Memphis Bonding Company, Inc. v. Criminal Court of Tennessee 30th District, et al.
This appeal involves a challenge to a local rule of the criminal court in Shelby County. The lawsuit was filed in the chancery court. After a hearing, the chancery court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and entered a temporary injunction prohibiting the criminal court and its ten judges from enforcing a section of the local rule. We granted an application for an extraordinary appeal filed by the criminal court and its judges. We reverse the chancery court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, vacate the temporary injunction and remand for dismissal of the complaint. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Carolyn Primm v. Tennessee Board of Appeals, et al
The plaintiff has appealed from a final order entered on September 25, 2015, dismissing her Petition for Judicial Review. Because the plaintiff did not file her notice of appeal within the thirty day time period required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Raven P.
This is an appeal from a juvenile court order assessing a portion of the mother’s attorney’s fees against the father’s counsel. Because the father’s counsel did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Rose Beeler v. Barry Allen Beeler
This appeal arises from a divorce and the entry of a permanent parenting plan. Pamela Rose Beeler (“Mother”) filed for divorce from her husband Barry Allen Beeler (“Father”) in the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Trial Court”). After a prolonged and contentious legal battle, the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce. The parties ultimately reached a settlement regarding the custody of their three minor children, which was announced in open court. Father appeals, arguing that, despite his agreeing to the settlement, he actually opposes the settlement and that the final judgment should be overturned. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. We further find this appeal frivolous and remand to the Trial Court for a determination of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded to Mother. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Central Woodwork, Inc. v. Cheyenne Johnson, Shelby County Assessor of Property
Taxpayer appealed the Shelby County Assessor of Property's tax assessment regarding unreported tangible personal property and raw materials to the Tennessee State Board of Equalization. The administrative judge ruled partially in favor of taxpayer but against taxpayer regarding the raw materials. Taxpayer appealed to the State Board's Assessment Appeals Commission, and the administrative judge's ruling was upheld. Taxpayer then challenged the Appeals Commission's ruling in the chancery court. The chancery court reversed the Appeals Commission's ruling, finding that taxpayer was not a manufacturer and that its inventory should not have been assessed as raw materials. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Analilia R.
This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Hamblen County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Luis M. (“Father”) to the minor child Analilia R. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence established the ground of persistent conditions against Father, and that the evidence was clear and convincing that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals, arguing DCS failed to meet its burden of proof on the ground of persistent conditions. DCS raises its own issue of whether the Juvenile Court erred in failing to find the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Leon Kelley v. Kenneth D. Varner et al.
Stephen Leon Kelley (“Plaintiff”) filed suit seeking, among other things, to have the 1958 divorce decree of Mary Joyce Long Kelley v. Joseph Gordon Kelley, Jr. (“the Divorce Decree”) set aside so that Plaintiff could be declared one of only two heirs at law of Mary Joyce Long Kelley (“Deceased”) entitled to inherit by intestacy. The Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) dismissed Plaintiff’s suit pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, among other things. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We find and hold that Plaintiff’s collateral attack upon the Divorce Decree cannot be sustained because the Divorce Decree is not void upon its face. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s suit. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Akilah Louise Wofford, et al. v. M.J. Edwards & Sons Funeral Home Inc., et al.
This appeal concerns the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate a dispute between a consumer and funeral home. The trial court refused to compel arbitration, finding no meeting of the minds as to the arbitration agreement. On appeal, the funeral home argues that this Court should consider not only the signed agreement, but also another document allegedly incorporated by reference into the parties‘ contract in compelling arbitration. We hold: (1) the additional document providing details regarding arbitration was not incorporated by reference into the parties‘ contract; and (2) the arbitration provision actually contained in the parties‘ contract is unenforceable because it is beyond the expectations of an ordinary person. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Fredrick Sledge v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al
Fredrick Sledge (Petitioner), an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC), challenges TDOC’s calculation of his release eligibility date. The chancery court (the trial court) granted TDOC summary judgment, finding that “the undisputed facts and law establish [Petitioner’s] sentence has been correctly calculated.” Because the criminal court’s order sentencing Petitioner awarded him 3,521 days of pretrial jail credit, while TDOC’s calculation of his release eligibility was based upon only 516 days of credit, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the correct calculation of his release eligibility date. We vacate the trial court’s summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency v. Howard Allen, Jr.
A former tenant of Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency (“MDHA”) appeals the decision of the circuit court dismissing the case for failure to prosecute pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(1). We have concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. The order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency v. Howard Allen, Jr. -Dissent
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the circumstances in this case do not warrant dismissal for failure to prosecute. However, because I find other grounds for dismissal from the record, I respectfully dissent. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Smith, 720 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tenn. 1986). (stating Court of Appeals may affirm a judgment on a different ground than that relied upon by the trial court when the correct result was reached). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Eva L. Hines v. Terence J. Hines
This is a divorce case. Eva L. Hines (Wife) filed a complaint for divorce from Terence J. Hines (Husband) while he was incarcerated in Arkansas. Husband was released from prison several days before the scheduled date of trial. Before and after his release, Husband asked that the case be continued so he could secure an attorney. On the original trial date, the court granted Husband’s request and continued the case for two weeks. On the morning of the rescheduled trial date, Husband called and advised the court that he would be late; in response, he was told that trial would begin as scheduled. Husband did not appear at the courthouse in time for the trial. The trial proceeded in his absence, and the court entered a final divorce decree. Husband filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion requesting that the court set aside the final decree, which he says substantively amounts to a default judgment. He seeks a new trial. The court denied his motion. Husband appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying his Rule 60 motion |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Vaal Hall, by and through his conservator, Theresa Anne Hall, and Theresa Anne Hall, individually v. Charles L. Owens Jr., et al.
This is an appeal from a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in a negligence case. Defendant’s truck collided with Plaintiff’s car causing Plaintiff serious injuries. Plaintiff sued Defendant for injuries stemming from the accident, which he alleged was proximately caused by Defendant’s negligence. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. It was undisputed that the accident occurred after Plaintiff’s car entered an intersection and proceeded to turn left across a lane of oncoming traffic despite the fact that the traffic signal facing him was red. It was further undisputed that the traffic signal facing Defendant was green as he proceeded into the intersection from the opposite direction in his truck. Traffic cameras installed at the intersection captured video footage of the collision, which was admitted as evidence. Based on the video footage and other undisputed evidence, the trial court determined that no reasonable juror could conclude that Plaintiff was less than 50% at fault. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Martha Carter v. David Carter
Father filed a petition to reduce child support. Mother sought to have their almost eighteen-year-old daughter testify that she did not intend to exercise visitation with Father to the extent previously ordered by the court after she turned eighteen. The court refused to let her testify. The trial court used the number of days of parenting time previously ordered in calculating child support instead of zero. The trial court also ordered Mother to pay a portion of Father’s attorney’s fees. Mother appeals these issues. We affirm the trial court as to the testimony of the child and the calculation of child support. We reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Lee Westberry v. Steve Allen Westberry
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion to recuse filed by Steve Allen Westberry ("Former Husband") in the parties' post-dissolution modification proceedings. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Former Husband, and finding no error in Trial Court's ruling, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Randall Thompson v. Herbert Hamm
Plaintiff brought a malicious prosecution action against defendant. Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Hope A.
This appeal concerns a father's parental rights to his daughter. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of the father's parental rights on the statutory ground of abandonment when he willfully failed to visit the child for the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. The court also found termination of the father's rights was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm as modified. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Hall v. Gaylord Entertainment Company, et al.
This is a negligence action. While attending a holiday-themed ice exhibit, the plaintiff slipped and fell at the top of an ice slide attraction that was a feature of the exhibit and sustained injuries to his arm. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the company that constructed the ice slide asserting various theories of negligence. After the company filed a motion for summary judgment in which it demonstrated that the plaintiff had not presented any evidence to support his claims, the plaintiff conceded that the company was entitled to summary judgment on all of his claims except those related to negligent design of the ice slide. In support of his assertion that the company breached a standard of care in designing the ice slide, the plaintiff relied solely on American Society of Testing Materials safety standards for children’s playground equipment. The trial court determined that because the standards were not applicable to the ice slide, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate how the company was negligent in designing the ice slide. The trial court granted the company’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gunnar C. Skarbrevik, et al v. Personal Representative of Estate of Carolyn E. Brown
An employee, who was injured in an accident with an uninsured motorist while on company business and while driving an automobile owned by his wife, sought to recover for his injuries through the uninsured motorist provision of his employer's business automobile policy. The insurer denied coverage, asserting that the policy only provided coverage for automobiles owned by the company. The trial court granted the employee's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that an endorsement to the policy which added employees using non-company vehicles on company business to the liability coverage operated to make those employees “insured” for purposes of the uninsured motorist coverage. Insurer appeals; finding no error in the trial court's interpretation of the policy, we affirm the judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Oneida Farms Development, Inc. v. Town of Huntsville
This case involves a quo warranto action challenging the validity and reasonableness of an annexation ordinance. The trial court determined that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-58-111, the plaintiff failed to prove that (1) the annexation ordinance was unreasonable for the overall well-being of the communities involved or (2) the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and property owners of the municipality and territory would not be materially retarded in the absence of such annexation. The court therefore dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Pursuant to an issue raised by the defendant, we also determine the plaintiff’s complaint to have been timely and properly filed. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Marino v. Board of Administration City of Memphis Retirement System
We granted an application for an interlocutory appeal in this case to consider whether the Board of Administration of the City of Memphis Retirement System is exempt from the contested case procedures of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act because the City of Memphis is organized as a home rule charter form of government. We hold that the Board is not exempt from the contested case procedures and therefore affirm the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment to the petitioner. This matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William Thomas McFarland v. Michael S. Pemberton et al.
This case involves a challenge by a candidate for circuit judge to the qualifications of the winning candidate. William Thomas McFarland and Michael S. Pemberton were the only candidates in the August 7, 2014 election for Ninth Judicial District Circuit Judge.2 In March 2014, an eligible voter in the Ninth District, who is not a party to this suit, filed a complaint with the local election commission challenging Pemberton's eligibility to run for circuit judge, alleging he did not meet the residency requirement. The local election commission held a public hearing, and ultimately determined that Pemberton was eligible. Accordingly, his name was reflected on the ballot. He won the election. McFarland, who had knowledge of the March 2014 complaint and subsequent actions by the local election commission, then filed this election challenge, seeking to void the election results on the ground that Pemberton failed to satisfy the residency requirement. The trial court dismissed McFarland's claim as an untimely review of a quasi-judicial determination under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102 (Supp. 2015). McFarland appeals. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In re Thomas T.
This appeal involves the termination of a father's parental rights to his seven-year-old son. In 2011, the son was adjudicated dependent and neglected due to his parents' substance abuse and was placed in the custody of his paternal great-aunt and great-uncle. In 2013, the same great-aunt and great-uncle filed a petition, as prospective adoptive parents, seeking to terminate the father's parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment and persistent conditions. The trial court found that the grounds of abandonment and persistent conditions were proved by clear and convincing evidence. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re S. S.-G.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant appeals the termination of his parental rights on grounds of severe child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(4) and persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(3). The child was found to be dependent and neglected by order of the Juvenile Court, and Appellant appealed the dependency and neglect finding to the Circuit Court. The ground of persistence of conditions requires a prior finding of dependency and neglect. However, our record does not reflect the status of Appellant’s appeal of the dependency and neglect order. In the absence of proof of full adjudication of the dependency and neglect appeal, we hold that the trial court erred in applying the ground of persistence of conditions. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Appellant’s parental rights on that ground. Concerning the termination of Appellant’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse, the trial court’s order states only that Appellant “has sexually abused the child . . . pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-1-602 and that this sexual abuse constitutes severe abuse pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-1-102(b)(2[1]).” Because the code sections that the trial court relies upon contain numerous definitions of “child sexual abuse” and “severe child abuse,” in the absence of specific citation to the exact definition(s) relied upon, we cannot make a meaningful review of the trial court’s decision. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse and remand with instructions for the trial court to make specific findings as required under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(k). |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Brookside Homeowners Association v. Stan Vaught
A party who failed to file a de novo appeal of a general sessions judgment filed the instant petition for writ of certiorari. The trial court dismissed the writ on the grounds that the petitioner had a “plain, speedy and adequate remedy” provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-727(b), a de novo appeal. We agree and affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |