In Re Treylynn T., et al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. Amanda L. W. (“Foster Mother”) and Brian L. W. (“Foster Father”) (“Foster Parents,” collectively) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Madison County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Angel T. (“Mother”) and Fortrell C. (“Father”) to their minor children Treylynn T. and Amelia C. (“the Children,” collectively). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), the Children’s legal custodian, supported the petition. This matter arose after Amelia received a suspicious head injury while in Father’s care. Mother never accepted that Father was responsible despite Father’s ensuing nolo contendere plea to attempted aggravated child abuse. After a hearing, the Trial Court terminated Mother’s parental rights on three grounds. The Trial Court found further that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing only that the Trial Court erred in its best interest determination. We find, as did the Trial Court, that the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody were proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We further find by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Peggy Jean Semanek
This appeal concerns the trial court’s determination that Tennessee law does not require a testator to sign their will prior to an attesting witness subscribing their signature as a witness to the will. Upon review of the relevant statutory language and associated case law, we conclude that Tennessee law requires that a testator sign their will prior to an attesting witness subscribing their own signature, and therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
George E. Gamble, III v. Patricia D. Morris
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
William D. Crowder v. State of Tennessee
This case involves the claimant’s pro se appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s dismissal, on res judicata grounds, of his claims of libel and malicious prosecution against the State of Tennessee. The claimant timely appealed to this Court. Because the claimant’s appellate brief does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we hereby dismiss the appeal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Isaiah M.
Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Vincent Stormes v. FF Property Holdings, LLC
This is a breach of contract action involving the sale of real property in which the plaintiff seller alleged that the defendant buyer withdrew from the sale in violation of the terms of the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Aloha Pools & Spas of Jackson, LLC v. Khaled Eleiwa a/k/a Kevin Eleiwa
This appeal arises from a dispute over the construction of a swimming pool. The defendant entered into a written contract with the plaintiff for the construction of a pool at the defendant’s home. The plaintiff later filed a complaint alleging that the defendant failed to pay the amount due under the contract. The defendant filed a counter-complaint and alleged breach of contract, fraud and/or misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for relief from the judgment, which the trial court denied. The defendant appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand for determination of appellate attorney’s fees. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Janice Farmer v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP
Appellant filed this premises liability action against Appellee after she fell inside Appellee’s store. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellant failed to establish that a dangerous condition existed or that Appellee had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition, if it did exist. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
John Doe Corp. v. Kennerly, Montgomery & Finley, P.C.
This is a legal malpractice suit filed by John Doe Corporation (“Plaintiff”) against its former counsel, Kennerly, Montgomery & Finley, P.C. (“Defendant”). The case arises from the expiration of a judgment obtained by Plaintiff against a defendant (“the third party”) in a suit that concluded more than a decade ago, and |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Aubrianna O.
In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court found that three |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Elizabeth Woodruff ex rel. Ethan Woodruff et al. v. Ford Motor Company et al.
After a tragic motor vehicle accident caused her husband’s death and her minor child’s serious injuries, the plaintiff filed this products liability action against several manufacturers and sellers. The plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., a booster seat manufacturer. Based on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Carolyn Coffman, et al. v. Armstrong International, Inc., et al., 615 S.W.3d 888 (Tenn. 2021), and the relevant provisions of the Tennessee Products Liability Act, we affirm the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Rayden R. et al.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Because the mother did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Richard A. Petersen v. Margaret E. Georgiades et al.
This is an action to rescind a quitclaim deed conveyed pursuant to a durable general power of attorney. On August 1, 2006, Richard Petersen (“Plaintiff”) appointed his sister, Margaret Georgiades (“Defendant”) as his attorney-in-fact. The power of attorney was recorded on July 8, 2009. In April 2010, Defendant conveyed, via quitclaim deed, one-half of Plaintiff’s undivided interest in his residence to herself for no consideration. Plaintiff contends that he did not discover the transfer until the fall of 2020, at which time he revoked Defendant’s power of attorney. Then, on February 4, 2021, he filed suit against Defendant to rescind the conveyance on the basis that the deed was void ab initio as the power of attorney did not authorize Defendant to make gifts or transfers “without consideration to anyone.” He also contended that the conveyance should be set aside because Defendant’s conduct “constitutes a clear breach of the fiduciary duty” she owed to Plaintiff as his attorney-in-fact. For her part, Defendant contends that the action is barred by the ten-year statute of limitations. She also contends that Plaintiff instructed her to make the conveyance and that he subsequently told others that he had consented to the conveyance. Following discovery, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the deed was void ab initio. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the power of attorney did not grant Defendant “the authority to transfer [Plaintiff’s] property by gift to her or to any third party” and, on this basis, declared the deed “void ab initio and to have no effect whatsoever.” This appeal followed. As provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-6- 110(a), because the power of attorney expressly authorized Defendant “[t]o exercise or perform any act, power, duty, right or obligation whatsoever that I now have,” Defendant had “the power and authority to make gifts, in any amount, of any of the principal’s property, to any individuals, . . . in accordance with the principal’s personal history of making or joining in the making of lifetime gifts.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-6-110(a). Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Because the trial court did not rule on other issues, including, inter alia, whether Plaintiff’s claim is time barred, whether Plaintiff approved of the conveyance, whether the gift was in accordance with Plaintiff’s history of making lifetime gifts, and/or whether the conveyance constitutes a breach of Defendant’s fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, we remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Orson E. Steward v. Regent Homes, LLC et al.
This is an appeal by a pro se appellant. Due to the deficiencies in the appellant’s brief on appeal, we conclude that he waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jack C. L. et al.
The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to two minor children on the grounds of abandonment and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the children. We reverse the trial court’s ruling as to abandonment but affirm the trial court’s ruling as to the father’s failure to manifest an ability and willingness. Because we also conclude that terminating the father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests, we affirm the trial court’s ultimate ruling. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Zachary C. Crouch v. The University of Tennessee
This appeal involves claims of breach of contract and employment discrimination filed by a graduate student/teaching assistant at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville. The plaintiff claimed that he was fired for discriminatory reasons and that the University of Tennessee had breached its employment contract with him. The trial court dismissed the breach of contract claim based on sovereign immunity and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court dismissed the employment discrimination claims by reason of the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
John B. Jones v. Samantha Rose Jones
In the first appeal in this case, we reversed the decision of the trial court to award custody of the minor children to Grandparents and remanded for Grandparents to prove substantial harm. While the appeal was pending, Mother and Grandparents filed a joint petition for custody to be returned to Mother. The trial court held a trial on both issues following the remand from this Court. Ultimately, the trial court granted Mother’s petition and entered a parenting plan naming Mother primary residential parent and awarding Father weekend visitation; Grandparents were not awarded any visitation. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Elizabeth Woodruff v. Ford Motor Company
After a tragic motor vehicle accident caused her husband’s death and her minor child’s serious injuries, the plaintiff filed this products liability action against several manufacturers and sellers. We granted the instant interlocutory appeal in which the defendant requests review — based on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Carolyn Coffman, et al. v. Armstrong International, Inc., et al., 615 S.W.3d 888 (Tenn. 2021) — of the |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
King Construction Group, Inc. v. Highlands Residential Services
This appeal concerns the Tennessee Prompt Pay Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-34-101, et seq. (“the PPA”). King Construction Group, Inc. (“King”) sued Highlands Residential Services (“HRS”) in the Chancery Court for Putnam County (“the Trial Court”) for violating the PPA. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court ruled in King’s favor, granting an award to King for HRS’s failure to place retained funds in a separate, interest-bearing escrow account as required by the PPA. The Trial Court further awarded King statutory interest and attorney’s fees. HRS appeals, arguing that an amendment to the PPA, which became effective in July 2020 after the parties had entered into their agreement, means that HRS, a public housing agency, did not have to place retainage in an escrow account. We hold that, as HRS first failed to place retained funds in an escrow account before the amendment became effective, the pre-July 2020 version of the PPA applies to this action. We affirm the Trial Court’s award of a penalty to King for HRS’s failure to place retainage in an escrow account. However, we reverse the Trial Court’s award of attorney’s fees to King because the Trial Court made no supporting findings nor is there any evidence of bad faith by HRS. In addition, we vacate the Trial Court in its award of statutory interest to King and remand for the Trial Court to calculate a new award of statutory interest to King at the interest rate specified in the pre-July 2020 version of the PPA. We thus affirm, in part, reverse, in part, and vacate, in part, and this cause is remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Russell v. Household Mortgage Services, Inc. et al.
In this appeal, Appellant does not offer any argument as to the trial court’s final order, and among other technical issues, fails to properly cite to her appendix or to the record. Because Appellant has failed to comply with the requirements set out in Rules 27 and 28 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ciara B.
Father, who is serving an eight-year sentence on a rape conviction, appeals the termination of his parental rights. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Houston | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Smith et al v. State Farm et al.
This appeal involves a complaint against four defendants for damages arising out of an automobile accident. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against three of the four defendants. Because the order does not resolve the plaintiff’s claims against all of the defendants, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Diane Bailey v. Donald Cobb
This is an appeal from a final order entered on January 23, 2024. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until February 23, 2024, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert H. Beckham et al. v. City of Waynesboro, Tennessee
In this personal injury action, the plaintiff slipped and fell while jumping off of a diving board during a visit to a city owned pool, injuring his knee. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued the city based on negligence to recover for his injuries sustained from the accident and his wife sought damages for a derivative claim for loss of consortium. The city filed an answer, raising the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (hereinafter “the TRUS”) as an affirmative defense. The city then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from liability under the TRUS because the city is a “landowner” as defined by the TRUS, the plaintiff was engaged in a “recreational activity” listed in the TRUS at the time of the accident, and none of the exceptions or limitations to the TRUS were applicable. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The trial court found that the language of the TRUS is not ambiguous and found that the city was immune from liability under the TRUS because the city pool, which is government-owned property, was being used for recreation at the time of the plaintiff’s injury and involved an activity included in the TRUS, “water sports.” The plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s holding that swimming in a city pool is a recreational activity protected under the TRUS. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Dezeray H.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (4) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (5) the persistence of conditions which led to removal; (6) severe child abuse; and (7) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s ultimate termination decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
