Stephen G. Butler v. Michele G. Butler
The parents of a three year old girl were divorced by order of a Georgia court, and their settlement agreement was incorporated into the divorce degree. The parties subsequently moved to this state, and after several years Father petitioned the Tennessee court to name him as the child’s primary residential parent. He also asked the court to modify his child support. After a hearing, the trial court declared that Mother would remain the child’s primary residential parent, and it granted Father additional visitation. The court also found that Father was not entitled by law to a reduction in his child support obligation, but it adopted Mother’s proposal that the obligation be reduced by about one fourth. On appeal, Father contends that the trial court erred by failing to apply the Tennessee child support guidelines to determine his support obligation. We vacate the child support order and remand for setting Father’s support using the Child Support Guidelines. Despite concerns expressed by Father, we find the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Sara Eigen Figal v. Vanderbilt University
This appeal arises out of an action for breach of contract and misrepresentation brought by a former university faculty member who was denied tenure. The faculty member has appealed from the trial court’s dismissal of her lawsuit and subsequent denial of her Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion to alter or amend. We hold that the order denying the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion complied with the service requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 58, and thus entry of the order was effective on May 29, 2012. Because the faculty member did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after the entry of that order as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Lee Hill v. Kimberly Dawn Hill
In this divorce appeal, Husband disagrees with the trial court’s decision regarding a residence he purchased during the pendency of the divorce and with the calculation of his child support obligation. We find merit in Husband’s arguments, vacate the relevant portions of the divorce decree, and remand. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Leah Angelique Thomas - Cathey J. Tillman, Conservator v. Ronald Marvell Thomas
The probate court appointed a conservator for a disabled young adult. The court awarded attorney’s fees to the petitioner who was appointed as conservator, and to the guardian ad litem, to be paid from the estate of the disabled ward. The court also ordered that another party, who originally sought to be appointed as conservator but withdrew his petition before the hearing, would likewise receive an award of attorney’s fees to be paid from the estate of the ward. The conservator appeals, arguing that the probate court lacked the authority to make such an award to the party who withdrew his petition. We agree, and therefore, we reverse the award of attorney’s fees and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dale England, et al. v. Robert England, et al.
This case is a property dispute between two brothers regarding the width of a right-of-way that affects both their properties. The plaintiff claims the right-of-way is eight feet wide and the defendant should be prevented from expanding the gravel road that runs along the right-of-way to 25 feet because the expansion would require the plaintiff to remove fences, septic tanks, and other permanent structures. The trial court ruled that the right-of-way created by the brothers’ father was intended to be 25 feet wide. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Robert Braun, Jr. v. Nita Lynn Braun
This is a post-divorce appeal. Stepfather assumed a parental role over Mother’s child from a previous relationship even though only one child was born of the relationship between the Parties. Following an agreed divorce, the court ordered Stepfather to submit child support for both children. The court reasoned that as a result of Stepfather’s participation in a petition to terminate the biological father’s parental rights to Mother’s child, the Child lost any right to support from his biological father. Stepfather appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court but remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Robert Braun, Jr. v. Nita Lynn Braun - Concurring
I do not disagree with the majority opinion’s decision to remand this case to the trial court so it can consider whether an upward deviation in the child support for Titus Braun is appropriate. I write separately to point out that the majority opinion should not be read as carte blanche to transfer automatically – and without legal justification for doing so – the difference between (a) the support previously ordered for two children and (b) that which would have been ordered for one child, as the amount of an upward deviation in the support for Titus. A court cannot do indirectly what it cannot legally do directly. See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 3:05-CV-0475, 2006 WL 3436064 at *2 (N.D. Tex., Nov. 29, 2006). |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Summer Bay Management, L.C., et al., v. Gatlinburg Town Square Members' Association, Inc., et al.
This Court issued a Show Cause Order setting forth that the Notice of Appeal filed in this case is not "a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights and liabilities of the parties"of which "an appeal of right would lie." |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn A. Duke v. Harold W. Duke, III
The father in this post-divorce action has filed a petition for recusal appeal seeking an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of his August 13, 2012, motion for recusal. We have reviewed the petition pursuant to the de novo standard of review as required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.06, and we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn A. Duke v. Harold W. Duke, III - Concur/Dissent
I agree with the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s denial of Father’s recusal motion. However, I would have held that the grounds previously raised by Father two years earlier were not subject to our review under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B and, therefore, would have dismissed that part of the appeal. I would affirm denial as to the new grounds upon the reasoning set out in the majority opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Merlina Elijah (Williams) Draper v. Ryan Ashley Williams
This case involves the modification of a parenting plan. The trial court modified the parenting plan upon its finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred such that primary residential custody with Mother was no longer in the child's best interest. On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court erred in granting primary residential custody to Father, and Father argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for attorney’s fees. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Mitzi Bayne Ruth, executrix of the Estate of Fred W. Bayne, et al., v. Home Health Care Of Middle Tennessee, LLC, et al.
This action was appealed before to this Court and this appeal follows our remand back to the Trial Court for determination of the ambiguous terms found in the contract between the parties. Upon remand, the Trial Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and made a finding as to what the parties intended as to the terms of the contract previously found ambiguous. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court's determination of what the document provided and determined the rights of the parties, and remand. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Earl Thomas Burgess v. Ford Motor Company
A management employee working for Ford Motor Company was to become an employee of Ford’s wholly owned subsidiary when the subsidiary was made an independent company. The manager wanted to remain employed by Ford and sought to transfer back to an hourly position before the spinoff took effect. The manager’s supervisor promised the manager his benefits and pay would not change as an employee of the subsidiary and that he could return to an hourly position with Ford after the spinoff until such time that the subsidiary was purchased by a third party. The subsidiary was purchased by a third party five years later, but Ford did not permit the employee to transfer back to Ford at that point. After the employee asked to transfer back to Ford, Ford offered its hourly employees a special retirement plan whereby they were offered lifetime health and pension benefits. The employee would have been eligible to participate in this plan if he had been allowed to transfer back to Ford. The employee filed suit against Ford, claiming promissory estoppel and seeking damages based on the amount he would have received under the special retirement plan. A jury found Ford liable for promissory estoppel and awarded the employee damages. Ford appealed, arguing (1) the employee’s claim was preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act and (2) the employee failed to prove all the elements of promissory estoppel. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael B. Adams v. State of Tennessee
This Court issues a show cause order on July 19, 2012, directing the pro se incarcerated appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant is seeking a review of the decision on a claim pending on the small claims docket of the Tennessee Claims Commission. "No appeal may be taken from a commissioner's decision regarding claims appearing on the small claims docket." Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-403(a)(2). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James Bostic v. State of Tennessee and Warden David Sexton
This is an appeal from a final order of dismissal in the Circuit Court, entered on April 11, 2012. The appellant did not filed a notice of appeal until August 9, 2012. This Court issued a show cause order directing appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant has responded to the show cause order by motion which does not show good cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Stoner v. Brittany C. Amburn
Karen Stoner (“the Executrix”), in her capacity as the Executrix of the Estate of Irma M. Collins, brought suit against Brittany C. Amburn seeking to divest ownership of certain real property out of Amburn and into her name in her representative capacity. The suit was grounded in the Executrix’s claim that the subject property was fraudulently conveyed to Amburn by the latter’s stepfather, Larry C. Collins (“the Judgment Debtor”), a judgment debtor of the Estate. The Executrix alleged that the transfer was made for the purpose of shielding the property from execution on her judgment. At the conclusion of the proof in a jury trial, the court held that no reasonable minds could reach a conclusion other than that the conveyance was fraudulent in nature. The court directed a verdict in favor of the Executrix. The court vested all right, title and interest to the property in the Executrix. Amburn appeals. We affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Daysia D. et al.
Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. She asserts the trial court |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Daniel v. Brittany Smith
In this negligence case, the jury returned a verdict in the amount of the plaintiff’s medical |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. James E. Brown
Defendant in suit to recover property taxes appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
W. Stanford Blalock v. Preston Law Group, P.C., et al.
A plastic surgeon entered into a five year lease on office space, and defaulted on the lease after the first month. The landlord’s attorney filed separate lawsuits in general sessions court for breach of the lease contracts against the lessee, who had personally guaranteed the lease, and against the lessee’s personal corporation. The landlord obtained duplicate judgments for unpaid rent as well as for attorney fees. The general sessions judge informed the landlord that he was only entitled to collect one judgment. The lessee appealed to the circuit court, but paid the general sessions judgment in full while the circuit court action was still pending. The landlord’s attorney then filed a “partial satisfaction of judgment” and another complaint for attorney fees in general sessions court, followed by another complaint in circuit court, alleging that additional rents had accrued while the litigation continued. The lessee responded by filing a complaint for abuse of process against the landlord’s attorney, alleging that the attorney filed meritless complaints in order to drive up the fees he could collect. The landlord’s attorney filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations for abuse of process had passed, and that in any case no abuse of process could be shown. The trial court granted the motion. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Ann Graybeal v. Howell H. Sherrod, Jr.
In 2003, Carol Ann Graybeal (“the Client”) filed this action against her former attorney and lover, Howell H. Sherrod, Jr. (“the Lawyer”), after he refused to give her an accounting regarding an investment she had made through him. In response to her demand for an accounting, he had accused her of stealing and damaging property, the value of which allegedly exceeded the value of her investment. In the answer later filed to her suit, he demanded a setoff; his answer was joined with a counterclaim seeking relief with respect to the stolen and damaged goods. Six years later, the case came on for trial. The court entered its first judgment on April 23, 2010 (“the April 2010 judgment”). The court found in favor of each of the parties regarding various of their respective claims, with the result that the Lawyer received a net judgment of $10,760.13, before interest. The Client filed a motion to alter or amend the April 2010 judgment. The court entered a second, almost identical, judgment on September 15, 2010 (“the September 2010 judgment”), in which it denied the Client’s motion. The Lawyer later filed a motion for discretionary costs as well as a motion to alter or amend the September 2010 judgment. In March 2011, the Client filed a motion for relief from the September 2010 judgment. In an order entered August 5, 2011 (“the August 2011 judgment”) and designated as “final,” the court granted the motion for discretionary costs in part, denied the Lawyer’s motion to alter or amend, and granted the Client’s motion for relief with respect to the calculation of prejudgment interest and the taxing of costs. The Lawyer appeals from the August 2011 judgment. The Client attempts to raise several issues of her own. We conclude that the merits of one of the earlier judgments – the September 2010 judgment – are not before us because what the Lawyer has labeled as a “motion to alter or amend” that judgment is not, despite its label, one of the motions recognized by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.01 as having the effect of “extending the time for taking steps in the regular appellate process.” We find no reversible error in the August 2011 judgment. Accordingly, we affirm that judgment. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Rodney W. Schutt v. Jodie Ann Miller (Schutt)
This appeal concerns post-divorce motions to set aside a marital dissolution agreement. The parties were divorced based on a mediated marital dissolution agreement. Shortly after the final decree was entered, the appellant wife filed post-divorce motions to set aside the marital dissolution agreement. The original trial judge first recused herself as to certain issues in the proceedings, and then later recused herself as to the entire case, so the post-divorce matters were ultimately heard by a special judge. All told, the appellant wife filed over 83 post-divorce pleadings, most involving efforts to set aside the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Eventually, the trial court denied the wife’s motions to set aside and awarded the appellee husband over $61,000 in fees as sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The wife now appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David White v. Empire Express, Inc. and Empire Transportation, Inc.
The case involves a lease-purchase agreement. The plaintiff is a truck driver. The co-defendants are two affiliated companies – a truckload hauling company and a leasing company. The plaintiff truck driver worked for the hauling company. The truck driver entered into a lease-purchase agreement with the leasing company to purchase the truck he drove in his work for the hauling company. His lease payments on the truck were made via weekly payroll deductions; the hauling company deducted the amount of the lease payments from the truck driver’s payroll and transferred those amounts to the leasing company on his behalf. If the driver earned less than the amount of the lease payment, the hauling company paid the lease payment anyway and the deficiency became a debt that the truck driver owed to the hauling company. At the end of the lease, the lease-purchase agreement required the truck driver to pay the residual value of the truck. He was allowed to pay this over the course of one year, also through weekly payroll deductions. After the final residual payment was made, the leasing company refused to give title of the truck to the plaintiff truck driver because he still owed money to the affiliated hauling company. The defendant leasing company then repossessed the truck and sold it. The plaintiff truck driver filed this lawsuit against both defendant companies, alleging breach of contract, conversion, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the truck driver on his breach-of-contract claim, and it conducted a bench trial on the breach-of- contract damages and the remaining claims. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff on all of his claims and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The defendants now appeal. We affirm the award of compensatory damages and reverse the award of punitive damages. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
De Lano Parker v. Shelby County Government Civil Service Merit Board and The Shelby County Sheriff's Department
Appellee corrections officer’s employment with the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office was terminated for appearing in a video in which he stated that he had been a gang member. The Civil Service Merit Board affirmed the termination. The officer filed a petition for judicial review in the Shelby County Chancery Court, arguing that there was not substantial and material evidence to sustain his termination and that the termination violated his First Amendment rights. The trial court ruled that the Civil Service Merit Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence, but vacate and remand to the Civil Service Merit Board for consideration of Appellee’s First Amendment argument. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Reece et al v. Helen S. Valois et al
The issue in this case is whether a warranty deed made by a 98-year-old uncle to his 85-year old niece should be set aside for lack of competence or undue influence. Following a bench trial, the court found that the uncle was competent and that the niece did not exert undue influence on him. The uncle’s children appeal. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals |
