Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Charles B. Tatum
This appeal arose after the trial court made its final determination on issues involving the support of the parties' minor child. Mother petitioned the trial court to establish parentage, to be awarded custody of the parties' child, and to establish other issues regarding the care of the child. At trial, Father conceded paternity and did not contest the custody issue. In making its child support award, the trial court based its decision on Father's new found employment. The court also set a payment schedule for the child support arrearage, determined that Father should claim the child as a dependent for tax purposes, split medical costs associated with the child's birth, and refused to award mother filing fees and attorney's fees. Mother contends that Father is voluntarily underemployed for purposes of child support and challenges several other decisions of the trial court. We reverse the court's decision in part, modify in part, affirm in part, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Stella L. Hargrove
This case involves an action to quiet title between the state chapter of a national fraternal organization and the members of a local chapter. The organization's constitution provides that, upon the dissolution of a local chapter, all acquired property becomes the property of the state chapter. After receiving a letter from three officers of the local chapter expressing their intent to surrender its charter, the state chapter sent a letter to all known members of the local chapter calling a meeting to discuss the future of the chapter. At a second meeting, three members attended; two of the members abstained until a vote of the entire membership could be taken while the third member voted to remain dissolved. Thereafter, the state chapter announced that the local chapter was dissolved and ordered the local chapter to surrender its bank account and had the door to the lodge padlocked. The state chapter then brought a lawsuit to quiet title. The defendant members disputed that their chapter had been properly dissolved. The trial court held that the dissolution of the local chapter and surrender of the chapter's premises and bank account by its officers was improper, dismissed the state chapter's petition to quiet title and ordered the return of the surrendered funds. From this decision, the state chapter now appeals. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Russell E. Simmons, Jr.
Plaintiff's action was held by the Probate Court to be barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. We dismiss the appeal for failure to file timely notice of appeal.
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Wheeler A. Rosenbalm
The origin of this appeal was a detainer warrant filed in the General Sessions Court by John Foster and Mamosa Foster against Larry Glenn seeking possession of property occupied by Mr. Glenn pursuant to an instrument styled "AGREEMENT FOR DEED." Mr. Glenn filed what he styles a counter-complaint seeking damages for breach of contract and prevailed in the General Sessions Court. Upon appeal the Circuit Court found in favor of the Fosters, but awarded Mr. Glenn a judgment as to insurance proceeds received by the Fosters as a result of a truck striking the house in question. Mr. Glenn appeals the judgment of the Trial Court. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: L. Marie Williams
In this divorce case, the trial court dissolved a marriage of 15 years; adopted a parenting plan relative to the parties' two minor children; divided the marital property; and awarded wife a portion of her attorney's fees. Husband appeals, arguing that the trial court's division of marital property was not equitable; that the trial court erred in allowing wife to amend her complaint to request attorney's fees; and that the trial court erred in ordering husband to pay a portion of those fees. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Graham
Carol Hankins ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint against Chevco, Inc., d/b/a Curtis Products So. Central, Inc., and Concord Confections, Inc. ("Defendants") alleging injuries to her jaw and one of her teeth which occurred when she chewed a gumball. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing they were entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law on the issue of causation of Plaintiff's temporomandibular joint disorder ("TMJ"). The Trial Court granted Defendants' motion. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the partial summary judgment and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Don R. Ash
Defendant physician appeals judgment for Plaintiffs in a jury trial of a medical malpractice action. Upon review of the record, we do not find that Plaintiffs' case was time barred pursuant to the statute of limitations. We find material evidence in the record to support the verdict and a jury finding that medical expenses incurred by the Plaintiff were necessary and reasonable. We therefore affirm.
