COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Kelso Oil vs. East West Truck Stop
E2001-02090-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
This main issue in this appeal involves an Unconditional Guaranty signed by Frank Webb ("Webb"), the president and owner of East West Truck Stop, Inc. In this document, Webb guaranteed the debt of the "buyer", which was identified as "Frank Webb d/b/a East West Truck Stop." The "buyer", however, was the corporate entity, East West Truck Stop, Inc. The Trial Court concluded the parties intended for the document to state the "buyer" was the corporate entity and entered judgment against Webb personally. Webb appeals, claiming the Trial Court improperly used parol evidence to supply an essential term of the Unconditional Guaranty (i.e. the identity of the "buyer") in violation of the Statute of Frauds. We affirm.

Knox Court of Appeals

E2001-02326-COA-R3-CV
E2001-02326-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Billy Joe White

Claiborne Court of Appeals

State ex rel. Anne Pope vs. United States Fire
E2002-01092-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown, III
This is a suit by the State of Tennessee, ex rel. Anne B. Pope, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance, against the following Defendants: United States Fire Insurance Company; United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company; Employers Reinsurance Corporation; Utica Mutual Insurance Company; Insurance Company of North America; and Safeco Insurance Company of America. The suit seeks to require the Defendant Corporations to deposit with a Receiver approved by the Chancery Court the principal amount of the last rider to a bond that they had executed to ensure payment of worker's compensation benefits that might be owed by North American Royalties, Inc., and its subsidiaries, Wheland Holding Company, Inc., Wheland Manufacturing Company, Inc., and Wheland Foundry, LLC. The suit was initiated because North American Realties, Inc., which sought bankruptcy protection, was self-insured pursuant to T.C.A. 50-6-405. A number of employees who contended they were entitled to benefits under the Worker's Compensation Statute intervened, insisting that the Companies which had executed the bonds were liable for the aggregate amount thereof, rather than the amount shown on the last rider issued as to the bonds in question. The Trial Court found in favor of the Insurance Companies. We affirm.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Steven Belford vs. J & J Plastering
E2001-02575-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Jacqueline E. Schulten
Steven R. Belford (Plaintiff") sued Danny W. Cox ("Cox") and J & J Plastering, Inc., ("Company") after he was rear-ended by a vehicle owned by the Company and driven by Cox. The jury returned a verdict for $9,000 in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed to this Court without first filing a motion for new trial. Plaintiff raises four issues on appeal, all of which center around the exclusion or admission of evidence at trial. Because Plaintiff did not raise these issues in a motion for new trial, we deem them to be waived and dismiss this appeal.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Floyd Gabriel vs. Anna Hubbs
E2001-03102-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Billy Joe White
This is a will contest. Floyd Gabriel ("the contestant") filed this action contesting the validity of the purported last will and testament of his grandfather, Floyd A. Harmon ("the decedent") on the grounds of incapacity and undue influence. Following a bench trial, the court below declared the will invalid. Anna Faye Hubbs ("Hubbs"), the decedent's caretaker and the primary beneficiary under the will, appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that she exercised undue influence over the decedent. In the alternative, Hubbs argues that any presumption of undue influence arising out of her relationship with the decedent was overcome by the clear and convincing proof that the decedent received independent advice before executing his will. We affirm.

Union Court of Appeals

Paul Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Services
M2001-00880-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
In this appeal, the Attorney General filed suit to dissolve two nonprofit public benefit corporations. Both the Attorney General and the nonprofit corporations filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Attorney General finding that the nonprofit corporations had abandoned their charitable purposes and devoted themselves to private purposes. The trial court ordered the appointment of a receiver to marshal and preserve the remaining assets. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Kenneth Nelson v. Metric Realty
M2000-03204-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Plaintiffs appeal the action of the trial court in converting a T.R.C.P. Rule 12.02 motion of those referred to as "affiliated defendants" into a T.R.C.P. Rule 56 motion and then granting it, and in sustaining a motion for summary judgment in favor of those described as "advisor defendants." The action against all Defendants asserted tortious interference with contract. Defendants appeal the trial court action in overruling their motion for summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations. We affirm the action of the Chancellor in granting summary judgment to the "affiliated defendants" and in granting the motion for summary judgment of the "advisor defendants." We further hold that the statute of limitations had expired as to all defendants. As modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Matthew Poliak v. James Adcock
M2000-02325-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes
This appeal involves a dispute between a father and his adult daughter's live-in boyfriend. The boyfriend filed a personal injury suit against his girlfriend's father in the Circuit Court for Davidson County after the father assaulted him with a piece of two-by-four. The father admitted that he had assaulted his daughter's boyfriend but asserted the defenses of self-defense, provocation, and defense of property. In response to the boyfriend's motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court determined that the father had failed to produce evidence to substantiate any of these defenses. The father perfected this appeal after the trial court certified its order as final in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We have determined that the trial court was correct when it determined that the father's evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the assault could not, as a matter of law, support his affirmative defenses. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Gale Smith & Co. v. The Governors Club
M2001-01616-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
This is a breach of contract case. The defendant real estate developer developed a golf club. The plaintiff insurance broker entered into an insurance binder with the manager of the golf club. The "master" binder covered five separate properties with which the manager was involved. The binder listed another of the manager's entities as the insured. The manager was later terminated by the defendant and a new management company was hired to manage the golf club. The insurance broker then issued a separate policy naming the defendant as the insured and sent invoices for the unpaid premiums to the new management company. The management company declined to pay the premiums. The insurance broker then filed suit against the defendant. The trial court entered a judgment for the insurance broker for all unpaid premiums due under the insurance binder, plus interest. We affirm, finding that manager had the apparent authority to enter into an insurance contract and that there was a contract for insurance between the parties.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Dagmar Moss vs. Alvin Moss
W2001-02809-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Dewey C. Whitenton
Wife filed a complaint for divorce alleging inappropriate marital conduct and, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences, and husband filed a counterclaim for divorce on the same grounds. The chancery court awarded the wife an absolute divorce and alimony in solido in the amount of $1,000.00, to be paid toward her attorney fees, but denied wife's claim for alimony in futuro. Wife appeals. We affirm as modified and remand.

