Code, Article V, Section 10-N (Ordinance) that assesses a license fee per annum for the inspection of all existing ground and portable signs within the City of Knoxville. Lamar owns and maintains 350 outdoor advertising sturctures within the City of Knoxville and has challenged the validity of the ordinance. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Roy S. Oakes, v. Harry Lane Nissan, Inc.
In this action for damages for breach of lease, the Trial Judge awarded damages in the amount of $25,000.00 and defendant has appealed. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Patty Jean Talbott and Sam Talbott, v. Judy F. Slaven
Patty Jean Talbott and her husband, Sam Talbott, appeal a judgment entered in the Circuit Court for KNox County which, in accordance with a jury verdict, awarded her $2264.59 for personal injuries received in an automobile accident. The jury obviously found that Mr. Talbott suffered no damages and fixed his recovery at zero. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Rhonda Lee Smith (Baliles) v. Home Beneficial Life Insurance Company
This case is before us pursuant to the grant of two Rule 9 Interlocutory Appeals, one to Plaintiff Rhonda Lee Smith and the other to Larry Wallace, in his offical capacity as Director of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Tami Sprintz Hall v. Richard Hamblen, et al.
Homeowners of a new residence brought an action against a subcontractor for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, professional negligence, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found that there was a breach of contract and awarded attorney's fees under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Subcontractor appealed insisting that because no violation of the TCPA was found, the trial court lacked a basis to award attorney's fees. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to the award of attorney's fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: M.E., M.E., R.B., M.B., S.B.
Mother and father of three children appeal termination of their respective parental rights. Mother appeals arguing that the trial court erred in finding persistence of conditions sufficient to terminate her rights. We reverse, finding that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite Mother with her children. Father appeals alleging that he was denied counsel and/or the effective assistance of counsel. The trial court appointed counsel to represent Father but thereafter relieved appointed counsel without stating a basis and did not appoint substitute counsel. Father retained an attorney on the eve of trial but this retained attorney only appeared on four of the seven days of trial and was absent during significant portions of the days he attended. Since the trial court initially found that Father was entitled to appointed counsel and never made a finding that Father was no longer entitled to appointed counsel or that he had waived the right to counsel, we find that the trial court erred when it failed to appoint substitute counsel. Father attempted to retain counsel; however, retained counsel's repeated failures to attend the hearings was equivalent to Father having no counsel. Thus, Father was deprived of the right to counsel. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment terminating Father's parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: C.T.S.
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) and Mother’s parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1). Mother and Father appeal. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: S.R.C.
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark McGehee v. Julie McGehee
In this divorce case, Mark K. McGehee ("Father") appeals the Trial Court's order regarding child support, its award of primary residential parenting responsibility to Julie A. McGehee ("Mother"), the propriety of the Court's decision to amend its final decree of divorce pursuant to Mother's Tenn.R.Civ.P. 60 motion and the granting of Tenn.R.Civ.P. 11 sanctions against Father's attorney. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Debra Lynn Lawson Gorman v. Richard Eugene Gorman
This is a post-divorce custody case wherein the Trial Court denied the Father’s petition for change of custody and denied the Mother’s petition for payment of uncovered medical expenses and attorney fees. Both parties appealed. We have determined that the Trial Court did not err and we affirm its decision. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
David Hodge, et al v. Shelly Renae Cornelison, et al.
In boundary line dispute, owner of southern tract of real property (appellee) brought action against adjacent land owner to the north (appellant) to quiet title and restrain appellant from alleged offending use of disputed piece of property. Appellant filed counter-claim to quiet title and have appellee ejected from property. Trial court decreed appellee lawful owner of disputed property, relying upon evidence of three iron pins referenced in deed to appellee as the proper boundary markers. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Alton Wayne Saddler, Deceased
The niece of a decedent filed a claim against his estate, contending that she was entitled to compensation for allowing her late uncle to live rent-free for more than four years in a house that she inherited from another uncle. The trial court granted her claim. We reverse. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Karl P. Birkholz, et ux. v. Davis N. Hardy, et ux.
Appellants/buyers appeal from judgment entered for Appellees/sellers on promissory note given for purchase of real estate. The note contained a condition precedent wherein the principal would not be due until Appellants/buyers sold commercial property they owned. The trial court imposed five years as a reasonable time for performance of the contract and awarded prejudgment interest. Appellants/buyers appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jeff Willard v. Golden Gallon-TN, L.L.C.
This is a retaliatory discharge case wherein the plaintiff/employee alleged that his employment was terminated, inter alia, in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act and because he obeyed a lawful subpoena. The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment. The employee appealed. We vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment because we have determined that (1) a claim for retaliatory discharge in violation of Tennessee public policy lies in cases where a substantial factor in an employer's decision to terminate an employee is the fact that the employee honored a lawful subpoena, (2) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the employee was terminated for honoring a lawful subpoena, and (3) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the employee was terminated in violation of the Family Medical and Leave Act. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
J.E.B. v. J.C.W.
This is a child custody case. After a trial, the trial court designated the Father as primary residential custodian of the parties’ child. Mother appeals, arguing that the trial court should have awarded her primary residential custody. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the child’s best interests are served by awarding Father primary residential custody. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Tommy Davis Craig v. David Robert Dison
This appeal involves an unsuccessful plaintiff who seeks review of a jury verdict. Plaintiff argues that the trial judge failed to perform his function as a thirteenth juror. We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Jon E. Shell v. D. Scott King
Jon and Rebecca Shell ("Plaintiffs") sued D. Scott King ("King") after a limited liability company formed by the three of them went out of business. Plaintiffs sought dissolution of the company known as The Big Red Barn, LLC ("the Company" or "the LLC"). Plaintiffs also claimed King had breached his fiduciary obligations to both them and the LLC. The trial court referred this case to a Special Master and after a trial, the Special Master issued a report concluding King was negligent and had breached his fiduciary obligations and recommending that plaintiffs be awarded a judgment which included some, but not all, of plaintiffs' attorney fees and expert witness fees. The trial court confirmed the report of the Special Master in all respects. We modify the judgment of the trial court and affirm as modified. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Gwinn Fayne, et al. v. Teresa Vincent, et al.
Purchasers of real property sued sellers and real estate company seeking rescission for tortious misrepresentation and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court rescinded the transaction and dismissed the real estate company on the basis that the salesperson was an independent contractor. Purchasers appealed asserting: (1) the salesperson was an agent rather than independent contractor; (2) the trial court did not place the purchasers in the position in which they would have been since the transaction was rescinded; and (3) the purchasers should have been awarded their attorney's fees. We agree with the trial court that the salesperson was an independent contractor, but modify and remand for further proceeding (1) relative to placing the parties in the position in which they would have been had there been no transaction and (2) concerning the allowance of purchasers' attorney's fees. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Green v. Leon Moore, et al
This appeal pertains to an alleged breach of a settlement agreement arising from a prior dispute between the parties. The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages resulting from an insulting remark allegedly made by an executive of her former employer in violation of a prior settlement agreement that contained a non-disparagement provision. As a result of the alleged breach, the plaintiff claims she was not permitted to serve as Director of Sales for twenty-seven motels, for which she would have received additional compensation, and was precluded from advancing with her new employer. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's claims on summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Keith Allen, et al., v. State of Tennessee
The Claims Commission awarded damages to Plaintiffs individually and as administrators of the Estate of their son, Robert Keith Allen. The state was held liable under Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(I) and (J). We affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
John R. Albamont v. Town of Pegram, Tennessee
Owner of commercial property in Pegram, Tennessee, filed suit against the Town of Pegram challenging the validity of Pegram's sewer tap privilege fee, asserting that the fee bears no reasonable relationship to the demand placed on the sewer system and therefore is capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Town of Pegram and dismissed the action. We find there are material facts in dispute and therefore reverse the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Robert L. Eubanks, Jr., et al., v. Procraft, Inc. et al.
An applied liquid siding damaged the Plaintiffs’ house. By amended complaint the Plaintiffs joined the purported manufacturer, a Canadian corporation, pursuant to the Hague Convention. Held, not subject to jurisdiction in Tennessee. Tenn. R. App. P. 9 Interlocutory Appeal; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Bruce McGehee, M.D. v. Otis A. Plunk, M.D.
A judgment was rendered against corporation, of which Defendant is 100% owner. Plaintiff sought to recover judgment from Defendant’s corporation but was unsuccessful. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant alleging that conveyance made between corporation and Defendant was fraudulent. The trial court found the conveyance fraudulent and assessed the judgment against the Defendant, personally. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