A death row inmate filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment, claiming that employees of the Department of Correction had caused his attorney's phone number to be removed from an approved calling list, and had refused to restore the number to the list in a timely way. The inmate named seven employees of the Department and a private telephone company as defendants, and demanded monetary damages. The trial court dismissed the action, because the petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Because we do not believe the petitioner was entitled to relief under any of the theories he advanced, we affirm the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Don R. Ash
Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant in order to determine the true boundary line and ownership of one-half acre of property adjacent to both Plaintiffs' property and Defendant's property. The trial court determined that the boundary line cut diagonally across the disputed property giving approximately one-quarter acre to Plaintiffs and one-quarter acre to Defendant. Plaintiffs appealed asserting that they are the true owners of the entire one-half acre and that the trial court was in error when it established the diagonal boundary line splitting the disputed property. We agree with the trial judge's determination of the boundary line and affirm the chancery court's opinion.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Donald P. Harris
A default judgment was entered against Sara and Andre Harakas, the Appellants herein, in a dispute over defects in the construction of a residence. At the time the default judgment was entered, Mr. and Mrs. Harakas had not answered the complaint. Mr. and Mrs. Harakas filed a pro se motion to set aside the default judgment, arguing that they did not receive the notice of the motion for default judgment, which the trial court denied after a hearing that included testimony from Mrs. Harakas. Mr. and Mrs. Harakas then retained an attorney who filed a motion to alter or amend the refusal to set aside the default judgment and a second motion to set aside the judgment taken by default. The trial court denied these motions. Because there was reasonable doubt as to whether the default judgment should have been set aside, we reverse the trial court's refusal to set aside.
Authoring Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Barry R. Brown
This is an appeal by appellant Caroline Elizabeth Smith from an order of the trial court which provided that the custody of the minor children of Caroline Elizabeth Smith and Mark O. Smith shall remain in the custody of Mark O. Smith. We affirm the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Barry R. Brown
This is an appeal by appellant Caroline Elizabeth Smith from an order of the trial court which provided that the custody of the minor children of Caroline Elizabeth Smith and Mark O. Smith shall remain in the custody of Mark O. Smith. We affirm the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Lee Russell
A landowner appeals from a decision finding him in violation of county zoning laws, ordering him to take corrective measures, and enjoining future activities of the same type. Because the record before us does not include a transcript of the trial or a statement of the evidence, we must presume the evidence supported the trial court's findings and, consequently, affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: James E. Walton
Parents of deceased child sued Clarksville Memorial Hospital and Dr. David Miller for the death of their child. They alleged this death occurred due to Defendants' mis-diagnosis of their daughter's injuries following an automobile accident and subsequent incorrect and negligent treatment. The jury returned a verdict for Defendants. Plaintiffs now appeal alleging two points of error in the jury instructions; (1) that it was error to charge the jury that Plaintiffs must prove causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and; (2) that it was error to charge the jury that they must find the child's death to be reasonably foreseeable. We find that the jury instructions on reasonable degree of medical certainty and foreseeability were incorrect statements of the law, confusing to the jury, and more probably than not, affected the jury's verdict. We thus reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial as to Defendant Miller. We affirm the judgment in favor of Clarksville Memorial Hospital.
Authoring Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John D. Wootten, Jr.
This is an appeal by appellant, City of Lebanon, Tennessee (hereinafter "City of Lebanon") from an order of the trial court awarding damages to the appellee Troi Bailey (hereinafter "Mr. Bailey") and appellees Sprint Logistics, LLC and Sprint Warehouse and Cartage, Inc.(hereinafter collectively "Sprint"), resulting from a motor vehicle accident. We affirm the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol A. Catalano
In this appeal the sole shareholder and director of Polygon appeals the trial court's decision to hold her personally liable for a debt owed by Polygon. The corporate officer contracted to do business in Tennessee, knowing that Polygon was not qualified to do business here and knowing that Polygon had not filed an annual report in three years, which made it subject to administrative dissolution. After suit was filed against Polygon, the shareholder encumbered all of the corporation's assets. Further, after she was sued personally, she filed to have Polygon's charter retroactively reinstated. The trial court held that the shareholder abused the corporate form, that the corporate entity should be disregarded and that the sole shareholder and director should be held personally liable. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
This Court now amends its previous Opinion in the above styled case with respect to the following issues: (1) the date of Mr. Burke’s summer visitation; (2) the Judgment shall be amended to include a statement of standard parenting orders pursuant to T.C.A. 36-6-101(a)(3); and (3) the assessment of costs for appeal.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Russ Heldman
This is an automobile accident case where each party claims she had the green light when she entered the intersection where the accident occurred. In addition to the depositions of the parties, Defendant submitted expert testimony to the effect that Plaintiff's version of the accident was physically impossible while Defendant's version was not. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to Defendant after concluding, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff's negligence was at least 50% under comparative fault principles. We conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist and vacate the judgment of the Trial Court.
