Lacy McAllister v. Lawrence County School System Board of Educations, et al.
This case involves a challenge to a decision to non-renew the employment of a non-tenured teacher. The plaintiff sued the defendants for breach of her one-year contract of employment. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Bank & Trust v. Scott Michael Boruff
A bank brought an action against a borrower for failure to repay a promissory note. The borrower asserted that the bank failed to mitigate its damages by failing to sell the shares of stock it held as collateral to pay off the loan at a time when the stock’s value was high. After a bench trial, the trial court granted judgment in favor of the bank, holding that the parol evidence rule prevented consideration of his purported oral modification of the parties’ agreement. Borrower appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dolores C. Jones v. Smith & Nephew INC.
Appellant filed this products liability action more than 10 years after undergoing a total hip replacement using Appellee's hip implant system. The trial court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss on the ground that Appellant's lawsuit fell outside the 10-year statute of repose and any exceptions thereto. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kailey A. Et Al.
This appeal involves the parental rights of a mother, Mary K. (“Mother”), to her minor children, Kailey A., Abigail K., Isaiah K., and Izzabella K. (collectively, “the Children”). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the statutory ground of severe child abuse committed against the Children. The Greene County Juvenile Court (“the Juvenile Court”) found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had severely abused the Children and that it was in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Commercial Painting Company INC. v. The Weitz Company LLC ET AL
This is the third appeal arising from a commercial construction project. Most recently, the case went to trial before a jury, which awarded the plaintiff subcontractor $1,729,122.46 in compensatory damages under four separate theories and $3,900,000.00 in punitive damages. The trial court further awarded the plaintiff pre- and post-judgment interest and attorney’s fees and costs. We conclude the economic loss rule is applicable to construction contracts negotiated between sophisticated commercial entities and that fraud is not an exception under the particular circumstances of this case. Because punitive damages and interest are not authorized under the parties’ agreement, those damages are reversed. The compensatory damages of $1,729,122.46 awarded for breach of contract are affirmed. The award of attorney’s fees incurred at trial are vacated for a determination of the attorney’s fees incurred in obtaining the compensatory damages award. No attorney’s fees are awarded on appeal. We therefore reverse in part, affirm in part, and vacate in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brad Rothbauer v. Ashley Sheltrown
Following the establishment of paternity, a father petitioned to change his child's surname. The trial court denied the petition. The trial court's order does not contain findings as to whether the name change is in the child's best interests. Therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Alan Thigpen v. The Estate of Kent Howard Smith et al.
Appellant’s brief in this case fails to substantially comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Caroline R. Et Al.
The trial court terminated a mother and father’s parental rights to their children on the grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility; (3) persistence of conditions; and (4) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The trial court also ruled that the termination ground of abandonment by failure to visit had been proven against the father. The trial court further found that termination of the mother and father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports these grounds for termination. We also affirm the trial court’s determination that the termination of the mother and father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
LaFarge North America v. Warren Mills ET AL.
This is the second appeal of this case. After remand from the first appeal, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to reopen discovery concerning Appellant’s counterclaim, wherein he asserted that the guaranty he signed was void and unenforceable. In the first appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s counterclaim, finding that the disputed guaranty was, in fact, valid. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err in precluding further discovery on the dismissed counterclaim. We grant Appellee’s request for an award of attorney’s fees and costs for frivolous appeal, and remand the case for determination of Appellee’s reasonable appellate attorney’s fees and costs and entry of judgment on same. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Hope King v. Stephen Bradley
In this negligent misrepresentation case, an insured alleges that her insurance agent made misrepresentations about the contents of an agreement she authorized her husband to sign on her behalf. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance agent, finding that the insured was “responsible for what she signs or what she has her agent to sign.” Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Megan Arndts Woody v. Jeremy Brice Woody
In this divorce case, a father appeals the trial court’s reduction of his parenting time after the parties had co-parented equally by agreement, and then nearly equally under a temporary court order. He also appeals the award of alimony. We reverse the residential parenting schedule portion of the parenting plan entered by the trial court and remand for the imposition of a plan that better maximizes both parents’ time with the child. Regarding alimony, because the trial court did not make the required findings, its judgment on that issue is vacated. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Patsy Glover Bonifield
Appellant, an attorney, filed a creditor’s claim against Decedent’s estate for legal fees allegedly owed to Appellant for his representation of Decedent in her divorce action and in her challenge of the seizure of certain assets by the State of Tennessee. Appellant argued that he represented Decedent in the seizure matter under a contingency fee agreement; however, Appellant failed to produce a valid contingency fee agreement. At the hearing, the only proof of fees Appellant produced was an invoice for $3,847.51, and the trial court awarded him the full amount of that invoice. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Barry Vaulton Et Al. v. Polaris Industries, Inc. Et Al.
