In Re: Katrina S.
Trista S. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of (1) persistence of conditions; (2) failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody of the child; and (3) mental incompetence. Mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Because the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the grounds for termination and the best interests determination, we affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex Rel. James R. Wilson v. Howard Gentry, Et Al.
The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the production of the audio recordings from his post-conviction proceeding pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the recordings were exempt from disclosure. The petitioner appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Chase Knipper v. Erin Elizabeth Enfinger
Mother appeals the trial court’s rulings changing the surname of the child, denying awards of retroactive child support and uncovered medical expenses, and allowing Father to seek modification of the residential schedule without showing a material change in circumstances. We vacate the trial court’s award of a deviation of child support because the trial court did not make the required findings under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-311 and the Child Support Guidelines. As to the remaining issues, we reverse. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Volodymyr Helyukh, Et Al. v. Buddy Head Livestock & Trucking, Inc.
The dispositive issue in this personal injury action is whether the claims against the defendant trucking company for the tortious acts of its employee/truck driver are time-barred under Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hospitals, 325 S.W.3d 98 (Tenn. 2010) or saved by the commencement of a new action under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105, Tennessee’s “savings statute.” After the plaintiffs commenced the new action, the company filed a motion to summarily dismiss the complaint, asserting the plaintiffs’ claims against the employee were procedurally barred before the new action was commenced. The trial court denied the motion because the first action was instituted before the plaintiffs’ right of action against the employee became extinguished by operation of law, and the second complaint was timely filed pursuant to the savings statute. For the same reason, we affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah D. Bartley Et Al. v. Tiny Nunley, Individually And As Administratrix Of The Estate Of Anthony Gene Nunley
This appeal arose from a dispute between relatives concerning the ownership of improved real property. The property at issue was conveyed in 2000 via warranty deed to a married couple, William and Jewel Nunley, and their adult son, Anthony Gene Nunley, each as tenants in common. Following William Nunley’s death in 2007, Anthony Nunley purchased his mother’s interest in the property, executing a promissory note in the amount of $112,509.00 and a deed of trust secured by title to the property. In 2015, Jewel Nunley and Anthony Nunley executed a document stating that the remaining balance on the note was $37,509.00. Anthony Nunley (“Decedent”) died intestate in June 2016. Decedent’s surviving spouse, Tiny Nunley, filed a petition in the probate division of the Carter County Chancery Court (“probate court”) and was granted letters of administration to act as the personal representative (“Personal Representative”) of Decedent’s estate (“the Estate”). Jewel Nunley filed a claim against the Estate for the balance owed on the promissory note, which was later settled and released by agreement. Personal Representative filed an action in the probate court to reform the deed and quiet title to the subject real property. Two of Decedent’s three adult sisters objected and filed an action in the Carter County Chancery Court (“trial court”) to partition the property. The probate court transferred the reformation action to the trial court, treating Personal Representative’s petition to reform the deed and quiet title as a compulsory counterclaim to the partition action. The plaintiffs asserted that via the 2000 deed, the property was conveyed in part to William Nunley as a tenant in common with his one-third interest in the property then passing to his wife, Jewel Nunley, and their four children, including Decedent, through intestate succession. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Marvin Duane Julian v. Debra Ann Julian
In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals the trial’s courts award of $200,000.00 to Wife/Appellee under the parties’ prenuptial agreement. This award was based on the trial court’s finding that Husband’s net worth is at least $400,000.00. In their agreement, the parties waived alimony; nonetheless, Husband sought an award of alimony in the trial court. The trial court held that Husband did not meet his burden to show that he was a public charge so as to overcome his waiver of alimony. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Trinity H.
This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Macon County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of James H. (“Father”) to his minor daughter Trinity H. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights on the grounds of wanton disregard, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The Juvenile Court found also that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals. With respect to wanton disregard, the Juvenile Court found only that Father committed criminal acts resulting in his incarceration, which by itself is insufficient to establish the ground. We, therefore, vacate the ground of wanton disregard. However, we find that the other two grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence and, by the same standard, that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We vacate, in part, and affirm, as modified. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Kampmeyer, Et Al. v. State of Tennessee
Appellants, Husband and Wife, filed a complaint for damages, including Wife’s loss of consortium claim, with the Tennessee Claims Commission. The State filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss Wife’s loss of consortium claim because she did not file notice of her claim with the Division of Claims Administration within the applicable statute of limitations. The Claims Commission dismissed Wife’s claim for failure to comply with the notice requirement. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402(b). Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Amelia Johnson, et al. v. Millington Municipal Schools
Appellants filed suit against Appellee under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleging that Appellee breached its duty to protect Appellant/student, who was injured in a fight on school grounds. The trial court held that Appellants failed to meet their burden to show negligence and denied relief. The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence for our review as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Alan Ellis v. Donica Ann Woods Ellis
This is the second appeal in this divorce case. In Ellis v. Ellis, No. W2017-02287-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 410704 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019), we vacated the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to Wife and its award of alimony in solido for Wife’s attorney’s fees. Contrary to our mandate, on remand, the trial court failed to consider Wife’s relative earning capacity in relation to the award of alimony in futuro. Although the trial court affirmed its previous award of alimony in solido, it failed to consider payments Wife made from pendente lite support she received from Husband. Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to reflect Wife’s earning capacity, and we modify the award of alimony in solido to reflect payments made from pendente lite support. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
C & C Tenn. Properties, LLC v. Reeves & Reeves Properties, LLC
This appeal concerns a legal dispute between a landlord and a commercial tenant. The trial court found that the landlord, a recent purchaser of the commercial property, had breached the pre-existing lease. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate Of Donald Cowan
The estate of the decedent appeals the trial court’s decision to grant the widow’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the estate’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint, filed in 2019, sought rescission of a quitclaim deed executed by the decedentin 1990 that created a tenancy by the entirety with his wife. The complaint alleged that the decedent executed the deed shortly after the marriage in consideration of and reliance on “a contract” between the spouses. The complaint alleged that the contract obligated the husband “to create a tenancy by the entirety” and, in return, the wife was “obligated to cohabit with him and to provide the love, affection and companionship that was essential for a ‘long and enduring marriage.’” Although the couple remained married until the decedent’s death in 2018—28 years after they married—the complaint alleged that the 1990 deed should be rescinded for the failure of consideration and the failure of a condition subsequent. The complaint additionally asserted that the wife was unjustly enriched by the conveyance and asked that a constructive trust be imposed on the property. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that it did not allege facts that would give rise to any obligation upon the wife because the deed unambiguously evinced the husband’s intent to convey the property as a gift. The court also found, inter alia, the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations applicable to each claim, the doctrine of gross laches, and the statute of frauds. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Church of God in Christ, Inc., et al. v. L.M. Haley Ministries, Inc., et al.
This appeal concerns a dispute over church property. David A. Hall (“Bishop Hall”), a bishop with The Church of God in Christ, Inc. (“COGIC”), tried to assert control over New Jerusalem Church of God in Christ (“New Jerusalem Church”), a COGIC member church, but was blocked by parties opposed to his pastorate. Bishop Hall, COGIC and New Jerusalem Church (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued these opponents (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiffs later filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Defendants appeal. Defendants argue, among other things, that under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the Trial Court and this Court lack subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute. However, we find this case amenable to resolution under the hybrid neutral-principles approach articulated by our Supreme Court in a factually similar case. The undisputed material facts show that New Jerusalem Church’s property is held in trust for COGIC and that Bishop Hall is the duly appointed Jurisdictional Bishop with rights of pastor at New Jerusalem Church. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tina Rogers Et Al. v. Adventure House LLC Et Al.
This negligence action arose from approximately 102 events of food poisoning or illness purportedly related to numerous patrons (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) who dined at or visited Adventure House, LLC d/b/a River Drifters Restaurant and River Drifters Adventure Center (“the Restaurant”), located on real property owned by Robert L. Newman (“the Premises”). Plaintiffs filed suit against the Restaurant; Mr. Newman; and Charles and Renee Eich, the owners of the Restaurant. Upon Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the action as a class action, the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“trial court”) denied Plaintiffs’ motion upon a determination that Plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden to prove the commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation elements required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23.01. The trial court further determined that if those elements were met, the class could maintain its certification pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23.02(1)(b). However, based on its determination that the class did not satisfy the threshold certification requirements under Rule 23.01, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the litigation as a class action. Plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Rukia B. Et Al.
Nathan B. (“Father”) and Kendra B. (“Stepmother”) appeal the judgment of the Campbell County Circuit Court (the “Trial Court”) denying their petition for termination of the parental rights of Hannah B. (“Mother”), as to Mother’s two biological children. Because the Trial Court’s final order does not contain sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the best interests of the children, this Court is unable to engage in meaningful appellate review, and the judgment of the Trial Court is vacated and remanded. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Friendship Water Co. v. City of Friendship, Tennessee
Subsequent to the grant of partial summary judgment in the trial court, we granted an application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Having reflected upon the specific issue for which our Rule 9 order granted review, we are of the opinion that the present appeal was improvidently granted as framed. In addition, we observe that the trial court’s partial summary judgment order fails to clearly articulate the legal grounds upon which that order is based. Given our conclusion that the interlocutory appeal was improvidently granted, we dismiss the appeal. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. The Blumberg Trust Et Al.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of its Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24 motion to intervene. Because the trial court’s order does not state the basis for its denial of the motion, we cannot review the ultimate decision. Vacated and remanded. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Wolf Organization, Inc. v. TNG Contractors, LLC
This is the second appeal in this case. In the first appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s enrollment of Appellee’s Pennsylvania judgment. In enrolling the foreign judgment, the trial court omitted the 1.5% interest awarded by the Pennsylvania court and entered judgment only for the principal amount of the foreign judgment. In seeking to enforce its judgment, Appellee filed a bank levy against Appellant, wherein Appellee included the 1.5% interest. Because neither party raised an issue in the first appeal concerning whether the trial court’s omission of the interest was error, the question is waived, and Appellee is entitled to only post-judgment interest under Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-14-121(a). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to quash Appellee’s bank levy in the amount of $40,482.03. The case is remanded for calculation of post-judgment interest consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Teal Properties, Inc. v. C&H Commercial Contractors, Inc.
Relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(5) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances. Outcomes, specifically judgments, occasioned by a party’s own inaction or lack of attention are not extraordinary. And a court does not abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 60.02(5) motion when a judgment results from such circumstances. So we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Horizon Trades, Inc. v. Aubrey Givens, Et Al.
The defendant in a malicious prosecution action moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. He contended that the prior suit that engendered the malicious prosecution action was not terminated on its merits. The plaintiff responded that the prior suit was dismissed on multiple grounds and that one of those grounds was on the merits. The trial court agreed with the defendant and granted the motion to dismiss. We do as well and affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nevaeh B.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court found the sole ground raised by the Department for termination against the child’s father of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child or assume financial responsibility pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14) had been established. The court further found that the termination of father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Father filed a timely appeal. On appeal, we vacate the trial court’s order terminating father’s parental rights due to the court’s failure to consider all required elements of the statutory ground for termination. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In re Raylan W.
After Mother failed to timely appeal the final order terminating her parental rights, she sought relief pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the motion, and Mother timely appealed from that order. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Mother’s Rule 60.02 motion, we proceed to consider the correctness of the trial court’s final order terminating Mother’s parental rights. But we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest. We therefore affirm the |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Jim Daniel Story, Jr. v. Heidi Rebekah Nussbaumer-Story
A husband challenges the trial court’s award of alimony in solido to his wife for a period of eight years. Having examined the record and the trial court’s analysis of the statutory factors, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court’s decision. We further award the wife her reasonable attorney fees on appeal |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Laurel Martin Griffin v. Kevin Michael Griffin
After seventeen years of marriage, a wife filed a complaint for divorce. The husband answered and filed a counter-complaint for divorce. The trial court granted the wife a divorce, named her primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children, classified and divided the marital estate, ordered the husband to pay the wife $1,941 per month in child support, and awarded the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $6,000 per month. The husband appealed. We affirm the trial court’s designation of Wife as the primary residential parent and the division of the marital estate as modified. We vacate the award of child support and the amount of alimony and remand for recalculation. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Knapp v. Jason Boykins
This appeal involves the issuance of an order of protection based on allegations of stalking. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