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton
This appeal involves a dispute between a woman and her former in-laws regarding the title to a tract of property in Prospect, Tennessee and the in-laws' accounting for $35,000 held for the benefit of the woman and her former husband. When she filed for divorce in the Chancery Court for Giles County, the woman also named her in-laws as defendants and alleged that they had misappropriated marital assets and breached a contract to convey the property in Prospect, Tennessee. After agreeing to an irreconcilable differences divorce, the woman proceeded with her claims against her former in-laws. Following a bench trial, the trial court held that the in-laws had accounted for all the funds being held for the benefit of the woman and her former husband and that the in-laws owned the disputed property. On this appeal, the woman takes issue with both of these conclusions. We have determined that the trial court properly found that the property belonged to the in-laws. However, we have also determined that the in-laws did not properly account for $892.15 of the funds they were holding. Accordingly, we modify the final order to award the woman a $892.15 judgment against her former in-laws.
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson
In this appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County Dr. Richard Wilson, the Plaintiff/Appellant, contends that the Chancellor erred in affirming an Administrative Judge's decision that Dr. Wilson engaged in conduct warranting his dismissal as a tenured faculty member at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, the Defendant/Appellee, for violation of the University's policy against sexual harassment. We reverse the judgment of the Chancery Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs against the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: William B. Acree
This is an action to recover personal property. The plaintiff and defendant lived together for seventeen years. In November 1999, the plaintiff moved out. She left personal property in the trailer in which the couple was living, in the nearby convenience store owned by the defendant, and in a storage unit in another town. In August 2000, the convenience store caught on fire, and the plaintiff's personal property in the store was destroyed. Soon thereafter, the defendant took possession of the plaintiff's other personal property that had been held in the storage unit and called her to come get it. In November 2000, the plaintiff filed a warrant in general sessions court to recover her personal property from the defendant. She claimed that the defendant had prevented her from retrieving any of her personal property. She received a judgment which was appealed to circuit court. The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarded damages, and ordered the defendant to return certain items to the plaintiff. The defendant now appeals. We reverse the trial court's decision with respect to two of the items ordered returned and the property that the plaintiff had kept in the storage unit in another town, and affirm the remainder of the order.
This is an appeal from an order of the Claims Commission granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant. The claim was brought by an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction claiming that employees of the Department lost two pages of pleadings he filed in an action in circuit court.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
Plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries at Mid Memphis Tower Building when she exited an elevator which failed to level. She and her husband sued the building's management company and the company that owns the manufacturer of the elevator. The suit against the elevator company alleges that the company was negligent "by failing to insure that the elevator in question was properly inspected, maintained, and repaired." The elevator company's interrogatories, inter alia, requested the identity of any expert witness the plaintiffs planned to use at trial. Plaintiffs answered this interrogatory in December, 1998: "Plaintiffs have not identified such individuals at this time." The interrogatories were never supplemented, and the case was set for trial on December 1, 1999. In October, 1999, the elevator company filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the lack of an expert witness prevented plaintiffs from proving essential elements of the case. Plaintiffs were granted additional time within which to obtain an expert witness and subsequently announced that plaintiffs did not intend to have an expert witness. The trial court granted summary judgment to the elevator company. Subsequently, the building's management company settled its case and upon dismissal of that suit, the grant of summary judgment became final. Plaintiff-wife appealed. We reverse.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Daniel L. Smith
This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding wherein the parties had two minor children. While the divorce was pending, the trial court issued a temporary order outlining the custodial rights of the parties with respect to their children. The final decree of divorce adopted a permanent parenting plan and distributed the marital property and debts. The husband filed this appeal contesting the permanent parenting plan and the manner in which the marital debts were apportioned. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Christy R. Little
This case involves the termination of parental rights. The child was voluntarily placed in the custody of the Department of Children's Services in April 1996 due to the parents' substance abuse. A petition was filed to terminate the parental rights of both parents. The mother's parental rights were terminated by default, but the petition was dismissed as to the father. The trial court then ordered visitation and child support. The father stopped making visits after two months and failed to pay any child support. A second petition to terminate the father's parental rights was filed on the grounds, inter alia, of abandonment and that the conditions which led to the child's removal persisted and were unlikely to be remedied. The trial court granted the petition to terminate parental rights and the father appeals. We affirm, finding clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the father's parental rights.
