Joey D. Thompson v. Asia Thompson E2022-00345-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gregory S. McMillan
This appeal involves an interstate custody matter. The mother and child reside in
Massachusetts while the father resides in Tennessee. The father attempted to obtain
custody of the child by filing an emergency petition in the Knox County Juvenile Court.
The juvenile court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The father
appealed the juvenile court’s decision to the Knox County Circuit Court which, also finding
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, dismissed the appeal. We affirm.
Court of Appeals
Joey D. Thompson v. Asia Thompson E2022-00345-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gregory S. McMillan
This appeal involves an interstate custody matter. The mother and child reside in
Massachusetts while the father resides in Tennessee. The father attempted to obtain
custody of the child by filing an emergency petition in the Knox County Juvenile Court.
The juvenile court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The father
appealed the juvenile court’s decision to the Knox County Circuit Court which, also finding
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, dismissed the appeal. We affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
In Re Trenton B. Et Al. M2022-00422-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Bussart
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by
clear and convincing evidence that three grounds for termination were proven against the
father: (1) abandonment by incarcerated parent for failure to visit; (2) substantial
noncompliance with a permanency plan; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume custody. The juvenile court also found that termination was in the
best interests of the children. The father appeals. We affirm.
This is an appeal from the entry of an order of protection for stalking. The respondent
asserts that he did not receive the statutorily required notice of hearing and that the evidence
did not support a finding of stalking. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. We
affirm.
Court of Appeals
Ciera Besses v. James Killian M2021-01121-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Binkley, Jr.
This case arises out of a vehicular accident between Ciera Besses (“Plaintiff”) and James
Killian (“Defendant”). Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages, seeking compensation for
past and future medical expenses, loss of earnings, pain and suffering, and loss of
enjoyment of life. Defendant admitted fault but challenged the reasonableness and
necessity of certain medical, hospital, and doctor bills itemized by Plaintiff. Defendant also
contended that some of Plaintiff’s claimed injuries were not causally related to the accident.
The jury awarded $16,720 to Plaintiff in damages, which represented $12,720 for medical
expenses; $3,000 for past physical pain and mental suffering; $1,000 for past loss of
enjoyment of life, and $0.00 for future physical pain and suffering and future loss of
enjoyment of life. Plaintiff filed a motion for additur and/or new trial, which the trial court
denied. Plaintiff appeals, contending that the trial court erred by denying her motion for a
new trial. We have determined it did not. Thus, we affirm.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
In Re Genesis B. E2022-00973-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sharon M. Green
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child. Jordan H.
(“Father”) and his wife Johnaysja S. (“Stepmother”) (“Petitioners,” collectively) filed a
petition in the Juvenile Court for Washington County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to
terminate the parental rights of Cynthia B. (“Mother”) to her minor son Genesis B. (“the
Child”). Mother has a history of criminal conduct involving the sale of illegal drugs. After
a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the
Child. The Juvenile Court found that the following grounds were proven against Mother
by clear and convincing evidence: abandonment by wanton disregard, persistent
conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The
Juvenile Court found further, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of
Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing in part that
despite her continued criminal conduct she has demonstrated a genuine desire to maintain
a relationship with the Child as evidenced by, for example, her filing a petition for visitation
and engaging in some visitation. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its
entirety.
Plaintiff sues to enforce his perceived right to address the House of Representatives. Finding that the case is identical to a prior case in that it involves a court of competent jurisdiction, the same parties as a previous case, a prior final decision on the merits, and the same parties and cause of action, the trial court applied the doctrine of res judicata and dismissed the case. We affirm.
A husband and wife divorced after a short marriage. The trial court awarded a
disproportionate share of the marital property to the husband. The wife challenges the
court’s division and its denial of her request for attorney’s fees. Discerning no reversible
error, we affirm.
Dyer
Court of Appeals
In Re Ethan W. Et Al. M2021-01116-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael Hinson
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to three of her children. The
juvenile court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of five statutory
grounds for termination. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing
evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. On appeal, we determine that
some grounds do not support termination of parental rights. Still, clear and convincing
evidence supports at least one statutory ground for termination and the best interest
determination. So we affirm.
The appellant, an insurance provider, sought a declaratory judgment against the policy
holder, his wife, and his grandson, relieving the insurance company of the duty to defend
and indemnify the policy holder, his wife, and his grandson against a complaint brought by
the conservator of the grandson’s girlfriend for varying claims of negligence. The
insurance provider filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the grandson
constituted a “covered person” under the grandfather’s policy as an authorized driver and
that the grandson’s girlfriend constituted a “person residing in the same household as a
covered person,” triggering the policy’s household exclusion. Pursuant to the household
exclusion, which excluded liability coverage for bodily injury to “any covered person or
any person residing in the same household as a covered person,” the insurance provider
claimed that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify the policy holder, his wife, and his
grandson. The trial court granted the insurance provider’s motion for summary judgment
in part and denied it in part.
Sevier
Court of Appeals
In Re Jackson R. et al. M2021-01545-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Branden Bellar
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children. Two years after the
children were removed and found to be dependent and neglected, the Department of
Children’s Services petitioned for the termination of her parental rights. The trial court
found the existence of four grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to provide a
suitable home, abandonment by an incarcerated parent/wanton disregard, persistence of
conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody with
custody posing a risk of substantial harm to the children. Finding it also to be in the best
interest of the children, the court terminated the mother’s parental rights. Mother contends
these findings were in error. Finding no error, we affirm.
Smith
Court of Appeals
In Re Piper N. W2021-01185-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor JoeDae L. Jenkins
This appeal arose from a termination of parental rights proceeding where a mother’s
parental rights were terminated on several statutory grounds. The original adoption petition
contained no grounds for termination of the parents’ rights, and therefore, the Trial Court
used the four months prior to the amended petition, which included grounds for
termination, for purposes of the abandonment grounds. We affirm the trial court’s use of
this time period before the amended petition. We hold that the record is insufficient for us
to conduct a meaningful appellate review in this case and that the trial court failed to make
sufficient findings of fact on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment
by failure to financially support, and mental incompetence based on the statutory authority
in effect at the time of the filing of the amended petition alleging grounds for termination.
These grounds are vacated and remanded to the trial court to allow the trial court to develop
a proper record from which this Court can conduct a meaningful appellate review and to
make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-
1-113(k). The amended petition seeking termination of parental rights was filed prior to
the 2018 statutory amendments of the relevant termination statutes. Because the Child was
never adjudicated as dependent and neglected, we reverse the ground of persistent
conditions under the statute in effect when the amended petition was filed. Additionally,
the statutory ground located at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14) was not pled in the
termination petition and was not tried by express or implied consent; therefore, we reverse
this ground as to the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
In a previous appeal, this Court affirmed the probate court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants on two separate grounds – res judicata and the statute of limitations. On remand, the appellant filed a Rule 60 motion seeking to set aside the same order granting summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that a recent order from a circuit court necessitated that the probate court’s summary judgment order be “voided and set aside.” The probate court denied the motion. The appellant appeals. We affirm and remand.
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee from the chancery court’s denial of a motion to recuse.
A new chancellor, during the course of a judicial election and shortly after the election was
held, made extremely critical comments regarding the personal and professional character
of his opponent, the incumbent chancellor. The challenger won the election, and the former
chancellor, who has returned to practice, is now representing a party before the new
chancellor. The former chancellor moved for the new chancellor’s recusal in cases in
which the former chancellor is appearing as counsel as well as recusal from cases involving
the law firm which the former chancellor joined after losing the judicial election. The new
chancellor denied the motion. On appeal, we conclude that, even in the absence of actual
bias, based upon concern about the appearance of bias toward the former chancellor,
recusal is warranted. This concern does not extend to the law firm the former chancellor
has joined. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of recusal insofar as it concerns the former
chancellor but affirm the denial of recusal insofar as it concerns the law firm.
Defendants appeal from the denial of their effort to invalidate a 2017 judgment on the basis that the trial judge harbored animosity against them at the time the judgment was rendered. Because these allegations were adjudicated in an earlier Rule 60.02 action, we conclude that res judicata bars the instant effort for relief from the judgment.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
In Re Emberley W. et al. M2022-00157-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles B. Tatum
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of persistent conditions
and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of the child.
Father also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in
the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court in all respects.
This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying
Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require
recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
This appeal concerns premises liability. The plaintiff slipped and fell on a pedestrian bridge on the defendants’ property. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appeal. We affirm.
A woman filed a complaint alleging she was assaulted at a retail store. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the woman failed to prove her assault claim, and the woman appealed. Due to the deficiencies in the woman’s appellate brief, this Court is unable to reach the substantive issues she raises, and we dismiss the appeal.
This appeals centers upon a challenge to a chancery court’s findings of fact that proved
determinative as to multiple legal issues arising in litigation related to unpaid repair costs
for rendering a private plane airworthy. The chancery court made the factual determination
that the plane owner did not agree to pay for the repairs performed by a mechanic. In
reaching this conclusion, the chancery court resolved the case based upon documentary
evidence in the form of deposition transcripts and exhibits rather than live witness
testimony. Given the documentary nature of the trial court proceedings, we conducted a
de novo review of the evidence presented without affording deference to the trial court’s
factual findings. We find the trial court erred in its factual finding that the owner did not
agree to pay for the repairs. Accordingly, we reverse the chancery court’s legal conclusions
for which the trial court’s contrary factual determinations had been determinative. We
conclude that the plane owner breached his contract with the mechanic and is responsible
for storage costs for the plane pursuant to the possessory lien thereupon. We remand for
further proceedings including a determination of the applicability of prejudgment interest
to the repair costs.
Montgomery
Court of Appeals
Christa Stephen et al. v. Sarah Hill M2022-00672-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Adrienne Gilliam Fry
This appeal involves a personal injury case where the defendant died during the pendency
of the litigation. Subsequent to the filing of a suggestion of death by the defendant’s
counsel, the plaintiff failed to timely file a motion for substitution within the time provided
in the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and, as a result, the defendant’s counsel filed a
motion to dismiss. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for substitution and
simultaneously moved the trial court to enlarge the time for filing the motion. The trial
court denied the plaintiff’s motions and dismissed the case. Upon our review of the record,
we reverse.
This appeal concerns an alleged violation of the Open Meetings Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §
8-44-101, et seq. Pauline Madron (“Plaintiff”) sued the City of Morristown, Mayor Gary
Chesney, as well as Councilmembers Al A’Hearn, Chris Bivens, Robert Garrett, Tommy
Pedigo, Kay Senter, and Ken Smith (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for
Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff alleged that the city’s public notice of a
July 12, 2019 special meeting to exceed the certified tax rate was inadequate. Plaintiff and
Defendants filed crossing motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s Open Meetings Act
claim. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the city’s notice that it intended to exceed the certified
tax rate was mere jargon that did not reasonably inform the public of the purpose of the
special meeting or the action to be taken. In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
Open Meetings Act claim is moot as it arises out of a property tax rate that was passed in
fiscal year 2019-2020, which lapsed before this matter was heard. Alternatively,
Defendants contend that, while most people may not understand the intricacies of city
finances, most people do understand what “exceed” and “tax rate” mean. While Plaintiff’s
claim is moot, it warrants resolution nevertheless. We hold that the city’s public notice of
the July 12, 2019 special meeting was adequate. We affirm.
Hamblen
Court of Appeals
In Re Aubree D. M2022-00267-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Tiffany G. Gipson
The mother of Aubree D. appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) established several grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights—including severe child abuse—and that termination of her rights was in Aubree’s best interest. On appeal, the mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove any ground for termination or that termination of her parental rights is in Aubree’s best interest. In a dependency and neglect proceeding, the Circuit Court for Overton County found that the mother subjected Aubree to severe child abuse, and this court affirmed that finding in In re Aubree D., No. M2021-01229-COA-R3-JV, 2022 WL 4488507 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2022). Thus, the finding of severe child abuse is res judicata. We have also determined that DCS proved other grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in Aubree’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
Overton
Court of Appeals
In Re Jacob J. M2023-00029-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Louis W. Oliver
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. Because the father did not
file his notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry
of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss
the appeal.
This appeal involves a breach of contract action filed against the agent of an undisclosed principal. The trial court entered an order granting judgment against the agent. The agent appeals. We affirm.
