COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

C.D. Boyd vs. TN Board of Paroles, et al
M1998-00914-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This appeal involves an prisoner's efforts to be paroled from a 35-year sentence for second degree murder. After the Tennessee Board of Paroles declined to parole the prisoner for the sixth time, the prisoner filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board's latest decision. The trial court dismissed the petition, and the prisoner has appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the prisoner's petition.

Harte Thomas vs. Shair Lab
02A01-9711-CH-00289
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.

03A01-9710-CV-
03A01-9710-CV-

Jerry Lynn Shorter vs. Margaret Mae Shorter - Concurring
03A01-9802-DR-00054
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joyce M. Ward

In this divorce action the Trial Court decreed the parties’ separate marital property, divided the marital estate, and granted the parties a divorce pursuant to T.C.A. §36 -4-129(b).

The wife has appealed and raises these issues:
1. The Court erred in not awarding alimony.
2. The Court erred in not equitably dividing the marital estate; and
3. The Court erred in not making an equitable distribution of the husband’s military retirement.

Beam vs. United Services
03A01-9802-CH-00055

Reagan vs. Malone
03A01-9805-CH-00173

Westwood vs. Moore
03A01-9805-CV-00155

Parman vs. Swatzell
03A01-9808-CH-00258

Dick Moore vs. GreenTree Financial
02A01-9707-CV-00148
Trial Court Judge: James F. Russell

Devona Mills vs. Immual Mills
02A01-9711-CV-00295
Trial Court Judge: James E. Swearengen

Jenkins Subway vs. Lynn Jones
02A01-9801-CH-00001
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis

Jan Cagle vs. Steve Cagle
02A01-9710-CH-00265
Trial Court Judge: John Walton West

Carolyn Love vs. Shelby Co.
02A01-9803-CV-00053
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

Dannenhold vs. Knoxville Pathology Group
03A01-9710-CV-00443

Dannenhold vs. Knoxville Pathology Group
03A01-9710-CV-00443

Sommerville vs. Sommerville
01A01-9710-CV-00559
Trial Court Judge: Thomas Goodall

Dept. of Human Services vs. Fineout
01A01-9710-JV-00582
Trial Court Judge: Burton D. Glover

Peggy Jean Bradford, v. James William Anderson and Myra Alea, In Re: Rachel Anderson, D/O/B 10/20/1990
01-A-01-9712 -CV-00689
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gerald L Ewell, Sr.

This is a custody dispute between the child's father and the child's maternal grandmother, who was nominated as the custodian in the will of the child's mother. The Circuit Court of Coffee County awarded custody to the father and his mother. We affirm.

Blick vs. Kent
01A01-9708-CV-00393
Trial Court Judge: James E. Walton

Barnett vs. Barnett
01A01-9605-CH-00228
Trial Court Judge: Tyrus H. Cobb

Baltz vs. Knight
01A01-9606-JV-00263
Trial Court Judge: George L. Lovell

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

Deborah H. Steele v. Superior Home Health Care of Chattanooga, Inc., and David Twombley - Concurring
03A01-9709-CH-00395
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor R. Vann Owens

The plaintiff, Deborah H. Steele (“Steele”), brought this action against her former employer, Superior Home Health Care of Chattanooga, Inc. (“Superior”), and her former supervisor, David Twombley (“Twombley”)1, alleging that she was the victim of, among other things, sexual  harassment, outrageous conduct, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. After various other claims were dismissed by the trial court², the case proceeded to trial before a jury on Steele’s claim of sexual harassment against both Superior and Twombley under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, T.C.A. § 4-21-101, et seq. (“THRA”), and her claim of outrageous conduct and intentional infliction of emotional distress, against Twombley alone. The jury found in favor of Steele on all of the remaining theories of recovery and awarded her $1.2 million in compensatory  damages and $60,000 in punitive damages. The trial court also awarded Steele attorney’s fees and costs against both defendants. After Steele  accepted a remittitur that eliminated the punitive damages award and reduced the compensatory damages award to $850,000, both Superior and Twombley appealed, raising in substance the following issues for our consideration:

1. Did the trial court err in allowing inadmissible hearsay testimony from witnesses who did not have first-hand knowledge of the events in question?

2. Did Steele’s counsel make improper and prejudicial statements during closing argument, thus warranting a new trial?

3. Is there material evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict?

4. Did the trial court err in submitting to the jury Steele’s cause of action against Twombley under the THRA?5. Did the trial court err in giving the jury an inaccurate charge, thereby prejudicing its verdict against Twombley?

6. Did the trial court err in not suggesting a further remittitur of the jury’s verdict?

7. Did the trial court err in awarding attorney’s fees against Twombley under the THRA?

Brenda J. Crowder, M.D., v. Brent D. Laing, M.D. and John D. Green, M.D., David Dobyns, First Medical Group and Healthcare Consultants, Inc., et al.
03A01-9801-CH-00083
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lewis W. May, Jr.

We granted the Rule 9, T.R.A.P., application of the appellant, Brent D. Laing, M.D. (“Laing”), in order to review the propriety of the trial court’s denial of Laing’s motion to amend his answer filed in litigation instituted against him and others by the appellee, Brenda J. Crowder, M.D. (“Crowder”). In the same order, we consolidated that interlocutory appeal with the appeal of Laing’s separate suit against Crowder, which latter appeal is before us as of right. See Rule 3(a), T.R.A.P. The claims asserted by Laing in the second suit are identical to those in the counterclaim which Laing attempted to pursue, albeit unsuccessfully, in the earlier litigation. We reverse the trial court’s denial of Laing’s motion to amend in the first suit. We dismiss, as moot, the appeal of Laing’s subsequent suit against Crowder.