Amanda Gilreath, et al. v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, et al.
This is a medical malpractice action1 in which the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant hospital. The defendant hospital requested summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed the action. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Keith C. Celebrezze v. Robin Ruben Flores, et al.
The final judgment from which the pro se appellant seeks to appeal was entered on March 22, 2016. The Notice of Appeal received by the Clerk and Master on April 19, 2016, was submitted via facsimile transmission. The appellant subsequently filed a second Notice of Appeal on May 31, 2016, more than thirty (30) days after entry of the March 22, 2016 judgment. Because the second Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, and the first Notice of Appeal submitted by facsimile transmission was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bailey W., et al
This case involves termination of the parental rights of a mother to her four children. After investigating a report of drug exposure, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) obtained emergency temporary custody of the children. Ten months after the children were removed from the mother’s home, DCS filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and failure to establish a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. The juvenile court found all grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The mother appeals both the grounds for termination and that termination was in the children’s best interests. The mother also argues her due process rights were violated because the court admitted testimony by deposition. Although we conclude that the proof was less than clear and convincing that the mother willfully failed to support her children, we affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc., et al v. Bluecross Blueshield of Tennessee, Inc.
Interlocutory appeal in suit brought by healthcare corporations to recover costs for emergency medical services rendered to patients participating in Defendant’s insurance plans. We conclude that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) preempts plaintiffs’ state-law cause of action based on implied-in-law contract; that we are without subject matter jurisdiction to rule on whether Plaintiffs should be deemed to have exhausted the insurance company’s appeals process and therefore decline to consider whether summary judgment should have been granted on the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies; that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under an implied-in-law contract cause of action as to those plans which are not governed by ERISA based upon the duties imposed on the parties by state and federal law; that the insurance company should have been granted summary judgment on certain coverage claims arising from plans not governed by ERISA because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust grievance procedures; that Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-110(b) does not bar coverage claims; and that 47 coverage claims were improperly included in this lawsuit and should have been dismissed on summary judgment. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate in part the lower court’s order and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Austin Davis v. Covenant Presbyterian Church of Nashville, et al.
Following the trial court’s dismissal of their complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 60.02”). The trial court found no basis for setting aside the judgment under Rule 60.02 and denied the motion. The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Victoria Haynes v. Benton Ned Bass, et al.
Ex-wife sued ex-husband, mortgage company, title company, and attorney alleging causes of action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, breach of contract, negligence, and civil conspiracy. Pursuant to the terms of a postnuptial agreement, a residence purchased in Collierville, Tennessee was to be ex-wife's separate property. Ex-wife alleged that ex-husband failed to deed the property to her as agreed in the postnuptial agreement. She further alleged that he forged or caused to be forged her name on loan documents for the Collierville residence, which were then “falsely notarized” by the attorney. Defendants asserted multiple defenses and filed motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. We have determined that the trial court properly dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff's damages were the result of her failure to pay the mortgage on the Collierville residence, which caused the Arkansas divorce court to hold her in contempt and to order the property sold at auction. Even if we assume that all of the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint are true, these allegations fail to make out a claim for relief. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Howard Story et al. v. Nicholas D. Bunstein et al.
This is a legal malpractice case. Appellees, who are licensed attorneys, represented Appellants in the underlying lender's liability lawsuit. Following dismissal of all defendants in the underlying litigation, Appellants' filed a complaint for legal malpractice against Appellees. The trial court dismissed the legal malpractice case, inter alia, on the ground that the one-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims had expired. Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-104(c)(1). Affirmed and remanded. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Joyce Bradley Watts v. Colin Wade Watts
At issue is whether a trial court may award attorney’s fees that relate to a petition for criminal contempt when the contempt arises in the context of a child support proceeding. Mother filed a post-divorce petition asserting that Father was in criminal contempt for failing to satisfy his support obligations along with a petition seeking a judgment for child support arrearages and attorney’s fees. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Father guilty of one count of criminal contempt and found that Mother was entitled to a judgment for the unpaid child support. When Mother submitted her application for attorney’s fees, Father objected arguing that an award of attorney’s fees for the prosecution of the criminal contempt petition would violate his rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-103(b) and Article VI, Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution. Following a hearing, the court awarded Mother her attorney’s fees related to the child support judgment pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c), which award is not at issue in this appeal. The court also awarded Mother the attorney’s fees she incurred in pursuit of the criminal contempt petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c) because “the criminal contempt [petition] served a dual purpose of preserving the power and vindicating the dignity and authority of the law and the Court as well as collecting substantial amounts of child support for the benefit of the minor children.” While we recognize that a criminal contempt petition may serve as the catalyst for a delinquent parent to satisfy his or her child support obligations, the purpose of criminal contempt is to uphold the court’s authority, not to enforce the private rights of a party. Moreover, the criminal contempt statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-103(b), expressly limits the punishment that a court may award, and it makes no provision for the recovery of attorney’s fees. Because attorney’s fees incurred in a petition for criminal contempt are not provided for by statute or other rule and the purpose of criminal contempt is to uphold the court’s authority, not to enforce the private rights of a party, we reverse the award of attorney’s fees related to the petition for criminal contempt. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ronnie Gordon v. Tractor Supply Company
Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of his claims for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and negligent supervision. Plaintiff was arrested and subsequently indicted for two criminal offenses based on statements given to police by two of Defendant’s employees at the Tractor Supply Company store in Lenoir City, Tennessee. When the criminal case went to trial, one of the charges was dismissed on the day of trial, and the jury found the defendant not guilty of the other charge. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced this action asserting several claims. Following discovery, Defendant filed a motion to summarily dismiss all claims. The trial court granted the motion as to three of the claims: malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and negligent supervision. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the false imprisonment claim. As for the claims for malicious prosecution and negligent supervision, we have determined that material facts are disputed. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of the claims for malicious prosecution and negligent supervision and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of Bruce Chapman Bower
This appeal arises over a dispute regarding the terms of a trust. Bruce Chapman Bower (“Decedent”) died having executed a trust (“the Trust”), the primary asset of which was a lake house. Decedent's son, Christopher R. Bower (“Successor Trustee”), served as Successor Trustee. Decedent's widow, Denise Bower (“Widow”), objected to the appointment of Successor Trustee, and the parties engaged in litigation over various terms of the Trust. The Probate Court for Sevier County (“Trial Court”) found that, under the Trust, Widow was entitled to exclusive use of the lake house as well as payments of $2,000 per month. Successor Trustee appealed to this Court. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court in its interpretation of the terms of the Trust. We also modify the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees to Widow. The judgment of the Trial Court is modified, in part, and reversed, in part. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In re Milli L. et al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, asserting that the evidence does not sustain the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and persistence of conditions as found by the court and does not support the finding that termination of Mother’s rights was in the child’s best interest. Finding that the record clearly and convincingly supports the grounds found by the court, as well as the finding that termination of Mother’s rights is in the child’s best interest, we affirm the judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Craig L. Beene v. Dan M. Alsobrooks
The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the district attorney general to furnish him with copies of records pertaining to his criminal case. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the district attorney general named in the petition had retired, that the statute did not require delivery of records to an incarcerated petitioner, and that the records had been provided in discovery and were no longer available to produce for inspection. The petitioner appeals. We affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jayvien O.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned her four-year-old son by willfully failing to visit him and that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carolyn Tillilie
This is a Rule 3 appeal of an order requiring the Appellant to post security for the care of three horses. Appellant was charged with cruelty to horses and ordered to post security for the care of the horses pending the resolution of her criminal charges. Appellant appealed. We determine that this is a criminal matter and therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
In re Christian P. et al.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to five minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of her rights on the statutory ground of the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Judy Childress, et al. v. United Parcel Service Inc., et al.
This accelerated interlocutory appeal results from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because Appellants’ did not provide the mandatory affidavit in support of their motion for recusal as required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Guy Michael Kapustka v. Courtney Rose Kapustka
In this post-divorce co-parenting action, the father filed a petition requesting modification of the parties’ permanent parenting plan and a finding of contempt against the mother in the Montgomery County Chancery Court which had entered the parties’ divorce decree. In response to the father’s petition, the mother filed a motion requesting that the trial court find Tennessee to be an inconvenient forum and that the court either dismiss the case or transfer it to Florida. Since entry of the divorce judgment, the mother and the parties’ minor child had resided in Florida. The father moved to Alaska at some point after entry of the divorce decree. The father filed a response objecting to the mother’s motion and asserting that Tennessee was not an inconvenient forum. Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-201, et seq., the trial court ultimately dismissed the father’s petition, determining that Tennessee was an inconvenient forum because no party resided in Tennessee, the mother’s alleged actions occurred in Florida, and the evidence necessary to resolve the issues would be unavailable in Tennessee. The father appeals, stating that the trial court erred in determining Tennessee to be an inconvenient forum and thereby dismissing his action. We affirm the trial court’s determination that Tennessee is an inconvenient forum. However, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-222(c), we reverse the dismissal of the father’s petition and remand to the trial court for issuance of a stay and imposition of conditions the court may consider just and proper. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Angela Caldwell, as power of attorney f/u/b of Leathy M. Johnson v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, et al.
In this health care liability action, this Court granted the defendants' application pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10 to address two issues. We have determined that: (1) the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) does not preempt Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(f); and (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendants' petition for a qualified protective order pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(f) because it is undisputed that the defendants complied with the procedural requirements of subsection (f), and the plaintiff did not file an objection as permitted under the statute. We, therefore, reverse the trial court's decision and remand for the entry of a qualified protective order. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis Vawter v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company
A 59-year old plaintiff who lost his job as a chemical operator, after working in that position for over 37 years, applied for the position of general operator with another company. Twelve individuals were hired by the other company, all of whom were younger than the 59-year old, and most of whom were less experienced. The plaintiff filed an age discrimination complaint against the company. The case was tried by a jury, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding him compensatory damages of $100,000. The trial court awarded the plaintiff front pay in addition to the compensatory damage award. The company appealed, and we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Natalie Rowland Steward v. Brian Stacy Rowland
This is a post-divorce case. Father appeals the trial court‘s decision not to hold Mother in contempt for failure to provide court-ordered insurance coverage for the child. Father also appeals the trial court‘s division of the child‘s uncovered medical bills and seeks reimbursement for monthly payments he made toward the child‘s insurance premiums while Mother failed to provide coverage. In addition, Father appeals the trial court‘s order requiring him to provide insurance for the child past the age of majority based on the child‘s medical disability and the judgment entered against him for Mother‘s attorney‘s fees. We conclude that Father is entitled to a credit for those insurance premiums he paid to Mother during the period of time the child was enrolled in TennCare. We reverse the trial court‘s order on attorney‘s fees. The order is otherwise affirmed. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Jean Dedmon v. Debbie Steelman, et al.
This interlocutory appeal requires review of a ruling on a motion in limine in a personal injury case. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs submitted expert testimony from a treating physician to establish the reasonableness of their claimed medical expenses. The defendants filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of what they deemed ―unreasonable‖ medical expenses. They argued that the Tennessee Supreme Court‘s decision in West v. Shelby County Healthcare Corporation, 459 S.W.3d 33 (Tenn. 2014), established a new standard in Tennessee for determining the reasonable amount of medical expenses as a matter of law. The trial court granted the defendants‘ motion in limine, thus excluding the testimony of the treating physician. For the following reasons, the trial court‘s order is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Omni Insurance Company A/S/O Lisa J. Earl v. Dennis R. Nickoloff
This appeal arises from an accident involving an automobile and a pedestrian that occurred in Anderson County. The pedestrian's insurer, as subrogee of the pedestrian, filed the instant action, alleging that the defendant driver should be held liable for negligence and negligence per se. Following a bench trial, the trial court assessed liability against the driver and awarded the pedestrian's insurer $50,000.00 in damages. The driver timely appealed. On appeal, the driver filed a statement of the evidence, approved by the trial court, that contains insufficient evidence to support the trial court's judgment. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jean Dedmon v. Debbie Steelman, et al.- Concur
I fully concur with the majority opinion by my learned colleague based upon existing case law, which we are bound to follow as an intermediate appellate court. I write separately to express my concerns relating to modern billing practices of medical providers and their effect upon present-day personal injury litigation . Were it not for existing case law which we are bound to follow as an intermediate appellate court, I would apply the West rationale to personal injury litigation. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Scott Elmer McCarter v. Debra Lynn Walker McCarter
In this second appeal involving the instant divorce action, the wife appeals the trial court's enforcement of an enhanced judgment lien on behalf of her former counsel and the court's inclusion of certain tractor tires within the farm equipment previously awarded to the husband in the final judgment for divorce. Having determined that the record contains no proof of notice to the wife of the hearing at which the trial court awarded the enhanced judgment lien, we vacate the portion of the judgment enforcing the enhanced portion of the attorney's lien. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including an evidentiary hearing addressing enforcement of the enhanced portion of the attorney's lien with notice to include the wife's former counsel. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Delwin L. Huggins et al. v. R.Ellsworth McKee et al.
Appellant appeals the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims against a limited liability corporation surrounding the sale of the corporation and the distribution of the proceeds to one member. Although we reverse the trial court‘s ruling with regard to the application of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 48-237-101(d), we otherwise affirm the trial court‘s ruling granting summary judgment to the corporation on all claims asserted by Appellant. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |
