COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Lon Walker v. William Cameron
M2000-01903-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: John J. Maddux
This is a legal malpractice action which was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. Fourteen months before suit was filed the plaintiff sent a holographic letter to the Disciplinary Counsel complaining, in considerable detail, of the defendant's purported shortcomings. The trial judge held that the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Judgment affirmed.

Putnam Court of Appeals

Madge Fell,e t al vs. Gloria Rambo, et al
M2000-02100-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Lee Russell
This case is before the Court on appeal from the action of the trial judge in overruling a Rule 60.02 Motion for Relief From a Final Judgment. Non-jury trial on the merits of the case resulted in a judgment of the trial court finding no lack of capacity of Nannie Bell Crockett and no undue influence exerted upon her. That same final judgment held that Plaintiffs, as remaindermen, under the will of John E. Crockett, received at the death of Nannie Bell Crockett, the remaining proceeds from the sale of a farm during her lifetime, which farm had been willed to her for life by her husband, John E. Crockett, with unlimited power of disposition. On appeal, this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, finding that the pre-1981 version of Tennessee Code Annotated section 66-1-106 (1993) applied to the case, and that the sale of the farm by the life tenant with unlimited power of disposition, terminated the interest of the remaindermen, and that the remaindermen were not entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the farm still remaining in the possession of Nannie Bell Crockett at the time of her death. This judgment is now final and is reported in Fell v. Rambo, 36 S.W.2d 837 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). On remand, the trial court denied the Rule 60.02 motion in issue on this appeal and we affirm the trial court.

Marshall Court of Appeals

Clarence Lewis vs. State
M2000-01529-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
A prisoner in the custody of the Department of Correction suffered a severe hand injury while working in a prison industries workshop. He submitted a claim to the Tennessee Claims Commission, contending that negligence on the part of his supervisors caused his injuries. Following a hearing, the Commissioner dismissed his claim, finding that the prisoner's own negligence was more than 50% of the cause of his injuries. We affirm.

Court of Appeals

Melissa Suzanne Dew v. ProTemp, et al.
E2000-01750-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William E. Lantrip

This appeal arises from a grant of summary judgment to Pro-Temp ("Defendant"), a temporary employment agency. Melissa Suzanne Dew ("Plaintiff") brought suit against her employer, Defendant, and Eagle Bend Manufacturing, Inc. ("Eagle Bend"). Defendant assigned Plaintiff to work in a temporary position at Eagle Bend where Plaintiff sustained a work-related injury. A few months later, Plaintiff received a reprimand from her Eagle Bend supervisor related to Plaintiff's work performance. Thereafter, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's assignment at Eagle Bend. Plaintiff claims Defendant terminated her employment in retaliation for exercising her worker's compensation rights. Plaintiff argues there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the granting of summary judgment to Defendant. We affirm.

Anderson Court of Appeals

Fred Birdsall, et al., v. Floyd Birdsall
E2000-01544-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Conrad E. Troutman, Jr.

Plaintiffs/Appellants sought the return of several items, including a shotgun, tiller and lawn mower, as well as $1,500 in damages to a 1980 Ford pick-up truck, from Defendant/Appellee. The Trial Court found the matter too speculative and dismissed the case. We have no transcript and no Statement of the Evidence. Accordingly, we must assume that the record, had it been preserved, would have contained sufficient evidence to support the Trial Court's factual findings. Judgment of the Trial Court affirmed.

Campbell Court of Appeals

Unifirst Corporation, v. Harry Lane, et al.
M2000-00357-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia C. Bonnyman

This is an appeal from an award of damages by the Chancery Court of Davidson County for a breach of a contract. The defendants assert that the individual executing the contract did not have the authority to bind the corporation and that the contract ended when the corporation sold its assets. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Appeals

River City Resort, Inc. v. Norfolk Southern Ry Co., Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific R. Y. Co. & Jit Terminal, Inc.
E1999-02567-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Frank Brown, III

This is a dispute over the validity of an easement between River City Resort, Inc. (“River City”), and Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Railroad”) which is across a certain property owned by River City. River City brought this declaratory judgment against the Railroad and JIT Terminal, Inc. (“JIT”), an adjoining landowner who derives benefit from the easement.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Eddie Williams vs. Alton Hesson
W2000-02725-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
This appeal involves a claim of discrimination and denial of access to the courts by a maximum security inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. The court below granted summary judgment to the defendants. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment.

Lauderdale Court of Appeals

Jaleesa Davis
W1999-01662-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: A. V. Mcdowell
The Shelby County Juvenile Court terminated parental rights of the natural mother and father of minor child. Parents have appealed. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

James Garrett vs. Isiah Roswer
W1999-02369-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
This is a dispute among the members and officials of a church and the church pastor. The plaintiff church members and officials filed for injunctive relief against the defendant pastor of the church, seeking to remove him as pastor and prevent him from disposing of or eroding church assets. The trial court enjoined the pastor defendant from disposing of, eroding or concealing church assets, and also ordered an election. Under the court-ordered church election, the defendant was removed as pastor of the church. Subsequently, the defendant pastor executed a trust deed encumbering certain church properties. After the trust deed was foreclosed and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale, the defendant pastor filed a counter-complaint in the pending suit, alleging that he was the successful bidder at the foreclosure sale and that title of the church property should be transferred to him. In payment of his bid, the defendant pastor tendered bonds issued by the church. The trial court referred to a special master eight issues relating to the ownership and value of the bonds. The special master and trial court found that the defendant pastor had not established that he paid for the bonds. The defendant pastor appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its finding on the bonds and that it failed to address or take evidence on additional issues raised in his counter-complaint. We affirm the decision of the trial court on the bonds, but remand the cause for proof on the remaining issues.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Wayford Demonbreun, Jr. vs. Dennis J. Hughes, et al
M2000-01116-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
Plaintiff, inmate acting pro se, sued two former attorneys alleging that after the first attorney was removed from his criminal case and ordered to refund part of the retainer fee paid, the second attorney was appointed to represent plaintiff. Subsequently, the second attorney, without authorization, compromised and settled plaintiff's claim against the first attorney and converted the proceeds of the settlement to his own use. The first attorney was never served with process, and the trial court granted summary judgment to the second attorney. Plaintiff has appealed.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Maria Nelson vs. Dept. of Safety
M2000-01147-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This appeal arises from entry of a default judgment by the Appellee against the Appellant following the Appellant's failure to appear at a scheduled hearing. The Appellant filed a petition for judicial review with the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The trial court affirmed. The Appellant appeals from the Chancery Court of Davidson County's decision affirming the default judgment entered against the Appellant. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court's decision.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Gabriel Alwin vs. Percy Pitzer
W1999-00537-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
An inmate filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the sentencing court in Wisconsin was without authority to convict on one of the three counts under which he was convicted and that his sentence had expired. The trial court dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.

Hardeman Court of Appeals

Sharon Kelly vs. George Evans, III
E1999-00417-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Steven H. Jones
This is a suit initiated by Sharon S. Sarli (now Kelly) against George Leroy Evans, III, wherein she sought a determination that he was the father of her child. After Mr. Evans stipulated that he was indeed the father of the child, the Referee and the Juvenile Judge made various determinations relative to custody, child support and the like. Mrs. Kelly, being dissatisfied with a number of the determinations in the Referee's last order which on appeal was in the main affirmed by the Juvenile Judge, filed this appeal. We vacate the judgment of the Juvenile Court and remand the case for further proceedings.

Sullivan Court of Appeals

State, Ex Rel., Tammy Davenport vs. Gerald Partridge
E1999-02779-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Suzanne Bailey
This appeal from the Hamilton County Juvenile Court concerns whether the Juvenile Court erred in determining the child support obligation of the Appellant, Gerald Lamont Partridge. We vacate the order of the Juvenile Court and remand for further findings of fact.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Robert Covert vs. Kimberloy Covert
E2000-00864-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: William R. Brewer

Blount Court of Appeals

Robert Covert vs. Kimberloy Covert
E2000-00864-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Susano

Blount Court of Appeals

Castleman vs. Castleman
M2000-00270-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey S. Bivins
Mother appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to set aside a default judgment awarding divorce to Father, distributing marital property, and awarding custody of the minor child to Father. Because no evidence was heard regarding factors which must be considered by a court in making these determinations, we reverse the trial court's denial of her motion to set aside the default judgment and remand this matter for a trial on the merits.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Seibers vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.
M1999-02559-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: J. Curtis Smith
This case involves a dispute between a lawyer and his former client over a fee in a personal injury case. The client discharged the lawyer before the case was concluded and agreed to give the lawyer a lien on the potential recovery for the work the lawyer had already performed. When the lawyer attempted to collect his fee after the case was settled by another lawyer, the former client asserted that the lawyer should forfeit his fee because he engaged in unethical conduct. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the lawyer had "technically" violated Tenn. S. Ct. R. 8, DR 5-105(A) but that the lawyer's conduct had not prejudiced the client and that the client had waived his conflict-of-interest claims. Accordingly, the trial court awarded the lawyer $69,525.83 in legal fees and expenses. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Putnam Court of Appeals

Stan Wallace Mosley vs. Carrie Lynn Mosley
E2000-01445-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Jean A. Stanley
This appeal arises from a bifurcated trial in a divorce action. After hearing the parties' proof in the second phase regarding alimony, child support and division of property, the Trial Court entered a Judgment which the Trial Court designated as "final." The Judgment, however, does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The Trial Court did not decide the issue of whether excess retained earnings of Telescan, Inc., a company in which Stan Wallace Mosley ("Husband") is a 90% shareholder, should be imputed as income to Husband. The Judgment states that this issue will be considered by the Trial Court in the future. Husband appeals the Judgment but does not raise the issue of Telescan's excess retained earnings. Carrie Lynn Mosley ("Wife") contends that the Trial Court erred by failing to impute the excess retained earnings of Telescan to Husband's personal income for purposes of calculating his child support obligation. We dismiss this appeal because the Judgment is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies.

Washington Court of Appeals

In Re: The Matter of John Adams, Deceased v. City of Lebanon v. The Tennessean
M2001-00662-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd
This appeal challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court to issue a protective order sealing a settlement agreement between the City of Lebanon, Tennessee, and a private citizen, Mrs. Lorrine Adams. The trial court issued the protective order in response to the City's motion, a motion which followed a request by The Tennessean, a daily newspaper, for information regarding the settlement. The protective order was issued ex parte, despite the fact that no action had been filed against the City by Mrs. Adams or by The Tennessean. We hold that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the protective order. The order is therefore void and vacated.

Wilson Court of Appeals

Mary Hall, et al vs. Mary Rose Pippin, et al
M2001-00387-COA-OT-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Vernon Neal
This is an original contempt proceeding filed by the appellants against the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court for Putnam County in a now-concluded appeal. The appellants assert that the clerk and master knowingly and willfully violated our September 3, 1998 order directing her to file a supplemental record containing seven exhibits that had not been previously transmitted to this court. We have determined that we no longer have jurisdiction to consider the contempt motion because it was not filed until after our jurisdiction over the appeal had ended.

Putnam Court of Appeals

John Morgan, etc. vs. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc.
M2000-02382-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
The State Comptroller sued Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. seeking access to Cherokee's records for an audit of the company's affairs. The Chancery Court of Davidson County held that the company's contract with the State, and Chapter 960 of the Public Acts of 2000, gave the State the right to conduct the audit. Based on our opinion in Memphis Publishing Company, et al. v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, et al., released simultaneously with this opinion, we hold that the company's contracts with the State do not make all their records public records. We also hold that to apply Chapter 960 retroactively would violate the constitutional prohibition against retrospective legislation. We therefore reverse the lower court's judgment.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Memphis Publishing Co., et al vs. Cherokee Children & Family Svcs, Inc., et al
M2000-01705-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
The publisher and assistant managing editor of The Commercial Appeal, a Memphis newspaper, sued a non-profit corporation seeking access to the corporation's books and records under the Tennessee Public Records Act. The Circuit Court of Shelby County held that the corporation's contract with the State made virtually all of its records State property. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and reject the appellee's alternative argument that the corporation is a State agency. Therefore the appellee is not entitled to free access to the corporation's records.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Lindsey, Bradley & Maloy vs. Media Marketing Systems, Inc., et al
E2000-00678-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
This appeal involves a grant of summary judgment to Defendant Sam Cooper, the sole shareholder, president and CEO of his co-defendant, Media Marketing Systems, Inc. Lindsey, Bradley & Maloy ("Plaintiff") brought suit against Sam Cooper and Media Marketing for breach of contract stemming from an agreement between Plaintiff and Media Marketing. Plaintiff sought to pierce Media Marketing's corporate veil so as to render Defendant personally liable for the debt owed under the agreement. Plaintiff also made claims against Defendant for his alleged individual tortious conduct related to the agreement. Both Plaintiff and Defendant filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court denied Plaintiff's motion but granted Defendant's motion. Plaintiff appeals and argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether Media Marketing's corporate veil should be pierced due to Defendant's conduct. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant should not have been granted summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

Hamilton Court of Appeals