Murray E. Body v. Jim Lamarr M2000-02111-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur E. McClellan
Murray E. Body ("Plaintiff") filed this personal injury suit against the owner of a jet ski, Jim Lamarr ("Defendant"). Plaintiff sustained physical injuries while pulling ski ropes into his boat when Defendant's jet ski ran over Plaintiff's ski ropes. Plaintiff had a boating policy ("Policy") with Continental Insurance Company ("Continental") which had uninsured boater limits of $100,000. Defendant had a liability policy with limits of $50,000. Plaintiff contends that his damages exceed Defendant's limits and that his Policy should be interpreted to provide coverage for accidents involving underinsured boaters. Continental filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Policy's language clearly and unambiguously does not provide coverage for underinsured boaters. The Trial Court treated Continental's motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the motion. Plaintiff was granted an interlocutory appeal. We affirm.
This appeal involves a post-judgment receivership proceeding commenced while the case was pending on appeal. The seller of a large tract of Brentwood property obtained a judgment against the defaulting purchaser in the Chancery Court for Williamson County. While the purchaser's appeal was pending, the seller proceeded to execute on its judgment and requested the trial court to appoint a receiver to protect the interests of the purchaser's creditors. After the trial court appointed a receiver, the purchaser's former law firm filed a claim with the receiver for over $100,000 in unpaid legal expenses. When the seller's judgment against the purchaser was satisfied outside of the receivership proceeding, the trial court granted the receiver's motion to dissolve the receivership without addressing the law firm's claim. The law firm asserts on this appeal that the trial court should not have closed the receivership until its claim was addressed. We have determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to establish the receivership and, therefore, that the receivership proceedings were null and void. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by declining to address the law firm's claim in the receivership proceeding.
This appeal involves two shootings during an attempted armed robbery of a restaurant, that left one man dead and one man wounded. The parents of the deceased victim and the wounded victim and his wife filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against the restaurant and the persons who attempted to rob the restaurant, alleging that the restaurant had negligently failed to use reasonable care to protect its patrons from foreseeable harm. The trial court granted the restaurant a summary judgment and dismissed the negligence claim against it. The plaintiffs, relying on McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn. 1996), assert on this appeal that the trial court erred by granting the restaurant's summary judgment motion. We concur with the trial court's conclusion that the material facts are not in dispute and that the restaurant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because it demonstrated that the plaintiffs would be unable to prove an essential element of their case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing the claims against the restaurant.
Plaintiffs in this matter have alleged that their employment was terminated in violation of Tennessee's Public Protection Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 51-1-304. The trial court ruled in favor of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed this case in its entirety finding that all three Plaintiffs had failed to prove that their termination was based solely on "whistle blowing". We affirm the trial court's decision in this regard.
This is the second appeal regarding the setting of the amount of the father's child support obligation for four children. In the earlier appeal, this court remanded for a determination of the father's actual net income and his corresponding child support obligation. On remand, the trial court in early 2000 based its award of prospective support on an average of father's income in 1992 through 1995 and established the father's back support based on that figure. We find that the prospective award should be set on the most current income figures, but that an average of the most recent years is appropriate. We also find that the amount of back child support should be computed using actual income for the intervening years. Because the record does not contain sufficient information regarding challenged deductions from gross income for the years now at issue, we remand for an evidentiary hearing on the father's income in the years since the divorce in 1996, and a redetermination of both prospective and back support. We affirm the denial of prejudgment interest.
This appeal involves a dispute over the division of a marital estate following a marriage that lasted approximately two and one-half years. Both parties sought a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct in the Circuit Court for Franklin County. During a bench trial lasting two days, the parties stipulated that they both had grounds for divorce but hotly contested the classification, valuation, and division of their marital and separate property. The trial court declared the parties divorced and divided their property without clearly classifying or placing a value on it. On this appeal, the wife asserts that the trial court erred by considering the husband's contributions to the marital home as his separate property and that the net division of the marital estate was inequitable. Despite the ambiguity resulting from the trial court's failure to classify and value the parties' property, we have determined that the trial court's division of the martial estate was essentially equitable.
Franklin
Court of Appeals
Cassie Gilliland vs. Billy Pinkley W2000-00982-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
Plaintiffs appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Vision Care Properties, Inc., and the refusal of the trial court to subsequently grant relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The complaint alleged that the minor child, Cassie Gilliland, was attacked and injured by a vicious dog owned by, and kept at the home of, defendant Billy Ray Pinkley, which residence was leased to Pinkley by defendant Vision Care Properties, Inc. Subsequent to the grant of summary judgment, plaintiffs sought Rule 60.02 relief based upon an affidavit of Pinkley which was inconsistent with his prior affidavit. We affirm the trial court in all respects.
Julia Crews vs. Buckman Lab W2000-01834-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
Plaintiff, attorney employed in legal department of corporation, sued the corporation for retaliatory discharge. Plaintiff alleges that she was discharged in retaliation for her reporting her superior, general counsel of the corporation, for the unauthorized practice of law, because her supervisor was unlicensed in the State of Tennessee. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Walter Chandler vs. Canale & Co. W2000-02067-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
Plaintiff appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The complaint alleged the plaintiff had a partnership with the defendants and accused the defendants of breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the basis of judicial estoppel, concluding the plaintiff had previously testified under oath in prior litigation that he had no ownership interest in the business. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Jeffrey Butler vs. City of Jackson W2000-02154-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Donald H. Allen
This case is before the court for the second time. Defendant was tried in city court for violation of five separate city ordinances and was fined a total of $250.00 for the five violations. After a de novo trial in circuit court, defendant was found guilty of violating the five separate ordinances and was fined a total of $250.00. This Court reversed the conviction on two of the five ordinances and affirmed the convictions on three of the ordinances. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of fine for the three violations. On remand, the trial court assessed fines totaling $750.00, being $250.00 for the violation of each of the three ordinances. Defendant has appealed. We reverse the trial court and set defendant's fine at $250.00 for violation of the three city ordinances.
Eddie Joe Hurst, Sr. vs. Sheila Gail Williams Hurst E2000-00458-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: William R. Brewer
This appeal from the Blount County General Sessions Court concerns whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing the Complaint to Enforce Judgment filed by the Appellant, Sheila Gail Williams Hurst. Ms. Hurst appeals the decision of the General Sessions Court. We reverse the decision of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. We adjudge cost of the appeal against the Appellee, Eddie Joe Hurst, Sr.
Blount
Court of Appeals
Travelers Indemnity Co. vs. Kenton Freeman, et al M2001-00657-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Travelers Indemnity Company [Travelers] filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment respecting its liability to pay UM coverage for the minor child of its policyholder who was divorced from the child's mother, with joint custody having been awarded. Mother was killed in a traffic accident in Alabama; her passenger child was injured. Mother owned and was driving her automobile, and she also had UM coverage. The adverse driver had split liability coverage all of which was paid, in equal parts, to the Administrator of the mother's estate, and to the minor child. Mother's UM carrier paid its entire policy proceeds to her administrator. Travelers objected, inter alia, to the lack of allocation of the proceeds of mother's UM coverage. Travelers' insured, on behalf of his minor child, filed a counter-claim against Travelers for the entire UM coverage, notwithstanding an amount certain had never been determined. The court found that Travelers had never disputed that the value of the minor child's claim exceeded the UM coverage and rendered a summary judgment against Travelers for an amount certain. We vacate and remand.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Woodrow Wilson vs. Sentence Information Services, et al M1998-00939-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This otherwise routine dispute over sentence reduction credits raises a seldom-considered point of procedure regarding the proper method for deciding contested facts at the preliminary motion stage. A prisoner filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County against the Tennessee Department of Correction and other state and city officials asserting that he had not been awarded sentence reduction credits allegedly earned while incarcerated in the Davidson County Criminal Justice Center. After the Department filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) motion to dismiss on the ground that the prisoner had not exhausted his administrative remedies, the prisoner asserted that he had exhausted all of the remedies available to him from the Department. After considering the arguments and evidentiary materials submitted by both parties, the trial court concluded that the prisoner had not exhausted his administrative remedies and dismissed the suit. On this appeal, the prisoner asserts that the trial court erred when it concluded that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. We have determined that the evidence regarding the prisoner's exhaustion of his administrative remedies does not preponderate against the trial court's conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the suit.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
In re: Estate of Lester Doyle and Estate of Edgar Doyle vs. William Hunt M1997-00179-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr.