This appeal concerns an ATV (all-terrain vehicle) accident. Sam Vaulton, a minor, by his parents, next friends and natural guardians, Barry Vaulton and Joy Vaulton, and Barry Vaulton and Joy Vaulton, individually (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued Polaris Industries, Inc. (“Polaris”) and Ritchie Power Sports, LLC (“Ritchie”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”) for injuries Sam Vaulton received from the winch on his ATV (called “The General”). The General was manufactured by Polaris and sold by Ritchie. Sam Vaulton lost his right index finger when he directed his friend to push the “out” button on the winch-controls while Sam Vaulton was holding the winch-hook and the cable went in rather than out. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the Trial Court’s conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiffs were provided an owner’s manual or safety instructions; the undisputed evidence shows they were provided. However, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether a tether was attached to the winch-hook and whether the General’s winch was in a defective or unreasonably dangerous condition when it left Polaris’ control. We hold further that the Trial Court erred in concluding at this summary judgment stage that Polaris had no duty to attach a rubber stopper to the winch. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The judgment of the Trial Court is thus affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kendall R. et al.
Father appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s order suspending his parenting time with his minor children. The Circuit Court had tried the matter de novo following an appeal by Father from prior proceedings in the Williamson County Juvenile Court. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that Father failed to timely perfect his appeal to the Circuit Court from the Juvenile Court’s order. Therefore, we conclude that the Circuit Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and we vacate its order and dismiss the case. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Elaine Murdock v. Joel Montgomery Murdock
In this divorce case, Husband and Wife filed cross-appeals seeking review of the trial court’s: (1) division of marital property; (2) award of alimony in futuro to Wife; and (3) award of alimony in solido to Wife. Husband raises additional issues concerning the trial court’s reliance on testimony from Wife’s medical expert and the trial court’s refusal to apply the missing witness rule. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. S.L.
A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court, as well as circuit court on de novo appeal, for rape of a child and incest. On appeal to this Court, the juvenile argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he committed those offenses. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Fitness and Ready Meals LLC et al. v. Eat Well Nashville LLC
A seller entered into an agreement to sell its meal preparation business and assets to a purchaser who was also in the meal preparation business. When the seller failed to perform certain of its obligations under the agreement, the purchaser ceased performing its contractual obligations. The seller filed a breach of contract claim against the purchaser, and the purchaser moved for summary judgment based on the seller committing the first material breach. The trial court granted summary judgment to the purchaser, and the seller appealed. We affirm as modified and remand for a determination of the purchaser’s reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Noblelynn Shelby Norris v. Terry Jamar Norris
This appeal arises from a petition for divorce filed in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County (the “trial court”). Noblelynn Shelby Norris (“Wife”) was granted a divorce from Terry Jamar Norris (“Husband”) after a hearing held on September 30, 2019. The trial court named Wife primary residential parent of the parties’ minor son, set child support, and awarded Wife her attorney’s fees. Because the trial court has never awarded Wife a specific amount of attorney’s fees, however, the order appealed from is nonfinal and must be dismissed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas A. Buckley individually and derivatively on behalf of TLC of Franklin, Inc. v. Grover C. Carlock, Jr. et al.
A minority shareholder in a close corporation brought a shareholder oppression claim. The trial court heard the claim in two phases. After the first phase, the trial court found that there was shareholder oppression by the majority shareholder and determined that redemption of the minority shareholder’s shares was the appropriate remedy. After the second, the court found the fair value of the minority shareholder’s shares. The court later awarded attorney’s fees to the minority shareholder, but it failed to award fees associated with the second phase of trial. The court also denied the minority shareholder’s request for prejudgment interest and dismissed an unjust enrichment claim. On appeal, the minority shareholder takes issue with the court’s fair-value determination. He also claims that he was entitled to prejudgment interest, as well as attorney’s fees for both phases of trial. And he argues that the court erred in dismissing his unjust enrichment claim. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Tom Cone, Jr.
A decedent bequeathed his ownership interest in a corporation to his sister. During the decedent’s lifetime, the corporate assets were sold, and the corporation terminated. The decedent’s widow petitioned the probate court to construe the will. Among other things, she argued that the decedent’s gift to his sister had been adeemed by extinction. The probate court granted the widow summary judgment on this issue. Based on the undisputed facts, we conclude that the gift was adeemed by extinction. So we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Welch, ET AL. v. Oaktree Health and Rehabilitation Center LLC D/B/A Christian Care Centers of Memphis, ET AL.
This appeal involves an arbitration agreement executed in connection with a patient’s admission to a nursing home. The arbitration agreement was executed by the patient’s brother, who had been designated as the patient’s attorney-in-fact for health care pursuant to a durable power of attorney for health care executed by the patient several years earlier. When the patient’s brother filed this wrongful death suit in circuit court, the nursing home defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. The patient’s brother then asserted that he did not have authority to bind the patient to the arbitration agreement because the patient had been mentally incompetent when he executed the durable power of attorney for health care years earlier. The defendants argued that the trial court was not permitted to “look beyond” the durable power of attorney for health care to determine the competency of the patient at the time of its execution. The trial court ruled that it would “look beyond” the power of attorney for health care in order to consider the patient’s competency and allowed the parties to engage in discovery related to the issue of incompetence. Discovery ensued, and the parties submitted additional evidence regarding the patient’s competency. The trial court then found by clear and convincing evidence that the patient was incompetent at the time the durable power of attorney for health care was executed. As a result, the trial court concluded that the patient’s brother lacked authority to sign the arbitration agreement as attorney-in-fact for health care. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, and the defendants appealed. Pursuant to the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Owens v. National Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 876 (Tenn. 2007), we hold that the trial court erred in looking beyond the durable power of attorney for health care to examine the patient’s competency at the time it was executed. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Emma F. Et Al.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence in support of one statutory ground of termination, the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We vacate the judgment of the trial court, holding that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence to support the sole statutory ground of termination found by the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. Abdiqani Gelle
The defendant appeals the trial court’s judgment finding that he violated a reckless driving city ordinance, Metropolitan Code of Law § 12.68.180, when he drove 65 miles per hour in a 45-mile-per-hour zone. During trial, Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee (“Metro”) presented evidence regarding the defendant’s speed to support its allegation that the defendant was driving recklessly. Following proof of the defendant’s excessive speed, the trial court found that the defendant had failed to rebut the presumption created by ordinance that he was driving in such a way as to demonstrate “a wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” The defendant challenges the constitutionality of such ordinance, which provides a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was driving recklessly when driving at least fifteen miles per hour over the speed limit. However, the defendant’s issues concerning constitutionality of the ordinance were not properly raised or decided by the trial court, and upon our determination that the ordinance is not facially unconstitutional, we hold that the defendant has waived his issues regarding the constitutionality of the ordinance. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that the defendant violated Metropolitan Code of Law § 12.68.180. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. Abdiqani Gelle- Dissent
John W. McClarty, J., dissenting. The majority affirms the trial court’s judgment that the defendant, Abdiqani Gelle (“Defendant”), violated a reckless driving city ordinance, Metropolitan Code of Law §12.68.180, by driving 65 miles per hour in a 45-mile-per-hour zone. The trial court determined that Defendant had failed to rebut the presumption created by the ordinance that he demonstrated “a willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property,” i.e., drove recklessly. Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance. Specifically, Defendant raises the issue of whether the ordinance violates his due process rights under the Tennessee Constitution, article 1, section 8, whether the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) has jurisdiction to administer a “criminal-type punishment” due to violation of its ordinance, and whether such punishment would violate Defendant’s rights under the Tennessee Constitution, article 1, section 16. Metro argues that Defendant waived the issues by failing to properly raise them during the trial proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
HCTEC Partners, LLC v. James Prescott Crawford et al.
In 2012, plaintiff HCTec Partners, LLC (“HCTec”) and James Prescott Crawford (“Crawford”) entered into an employment agreement under which Crawford was prohibited from disclosing any of HCTec’s confidential information and competing with HCTec for one year after Crawford’s employment with HCTec ended. When Crawford left HCTec to work for a competitor in 2019, HCTec sought to enforce the agreement. HCTec sued Crawford for breach of contract and sued Crawford’s new employer, The Rezult Group, Inc. (“Rezult”), for inducement of breach pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-50-109. After extensive discovery, HCTec moved for summary judgment as to both claims, which the trial court granted. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |
