Abbington Center, LLC v. Town of Collierville
The two billboards at issue in the case were erected in 1979, prior to Collierville’s prohibition of billboards. Plaintiff sought to re-construct the billboards, and he received assurances from the Town that he could do so. However, the Town subsequently questioned whether the billboards were legal, non-conforming uses protected by the “grandfather clause” set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208, and it issued stop work orders on the billboards’ reconstruction and it refused to issue the building permits necessary for reconstruction. Plaintiff appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which affirmed the Town’s actions. Plaintiff then filed a writ of certiorari in the chancery court, which, prior to trial, remanded to the BZA. On remand, the BZA affirmed its prior decision, and Plaintiff subsequently filed a second writ of certiorari in the chancery court. The chancery court found that the BZA acted illegally, arbitrarily, and capriciously, and it invalidated the stop work orders and it declared that Plaintiff could re-construct the billboards. Based on Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that the billboards were legal uses prior to the 1982 amendment, we find that the BZA was justified in upholding the Town’s stop work orders and in upholding the Town’s denial of Plaintiff’s requested building permits. Accordingly, we find that the BZA’s decisions were not illegal, arbitrary, or capricious. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Regina Morrison Newman, et al. v. Shelby County Election Commission
This is an election contest case brought pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 2-17-101, et seq. Appellants, unsuccessful candidates for various offices in the August 5, 2010 Shelby County general election, filed suit against the Appellee Shelby County Election Commission. Appellants aver that the election process was incurably flawed to the extent that Appellants and the citizens of Shelby County were denied a free and equal election as required by Article I, Section V of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court granted an involuntary dismissal, under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2), finding that Appellants’ proof was insufficient to prove that the election was incurably uncertain. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sybil Leo v. Robert George Gardner, II v. Eddie Porter and Carmen Porter
This appeal involves a divorce action that includes a claim against third parties. The wife filed a divorce complaint against the husband, and the husband counterclaimed for divorce. Later, the husband amended his divorce counterclaim to add claims against third parties as defendants, alleging that they took personal property from the marital home with the wife’s acquiescence. Later, the divorce claims were dismissed, but the claims against the third parties remained. After a hearing, the trial court awarded the husband compensatory and punitive damages as to the property taken. As to one item, however, the third parties were ordered to deliver the item to the court to be donated to a local charity. The third parties now appeal. We affirm the trial court’s finding as to the value of the property taken, remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52.01 as to the monetary judgment, and vacate the order requiring the donation of an item of property. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Marshal San Miguel
Michael San Miguel (“Claimant”) filed a claim against his brother’s estate, Marshal San Miguel (“Decedent”), alleging that Decedent was responsible for expenses and mortgage payments relating to their jointly-owned Louisiana property. Decedent’s son, Nicholas Brandon San Miguel (“Beneficiary”), filed an exception to the claim. The clerk and master disallowed the claim. Claimant objected to the clerk and master’s report, and the trial court precluded recovery. Claimant appeals. We reverse the court’s preclusion of recovery of the mortgage payments and expenses and conclude that Claimant is entitled to reimbursement for the mortgage payments submitted on behalf of Decedent and a portion of the expenses incurred on behalf of the property. We affirm the court’s decision in all other respects. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Leon Dickson, Sr. v. Sidney H. Kriger, M.D.
This appeal arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained after undergoing laser corrective eye surgery. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging medical negligence. Subsequently, Defendant filed an amended answer alleging, inter alia, the affirmative defense of comparative fault. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike portions of Defendant’s amended answer, and following a hearing on the motion, Defendant agreed to the entry of a consent order waiving the defense of comparative fault. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed motions in limine to preclude the testimony of two of Defendant’s experts. Plaintiff argued that, because Defendant waived comparative fault, he could not use the causation testimony of the two experts to shift blame away from himself unless he first plead comparative fault under Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied both motions. We granted permission for interlocutory appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: B.R.
This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the then minor child B.R. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found B.R. to be an unruly child. B.R. filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss (“Petition to Vacate”) regarding the order finding B.R. to be an unruly child. The Juvenile Court denied the Petition to Vacate. B.R. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. B.R. appeals to this Court, arguing that the Circuit Court should have heard B.R.’s appeal from Juvenile Court. We hold that the Circuit Court erred in granting the State’s motion to dismiss B.R.’s appeal of the Juvenile Court’s order denying B.R.’s Petition to Vacate. We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: A.W.
This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the then minor child A.W. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found A.W. to be an unruly child. A.W. filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss (“Petition to Vacate”) regarding the order finding A.W. to be an unruly child. The Juvenile Court denied the Petition to Vacate. A.W. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. A.W. appeals to this Court, arguing that the Circuit Court should have heard A.W.’s appeal from Juvenile Court. We hold that the Circuit Court erred in granting the State’s motion to dismiss A.W.’s appeal of the Juvenile Court’s order denying A.W.’s Petition to Vacate. We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Margaret Novack v. William Fowler
This case involves the sufficiency of service of process. After an automobile accident, Plaintiff sued Defendant for personal injuries. Private process server served Defendant’s father with the complaint rather than Defendant. The Defendant answered the complaint, raising the defense that there was insufficient service of process as to him. Over a year after the summons had been issued, Defendant moved for summary judgment based on insufficient service of process. The trial court denied summary judgment, finding that the Defendant was evading service. Because we conclude that there was insufficient evidence to find that the Defendant was evading service of process, we reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Damon A. Tatum v. Mercedeas Tatum
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: T.W.
This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the minor child T.W. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found T.W. to be an unruly child. T.W. filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss (“Petition to Vacate”) regarding the order finding T.W. to be an unruly child. The Juvenile Court denied the Petition to Vacate. T.W. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. T.W. appeals to this Court, arguing that the Circuit Court should have heard T.W.’s appeal from Juvenile Court. We hold that the Circuit Court erred in granting the State’s motion to dismiss T.W.’s appeal of the Juvenile Court’s order denying T.W.’s Petition to Vacate. We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: M.R.
This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the minor child M.R. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found M.R. to be an unruly child. M.R. filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss (“Petition to Vacate”) regarding the order finding M.R. to be an unruly child. The Juvenile Court denied the Petition to Vacate. M.R. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. M.R. appeals to this Court, arguing that the Circuit Court should have heard M.R.’s appeal from Juvenile Court. We hold that the Circuit Court erred in granting the State’s motion to dismiss M.R.’s appeal of the Juvenile Court’s order denying M.R.’s Petition to Vacate. We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Hong v. Leroy Foust, et al.
In this boundary line dispute, the defendants sought to claim property beyond a road known as “Creek Road.” The trial court concluded that the road constituted the defendants’ southern boundary. However, because the plaintiff’s complaint sought the adoption of a survey that conceded a small strip of land south of Creek Road to the defendants, along with the fact that the plaintiff testified that he believed that the defendants owned some property south of Creek Road, the trial court granted the defendants a strip alongside the road about four feet deep. After the defendants moved to conform their pleading to the proof and sought relief under the doctrine of adverse possession, the trial court reopened the proof to consider adverse use. Another opinion was issued awarding the defendants a strip extending approximately ten feet from the southern edge of Creek Road. The defendants appeal. We affirm the findings of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Megan A. Rowe Ellis v. Sammy D. Rowe, Jr.
The divorce action in this case was commenced in 2001. The Final Decree in the divorce action was entered in January 2008. Subsequently, the case was transferred to the Circuit Court in an adjoining county. Post to that transfer, numerous motions and petitions were filed in the Trial Court and on January 5, 2011 the Trial Court tried the issues relating to child support and a parenting plan. As a result of that hearing a Judgment was entered which held that the father failed to appear for the hearing, despite proper notice, had failed to respond to discovery and mediation in violation of the Court's order and the Court found that the mother's proposed parenting plan was in the children's best interest and incorporated the same in its Decree. The Court awarded child support based on the computed amount of income of the father, and also awarded the mother Judgment for her attorney's fees. The Court dismissed all of the father's request for relief and the father appealed. We hold that the facts relied on by the father in his brief are not supported by any evidence in the record, and his conclusions of law are not supported by authority, and the record establishes no basis for finding any merit in the issues raised on appeal. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Jerome Degans v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al.
Inmate filed petition seeking review of decision of prison disciplinary board. Trial court dismissed petition for failure to comply with applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. Finding that the trial court did not err, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Reginald Boya Demonbreun
Personal representative appeals from order granting $27,900 claim against decedent’s estate. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James P. Hurt v. State of Tennessee
Inmate filed petition seeking review of decision of prison disciplinary board convicting him of various disciplinary offenses. Trial court dismissed petition for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-106. Finding that the trial court did not err in dismissing the Petition, we affirm the judgment. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
John A. Brubaker v. H.T. Beckham
This appeal arises out of a dispute over personal property located on land sold at a foreclosure sale. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Kenard P. Wallace v. Commissioner of Labor & Workforce Development et al.
Truck driver was discharged for having too many accidents pursuant to employer’s policy on preventable accidents. He was denied unemployment benefits and the denial was upheld by the Appeals Tribunal, the Board of Review and the Chancery Court. We affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Household Financial Center, Inc. v. Darrell Kirby
Lender appeals the trial court’s decision awarding judgment in its favor for only part of the debt it claims to be owed by borrower. Finding no error in the trial court’s factual findings and conclusions, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Andrea A. R.
Father appeals an order of the juvenile court requiring Father to pay private school tuition as an upward deviation from the presumptive child support amount, which more than doubled his child support obligation. We have determined that the trial court erred by ordering an upward deviation for private school tuition without first determining whether the extraordinary educational expense was appropriate based upon the parents’ financial abilities and the lifestyle of the child and by failing to make the requisite findings of fact to establish that Father has the abilityto payall of the tuition in addition to the presumptive child support. Therefore, we reverse the upward deviation for private tuition and remand the issue of the extraordinary educational expense to the trial court to make the requisite findings to determine, inter alia, whether private schooling is appropriate based upon the facts of this case and, if so, to determine which parent pays what portion of the private school tuition and costs. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Charles F. "Frank" Holland and Mary Lou Holland, et al. v. City of Memphis
Upon determining that the order appealed in this matter is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Neal Lovlace and Norma Jean Lovlace v. Timothy Kevin Copley and Beth Copley
This is a modification of child visitation case, involving grandparent visitation. The Appellant grandparents appeal the trial court’s order, denying their request for more visitation with the minor child, as well as the failure of the trial court to find the Appellee Mother guilty of all alleged incidents of civil contempt. In the posture of Appellees, the mother and her husband (the child’s adoptive father) argue that the Appellants are not entitled to any visitation. We conclude that in modification of grandparent visitation cases, if the parent is the movant, his or her burden is to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there has been a material change in circumstance affecting the child’s best interest. However, where the movant is the non-parent, we hold that the grandparent visitation statute provides that the burden is on the non-parent to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there has been a material change in circumstance that would present a substantial risk of harm to the child if modification is denied. Because the trial court incorrectly applied the best interest standard, we vacate its order modifying the visitation arrangement. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the mother in civil contempt on five counts; however, we conclude that the award of attorney’s fees for that contempt is not clear as to what portion, if any, of those fees was expended for prosecution of the contempts, and what portion, if any, was expended in pursuit of the Appellees’ attempt to modify the visitation order. Therefore, we also vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand for an award of those fees associated only with the prosecution of the contempts. Vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Neal Lovlace and Norma Jean Lovlace v. Timothy Kevin Copley and Beth Copley - Concur and Partial Dissent
I concur with the result reached in this case, but I disagree with some of the reasoning and therefore write separately. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Neal Lovlace and Norma Jean Lovlace v. Timothy Kevin Copley and Beth Copley - Concur and Partial Dissent
I agree with much of the majority’s well reasoned analysis in this case. However, in some respects, I would use different reasoning to reach the same result, and so must file this separate concurrence. In some other respects, I disagree with the result reached by the majority and so must partially dissent. These are discussed below. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Robert Sadler Bailey
This appeal arises from an action for criminal contempt. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion upon determining Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated. The State appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
