In Re Amiyah W. Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the two minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (4) severe child abuse; (5) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also determined that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. As an initial matter, Mother asserts that, having surrendered her parental rights at the outset of the hearing (she later rescinded her surrender), the trial court was required to continue the hearing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-112. We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-112 does not require a trial court to either continue or delay a contested termination hearing when a parent surrenders his or her parental rights before or during the hearing. We reverse the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Josephine H. et al.
This is a dependency and neglect case. Appellants/parents do not dispute the trial court’s finding that the children are dependent and neglected. Rather, the sole issue involves whether the trial court’s disposition, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-130, was made in compliance with section 37-1-130(c) and, if so, whether the placement of the children with their aunt was “best suited to the protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child[ren].” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-130(a). Affirmed and remanded. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Brittany Lee-Ann Stanifer v. Derrick Tyler Stanifer
This appeal arises from a permanent parenting plan entered after the father requested a modification of the existing plan. The father argues that the trial court failed to properly weigh the evidence when establishing the plan. However, the plan did not include a determination of child support. Thus, the order appealed is not final, and we lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider the issue raised. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Millen v. Tennessee Department of Labor & Workforce Development, et al.
Pro se Appellant, Kevin Millen, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court that was entered on April 19, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Mia C.
There is much in the Majority Opinion with which I agree, including the reprehensibility of Father’s conduct toward Mother during their relationship and the inappropriate nature of his “discipline” of the Child. However, because the trial court relied heavily on witness credibility determinations in finding that the termination of Father’s parental rights was not in the Child’s best interest, I must respectfully dissent from the Majority Opinion’s decision to terminate. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Mia C.
I wholly concur with Judge Frierson’s well-reasoned conclusion that our de novo review of the underlying record in this case demonstrates that Mother and Stepfather have presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in Mia’s best interest. I write separately to address the important concerns raised by Judge Stafford in his thoughtful dissent. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Mia C.
This case involves termination of the parental rights of a biological father to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to support had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. However, the trial court declined to find that termination of the father’s rights was in the child’s best interest and accordingly denied the termination petition. The petitioners have appealed. Upon thorough review, we conclude that the trial court erred in its determination concerning the best interest analysis. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the termination petition, and we grant termination of the father’s parental rights. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
SH Trelleborg Cadence, LLC v. Thomas Smythe et al.
Tenant appeals the trial court’s determination that (1) he breached his lease by failing to pay water bills for several years and (2) the apartment complex did not breach the lease by bringing the underlying eviction proceedings. The apartment complex also appeals the trial court’s grant of only some of its attorney’s fees. Because we conclude that there was no meeting of the minds regarding the payment for water services, we reverse the trial court’s finding of a breach of contract. We further determine that Cadence is entitled to quantum meruit relief, and we remand for a determination of the reasonable value of the utilities used by the tenant. We also vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and remand for the determination and calculation of those fees allowed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Carlton J. Ditto v. City of Chattanooga Et Al.
This is an appeal from trial court proceedings in which a property owner sought to enjoin the City of Chattanooga from demolishing a condemned house. Because the property owner has since sold the property at issue to a third-party purchaser who is now renovating the property, the original property owner no longer has standing, and the issues he attempts to raise are moot. This appeal is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen H. Bills Et Al. v. Joe B. Barton Et Al.
Litigation arose in connection with a dispute over an option agreement to purchase property. The parties agreed to settle the case and to allow a Tennessee-licensed real estate appraiser to set the purchase price. The purchasers, however, moved to set aside the price set by the appraiser. Relying on the opinions of a licensed real estate broker and a different licensed appraiser, the purchasers argued that the appraiser’s valuation deviated from the required professional standards to such an extent that it fell below the relevant standard of care. The trial court denied the motion, concluding: (1) the purchasers could not under the settlement agreement challenge the appraisal; (2) even if they could, the real estate broker’s lack of an appraisal license rendered him per se incompetent to testify; and (3) the purchasers failed to provide a declaration from their expert licensed real estate appraiser stating that the appraisal had not been conducted in accordance with professional standards. In response to a motion to alter or amend, the trial court judge recognized that the purchasers had, in fact, provided such a declaration, but, nevertheless, denied their motion. The purchasers appeal. We conclude that the purchasers can challenge the appraiser’s evaluation on the limited basis that he allegedly departed from the professional standard of care. We also conclude the Tennessee licensed real estate broker not holding a Tennessee real estate appraiser’s license does not per se render his testimony incompetent. We also conclude that even assuming the testimony from the real estate broker is inadmissible, the purchasers have presented evidence that the appraisal was not conducted in accordance with professional standards. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for the trial court to reassess the admissibility of the real estate broker’s testimony and to determine whether the appraiser violated the professional standard of care. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Taurick Boyd v. City of Memphis ET AL
Appellee’s employment as a City of Memphis Firefighter was terminated based on an offensive post to Appellee’s Facebook page. After receiving notice of his termination, Appellee requested an appeal hearing with the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission. Following the hearing, the Commissioner issued a decision affirming the termination, and Appellee sought review in the trial court. The trial court reversed the Commissioner’s decision, finding that substantial and material evidence did not support the decision, and that the decision was arbitrary and capricious and made in violation of Appellee’s right to equal protection. The City of Memphis appeals. We vacate the trial court’s decision reversing the Commission’s termination of Appellee’s employment. The case is remanded to the trial court for entry of an order vacating the Commissioner’s decision and ordering further proceedings in compliance with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tucker R. Et Al.
The Juvenile Court for Jefferson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Meliah B. (“Mother”) to her children, Tucker R., Gracelynn R., and Roland R. (“the Children”). Mother has appealed, challenging only the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Keetly Marc v. Jackson Eck, D.O.
This appeal concerns the discovery rule. Dr. Jason C. Eck, D.O. (“Defendant”) performed spinal surgery on Keetly Marc (“Plaintiff”). On November 10, 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel, who then was representing Plaintiff only in a workers’ compensation case, received information through discovery reflecting that Plaintiff’s surgery was performed at the wrong level. Counsel reviewed the material on November 30, 2020, and informed Plaintiff by December 4, 2020. On November 24, 2021, Plaintiff sent pre-suit notice. On March 30, 2022, Plaintiff sued Defendant in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) alleging health care liability. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the statute of limitations. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to Defendant. Plaintiff appeals. We hold that Plaintiff cannot be charged with constructive notice based on her attorney’s November 10, 2020, receipt of the relevant information because counsel was then representing Plaintiff only in a workers’ compensation case, and a potential health care liability claim was beyond the scope of her representation. Thus, the knowledge obtained by Plaintiff’s counsel on November 10, 2020, may not be imputed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff was made aware of the relevant information at some point from November 30, 2020, through December 4, 2020, meaning her lawsuit against Defendant was timely filed. We reverse the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for this case to proceed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffery Riley v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development
The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“the Department”) denied the claimant’s claim for unemployment benefits after determining that the claimant had “voluntarily quit” his job. The claimant appealed, but the Department’s appeals tribunal denied the appeal as untimely. The claimant appealed further to the Department’s office of administrative review, which affirmed the appeals tribunal’s decision. Four years later, the claimant sought judicial review of the Department’s decision by filing a civil warrant in the Davidson County General Sessions Court (“general sessions court”). The general sessions court dismissed the civil warrant upon a motion filed by the Department, and the claimant appealed to the Davidson County Circuit Court (“trial court”). The Department moved to dismiss the action based upon (1) insufficiency of service of process, (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (3) failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 12.02(1), (2), (5), and (6). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on all grounds. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Shanira Lee Tankard v. Benjamin Lee Tankard, II
A mother relocated out-of-state with her children and filed a petition to modify the existing parenting plan. The father filed a competing petition for modification. The trial court found a material change in circumstances warranting modification of the parenting plan. It crafted two modified parenting plans: one which would take effect if the mother remained out-of-state and the other which would take effect if she returned to Tennessee. The mother returned and now argues the parenting plan should not have been modified. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ezerah L. et al.
Appellant filed this petition for recusal appeal after the trial court denied a motion to recuse. In light of Appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby MacBryan Green v. Michael John May Et Al.
