Rebecca L. (Vanover) Million vs. Fairly Vanover
Plaintiff's action sought to reopen a divorce case which became final in 1982, to obtain part of her former husband's military pension. The Trial Court held the action was not filed within a reasonable time after the divorce and dismissed the action. On appeal, we affirm. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
Tina Johnson, et al vs. David J. Richardson, M.D. - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion, but concur separately only to elaborate on establishing the similarity of medical communities for the purpose of qualifying a medical expert witness. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tina Johnson, et al vs. David J. Richardson, M.D.
This is a medical malpractice case. Plaintiff/Appellant appeals from the trial court's disqualification of her expert witness and grant of the defendant/appellee's motion for directed verdict. Finding that the appellant failed to show that her expert was familiar with the standard of care in a community similar to the defendant's community, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Flagstar Enterprises Inc. vs. Erie Hurst, Individually, and as Executrix of the Estate of Arnold Hurst, Deceased
Defendant appeals the award of summary judgment to plaintiff in this action for specific performance of an option to purchase real property which plaintiff asserts is contained in a lease agreement. Finding a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the authenticity of the option to purchase, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Beard vs. Jepco, Inc., et al
This lawsuit was filed by Charles Beard ("Plaintiff") against Jepco, Inc. ("Jepco"), and Mike Phillips (collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiff rented a storage unit from Jepco. Mike Phillips is a manager for Jepco. Plaintiff essentially claims that Jepco raised the rent on the storage unit he rented in violation of the rental agreement. Plaintiff initially filed this lawsuit in the Hamilton County General Session Court. He appealed the unfavorable sessions court judgment to the circuit court. Thereafter, defendants filed a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's response to that summary judgment motion failed to create any genuine issue of material fact and, accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment to defendants. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Keener v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
This is an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside a prior order of dismissal. The trial court dismissed an inmate's petition for writ of certiorari for failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 41-21-805 and -807, which govern inmate lawsuits. Nearly two years later, the inmate filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the order of dismissal. The trial court denied the motion and the inmate appealed. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested relief, its ruling is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Edna N. Zulueta v. Stephen A. Montgomery, MD
Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed after she failed to respond to the defendant's motion to dismiss and failed to appear at the hearing on the motion. The trial court denied her subsequent motion to set aside the order of dismissal, finding that she had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she was not served with the motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Isaiah S.
Father sought to become the primary residential parent due to the failure of Mother to comply with the parenting plan. The trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother appealed. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Elmer Elliott, Jr., v. Pearl Elliott, et al.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's award of summary judgment to Defendants. We dismiss the appeal for the failure to appeal a final judgment. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Randall C. Trent vs. Wayne Anderson, et al
Randall C. Trent ("Plaintiff") was incarcerated at the Sullivan County jail for several months before being transferred to the Tennessee Department of Correction. Plaintiff claims that while incarcerated at the Sullivan County jail, he was denied proper medical care and retaliated against for complaining about the lack of proper medical care. Plaintiff initially brought numerous claims against various defendants. This appeal involves the dismissal of plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. _ 1983, 42 U.S.C. _ 1985, and 42 U.S.C._ 12101, also known as the Americans with Disabilities Act. These various federal claims were dismissed by the trial court after finding that the applicable one-year statute of limitations had expired by the time the complaint was filed. On appeal, plaintiff claims that the "continuing violation" doctrine applies to save his untimely claims. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Vicki Brown v. Antione Batey
This is an appeal of a criminal contempt hearing in which the appellant father was found to be in contempt for non-payment of child support pursuant to court order. Upon review of the record, we vacate. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jerome Degans v. Tennessee Department of Corrections
This appeal involves an inmate's efforts to obtain judicial review of a prison disciplinary board decision. After the trial court determined that the inmate's petition for writ of certiorari was time barred by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 27-9-102 (2000), the inmate filed both a notice of appeal and a letter requesting "another chance." Because the trial court ordered the letter sent to the appellee for a response but has not yet ruled on the relief sought in the letter, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State, ex rel., Yvette Martin v. Lakisha Lynch
The mother of a minor child appeals her conviction of eighteen counts of criminal contempt for willful failure to pay child support. She contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions for criminal contempt. We agree and reverse the finding of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Andrew Bernard Shute, Jr., et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, et al.
The Nashville Metropolitan Council approved a Planned Unit Development (PUD) for a large residential subdivision to be constructed by Habitat for Humanity. The Metropolitan Planning Commission subsequently approved a site plan for the first phase of the subdivision, over the objections of neighboring landowners, who then challenged the approval by filing a petition for writ certiorari in the Chancery Court. The petitioners also mounted a challenge against the entire project based on the ground that the PUD had become"inactive" because construction had not yet begun, even though six years had passed since it was initially approved. The Planning Commission rejected the challenge, finding that the project was still "active" and, therefore, that the PUD did not have to go through the process of approval for a second time. The neighbors then filed a second petition for writ of certiorari. The trial court consolidated the two petitions and heard arguments that the procedures the Planning Commission followed in reaching its decisions violated the petitioners' constitutional rights. The court dismissed both petitions, ruling that the Planning Commission had not acted illegally, arbitrarily or fraudulently, and that the petitioners' constitutional rights were not violated. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Randall S. Patton, et al vs. Larry Massey
Lessor and Lessee entered into a lease with an option to purchase. Lessee subsequently assigned his interest in the Lease to a third party, who lived on the property throughout the Lease's primary term. The option to purchase the property was never completed and Lessee's assignee remained on the property after the expiration of the lease. Lessor filed a suit alleging breach of contract and sought damages from Lessee. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the lease was renewed by oral agreement; Lessee breached the contractual obligations of the lease; and Lessee was liable for damages. Lessee appeals. We affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
P & N Development, A Partnership, et al vs. Betty B. Church
Lessee sued Lessor for specific performance and damages, alleging breach of contract after Lessor did not permit Lessee to exercise the option to purchase the property. Lessor moved to dismiss, claiming that Lessee failed to properly and timely exercise the option to purchase the property. Lessor filed a counterclaim, alleging breach of contract and damages. After a bench trial, the trial court held that Lessee properly and timely exercised the option to purchase the property. Lessor appeals. Upon reviewing the record, we conclude Lessee did not exercise the option to purchase the property before the expiration of the Lease. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Joseph A.
This proceeding began in the Hamilton County Juvenile Court when the Department of Children's Services ("DCS") filed a petition seeking to have Joseph A. (the "Child") declared dependent and neglected based on allegations of abuse committed by Douglas A. ("Father"). Katheryn B. ("Mother") was allowed to intervene. A guardian ad litem was appointed on the Child's behalf. The Juvenile Court found the Child to be dependent and neglected, and Father appealed that finding to the circuit court. While this case was pending in the circuit court, DCS voluntarily dismissed the original petition. Thereafter, the guardian ad litem filed a motion seeking payment of attorney fees and costs. The circuit court granted this motion and entered a judgment against DCS for the guardian ad litem's fees and expenses. DCS appeals. We vacate the order taxing the guardian ad litem fees and costs against DCS and remand for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Alvin Seagroves v. State of Tennessee and Tennessee Board of Probation & Parole
This appeal involves a prisoner who has filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the wrong court for the second time. The instant petition was filed in the Davidson County Circuit Court, which dismissed the petition upon concluding that it should have been filed in Davidson County Chancery Court. The prisoner appeals, contending that the Circuit Court should have exercised jurisdiction over the petition or transferred it to the proper court. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Reda Jo Mills v. Matthew Scott Mills
This is a divorce case. Wife appeals from the trial court's decision denying her alimony in futuro and attorney's fees. After reviewing the record, we discern no error and affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Coleman et al. v. St. Thomas Hospital
Plaintiffs filed suit against their employer, alleging common law negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress due to their exposure to carbon monoxide in the workplace. The employer filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiffs' tort claims were barred by Tennessee's workers' compensation law. The trial court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiffs' injuries did not "arise out of" their employment. The employer's application for an extraordinary appeal was granted. We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting summary judgment to the employer. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: Arteria H.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Both Mother and Father appeal the trial court's decision to terminate their parental rights. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Noel Montepeque, et al vs. Patricia Claire Adevai, Executrix of the Estate of Joseph Adevai
The parties own adjoining properties with a common party wall. The building belonging to Noel Montepeque and Celia M. Martinez (collectively "Party A") is one story, whereas the building of Joseph Adevai ("Party B") is two stories and overlooks Party A's roof. The party wall contains four windows on the second level of Party B's building. The bottom sills of two of these windows are below the roof line, thus creating open spaces between the party wall and Party A's roof. While Party A was in the process of having a new rubberized roof installed by a contractor, a dispute arose between the parties concerning the manner in which the new roof would be secured to the party wall. Actions allegedly taken by Mr. Adevai to remove the flashing covering the party wall windows eventually resulted in water damage to the existing roof and interior portions of Party A's building. Party A sued Mr. Adevai for compensatory damages and requested that Mr. Adevai be enjoined from committing further damage to the party wall. Mr. Adevai filed a counterclaim, alleging harassment and intimidation by Party A. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the counterclaim and awarded Party A damages for negligence, totaling $28,350.00. We affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Dave Brundage, et al vs. Cumberland County, et al
Petitioners filed a Statutory Writ of Certiorari, seeking the review of respondents' action in granting the right to develop a landfill to Smith Mountain Solutions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _68-211-704. Petitioners did not timely verify their petitions and the Trial Judge dismissed the action on the ground he did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition. On appeal, we affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Judy Wyatt v. Ronald Byrd
Property was purchased in Mr. Byrd's name alone, but Ms. Wyatt contends that partnership/joint venture profits were used to secure the purchase, such that she is entitled to an interest in the property. We find that, to the extent that partnership profits were used towards earnest money and closing costs, Ms. Wyatt is presumed to have an interest in the property. We vacate the trial court's dismissal order and we remand for an evidentiary hearing regarding whether R & J Remodeling profits were expended towards earnest money and closing costs, and to allow Mr. Byrd an opportunity to rebut the presumption of partnership property. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Jesse Robert Anderson v. Chris (Anderson) Webster
The order that is the subject of this appeal purports to amend the division of marital property as stated in the final judgment. It was entered in response to a motion filed more than a year after the entry of the final judgment. We have determined the motion was untimely because it did not qualify as a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion; therefore, the order that purports to amend the division of marital property as stated in the final judgment is void. We, therefore, reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate the order that purports to amend the final judgment. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals |
