Rachel Sumner, et al v. Metropolitan Board of Public Health
Petitioners challenge a mosquito spraying plan adopted by a local board of health alleging that it violates an ordinance on the same subject. Dismissal by the trial court is affirmed since there is no conflict between the plan and ordinance and petitioners fail to allege a legally cognizable ground to challenge the plan since dissatisfaction with the plan is not sufficient. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Apollo Hair Systems of Nashville v. Micromode Medical
Plaintiff filed suit against two defendants, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to this Court. However, we find that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the order appealed from is not a final judgment. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Drexel Chemical Company, Inc. v. Gerald McDill
This breach of contract action arises from the parties’ employment agreement. Employer agreed to pay Employee $10,000.00 to relocate to the city where Employer’s plant was located. Employee moved to the local area without his family and Employer paid him $10,000.00. After Employee terminated his employment, Employer sued to recover the $10,000.00 because it claims that Employee failed to satisfy the relocation requirement because he did not move his family with him to the local area. The trial court held that Employee satisfied the relocation requirement. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wesley Roberts v. William D. Vaughn
This appeal involves the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff and the defendant had several business dealings, including loans, a marketing consultant agreement, and a lease agreement. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant in general sessions court to recover monies allegedly owed under the marketing consultant agreement. The defendant failed to answer or appear. The general sessions court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed the instant lawsuit against the same defendant in circuit court. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Metro Construction Co., LLC. v. Sim Attractions, LLC.
This case originated with a mechanic’s and materialman’s lien asserted by Plaintiff Metro Construction against commercial real property owned by Defendant/Cross Plaintiff Peabody Place Center in Memphis. It arises from improvements made by Metro Construction to a leasehold held by Defendant Sim Attractions. Sim Attractions abandoned the leasehold without compensating Metro Construction for the improvements, which included the installation of a several-ton race car simulator that remained in the abandoned leasehold. Defendant Fitraco claimed the simulator was its property under the terms of a lease agreement between Fitraco and Sim Attractions. It alternatively asserted a superior security interest. The trial court found that the simulator was personal property and determined that that the agreement between Sim Attractions and Fitraco was not a lease but an unperfected, disguised security agreement. The trial court attached the simulator to secure judgment in favor of Metro Construction. It also awarded Metro Construction discovery sanctions against Fitraco. The trial court awarded Peabody Place damages for lost rent. Fitraco appeals, asserting it had leased the simulator to Sim Attractions or, in the alternative, that it had properly perfected its security interest prior to judicial attachment by the trial court. It further asserts the damages claimed by Peabody Place were speculative. We reverse the judgment in favor of Metro Construction and affirm the judgment in favor of Peabody Place. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Marcus Willis v. Shelby County, Tennessee, et al.
This appeal arises from the removal of a state court action to federal court. Once the federal court granted the defendants summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s federal claims, it dismissed plaintiff’s state law claims without prejudice. Approximately one year later, the plaintiff sought to present its state law claims in state court by filing a motion titled to be a “Motion to Reassume Jurisdiction” and refiling its entire cause of action in state court. The trial court dismissed both cases with prejudice because the statute of limitations had run. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: L.W., d/o/b 07/04/1991, A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age
The trial court sustained the petition to adjudicate dependency and neglect filed by the Department of Children’s Services. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jerome William Devereaux, Jr., et ux. v. Jerome William Devereaux, Sr., et ux.
This case involves a family dispute over real property. The plaintiffs filed suit to enforce a document which purported to convey to them a co-ownership interest in certain property and to estop and enjoin the defendants from selling the property at issue. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the plaintiffs were “equitably entitled to ownership of the five acre tract they have improved.” We affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: E.G.B.
This is a child support case. The child’s mother is married to a man who is not the child’s biological father. The biological father petitioned the trial court to order genetic testing to establish paternity and to set child support. The mother sought the dismissal of the biological father’s petition, asking that her husband be designated as the child’s legal father. The husband also intervened, seeking dismissal of the petition and asking to be designated as the legal father. The trial court ordered genetic testing, which showed that the petitioner was the child’s biological father. The trial court declared the petitioner to be the child’s legal father and he began to pay the mother child support. An agreed permanent parenting plan was eventually entered, but the issue of child support was reserved. The mother sought retroactive child support for the five month period between the child’s birth and the date on which the biological father began to pay child support. The trial court denied the mother’s request, without including written findings to explain the reason for deviating from the presumption under the child support guidelines that retroactive support should be awarded. The mother now appeals. We remand for the trial court to either comply with the child support guidelines or make specific findings to support deviation from the guidelines. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
John P. Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority
John P. Konvalinka (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for access to public records seeking access to certain records in the possession of the Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority (“the Hospital” or “Erlanger”). These documents were created pursuant to the provisions of a Corporate Integrity Agreement entered into between the Hospital and the federal Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services following an investigation into allegations of illegal conduct by the Hospital. The Hospital filed a motion for protective order claiming the requested documents were confidential and protected from disclosure pursuant to: (1) the Tennessee Public Records Act; (2) the federal Freedom of Information Act; and/or (3) federal regulations implemented by the Department of Health and Human Services. The Trial Court found that the documents were protected from disclosure by the Tennessee Public Records Act; specifically, Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(a)(2)(A). This finding rendered moot whether the documents were protected from disclosure pursuant to either or both the Freedom of Information Act or the regulations developed by the Department of Health and Human Services. Petitioner appeals. We hold that the documents at issue are not protected from disclosure by the Tennessee Public Records Act, and the judgment of the Trial Court holding otherwise is vacated. We remand this case to the Trial Court for a determination of whether the documents at issue are protected from disclosure pursuant to applicable federal law. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company v. Michael Neill
Insurance company filed suit for a declaration that the policy exclusion for intentional acts applied to an injury arising from a paintball game. The trial court ruled for the insured. We affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: John Ussery, et al. v. The City of Columbia
Appellees, employees of Appellant City of Columbia, filed a class action suit against the City, seeking step raise promotions based upon merit. Appellees brought their suit under breach of contract theories, claiming that the City was contractually obligated to pay the raises based upon contract(s) arising from a 1984 employee handbook and certain pay ordinances passed by the City. The trial court held that the1984 Handbook was a contract, which the City had breached, and that the ordinances gave rise to an implied contract entitling the Appellees to damages on grounds of detrimental reliance. The City appeals. We reverse in part and affirm in part. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Jonny Hatcher, Jr. v. Chairman, Shelby County Election Commission, et al.
Appellant, a candidate for the Memphis City Council, filed suit against his opponent and the members of the Shelby County Election Commission, seeking a declaratory judgment that his opponent was not a qualified candidate and to enjoin the Commission from including his opponent’s name on the election ballot. Following the election, the trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint as being moot. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Richard T.D. Bethea, et al. v. Song Hee Hong, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute arising out of a contract for the sale of Appellant’s house. After the contract was executed, Appellees conducted a home inspection which revealed mold in the home’s air ducts. Appellants refused to repair the air ducts, and Appellees terminated the agreement. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees finding that termination was an available remedy under the terms of the agreement. Finding no error in this conclusion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James Daniel Richardson Roberts, Jr. v. Champs-Elysees, Inc., et al.
Appellant challenges the dismissal of his malicious prosecution action and the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Finding that an essential element of Appellant’s cause of action had been negated, the trial court’s dismissal is affirmed. Finding there to be no abuse of discretion, the trial court’s imposition of sanctions is affirmed. Finding this appeal to be frivolous as to one of the Appellees, we remand the case for the trial court to determine the damages to be awarded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Wooten Tractor Co., Inc. v. Arcon of Tennessee, L.L.C., et al.
This appeal arises out of a tractor lease. After lessee failed to make the required monthly payments, lessor filed this action alleging that lessee breached several different contract provisions. The trial court granted summary judgment and awarded lessor the unpaid rentals. Lessee appeals arguing that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment on grounds which lessor failed to allege in its motion for summary judgment. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Loren L. Chumley, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee - Dissenting
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Loren L. Chumley, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
Commissioner of Revenue assessed a tax based on the taxpayer’s use of an airplane which had been purchased out of state. Taxpayer sought review from the Department, but was denied relief following an informal hearing. Taxpayer appealed and the Chancery Court reversed, finding that, because (1) taxpayer provided the seller with a certificate of resale, (2) taxpayer immediately leased the airplane such that it transferred possession and control of the plane to the user, and (3) taxpayer was a validly organized business which observed all corporate formalities, the sale-for-resale exemption pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(34)(A) applied to the transaction. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Ann Vick Watson v. Frank Lee Watson, Jr.
This is the second appeal in this divorce case. The husband is a lawyer and the wife was a homemaker during most of the marriage. After the divorce trial, the trial court divided the marital estate, awarded the wife transitional alimony, and ordered each party to pay his or her own attorney’s fees. The wife appealed and the husband cross-appealed. In the first appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s valuation of two marital assets, stock and a corporation, and remanded for the trial court to re-value those assets. In addition, the trial court’s decision regarding the husband’s alleged dissipation of marital assets was reversed, and that issue was remanded to the trial court for reconsideration as well. The issues raised on alimony and attorney’s fees were not addressed in the first appeal. On remand, the trial court found a debt owed by the corporation to the husband was uncollectible and determined that the value of the corporation was zero. The trial court adjusted the valuation of the wife’s interest in the stock and engaged in a detailed analysis of the husband’s alleged dissipation of marital assets, finding no dissipation. On remand, the wife sought an award of alimony in futuro. The trial court declined to award alimony in futuro but awarded the wife an additional year of transitional alimony. Finally, the trial court declined the wife’s request for her attorney’s fees. Both parties now appeal. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the husband did not engage in dissipation, affirm the trial court’s increased property award to the wife, reflecting her interest in the stock, reverse the trial court’s finding that the value of the corporation is zero, and remand to the trial court for valuation of the corporation and division of that asset, modify the trial court’s award of alimony by awarding the wife alimony in futuro when the transitional alimony ends, affirm the trial court’s refusal to award the wife her attorney’s fees, and order the award of postjudgment interest on the wife’s increased property award from the stock, dating from the date of the judgment on remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William Griffin, Jr. v. Terrance Borum, et al.
Appellant William Griffin, Jr. appeals the trial court’s denial of his Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion to vacate or amend its order dismissing Mr. Griffin’s case against the Appellee Kentucky National Insurance Co. for bad faith denial of an insurance claim. We affirm |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Donnie Vaught, et al. v. Alan Jakes, Sr. and wife Deborah Jakes, et al.
A group of Rutherford County landowners whose property abutted one side of a private road which they maintained at their own expense filed a suit for trespass against a neighbor and developer who used the same road for access to houses he was building on the other side. Their suit also included a due process claim against the County for erroneously granting building permits for those houses. The trial court agreed that the building permits were granted in error, but ruled that the county’s action was an innocent error rather than a due process violation. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the developer, holding that he was entitled to use the road because of a permanent easement he had acquired from his predecessors-in-interest. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the due process claim, but reverse its dismissal of the trespass claim because the evidence shows that the individual who sold the property to the defendant had abandoned the easement and, thus, that the defendant had no right to use the road. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Daniels and Peggy Daniels v. Michael D. Wray
Plaintiff filed this action for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Defendant answered, denying liability, and subsequently filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 to amend and make claim for personal injuries and property damage as a result of the accident. The Trial Court allowed the amendment as to property damages, but refused to allow defendant to assert the claim for personal injuries on the grounds inter alia that the statute of limitations had run on the personal injury claim prior to the filing of the Motion to Amend. The property damage claim was settled, but the refusal to allow the amendment has been appealed to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the amendment. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
Leitha C. Perkins and Robert L. Perkins v. Big Lots Store, Inc.
This is a slip-and-fall case. The plaintiff tripped on a floor mat and fell as she was entering the defendant’s store. A store security video showed that the corner of the floor mat was overturned by another customer twenty-one seconds before the plaintiff fell. At the time that the corner of the mat became furled, the assistant store manager was at the service desk several feet from the entrance. He denied seeing the overturned mat. The plaintiff sued the store, alleging negligence in allowing a dangerous condition to persist and in failing to warn the plaintiff of it. After the trial, the jury found that the defendant store was eighty percent at fault and that the plaintiff was twenty percent at fault. The defendant store filed a motion for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct based on comments by jurors to the attorneys. The store also contended that the evidence showed that it did not have actual or constructive notice that the corner of the mat had become folded over. Finally, the store maintained that no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff was less than fifty percent at fault for her own injuries. The trial court denied the motion and the defendant appeals. We reverse, finding no material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and dismiss the case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Candace Mullins v. State of Tennessee
This is a claim filed against the State by a minor-decedent’s mother for the wrongful death of her child based on T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) (Negligent Care, Custody and Control of Person). The child was murdered while in the care of a relative after he had been removed from the mother’s home by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. The mother contended that if the caseworker assigned to her son’s case had properly investigated an earlier allegation of abuse at the home in which the child had been placed, the child would have been removed from the placement before the murder occurred. The Claims Commission held that it did not have the subject matter jurisdiction to hear the mother’s claims under T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) because the child was not in the care, custody, or control of the State at the time of the alleged negligence. The mother appeals. We affirm the judgment as modified. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Booker T. Holloway and wife, Brenda Holloway v. James C. Purdy and Chris Purdy
This appeal involves the Tennessee Uninsured Motorist Act. The plaintiffs owned a body shop that was insured under a garage owner’s policy. The policy limited its uninsured motorist coverage to vehicles that were owned by the plaintiffs and listed on the policy. While driving to an auto parts store in a customer’s car, one of the plaintiffs was hit by an uninsured motorist and sustained physical injuries. The plaintiffs then submitted claims to the insurance company that issued the garage owner’s policy, and also to his customer’s insurance company, seeking recovery under the uninsured motorist provisions of both policies. After the claims were denied, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the uninsured motorist. The insurance company that issued the plaintiffs the garage owner’s policy filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no coverage because the policy did not cover the plaintiffs while operating a non-owned vehicle. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. As a permissive operator, the injured plaintiff was covered under his customer’s uninsured motorist policy. The customer’s insurance company settled with the plaintiffs, obtained an assignment of their rights against the insurance company that issued them the garage owner’s policy, and then intervened as a third party plaintiff. The intervening plaintiff now appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurer under the garage owner’s policy, arguing that the Uninsured Motorist Act prohibits such a limitation. We affirm, finding that the statute does not prohibit the limitation. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
