In Re Michayla T. Et Al.
A mother appeals the termination of parental rights to her two children. After investigating a report of drug exposure, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) obtained emergency temporary custody of the children. After nearly ten months, DCS petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence six statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, abandonment by an incarcerated parent by willful failure to support, abandonment by wanton disregard, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the children. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Andrea Scott et al. v. Carlton J. Ditto et al.
This is the second appeal of a case in which a parcel of property was sold by the City of Chattanooga at a delinquent tax sale. The property had earlier been sold at a foreclosure sale conducted by the holder of a deed of trust on the property. The successor in interest to the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale brought an action against the purchaser at the tax sale and others to quiet title to the property; the tax sale purchaser filed a counterclaim and cross-claim against two of the defendants. The trial court granted summary judgment to the foreclosure sale purchaser based on its determination that she was a bona fide purchaser without notice of the tax sale and that she had recorded her deed first; the court dismissed the cross-claims. The tax sale purchaser appealed and this Court affirmed the dismissal of the cross-claims and reversed the grant of summary judgment to the foreclosure sale purchaser, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she had notice of the tax sale purchaser’s interest in the property prior to her purchase. Upon remand, the case was tried without a jury, and the trial court ruled in favor of the foreclosure sale purchaser, holding that she was a bona fide purchaser of the property without notice of the tax sale purchaser’s claim of ownership. Tax sale purchaser appeals; finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Kocher, et al. v. Laua Bearden, et al.
This is the second appeal in this dispute involving a third party’s attempt to obtain access to a record that was sealed in the trial court pursuant to an agreed order. In the first appeal, this Court explained that judicial records are presumptively open, and the reason for sealing judicial records must be compelling. Because the trial court had not articulated any specific reasons for keeping the record sealed, we remanded for the trial court to reconsider its decision to deny the petitioner access to the record. We said, “If the trial court determines on remand that the record should remain sealed due to a compelling reason, that reason ‘is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.’” Kocher v. Bearden, 546 S.W.3d 78, 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2017) (quoting In re NHC-Nashville Fire Litig., 293 S.W.3d 547, 560 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)). Unfortunately, the trial court did not comply with these instructions on remand. After repeatedly expressing disagreement with this Court’s decision, the trial judge refused to modify the seal on the record, citing only “confidential information pertaining to the minor plaintiff.” Because both the trial court and the appellees have failed to articulate any compelling reason for maintaining the seal to the exclusion of the petitioner, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for reassignment to a different trial judge and the entry of an order allowing the petitioner to access the sealed record. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Solima v. David Solima
This appeal involves a post-divorce custody dispute between David Solima (father) and Stephanie Solima (mother) with respect to their only child, A.J.S. Father filed a petition in the trial court seeking a modification of the then-existing permanent parenting plan. Finding that there had been a material change in circumstances, the court entered an order modifying the parenting plan. Father then filed a motion to alter or amend, which the trial court denied. Father now appeals the court’s order denying his motion. We hold that the order appealed from is not a final judgment because the trial court has not fully adjudicated the issue of child support. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jon Vazeen v. Martin Sir
Jon Vazeen (plaintiff) filed this action for legal malpractice and fraud against his former attorney, Martin Sir (defendant). Plaintiff alleged that defendant was guilty of “repeated unprofessional behavior” and the “inept and total mishandling” of his divorce case. He also alleged defendant defrauded him by “infusing several thousand dollars of fake items in his invoice” for attorney’s fees. (Underlining in original). The trial court granted defendant summary judgment on the malpractice claim because the complaint was not filed within one year of the accrual of the claim, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(c)(1)(2017). The court granted summary judgment on the fraud claim on the ground of res judicata. The court held that the fraud claim was barred by the earlier dismissal of plaintiff’s ethics complaint based upon the alleged fraud of the defendant with the Board of Professional Responsibility (the Board). We affirm the summary judgment of the trial court on the legal malpractice claim. We hold that the Board’s decision to dismiss an ethical complaint does not bar plaintiff from bringing a malpractice or fraud claim against an attorney on the ground of res judicata. Summary judgment on the fraud claim is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re R. L. Et Al.
In this dependency and neglect case, the juvenile court adjudicated father’s (E.L.) six children dependent and neglected and one of the female children (R.L.) a victim of severe abuse perpetrated by father. Father appealed to the circuit court. After a de novo hearing, the circuit court entered an order holding that clear and convincing evidence exists to demonstrate that R.L. was sexually abused by father and as such was a dependent and neglected and severely abused child. The court similarly found clear and convincing evidence that father’s additional children were also dependent and neglected. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
John N. Moffitt v. State of Tennessee
Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for restoration of citizenship rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-105. Appellant contends that the trial court’s decision violates ex post facto protections by imposing a harsher sentence than that available at the time of his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Hamilton County Et Al. v. Tax Year 2011 Delinquent Taxpayers Et Al.
