COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Civil Cases". See Memphis Board of Realtors v. Cohen, 786 S.W.2D 951 (Tenn. App.
03A01-9906-CV-00229

03A01-9906-CV-00229
03A01-9906-CV-00229

03A01-9812-CV-00423
03A01-9812-CV-00423

03A01-9904-CV-00153
03A01-9904-CV-00153

Johnny D. Young, v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company
03A01-9812-CV-00414
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Neil Thomas, III

This is an appeal from the Trial Court’s denial of a Motion for New Trial filed by Plaintiff/Appellant, Johnny D. Young. The motion was based upon allegations of a quotient verdict, improper admission of evidence, and improper argument by counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Norfolk Southern Railway Company. Although Plaintiff prevailed in his Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) action against Defendant, Plaintiff alleged five grounds in a Motion for New Trial, attaching as exhibits affidavits of five jurors, a court officer and Plaintiff’s trial counsel. Defendant responded with contradictory affidavits from four jurors. By entry of a Memorandum and Order, the Trial Court denied four of the grounds for new trial asserted by Plaintiff, and reserved final ruling on the issue of quotient verdict pending testimony by the jurors to resolve the contradictory statements in the affidavits filed by the parties. A hearing was held during which

Johnny D. Young, v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company
03A01-9812-CV-00414
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Neil Thomas, III

This is an appeal from the Trial Court’s denial of a Motion for New Trial filed by Plaintiff/Appellant, Johnny D. Young. The motion was based upon allegations of a quotient verdict, improper admission of evidence, and improper argument by counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Norfolk Southern Railway Company. Although Plaintiff prevailed in his Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) action against Defendant, Plaintiff alleged five grounds in a Motion for New Trial, attaching as exhibits affidavits of five jurors, a court officer and Plaintiff’s trial counsel. Defendant responded with contradictory affidavits from four jurors. By entry of a Memorandum and Order, the Trial Court denied four of the grounds for new trial asserted by Plaintiff, and reserved final ruling on the issue of quotient verdict pending testimony by the jurors to resolve the contradictory statements in the affidavits filed by the parties. A hearing was held during which the Trial Court questioned, and then heard examination by counsel for the parties of, all twelve jurors. After Plaintiff voiced allegations of improper communication between jurors at this first hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel and a paralegal for Plaintiff’s counsel testified at a second hearing. The Trial Court subsequently entered a second Memorandum and Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial in its entirety. The issue in this appeal is whether the Trial Court erred in the application of evidence gathered in the post-trial proceedings, with peripheral assertions of error concerning the conduct of the trial. We affirm the Trial Court’s denial of the Motion for New Trial, as all issues raised by Plaintiff were properly, and articulately, resolved by the Trial Court.
 

03A01-9901-CH-00020
03A01-9901-CH-00020

Keaseler vs. Swain
M1998-00228-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson

Ferrell vs. Ferrell
M1998-00214-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley

Daron vs. Dept. of Correction, et al
M1998-00217-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy

M1998-00221-COA-R3-CV
M1998-00221-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Cole vs. Cole
M1999-00933-COA-R3-CV

Buford vs. TDOC
M1998-00157-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Crumbley vs. Crumbley
M1998-00158-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey F. Stewart

Clark vs. Service Corp. Int'l.
M1998-00160-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Merrimack Mutual Fire Ins. Co. vs. Gloria Batts
M1999-00078-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
This appeal involves a dispute between a homeowner and her insurance company regarding the damages to her house caused by the tornado that struck Nashville on April 16, 1998. When they could not agree on the amount of the loss, both parties invoked the insurance policy's provision for the appointment of appraisers. After the parties' two appraisers could not agree on the amount of the loss, the two appraisers selected a third appraiser who eventually agreed with the homeowner's appraiser regarding the amount of the loss. The insurance company filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, seeking a declaratory judgment that it was required to pay the homeowner less than one-half of the amount of the loss calculated by the two appraisers. Both parties filed motions for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted the insurance company's motion, concluding that the insurance policy's appraisal clause was not an agreement for binding arbitration and that the appraisers had not been empowered to determine whether parts of the claimed damage had been caused by a peril covered by the policy. The homeowner takes issue with both of the trial court's legal conclusions on this appeal. We have determined that the trial court interpreted the insurance policy correctly and, therefore, that the trial court properly concluded that the insurance company was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Kennedy vs. Trammel
M1999-00538-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd

M1999-00540-COA-R3-CV
M1999-00540-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

William D. Hunley and wife, Brenda K. Hunley, and Velvac, Inc., v. Silver Furniture Mfg. Co. and Tab Service Corp. - Dissenting
03A01-9902-CV-00049
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

I dissent from the majority’s holding that the workers’ compensation carrier for Mr. Hunley’s employer is subrogated, without further inquiry, to the proceeds of Mrs. Hunley’s settlement of her loss of consortium claim that arose out of the work-related injuries sustained by her husband.

William D. Hunley, Jr., Brenda K Hunley, & Velvac Inc., v. Silver Furniture Mfg. Co. & Tab Service Corp., - Dissenting
03A01-9902-CV-00049
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

I dissent from the majority’s holding that the workers’ compensation carrier for Mr. Hunley’s employer is subrogated, without further inquiry, to the proceeds of Mrs. Hunley’s settlement of her loss of consortium claim that arose out of the work-related injuries sustained by her husband.

Charles w. McKinney, a resident of Smith County, Tennessee, v. Smith County, Tennessee, a county duly constituted by the State of Tennessee
M1998-00074-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bobby H. Capers

In this inverse condemnation action, Defendant Smith County appeals the trial court’s final judgment that suggested a $15,000 additur to the $7700 verdict rendered by the jury in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee Charles W. McKinney. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this cause for a new trial on the issue of damages.

Christine Spann v. Barry Abraham, Individually, and D/B/A Sir Pizza
M1996-00003-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This appeal involves a pregnancy discrimination claim asserted by an employee of a Nashville pizza restaurant. After refusing to accept a temporary reassignment requested by her employer, the employee quit her job and filed suit, alleging that her employer had discriminated against her in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Chancery Court for Davidson County granted the employer ’s motion for directed verdict at the close of the employee’s proof after concluding that she had not made out a prima facie case for disparate treatment because of her pregnancy. The employee asserts on this appeal that the trial court erred by directing a verdict for the employer and by amending its final order on its own motion. We have concluded that the trial court correctly directed a verdict for the employer in this case and, therefore, affirm the trial court.

Richard Thomas Bogan v. Doris Mae Bogan
03A01-9811-CH-00393
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John S. McLellan, III

This is an appeal by Ms. Bogan (Appellant) from an Order of the Chancery Court for Sullivan County which reduced Mr. Bogan’s (Appellee) alimony payments to her from $2,300 monthly to $945 monthly after Appellee’s retirement

Richard Thomas Bogan, v. Doris Mae Bogan - Dissenting
03A01-9811-CH-00393
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John S. McLellan, III

I dissent from the judgment of the majority opinion “reinstat[ing] the prior award of $2,300 monthly alimony as provided in the parties’ original divorce decree.” In my opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it reduced Mr. Bogan’s monthly alimony obligation from $2,300 to $945. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Katheryn Griffin vs. Steven Griffin
02A01-9807-CH-00177
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos