COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Harte Thomas vs. Shair Lab
02A01-9711-CH-00289
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.

Dick Moore vs. GreenTree Financial
02A01-9707-CV-00148
Trial Court Judge: James F. Russell

Devona Mills vs. Immual Mills
02A01-9711-CV-00295
Trial Court Judge: James E. Swearengen

Jenkins Subway vs. Lynn Jones
02A01-9801-CH-00001
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis

Carolyn Love vs. Shelby Co.
02A01-9803-CV-00053
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown

Jan Cagle vs. Steve Cagle
02A01-9710-CH-00265
Trial Court Judge: John Walton West

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Dannenhold vs. Knoxville Pathology Group
03A01-9710-CV-00443

Dannenhold vs. Knoxville Pathology Group
03A01-9710-CV-00443

Sommerville vs. Sommerville
01A01-9710-CV-00559
Trial Court Judge: Thomas Goodall

Dept. of Human Services vs. Fineout
01A01-9710-JV-00582
Trial Court Judge: Burton D. Glover

Peggy Jean Bradford, v. James William Anderson and Myra Alea, In Re: Rachel Anderson, D/O/B 10/20/1990
01-A-01-9712 -CV-00689
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gerald L Ewell, Sr.

This is a custody dispute between the child's father and the child's maternal grandmother, who was nominated as the custodian in the will of the child's mother. The Circuit Court of Coffee County awarded custody to the father and his mother. We affirm.

Blick vs. Kent
01A01-9708-CV-00393
Trial Court Judge: James E. Walton

Barnett vs. Barnett
01A01-9605-CH-00228
Trial Court Judge: Tyrus H. Cobb

Baltz vs. Knight
01A01-9606-JV-00263
Trial Court Judge: George L. Lovell

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Deborah H. Steele v. Superior Home Health Care of Chattanooga, Inc., and David Twombley - Concurring
03A01-9709-CH-00395
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor R. Vann Owens

The plaintiff, Deborah H. Steele (“Steele”), brought this action against her former employer, Superior Home Health Care of Chattanooga, Inc. (“Superior”), and her former supervisor, David Twombley (“Twombley”)1, alleging that she was the victim of, among other things, sexual  harassment, outrageous conduct, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. After various other claims were dismissed by the trial court², the case proceeded to trial before a jury on Steele’s claim of sexual harassment against both Superior and Twombley under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, T.C.A. § 4-21-101, et seq. (“THRA”), and her claim of outrageous conduct and intentional infliction of emotional distress, against Twombley alone. The jury found in favor of Steele on all of the remaining theories of recovery and awarded her $1.2 million in compensatory  damages and $60,000 in punitive damages. The trial court also awarded Steele attorney’s fees and costs against both defendants. After Steele  accepted a remittitur that eliminated the punitive damages award and reduced the compensatory damages award to $850,000, both Superior and Twombley appealed, raising in substance the following issues for our consideration:

1. Did the trial court err in allowing inadmissible hearsay testimony from witnesses who did not have first-hand knowledge of the events in question?

2. Did Steele’s counsel make improper and prejudicial statements during closing argument, thus warranting a new trial?

3. Is there material evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict?

4. Did the trial court err in submitting to the jury Steele’s cause of action against Twombley under the THRA?5. Did the trial court err in giving the jury an inaccurate charge, thereby prejudicing its verdict against Twombley?

6. Did the trial court err in not suggesting a further remittitur of the jury’s verdict?

7. Did the trial court err in awarding attorney’s fees against Twombley under the THRA?

Si J. Williams v. Mary C. Williams
01A01-9709-CV-00522
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.

I concur with the results of this opinion. However, I am filing this separate opinion to clarify my understanding of the significance of the portion of the decision dealing with the need of the parties’ daughter for continuing support past her eighteenth birthday.

Si J. Williams, v. Mary C. Williams
01A01-9709-CV-00522
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

In this divorce case, Mary C. Williams, hereafter “wife” has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court awarding her a divorce from Si J. Williams, hereafter “husband,” custody, child support, alimony, insurance, fees and division of property.

Si J. Williams, v. Mary C. Williams - Concurring
01A01-9709-CV-00522
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.

I concur with the results of this opinion. However, I am filing this separate
opinion to clarify my understanding of the significance of the portion of the decision
dealing with the need of the parties’ daughter for continuing support past her
eighteenth birthday.

Cathy P. McManamay v. Charles T. McManamay
01A01-9802-CH-00081
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol A. Catalano

In this divorce case, the defendant husband has appealed from a decree awarding the plaintiff a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences and dividing the marital estate. The husband has presented the issues in the following form:
1. The Trial Court rushed the trial, making it difficult for the defendant/appellant to fully present his case.
2. The Trial Court erred by awarding the plaintiff/appellee an interest in the defendant/appellant’s
separate property.
3. The Trial Court erred in refusing to make any division in marital property that was held solely in the plaintiff/appellee’s name.
4. The Trial Court erred in awarding the divorce to the plaintiff/appellee despite overwhelming grounds in favor of the defendant/appellant.

Lucy L. Bond v. Belle Meade Fund Partners, L.P., et al. - Concurring
01A01-9802-CV-00059
Authoring Judge: Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

The plaintiff sued for injury suffered when she stepped into a hole in the asphalt surface of a parking lot provided for customers of Kroger Company. Kroger was dismissed by nonsuit, and the remaining defendants were dismissed by summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed and presented the following issue:

I. Whether a genuine issue of material fact has been raised by the plaintiff/appellant, so as to warrant this cause to be tried on its merits.

Gary Wayne Robertson v. Lori Vanhooser Robertson - Concurring
03A01-9711-CV-00511
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Neil Thomas, III

This is a divorce case. The trial court granted Lori Vanhooser Robertson (“Wife”) a divorce on the ground set forth at T.C.A. § 36-4-101(3)1; awarded the parties joint custody of their 16-year-old son; ordered Gary Wayne Robertson (“Husband”) to pay Wife child support of $387 per month plus 21% of part of Husband’s future increases in net income; awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony of $250 per month for 12 months, beginning with the month of October, 1997; divided the parties’ property and debts; denied Wife’s request for attorney’s fees; and made other decrees not relevant to a resolution of the issues now before us. Wife appealed, raising issues that present the following questions for our review.

Brenda J. Crowder, M.D., v. Brent D. Laing, M.D. and John D. Green, M.D., David Dobyns, First Medical Group and Healthcare Consultants, Inc., et al.
03A01-9801-CH-00083
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lewis W. May, Jr.

We granted the Rule 9, T.R.A.P., application of the appellant, Brent D. Laing, M.D. (“Laing”), in order to review the propriety of the trial court’s denial of Laing’s motion to amend his answer filed in litigation instituted against him and others by the appellee, Brenda J. Crowder, M.D. (“Crowder”). In the same order, we consolidated that interlocutory appeal with the appeal of Laing’s separate suit against Crowder, which latter appeal is before us as of right. See Rule 3(a), T.R.A.P. The claims asserted by Laing in the second suit are identical to those in the counterclaim which Laing attempted to pursue, albeit unsuccessfully, in the earlier litigation. We reverse the trial court’s denial of Laing’s motion to amend in the first suit. We dismiss, as moot, the appeal of Laing’s subsequent suit against Crowder.

Lanny McCormack, individually and as partner of McCormack Farms v. Zollie McCormack
01A01-9707-CH-00341
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William B. Cain

Plaintiff Lanny McCormack appeals the final judgment entered by the trial court in this dissolution of partnership case. In its final judgment, the trial court ordered Defendant/Appellee Zollie McCormack to pay Lanny McCormack $137,453 for all of the latter’s right, title, and interest in the McCormack Farms partnership. On appeal, Lanny McCormack has raised only one issue for this court’s review: whether the trial court, which previously had adopted a special master’s report, erred when it ruled that Lanny’s interest in the partnership would be resolved in a manner which was not one of three options set forth in the special master’s report. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.