The beneficiaries of the Edgar J. Doyle estate and trust petitioned the court for removal of the executor/trustee of the estates and trusts of Lester Hill Doyle and Edgar J. Doyle for, inter alia, failure to timely file the required inventories and accountings of both estates. Finding that the executor/trustee breached his fiduciary duty, the trial court removed the executor/trustee and appointed a third party not nominated in either will as the successor executor/trustee in both estates. The executor/trustee alleges error with his removal without an evidentiary hearing and the court's appointment of the successor trustee. We reverse.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Billy Crowe, et al vs. Maury County, et al M1999-02377-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Holloway
This appeal arises from the purchase of part of the Appellees' property by the Appellant. The Appellees filed a complaint against the Appellant in the Circuit Court of Maury County, alleging trespass, material misrepresentation of fact or mutual mistake of fact, inverse condemnation, and unauthorized use of property. The Appellant filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion on all counts but the inverse condemnation claim. Following a jury trial on the inverse condemnation claim, the jury found in favor of the Appellees in the amount of $12,000.00. The Appellees filed a motion for attorney's fees with the trial court, seeking $29,116.29. The trial court awarded the full amount of attorney's fees requested. The Appellant appeals the award of attorney's fees by the Circuit Court of Maury County. For the reasons stated herein, we remand this case for further findings of fact.
Maury
Court of Appeals
Eric Young v. Dept. of Corrections M2002-01086-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
A prison inmate was convicted of a disciplinary offense, and sentenced to punitive segregation. He filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, claiming there were serious procedural defects in the disciplinary proceeding. The trial court dismissed his Petition as time-barred. We affirm the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Robert Wilson, Jr. vs. Martha Wilson E2000-01181-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William R. Brewer
In this post-divorce case, the trial court (1) denied the father's request to relocate to Georgia with the parties' minor child; (2) imposed sanctions for the father's perjury; and (3) changed the joint custody decreed at the time of the divorce to sole custody in the mother. On this appeal, the father argues (1) that the trial court erred in reversing its initial post-divorce decision pursuant to which the father had been permitted to relocate to Georgia; (2) that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act to make a custody determination; (3) that the trial court should have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground of inconvenient forum; (4) that the trial court erred in basing its change of custody upon the father's admittedly false testimony; (5) that the trial court's reversal of its prior decision to permit the father to relocate is barred by the doctrine of laches; (6) that the trial court erred in finding that father's contemptuous behavior was a proper basis for denying him an award of child support; and (7) that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions for criminal contempt without providing the necessary procedural safeguards. We find that the trial court erred in dismissing Father's petition for child support. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Blount
Court of Appeals
Nina Noel vs. Harold Noel W1999-02343-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
This is a divorce case. The trial court granted the husband the divorce but ordered him to pay, inter alia, $8000 in child support arrearage, half of the wages owed to the former employees of the wife's new business, and court costs. The husband appealed. We reverse the trial court's holding that the husband should pay half of the wages of the wife's new business, since this is the wife's separate debt incurred after the parties separated, and affirm the remainder of the trial court's order.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Lydia Brewster vs. Dan Brewster M2000-01174-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Leonard W. Martin
This appeal involves the trial court's denial of the father's visitation after entry of a final decree of divorce granting the parents joint custody of the two minor children. The father filed a motion to alter and amend the final decree of divorce and for visitation. The mother opposed visitation by the father because of alleged sexual abuse of their daughter. The trial court denied father visitation. The father has appealed. We amend the final decree, affirm the denial of visitation, and remand the case for further proceedings.
Stewart
Court of Appeals
Amy Blankenship vs. Carl Blankenship M2000-01483-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
Husband appeals a final decree of divorce terminating a marriage of ten years, presenting issues regarding the trial court's finding of contempt, confiscation of his guns, alimony, division of marital assets and debts, and attorneys fees. We vacate in part, modify in part, and affirm as modified.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
C.R. Batts Const. v. 101 Construction Co., et al. M2004-00322-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: J. S. Daniel
This appeal arises out of a breach of contract action filed by the plaintiff against the defendants. After a hearing, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding the plaintiff $24,260.11. Additionally, the trial court awarded the plaintiff pre-judgment interest in the amount of $5,579.82. The defendants have appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Rutherford
Court of Appeals
Billy Walker vs. State W2000-03079-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
This is a medical malpractice action before the Tennessee Claims Commission. The Commission found that the evidence presented by the plaintiff was insufficient to establish that the defendant's employees failed to meet the required standard of care. The plaintiff appealed the decision of the Claims Commission, asserting that the Commission improperly reviewed medical sources not presented at trial. We affirm, finding that the Commission did not base its decision on information outside the record and that any such review was harmless error.