Hardeman Court of Appeals

Felicia Webb vs. Ernest Gillespie
W2001-02828-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Harold W. Horne

Shelby Court of Appeals

Felicia Webb vs. Ernest Gillespie
W2001-02828-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Howard W. Horne

Shelby Court of Appeals

Edward/James/Leigh Hutchinson vs. Nancy Neuman & James Day
W2001-02886-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Dewey C. Whitenton
This is a will construction case. The husband devised a life estate in land to his wife, and at her death, to his devisees. The husband devised other land in fee simple to his wife, and gave her the rest and residue of his estate. The husband died in 1954 and the wife died in 1998. The remaindermen under the husband's will argued that certain real property was included in the wife's life estate and, thus, at her death, devolved to them. The beneficiaries of the wife's will argued that the real property in question was not included in the life estate or mentioned in the husband's will, and thus the land went to the wife in fee simple by operation of the residue clause in the husband's will and should now devolve to them. The trial court found that the husband intended to include the land in question in the life estate to the wife. Therefore, the land devolved to the husband's devisees. The beneficiaries of the wife's estate appeal. We affirm.

Fayette Court of Appeals

Vernessa Ekelem vs. Ifeatu Ekelem
W2001-02986-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon
This is a divorce case. Both parties are physicians. Both have children from previous marriages, and they have three children together. The parties' three children were minors at the time of the divorce hearing. The father earned substantial income in 1996, which fell precipitously when he started his own medical practice in 1998. His medical practice, however, owns luxury vehicles, and the father owns a large home with significant acreage. The trial court found the father's earning capacity to be at the level of the mother's income, set child support based on that earning capacity, and established the father's parenting time with the parties' children. The father was ordered to assume the parties' tax debt, and to cease making derogatory remarks about the mother. On appeal, the father argues that the trial court erred in setting child support, in setting parenting time, in assigning the tax liability to him, and in enjoining him from making derogatory comments about the mother. We affirm as modified, and remand, awarding the mother attorney's fees for this appeal.

Madison Court of Appeals

Daniel Goodwin vs. John Dunlap
W2002-00014-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This is a legal malpractice action originally filed by individual plaintiff and a corporation. The individual plaintiff was acting pro se for himself and also for the corporation. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant based upon his affidavit that he complied with the standard of care representing the corporate plaintiff, that he had no attorney/client relationship with the individual plaintiff. No countervailing affidavit concerning the standard of care was filed by the plaintiffs and the dismissal of the corporation's case was also premised on the rule that a corporation cannot act pro se by a nonlawyer agent. Individual plaintiff's affidavit does not specifically refute defendant's affidavit concerning no attorney-client relationship between the individual plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Sheri English vs. Chris Pretti
W2001-01657-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to the Plaintiffs' uninsured motorist insurance carrier, finding that the carrier's liability was offset by the workers' compensation award which the Plaintiff received for her injuries. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Connie Pugh vs. Poplar Apartments
W2001-02050-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio
This case involves allegations of unlawful ouster. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the defendant landlord. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Christian Yeubanks vs. Methodist LeBonheur
W2001-02051-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This is a procedurally complex medical malpractice case. A child was injured in a car accident. She was taken by helicopter to the hospital, where she died. The child's mother filed suit, alleging liability on the part of three physicians, and vicarious liability on the part of the hospital for the actions of the three physicians. She also asserted that the second physician's medical group was liable for that physician's actions. The complaint was later amended to include independent allegations of liability against the hospital. The mother voluntarily dismissed the claims against the first physician; however, the claim of liability against the hospital for the actions of the first physician remained. Immediately before the trial, the mother asserted that the hospital was liable for the actions of a fourth physician. The trial court ruled that evidence regarding a claim against the fourth physician was not admissible. Near the close of her proof, the mother voluntarily dismissed her claims against the second physician and his medical group. At the conclusion of the mother's proof, the trial court granted motions for directed verdict for the claims based on the independent actions of the hospital and for the claims against the hospital based on the actions of the first physician. The trial court then denied a motion for directed verdict on the claim of vicarious liability against the hospital for the actions of the third physician. The trial court then heard a motion to strike testimony related to claims against the third physician. Prior to a ruling on the motion, the mother voluntarily dismissed the claims against the third physician and against the hospital based on the actions of the third physician. The trial court awarded costs against the mother and ordered that, prior to refiling her case, the mother would be required to pay the costs. The mother appeals, arguing that consideration of the motions for directed verdict was premature, that the trial court's decision is not final and appealable, that the trial court improperly excluded evidence on claims that the hospital was liable for the actions of the fourth physician, that the trial court erred in granting the motion for directed verdict for the independent claims of negligence against the hospital, and that the trial court erred in awarding costs against the mother and in requiring her to pay those costs prior to refiling her case. We reverse the portion of the trial court's decision requiring the mother to pay the awarded costs prior to refiling her case. The remainder of the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Shelby Court of Appeals

