Dept. Children Serv. vs. Ericka Everson W2002-01085-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Charles V. Moore
This case involves the termination of parental rights. The two children lived with their single mother in Arkansas. The mother and children stayed temporarily with the children's grandfather in Arkansas, who sexually abused one of the children. After the grandfather threatened the mother, she and the children went to Tennessee and stayed with the children's grandmother. The mother went back to Arkansas and left the children with the grandmother in Tennessee. The grandmother repeatedly sought medical attention for one of the children. A physician determined that the child was a victim of Manchausen Syndrome by Proxy, a form of child abuse in which the caretaker exaggerates or secretly induces symptoms of illness in the victim and then seeks medical attention for the victim's "illness." Both children were taken into custody by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services. A permanency plan was designed for the children's mother. The mother failed to comply with the permanency plan, provide support for the children, or visit the children on a regular basis. In addition, she abducted the children from foster care and would not protect them from the abusive grandmother. The State filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights. The trial court granted the petition, and the mother appeals. We affirm, finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was warranted on several grounds and that termination was in the children's best interest.
Dyer
Court of Appeals
W2002-01945-COA-R3-CV W2002-01945-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
Shelby
Court of Appeals
W2002-02672-COA-R3-JV W2002-02672-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Sam C. Nailling
The appeal involves a claim for property damages by Shirley Secrest ("Secrest" or "Plaintiff") against Kenneth Smith and Tera Haynes, who were driving separate vehicles involved in a multi-vehicle accident with a vehicle owned by Plaintiff. After a trial, the Trial Court concluded that while the driver of Plaintiff's vehicle was not at fault and that either one or both of the Defendants were at fault, the complaint nevertheless should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Kenneth Smith was negligent; and (2) Plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Tera Haynes was negligent. Plaintiff appeals, claiming the Trial Court was required to allocate fault to Smith and/or Haynes once it concluded that Plaintiff was not at fault and either one or both of the Defendants were at fault. We affirm.
Plaintiff initiated this action alleging breach of contract, interference with contractual relations, and pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. We affirm.
Sharron Johnson brought suit against her former husband, Rodney Lockhart, alleging breach of an oral contract to pay equal shares of the college expenses for their son, Paul G. Lockhart. The Circuit Court of Sumner County entered judgment for Ms. Johnson, and Mr. Lockhart appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Plaintiff filed a cause of action against several state employees for malicious prosecution. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We reverse.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
John McConkey v. State of Tennessee M2002-02671-COA-R12-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner W.R. Baker
John McConkey ("Plaintiff") had a vasectomy performed by a state-employed doctor. Plaintiff experienced swelling and pain after the operation, which he claimed caused him to lose time at work and caused problems in his marriage. Plaintiff underwent two subsequent surgeries including the removal of his left testicle. Plaintiff brought this claim against the doctor who performed the vasectomy. Plaintiff had no expert witness at trial. After trial, the Claims Commission ("Commission") entered an order holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff did not carry his burden of proof to establish a res ipsa loquitur case. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
In this Estate dispute, the Trial Court dismissed claims of two claimants. We affirm, dismissal of claimant who died on grounds his Estate had no standing to proceed. We reinstate the action of the other claimant on grounds she is not estopped to maintain her action.
This appeal questions whether the Trial Court erred in its judgment against the Appellant/Defendant, Water and Light Commission of the Town of Greeneville, Tennessee, for personal injuries sustained by a Greeneville resident as a result of the smoking of sewer lines by the Appellant. We affirm This appeal questions whether the Trial Court erred in its judgment against the Appellant/Defendant, Water and Light Commission of the Town of Greeneville, Tennessee, for personal injuries sustained by a Greeneville resident as a result of the smoking of sewer lines by the Appellant. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
Greene
Court of Appeals
Department of Children's Services v. C.L. & M.T. M2001-02729-COA-R3-JV
Trial Court Judge: Andrei E. Lee
At issue in this appeal is the petition filed by the Department of Children's Services to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father to nine of their children. After a trial, the trial court granted the petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father based on abandonment, failure to comply with the Permanency Plans, and persistence of the conditions which led to the removal. Each parent independently appeals the decision of the trial court, arguing that there was not clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's ruling. Because we find that grounds for termination were not proved as to either parent, we reverse the judgment terminating Father's and Mother's parental rights.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
In Re: Lillie Odessie Green, Decedent M2002-01672-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Royce Taylor
Trial Court Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr.
The court is asked to construe the following language contained in a form will: "I give all my estate to my children, if any, who survive me in equal shares, per stirpes." The testatrix was survived by four of her five children. The trial court held that the two children of the testatrix's child who predeceased her did not take any of her estate. We hold likewise.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Barbara Lee Bunce Kerce v. Stephen Paul Kerce M2002-01744-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Lee Russell
The appellant Stephen Paul Kerce challenges the divorce decree entered in Moore County Circuit Court, alleging that the court erred in its valuation and distribution of the marital estate. We affirm.
After the death of their elderly mother, her sons discovered that the decedent's stepson and his wife had used a power of attorney to transfer the funds from the decedent's $20,000 CD to themselves. The decedent's son filed a petition to have the money restored to her estate. The trial court held that the CD was a valid inter vivos gift from the decedent. We reverse, because there is no evidence in the record that such a gift was ever made.
Stewart
Court of Appeals
M2002-02661-COA-R3-CV M2002-02661-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Shawn E. McWhorter v. Randall Bare E2002-02896-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
Professional pilot Shawn E. McWhorter ("Plaintiff") sued Randall Barre ("Defendant") for defamation based upon a letter Defendant wrote to the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") containing allegations that plaintiff was medically unfit to be a pilot. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and awarded $25,000 in compensatory damages and $42,500 in punitive damages. The trial court entered its judgment, as later amended, in favor of plaintiff against defendant for $105,820.01, consisting of compensatory damages of $25,000, punitive damages of $42,500, and attorney fees and expenses in the amount of $38,320.01. The trial court's award of attorney fees and expenses was based upon defendant's refusal to admit liability in response to requests for admission. Defendant appeals. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Jasmine A. Ali v. Eric N. Fisher, et al. E2003-00255-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John S. Mclellan, III
After an automobile accident in which she suffered serious injuries, Jasmine A. Ali ("Plaintiff") sued both the driver of the automobile, Eric N. Fisher ("Fisher"), and the owner of the automobile, Thomas Scheve ("Scheve"). The claim against Scheve was based on negligent entrustment. Prior to trial, Plaintiff and Scheve were in sharp disagreement as to whether Scheve's alleged negligent entrustment resulted in Scheve's being vicariously liable for Fisher's conduct, or whether Scheve's negligence should be apportioned by the jury pursuant to comparative fault principles. The trial court concluded Scheve's alleged negligent entrustment should be apportioned by the jury pursuant to comparative fault principles. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and apportioned fault, 80% to Fisher and 20% to Scheve based on his negligent entrustment of the vehicle to Fisher. The trial court entered a judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment asking the trial court to reverse its earlier pre-trial ruling and hold Scheve vicariously liable for Fisher's negligence because Scheve negligently entrusted the vehicle to Fisher. The trial court granted the motion and amended the judgment which, in effect, held Scheve and Fisher jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the jury's award. Scheve appeals. We hold the trial court erred when it amended the original judgment after concluding, post- trial, that Scheve was vicariously liable for Fisher's conduct. We vacate the amended judgment and reinstate the original judgment of the trial court entered in accordance with the jury's verdict apportioning fault.
Sullivan
Court of Appeals
Lindsay Alford vs. Oak Ridge City Schools E2002-03133-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
Lindsay E. Alford ("the plaintiff") and her father, David R. Alford, IV, sued The Oak Ridge City Schools ("the high school") under the Governmental Tort Liability Act ("GTLA") for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when she slipped on a hallway floor at Oak Ridge High School, where she was a student. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's proof, the trial court granted the high school's motion for an involuntary dismissal, finding that, while the plaintiff had proven the existence of water on the floor, she had failed to prove that the high school knew or should have known about the water. From this ruling, the plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
Anderson
Court of Appeals
TGJ & Co. vs. Michael E. MaGill E2003-00298-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John F. Weaver
Margaret E. Bowers ("the Claimant") appeals the judgment of the trial court, which reversed an administrative determination of the Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Workforce Development ("the Commissioner"). The Commissioner had held that the Claimant is eligible for unemployment compensation as a result of the termination of her employment with TGJ & Co., Inc. ("the Employer"). Because we hold that the Claimant voluntarily quit her employment without good cause, we affirm the trial court.
Knox
Court of Appeals
In Re: The Estate of Lowell Frazier E2002-01203-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Billy Joe White
This appeal concerns two separate suits filed in the Chancery Court for Campbell County in connection with the administration of the Estate of Lowell Frazier. The first suit was brought by Sam Lough, individually, and also, along with his wife, Debbie Lough, as parents and guardians of Matthew Lough, and Darryl Herron and Elizabeth Herron, as parents and guardians of Chelsea Herron. It sought to establish a lost or spoilated will of Mr. Frazier, which was dated January 30, 1998 ("the first will"). The second suit was brought by Matthew Lough and Chelsea Herron by and through their guardian ad litem, appointed in the first case, contesting a later will dated May 24, 2000 ("the second will"). The cases were consolidated below and the suit seeking to establish the first will was tried first. Under an agreement of the parties, the first case must be decided in favor of the minors before they would have standing to contest the second will. After a plenary trial a jury found as to the first case that the Plaintiffs proved by clear and convincing evidence that Lowell Frazier did not destroy the first will. Thereupon, the second trial was had before the same jury, which found against the second will on the ground that due execution was not proved and that Glenda Faye Smith, who was the sole beneficiary of the second will, and at the time it was executed was attorney-in-fact for Mr. Frazier, did not overcome the presumption of undue influence over Mr. Frazier by clear and convincing evidence. Ms. Smith raises a number of issues, many of which merit a critical examination, but our review of the record persuades us that the issue which contends that she was entitled to a directed verdict in the first case is the dispositive issue in this appeal. We find that the Court was in error in not directing a verdict in her favor in the lost will case and reverse the judgment rendered therein. This results in the Plaintiffs not having standing to pursue the second case, which is reversed and dismissed.
Campbell
Court of Appeals
W2003-00129-COA-R3-CV W2003-00129-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
James Tate v. Glenda Tate M2002-01749-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Carol A. Catalano
This appeal concerns the propriety of the trial court's property division between divorcing parties. As part of its division of the marital property, the trial court ordered that Husband transfer a home, which was his separate property, to Wife. The trial court also awarded Wife $4,500.00 as her interest in a Mercedes automobile which the parties purchased for $15,000.00. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Robertson
Court of Appeals
Donovan Davis v. Ray Maples M2002-02564-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
An inmate brought this action to seek judicial review of the Board of Paroles decision to deny him parole. Because a prisoner has no liberty interest in early release, we affirm the dismissal of the due process claims brought herein. We affirm dismissal of that portion of the petition that alleges that the denial of parole was arbitrary and capricious, but specifically hold that Mr. Davis may pursue administrative appeal of that denial. We reverse dismissal of the claim that the Board's decision to defer Mr. Davis's next meeting with the Board for eleven years is not arbitrary and capricious, and remand that claim for further proceedings.