This case involves the right of redemption after a tax sale. REO Holdings, LLC (REO), purchased a parcel of real property at a delinquent tax sale. After the sale, the original property owners quitclaimed their remaining interest in the property to Basswood Revocable Land Trust (the Trust). The Trust filed a motion to redeem the property, which the trial court granted. REO appeals. We reverse. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
City of Chattanooga, Tennessee v. Basil Marceaux
The Notice of Appeal in this case was filed with the Appellate Court Clerk on May 7, 2018, more than thirty (30) days after the April 4, 2018 date of entry of the only order in the record from which the appellant could be appealing. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
City of Soddy Daisy, Tennessee v. Basil Marceaux
The Notice of Appeal in this case was filed with the Appellate Court Clerk on June 7, 2018, more than thirty (30) days after the April 4, 2018 date of entry of the only order in the record from which the appellant could be appealing. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Alexis S. Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the mother, Lequita S. (“Mother”), to her minor children, Alexis S., Jaxon S., and Jasmine S. (collectively, “the Children”). The Children were born in 2011, 2014, and 2017, respectively, to Mother and Jerry S. (“Father”). In November 2016, the Overton County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) entered an order removing Alexis and Jaxon from the parents’ custody and placing the two children into the temporary legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). These children were immediately placed in foster care, where they remained at the time of trial. The trial court subsequently entered an order on February 15, 2017, wherein the trial court found that Alexis and Jaxon were dependent and neglected due to the parents’ drug abuse and unsuitable home. Jasmine was placed into the same foster home as her siblings following her birth in June 2017, and the trial court entered an order on October 4, 2017, finding Jasmine to be dependent and neglected. On October 19, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children by failing to provide a suitable home for them, (2) Mother had abandoned the Children by her willful failure to visit them, (3) Mother had demonstrated substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, (4) Mother had committed severe child abuse against Jasmine, (5) Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Children, and (6) the conditions leading to removal still persisted and a return of custody would in all probability cause the Children to be subjected to further abuse and neglect. The trial court further found clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Children. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Brianna Danielle King v. Aaron Jefferson Daily
This appeal arises from a divorce action involving two minor children. Mother filed a complaint for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. Father filed an answer and counter complaint based on Mother’s inappropriate marital conduct and adultery. As to the minor children, Father wanted to have the children vaccinated, and Mother opposed vaccinations on religious grounds. The trial court awarded the divorce to Father based on Mother’s inappropriate marital conduct and adultery. The court also designated Father as the primary residential parent and gave him sole decision-making authority for non-emergency medical decisions, which included vaccinations. On appeal, Mother contends that the court interfered with her right to exercise a religious exemption from vaccines. Mother also takes issue with the court’s decision to award the divorce to Father based on Mother’s adultery. She argues that because she had sexual relationships with other men after the parties separated, her acts do not constitute adultery. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Mary L. Miller v. Brenda S. Maples, Et Al.
Following settlor’s death, settlor’s daughters, the beneficiaries of the settlor’s trust, engaged in mediation, which resulted in a settlement agreement concerning the distribution of the trust’s assets. Before the settlement was approved by the trial court under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Act (“TUTA”), one of the daughters died, and her estate was substituted in the lawsuit. The surviving siblings then joined in an amended complaint seeking a determination concerning whether the terms of the settlement agreement violated a material purpose of the trust so as to be unenforceable under the TUTA. The deceased daughter’s estate argued for enforcement of the settlement agreement such that the estate would receive the deceased daughter’s share of the trust. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the estate, holding that the settlement was enforceable under the TUTA. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the estate under the terms of the settlement. We affirm the trial court’s enforcement of the settlement but reverse its award of attorney’s fees and costs to the estate. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Caitlin J. Groves, Et Al. v. Tennessee Department of Safety And Homeland Security
After his vehicle was seized, the owner filed a claim and request for hearing. After the passage of thirty days following the filing of his claim, the owner moved to dismiss the forfeiture, arguing that the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security had failed to timely set his claim for a hearing. The Administrative Law Judge took the motion to dismiss under advisement, but declined to set a hearing on the merits of the forfeiture. The owner sought interlocutory review of the decision not to set a hearing on the merits, which the Commissioner ultimately denied. Shortly before the Commissioner’s decision on the interlocutory appeal, the ALJ granted the owner’s motion to dismiss and ordered the vehicle returned. The ALJ also denied the owner’s request for attorney’s fees. The owner petitioned for judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision and later amended the petition to include a request for declaratory relief. The chancery court dismissed the owner’s petition for judicial review as moot. The court also dismissed the declaratory judgment action for improper joinder of an original action with an administrative appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State, ex rel., Shem Peter Malmquist v. Danielle Nicolosi Malmquist
In this post-divorce dispute, the mother, a California resident, asked the court to modify a Tennessee child support order. At the hearing before the magistrate, the mother agreed to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. But later she asked the juvenile court for a rehearing. At the request of both parties, the juvenile court then directed the magistrate to hold another hearing on the mother’s motion. At the new hearing, the magistrate denied the mother’s request to testify by telephone. And, because no one present was ready to proceed, the magistrate also dismissed the notice of rehearing. On appeal, the mother argues that she was entitled to testify by telephone under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. We conclude that the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act did not apply to her request to modify a Tennessee child support order. We further conclude that the record does not support her claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. So we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. Bluecross Blueshield of Tennessee, Inc., et al.
This interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-125 follows the trial court’s denial of a motion for class action certification. The proposed class consists of various physicians and health care professionals who are participating providers in the Defendants’ insurance networks and who provide medical services in the emergency departments of hospitals. The central contention is that the class members’ contracts with the Defendants were breached when the fee for certain services was capped at a $50.00 rate. The trial court ultimately concluded that certification of the class was improper and held, among other things, that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that common issues in the case predominated over individual ones. For the reasons stated in this Opinion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of class certification. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. Bluecross Blueshield of Tennessee, Inc., et al.- Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision in this case. I disagree with the majority’s assertion that “the argument that diagnosis codes cannot be the standard upon which an emergency is determined for purposes of payment does not somehow make common issues predominate regarding the claims for which a $50.00 cap provision is operative.” I would reverse the trial court as I believe that common issue predominates over all individual issues in this case. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jeromia W.
This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to support and wanton disregard for the child’s welfare; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume responsibility for the child. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Susan R.Templeton v. Macon County, Tennessee, Board of Education
A 62-year-old former employee of the Macon County School System sued the Board of Education on the grounds of age discrimination and retaliation under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. She alleged that her supervisor, the school principal, made age related discriminatory remarks and demoted her after she complained about a co worker’s repeated, sexually explicit comments. In its answer, the Board of Education contended that the re-assignment was a lateral transfer and was justified by nondiscriminatory reasons. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination or retaliation, and that the Board produced undisputed evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for transferring Plaintiff. We respectfully disagree, having concluded that Plaintiff identified and produced evidence to establish a prima facie case for both claims and to create a genuine issue of fact concerning whether the Board’s stated reasons are pretexts for discriminatory or retaliatory animus. For these reasons, the Board was not entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Roy Franks, et al. v. Tiffany Sykes, et al.
This appeal concerns two separate plaintiffs’ claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), alleging that the filing of undiscounted hospital liens violated the TCPA by “[r]epresenting that a consumer transaction confers or involves rights, remedies or obligations that it does not have or involve or which are prohibited by law.” The trial court dismissed one plaintiff’s claim based on the pleadings due to the plaintiff’s failure to bring a claim under the Hospital Lien Act and dismissed another plaintiff’s claim for improper venue. We affirm in part as modified, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Steven W. Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Steven W., Jr. (“Steven”); Joseph W.; Jorrie W.; Lyric W.; and Timothy W., the minor children (“the Children”) of Tabbitha S. (“Mother”) and Steven W. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on August 14, 2015, upon investigation into allegations of inadequate supervision, lack of stable housing, child abuse, substance abuse, and domestic violence concerns. The Davidson County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) subsequently adjudicated the Children dependent and neglected as to both parents in an order entered May 16, 2016. On March 3, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father to the Children. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to both parents in an order entered on December 28, 2017. As pertinent to this appeal, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children by willfully failing to financially support them, (2) Mother had abandoned the Children by exhibiting behavior prior to her incarceration that demonstrated wanton disregard for the Children’s welfare, (3) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities and requirements of the permanency plans, (4) the conditions leading to the Children’s removal from Mother’s home persisted, and (5) Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility for the Children. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Having determined that DCS failed to present clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s failure to financially support the Children was willful, we reverse the trial court’s finding on that ground. We affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Hartford Caualty Insurance Company v. Comanche Construction, Inc., et al. v. Andrea Blackwell, et al.
This case involves a dispute between workers’ compensation insurance carriers concerning liability for benefits paid to an injured employee. The plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action seeking indemnity for benefits voluntarily paid to the employee on the theory that the employee was actually a loaned servant, which shifted liability to the defendant borrowing employer. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the undisputed facts could not establish a claim for implied indemnity. We granted this Rule 9 interlocutory appeal to consider whether the trial court improperly denied the motion. After our thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Owens v. Hamilton County, Tennessee, Et Al.
Taxpayer brought action against the county and the purchaser at the delinquent tax sale alleging the sale of her property was void due to the lack of notice of the delinquent tax sale proceeding. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment filed by the taxpayer and dismissed taxpayer’s complaint in its entirety. Taxpayer appeals. Because the county never effectuated proper service on taxpayer, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand with instructions that the trial court void the sale of taxpayer’s property and declare taxpayer the fee simple owner |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond Bertuccelli Et Al. v. Carl Mark Haehner Et Al.
Appellants appeal the trial court’s order granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment “as to all remaining issues” asserted by Appellants in their complaint. In its order granting summary judgment, the trial court failed to state the legal grounds on which it granted summary judgment on the remaining claims as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. In the absence of such grounds, this Court cannot make a meaningful review of the trial court’s decision. We, therefore, vacate the trial court’s final order and remand the case for further proceedings. Vacated and remanded. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Blount Memorial Hospital v. Eric Glasgow
The Notice of Appeal in this case indicates that the appellant, Eric Glasgow, is appealing from a final judgment entered on June 8, 2018. However, the order entered on June 8, 2018, simply removes the case from the Trial Court’s active trial docket, subject to being re-activated to the active docket upon proper petition and/or application by any interested party. As such, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals |
