C. H. Guenther & Son, Inc. v. Sue Ann Head et al.
An employee appeals the trial court’s decision to void a final administrative order by the Department of Labor awarding the employee attorney fees with respect to the employee’s actions to enforce a workers’ compensation settlement. We have determined that the applicable request for assistance process does not constitute a contested case under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act and that the trial court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Murray v. Jamie Hollin, et al.
This is a libelous defamation case. Appellant, a public figure, filed suit against Appellees for publication and distribution of allegedly defamatory comments. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees upon its finding that Appellees had negated the essential element of actual malice, and that Appellant had not met her burden to provide sufficient countervailing evidence so as to survive summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of: Dakota C.R., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, in which the trial court terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights to three of their children on the grounds of severe abuse and persistence of conditions. We reverse the ground of severe abuse as to Father, affirm as to Mother, and affirm the ground of persistence of conditions as to both parents. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interests of the children. On that basis, we affirm the termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Reed's Track Hoe & Dozier Service v. Terry Patrick Dwyer
This is a breach of contract case. The defendant entered into an oral contract with the plaintiff to demolish a dilapidated building. After the building was demolished, the defendant disputed the amount charged by the plaintiff and so refused to pay the plaintiff for his work. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant alleging breach of contract. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the parties had entered into an oral agreement under which the plaintiff would be paid hourly for the demolition services, and that the defendant owed the plaintiff for the time spent on the job at the rates claimed by the plaintiff. The defendant now appeals. The appellate record does not contain a transcript; it contains only a statement of the evidence submitted by the defendant and not acted on by the trial court. We decline to consider the appellant’s proposed statement of the evidence, on the basis that, on its face, it does not convey a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transpired in the trial court as required under Rule 24 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Left only with the technical record, we must assume that the evidence presented at trial supported the trial court’s decision. On this basis, the trial court’s decision is affirmed. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Timothy W. H. et al.
The father of two minor children appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment for failure to pay child support; failure to comply with the permanency plan; and failure to remedy persistent conditions. The court also found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Greenbank v. Sterling Ventures, L.L.C., et al.
After the property at issue was sold at a foreclosure sale, Appellee Bank filed the instant action seeking a deficiency judgment against Appellants. The Bank subsequently moved for summary judgment on the basis of the statutory presumption that the foreclosure sale price was the fair market value of the property at the time of purchase. Tenn. Code Ann. §35-5118(b). Appellants objected, asserting that, because the foreclosure sale price was less than the appraised value of the property, the sale was commercially unreasonable. The trial court granted the Bank’s motion, finding that Appellants failed to meet their burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the foreclosure sale price was “materially less” than the fair market value of the property at the time of foreclosure. Tenn. Code Ann. §35-5118(c). Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel., Donna Thorn v. Clay Gentry
This is a proceeding to establish the arrearage for child support owed by the father to the mother of their minor child. The genesis of this matter was in 1993, when Mother filed a petition to establish paternity and set support. The Department of Human Services, Child Support Services intervened on behalf of Mother, paternity was established and child support was set. Over the next two decades Father was habitually delinquent in paying child support and Mother obtained judgements from time to time for arrearages. The most recent petition to establish the arrearage was assigned to a Child Support Magistrate in Dickson County. Following a hearing in March 2012, the magistrate ruled that Father’s child support arrearage principal was $17,894.26, and that the interest on the principal, some of which had been accruing since the entry of a 1994 judgment, totaled $54,726.64. Judgment in favor of Mother was awarded by the magistrate in the gross amount of $72,620.90. Although Mother had independent counsel representing her before the magistrate, the Department appealed the magistrate’s order, purportedly on behalf of Mother but over Mother’s objection and despite the fact none of the proceeds were owed to the Department. The juvenile court reduced the total award to $26,937.36. Mother filed this appeal. We have determined that Mother was not aggrieved by the magistrate’s decision; thus, the Department could not appeal, on behalf of Mother, a wholly favorable decision. Because the case was never properly before the juvenile court, we vacate the judgment of the juvenile court and remand with instructions to reinstate the $72,620.90 judgment awarded by the magistrate. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Hannah V. S.
The mother of a sixteen month-old girl left the child in the care of the child’s grandparents. The grandparents subsequently filed a dependency and neglect petition, and the court found that the child was dependent and neglected and granted temporary custody to the grandparents. They continued to raise the little girl without any assistance from the mother. Almost eight years later, the mother petitioned the court to restore custody of the child to her. Proceedings in the Juvenile Court followed, with an appeal to the Circuit Court, which determined that the child was dependent and neglected because changing custody to the mother would expose her to a risk of substantial harm. It also found that it was in Hannah’s best interest that custody remain with the grandparents. The appropriate standard for the mother’s request for modification of the order giving temporary custody to non-parents is whether the non-parents demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a substantial risk of harm to the child if custody were granted to the parent. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Rudd Halliday v. Todd Eric Halliday
This is a divorce appeal. Husband appeals the court’s award of alimony in solido, alimony in futuro, upward deviations in the calculation of child support to provide for education trust funds and private school expenses for the parties’ two children, and the award of discretionary costs; Wife appeals the court’s award of attorney’s fees. We affirm the award of alimony in solido, alimony in futuro, and attorneys’ fees and remand the case for additional findings with respect to the upward deviations for educational expenses and discretionary costs. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re The Conservatorship of Alfonso B. Patton
In this conservatorship case, Gloria and John Walker filed a petition in which they sought to be appointed as the conservator of Alfonso B. Patton. Patricia Richmond protested, alleging that she would be an appropriate conservator. Prior to a full hearing on the petition, the trial court appointed the Walkers as temporary conservators of the estate and Patricia Richmond as a temporary conservator of the person. Following approximately one year of protracted litigation, the court confirmed that Alfonso B. Patton was in need of a conservator of his estate and of his person. The court subsequently appointed a neutral, third-party as permanent conservator of the estate and of the person. Patricia Richmond appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Christopher P., Kobey P., Blake H. and Myles H.
Father’s parental rights to two children were terminated as a result of his confinement in a correctional facility for more than ten years; he appeals, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the holding that termination of his parental rights would serve the best interest of the children. We disagree and affirm the decision terminating his rights. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Walter Himes v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by a state prisoner. The prisoner was found guilty of a disciplinary offense while in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. After exhausting his administrative remedies, the prisoner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the trial court. The trial court granted the petition. After reviewing the record, the trial court found that the prisoner was not entitled to relief and dismissed the petition. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Hope A.P.
This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. Sean and Amber G. (“the Petitioners”) filed a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights with respect to Hope A.P. (“the Child”) against Jessica N. (“Mother”) in the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”). The petition alleged that Mother willfully failed to visit or support the Child in the four month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition. The Trial Court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child after finding that Mother’s willful failure to support had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence showed that it was in the Child’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Lowell Blanchard, II v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
This appeal involves the petitioner’s efforts to be paroled. After the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole declined to recommend the petitioner for parole, he filed a pro se petition for a writ of certiorari. The Board filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the Board’s motion, and the petitioner appeals. We affirm. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Esmat Eslami v. Mark Derrick, et al.
On June 6, 2012, Esmat Eslami (“Plaintiff”) filed a notice of appeal of an order entered by the Trial Court on May 9, 2012. On November 5, 2012, this Court entered an order directing Plaintiff to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as premature. Plaintiff did not respond to the show cause order. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Cheatham County, Tennessee v Cheatham County Board of Zoning Appeals and Randall and Margaret Mooneyhan - CONCUR
The Mooneyhans were brought into court by the county government and were forced to defend a decision by the county’s board of zoning appeals. After that decision was upheld in the trial court, the county once again forced the Mooneyhans into this court. They were required to spend money on an attorney in both courts to defend an action by the county government from attack by the county government. These egregious actions by the county were unauthorized. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Una P. Irvin v. Ernest J. Irvin, II
This is the second appeal in this divorce case. During the parties’ ten-year marriage, they had two children. The husband served in the military, stationed in several different places. Eventually the family moved to Tennessee, where the wife worked part-time and took care of the children while the husband was deployed. Just after the husband returned from his deployment, the wife filed a petition for divorce, and the husband filed a cross-petition. The parties reached an agreement on property issues, but no others. After a trial, the trial court entered a final decree, found the husband at fault for the demise of the marriage, and granted the wife a divorce. The final decree designated the wife as the children’s primary residential parent, awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony, and divided the marital estate in accordance with the parties’agreement. The husband filed the first appeal.The appellate court dismissed the first appeal for lack of a final order and remanded the case for resolution of several issues. After a post-remand hearing, the trial court entered an order mostly reaffirming its initial decision. However, in light of the wife’s post-remand admission of infidelity during the marriage, the trial court declared the parties to be divorced, rather than granting the wife a divorce. The husband again appeals, challenging the trial court’s failure to find the wife at fault for the demise of the marriage, its designation of the wife as the children’s primary residential parent, the award of rehabilitative alimony, the property division, and the award of attorney fees in favor of the wife. We modify the award of alimony, but otherwise affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Chase B.S., et al.
The trial court dismissed “petitions for medical support” of non-marital children filed by the Department of Human Services as inconsistent with the child support statutes and guidelines. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re The James M. Cannon Family Trust
The plaintiff filed this action alleging that the defendant killed the latter’s husband thereby forfeiting any rights she had under a trust the husband had created. After the complaint was filed, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of her husband. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment supported by the judgment of conviction and other documents. The defendant filed an affidavit denying any responsibility for her husband’s death. While the motion for summary judgment was pending, the defendant filed a motion asking the trial judge to recuse himself. The trial court denied the motion to recuse. It then granted the motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to recuse but vacate the order granting the motion for summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Bernard Mobley v. Priscilla Ann Caffa-Mobley
The former husband appeals from the denial of his Motion to Set Aside or in the Alternative Alter or Amend the Final Decree of Divorce, which was filed 23 days after the entry of the Final Decree. In his Motion for relief, Husband sought to amend the Final Decree as it pertained to the division of the parties’ mortgage debt on two homes, the division of Husband’s military pension, and the award of rehabilitative alimony to Wife. We have determined the trial court should have granted partial relief as it pertained to Husband’s continuing liability on the mortgage on the Miami, Florida property awarded to Wife, and to address a mathematical error pertaining to Wife’s interest in Husband’s military retirement. Thus, we remand for review of these two issues and affirm in all other respects. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Lea Womble v. Larry Glen Womble, II
Husband appeals from an order of the trial court granting Wife a divorce and making a distribution of marital property. We affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Cheatham County, Tennessee v. Cheatham County Board of Zoning Appeals and Randall and Margaret Mooneyhan
Property owners’ permit to place a mobile home on their property was revoked by the county building commissioner on the grounds that the property on which the home was to be located did not meet the minimum lot size requirement in the zoning ordinance; on appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals, the property owners were granted a variance. The County filed a petition in Chancery Court seeking certiorari review of the grant of the variance, naming the Board of Zoning Appeals and property owners as defendants. After a hearing, the trial dismissed the petition; the court denied the property owners’ request for attorney fees incurred in connection with the Board of Zoning Appeals and certiorari proceedings. We hold that the property owners are entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Elliott v. James Lucas Muhonen, et al
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of motions for recusal in two post- ivorce cases involving custody of the parties’ minor children. Having reviewed the appellant’s petition for recusal appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, we affirm the Trial Court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
U.S. Bank, N.A., as Servicer for the Tennessee Housing Development Agency v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
U.S. Bank, N.A. (“Bank”) had a mortgage on a residence which was insured against fire loss by Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”). When the owner of the residence failed to pay the mortgage, the Bank commenced foreclosure proceedings. Thereafter, the owner filed for bankruptcy which stayed the foreclosure proceedings. After the residence was destroyed in a fire, the Bank filed a claim to recover the insurance proceeds. Tennessee Farmers refused to pay the claim. As a result, the Bank filed suit against Tennessee Farmers alleging breach of contract, bad faith refusal to pay an insurance claim, and unfair or deceptive practices under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the Bank, concluding that the Bank's failure to give Tennessee Farmers notice of the foreclosure proceedings did not invalidate the insurance coverage. On appeal to this Court, we reversed, finding that the Bank’s commencement of foreclosure proceedings amounted to an increase in hazard under the policy and the Bank’s failure to provide notice precluded coverage. After granting the Bank’s application for permission to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this Court, and held that commencement of foreclosure proceedings did not constitute an increase in hazard under the terms of the insurance policy or the applicable statutory provisions, and therefore, the Bank was not required to give notice to Tennessee Farmers. U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 277 S.W.3d 381 (Tenn. 2009). Subsequently, on remand from the Supreme Court, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the Bank for the amount due on the mortgage plus accrued interest. The trial court further awarded the Bank attorney’s fees and costs based on its finding that Tennessee Farmers’ interpretation of the policy, that the Bank was required to provide them with notice of the commencement of foreclosure proceedings, amounted to bad faith and an unfair act or practice under the TCPA. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we reverse and remand. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Martha R. Scent v. Chester Shoemaker, et al.
Martha Scent filed a declaratory judgment action against multiple defendants to establish her rights with respect to a deed of trust that granted her a lien on a tract of land. In addition, Scent sought to establish that “her” signature on a release of her deed of trust is a forgery. The trial court granted Scent partial summary judgment voiding and nullifying the release of her trust deed. The case proceeded to a bench trial with the focus on the priority of trust deeds as between Scent and the defendant Ellen W. Hood. Based upon the application of the doctrine of merger, the court ruled that Scent held the priority position. The court awarded judgment in her favor and Hood appeals. We affirm. |
Scott | Court of Appeals |