In Matter of R.C.V. and O.V.
W2001-02102-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George E. Blancett
This is a termination of parental rights case on appeal for the second time. This Court in the first appeal reversed the order of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights of the parties primarily because the trial court failed to provide counsel to the parties pursuant to Rule 39, Tenn. R. Juv. P. On remand, the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence justifying termination of parental rights pursuant to the applicable statutes and that termination was in the children's best interests. The juvenile court also held that the appointment of a special judge in this instance was not unconstitutional nor was the parent denied due process in the termination proceeding. As appealed, we affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Watson & Son Landscaping vs. Power Equip.
W2002-00136-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
This is a sales/UCC case. A landscaper contracted to purchase a used piece of machinery, an excavator, from an equipment company. The excavator had a defective hydraulic system. Under the terms of the sales contract, the equipment company was to repair the defective hydraulic system. The equipment company attempted to do so and delivered the excavator to the landscaper. The hydraulic system, however, did not work properly and the equipment company was unable to repair the excavator to the landscaper's satisfaction. The landscaper then had the excavator repaired by a third party. The landscaper sued the equipment company for failure to satisfy a condition precedent to the contract, and for breach of contract. The trial court awarded actual damages for the difference in value between the excavator bargained for and the excavator actually received, as well as consequential damages. The equipment company appeals. We modify the actual damages to the cost to repair the excavator, and we reverse the award of consequential damages, finding that the proof of consequential damages was too speculative to support such an award.

Madison Court of Appeals

Norman Hamby vs. State
W2002-00928-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
This is a premises liability case arising from Plaintiff's fall into a ventilation pit on the University of Tennessee at Memphis (referred to herein as UT) campus when an aluminum grate covering the opening collapsed while Plaintiff was standing on it. The Commissioner of Claims of the Western Division held that the accident was not foreseeable and that UT did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the grating over the pit. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand.

Court of Appeals

Estate of James Sanderson
W2001-01938-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
This case concerns the administration of an estate. The decedent's widow appeals the trial court's judgment claiming that it was error to deny her claim for an elective share of the estate. Appellant also alleges error in the finding that the administrator had not caused the estate to suffer monetary loss as a result of actions taken by him in his role as administrator. We affirm.

Hardeman Court of Appeals

Town of Collierville vs. Norfolk Railway
W2001-02391-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
This is a condemnation case on appeal for the second time. At three places at which roads were to cross over an existing railroad track, the town filed a petition to condemn property in which the railroad owned a right-of-way, in order to build railroad crossings. The trial court initially found that the railroad could not challenge the town's right to take the property and granted the town's motion for the writs of possession. The railroad appealed for the first time. In the first appeal, this Court reversed the trial court and found that the railroad was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the railroad crossings would materially impair or interfere with the railroad's prior use of the rights-of-way. On remand, the trial court found that they would not, thus concluding that the town had the right to condemn the property. The trial court then considered the damages for the condemnation. The railroad sought incidental damages related to its depreciation costs, as well as costs for its increased exposure to liability because of the additional crossings. The trial court determined that the railroad, as a matter of law, could not recover depreciation costs, and also held that the railroad failed to produce proof to support an award of damages for increased liability exposure. The railroad appeals. We affirm, finding that the railroad can recover neither depreciation costs nor damages for increased exposure to liability from the additional crossings.

Shelby Court of Appeals

CH-01-0462-2;
CH-01-0462-2;
Trial Court Judge: Kenny W. Armstrong

Shelby Court of Appeals

CH-01-1148-3
CH-01-1148-3
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

Shelby Court of Appeals