The issues in the former underlying action and the present controversy pertain to an easement dispute that arose from a joint driveway agreement. A final judgment in the underlying action, titled “Consent Agreement and Order” (hereinafter “the Consent Order”), was entered in July 2013, from which there was no appeal. The final judgment was also duly recorded in the office of the Washington County Register of Deeds on August 5, 2013. The only parties to the former action were the plaintiff, Bobby MacBryan Green (“Mr. Green”), and the defendant, Michael John May (“Mr. May”). In 2021, Daniel Anthony (“Mr. Anthony”) purchased the property previously owned by Mr. May. In December 2023, Mr. Green obtained and filed an order of extension with the Washington County Circuit Court to extend the judgment entered in 2013. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Green filed a motion to show cause alleging that Mr. Anthony had violated the Consent Order and personally handed the motion to Mr. Anthony. One week later, Mr. Green filed a motion for joinder of Mr. Anthony pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 19, which was also hand delivered to Mr. Anthony. Mr. Anthony’s counsel made a limited appearance opposing the relief sought on multiple grounds. Following a hearing on Mr. Green’s motions, the trial court found that Mr. Anthony was not a proper or feasible party capable of being joined in the former 2013 action. Based on this finding, the court denied Mr. Green’s motion for joinder and dismissed the show cause motion as moot. Mr. Green appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects. In his brief, Mr. Anthony asks this court to award him the attorney’s fees and expenses he incurred in defending this appeal, contending that the appeal is frivolous. Finding that the appeal is devoid of merit and, therefore, frivolous, we remand this matter to the trial court to award Mr. Anthony his reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this frivolous appeal. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Remmia Radhakrishnan Sukapurath v. Sajeesh Kumar Kamala Raghavan
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. The petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Metric D.
The juvenile court terminated a mother’s and a father’s parental rights. The mother challenges the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination of her parental rights existed and that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father asserts that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights because his due process rights were violated. Because the juvenile court erred in allowing the father’s attorney to withdraw from representation, we vacate the court’s termination of his parental rights on all grounds and remand for a new trial. We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Garner v. State of Tennessee, and its agency, Tennessee Department of Correction
The plaintiff in this case sued the State of Tennessee, Tennessee Department of Correction, alleging that it refused to hire her for employment solely on the basis of her disability. The complaint asserted a single claim -- for violation of the Tennessee Disability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-50-103, et seq. During the three years of litigation that followed, the plaintiff’s TDA claim survived a motion for summary judgment and was eventually tried before a jury over the course of five days. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff but awarded her only $10,000 for lost wages and $5,000 for compensatory damages. The plaintiff’s counsel then sought an award of attorney fees of nearly $700,000. The Department challenged the reasonableness of the fees. After a hearing, the trial court found the requested amount was excessive and reduced it, but only by twenty-five percent, awarding counsel $511,620. Due to the lack of findings regarding the factors applicable to such decisions, we vacate the award and remand for entry of an order analyzing the relevant factors. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Erdman v. Mark Erdman
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of alimony and attorney’s fees to wife following a long-term marriage. Upon our review of the record transmitted on appeal, and for the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s denial of alimony and attorney’s fees and remand those matters for reconsideration. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Julius Summerrow v. Cara C. Welsh
This is a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident on a road encircling a Chattanooga mall. The case was heard before a jury, which concluded that the defendant was not at fault. The plaintiff appeals. Having determined that there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Nucsafe, Inc. Et Al. v. Stephen Farber Et Al.
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment wherein the trial court found that the plaintiff corporations were barred, based on a prior lawsuit between the same parties, from litigating their claim that a promissory note had been procured by fraudulent inducement. The defendants in the instant case, who were the plaintiffs in the prior action, had successfully moved for summary judgment in that prior action concerning the enforcement of a promissory note against the corporations, which were the defendants in the prior action. In that action, the trial court found that the corporations had waived their fraud defense b cause they had neither pled fraud as an affirmative defense in their answer nor requested permission to amend their answer. The trial court ultimately held that the promissory note was enforceable and entered judgment against the corporations. On appeal in the prior action, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, including its ruling that the defense of fraud had been waived. In the present action, the corporations—now plaintiffs—sought to repudiate the same promissory note, alleging that it was induced by fraud. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, as well as expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff corporations have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel Shawn Harvey v. Amy Elizabeth Harvey
This case involves a post-divorce petition for criminal contempt filed by the husband against the wife for alleged violations of the parties’ permanent parenting plan. The trial court determined that the husband had not met his burden of proof to establish criminal contempt. The husband timely appealed to this Court. Because the husband’s appellate brief does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we hereby dismiss the appeal. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
John Doe v. Jane Roe
This appeal arises out of the partial denial of a Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”) petition filed by the Appellant/Defendant, Jane Roe (“Roe”). This case was previously before this Court after Roe appealed the trial court’s determination that the TPPA was not applicable to the claims of Appellee/Plaintiff, John Doe (“Doe”). In the first appeal, this Court found that Roe’s filing of a Title IX complaint fell within the scope of the TPPA and remanded the case back to the trial court. On remand, the trial court granted in part and denied in part Roe’s TPPA petition. Roe now appeals the trial court’s partial denial on remand. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
