Nancy Ann McCracken Sizemore v. Steven Douglas Sizemore and Nancy Ann McCracken Sizemore v. Steven Douglas Sizemore
Nancy Ann McCracken Sizemore (“Wife”) initially sued her spouse, Steven Douglas Sizemore (“Husband”), for divorce in the Washington County Circuit Court. She subsequently filed a notice of voluntary dismissal in that case. On the day the notice of nonsuit was filed in Circuit Court, Wife filed a divorce complaint in the Chancery Court for Washington County. The parties proceeded to trial in that court. The Chancery Court granted Wife a divorce, divided the parties’ marital property, and ordered Husband to pay Wife child support and alimony. Following the entry of the Chancery Court’s judgment, Husband filed a counterclaim in the Circuit Court proceeding – the one that had been dormant since Wife filed her notice of voluntary nonsuit some two years earlier. He argues that the case in Circuit Court was still pending because that court had not entered an order dismissing Wife’s complaint. The Circuit Court dismissed Husband’s counterclaim, stating (1) that Husband had waived his right to have the parties’ divorce case tried in Circuit Court by fully participating in the trial in Chancery Court; and (2) that Wife’s notice of nonsuit had “effectively dismissed the case” in Circuit Court. On appeal from the Chancery Court case, Husband contends that (1) the Chancery Court “never had jurisdiction” because the complaint in Circuit Court was pending when the -2- Chancery Court purported to assume jurisdiction; (2) the Chancery Court erred in not allowing him to obtain a transcript of the divorce hearing; (3) the Chancellor was biased against him and should have recused himself; (4) the Chancery Court erred in ordering him to pay child support for the parties’ disabled adult son; (5) the Chancery Court erred in its division of the parties’ marital property; (6) the Chancery Court erred in awarding Wife alimony; (7) the Chancery Court erred in imputing $100,000 per year of income to Husband; and (8) the Chancery Court erred in finding him in contempt. On appeal from the Circuit Court, Husband argues that the court lacked authority to dismiss his counterclaim. We affirm the judgments of both courts. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scotty Henry Pace, Jr.
The appellant’s former girlfriend obtained an order of protection against the appellant in June of 2003. In August of 2003, the former girlfriend filed warrants alleging two separate violations of the order of protection by the appellant. The general sessions court found the appellant guilty of criminal contempt for both violations and sentenced the appellant to ten days in jail for each offense. The appellant appealed to the circuit court, which held a hearing and affirmed the convictions. Because the appellant has failed to include in the appellate record the June 2003 order of protection which he was found to have violated, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa McWherter v. JACOA Alcoholism Center
This is a negligence case. The defendant is a treatment facility for drug and alcohol addictions. The plaintiff was an inpatient at the defendant facility, undergoing substance abuse treatment. The plaintiff was admitted on referral from her probation officer. As part of her treatment, the plaintiff participated in experiential therapy designed to teach through experiences. For one exercise, a group of patients were organized into a team and a rope was tied between two posts, with a mattress on one side. The team was asked to devise a plan for getting all team members over the rope, without touching it. The plaintiff’s team decided to “toss” the female members of the team over the rope. The plaintiff was thrown over the rope once without injury. However, the team had to repeat the exercise. During the second attempt, the plaintiff was tossed over the rope, but this time her foot missed the mattress and she broke her ankle. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against the defendant facility. The facility moved for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be held liable because the plaintiff voluntarily chose to engage in the exercise despite an obvious risk of injury. The trial court granted the motion. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse and remand, finding that the defendant facility had a duty of care to the plaintiff and that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the extent to which the plaintiff felt compelled to participate in the exercise and as to whether the fault attributable to the plaintiff is greater than the fault attributable to the defendant facility. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, v. P.W.K., In Re: J.B.K. DOB: 11/25/02
The parties stipulated statutory grounds for termination of parental rights, and the Trial Court found that it was in the child’s best interest that the father’s parental rights be terminated. On appeal, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Lilliane Kambu v. Jean Katera
The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce, ordering the husband to pay child support and alimony in futuro. The husband has appealed arguing the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding the wife alimony. We modify the alimony award and otherwise affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Suzy Whitley v. Sam Lewis
This appeal involves a claim in juvenile court to recover child support payments. The mother of the child at issue told the respondent that he was the child’s father. In reliance on this, the respondent signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, and the juvenile court entered an agreed order setting child support and establishing the respondent’s child support arrearage. Over two years later, the respondent learned that the child might not be his, and he petitioned the juvenile court for a paternity test. His petition was granted, and the test showed that he was not the biological father of the child. The juvenile court set aside the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity based on fraud, relieved the respondent of any future obligation to pay child support, and forgave all past child support arrearages. Subsequently, the respondent filed a petition against the mother, seeking damages because the mother had fraudulently induced him into signing the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. The juvenile court granted the respondent’s petition against the mother, awarding him damages consisting of the child support erroneously paid, the cost of paternity testing, and attorney’s fees. The State, on behalf of the mother, now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the juvenile court erroneously forgave the respondent’s accrued child support arrearages, and that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent’s petition against the mother for damages. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald C. Howse v. Tennessee Department of Correction
In 1982, appellant prisoner was sentenced to one twenty-five year determinate sentence and four five-to-ten-year indeterminate sentences, to run consecutively. In 2003, appellant filed a declaratory judgment action in the Davidson County Chancery Court, alleging that he had been wrongfully denied the possibility of custodial parole. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant appeals such ruling. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Ruff v. Raleigh Assembly of God Church, Inc.
On remand pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-3-128, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendant with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for assault. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas R. Jones, Jr. v. Heather L. Rusch-Jones - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to address two matters. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas R. Jones, Jr. v. Heather L. Rusch-Jones
Following a short marriage of less than four years, Thomas R. Jones, Jr. (“Father”) filed a complaint for divorce from Heather L. Rusch-Jones (“Mother”). Mother filed a counter-claim also seeking a divorce. Both parties sought to be the primary residential parent of their young daughter. While this case was pending, both parties filed competing petitions for orders of protection. Father’s petition was granted; Mother’s was not. Following a very lengthy trial, the Trial Court designated Father as the primary residential parent and awarded Mother supervised and restricted co-parenting time. The Trial Court awarded Mother a limited amount of alimony. Mother appeals raising numerous issues, including a challenge to the Trial Court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent and the amount of alimony she was awarded. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Lee T. Myers v. Sandra Brown
This case involves the third and fourth appeals (consolidated) of successive petitions to modify custody. The mother and father of the child at issue were never married. The mother was designated the primary residential parent for the child, and the father was given designated parenting time and ordered to pay child support. In 2002, the father filed a petition to modify custody. The trial court denied the father’s petition, and the decision was affirmed by this Court (“E.J.M. I”). During the pendency of that appeal, the father filed a second petition for a change of custody based on facts that arose after his first petition was denied. A hearing on this petition was conducted shortly after this Court issued its decision in E.J.M. I. A juvenile court judge held that, though he might otherwise change custody to the father, he was bound by the appellate decision in E.J.M. I to give final decision-making authority to the mother. Nevertheless, joint custody was ordered. The father now appeals that decision. Shortly after that, the father filed another petition to modify custody, based on facts that arose after the decision to award joint custody. Another juvenile court judge conducted a hearing, heard testimony, and reviewed the entire record. After doing so, the juvenile court judge strongly criticized the father’s litigiousness and, in light of the pending appeal of the joint custody award, dismissed the father’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The father appeals that decision as well. Both appeals were consolidated, but the appeal was dismissed due to a procedural defect (E.J.M. II). The procedural defect was cured, and we now hear the consolidated appeal. We reverse the conclusion by both juvenile court judges, holding that the trial court has jurisdiction and authority to modify custody even while an appeal is pending, so long as the modification is based on new facts and changed conditions that arose after the trial court judgment that is the subject of the appeal. The cause is remanded for a decision on the father’s petitions to modify custody. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald F. Fleming v. Jim Murphy, et al
The plaintiff buyer, a Texas resident, became aware of a used car for sale in Memphis through an internet advertisement. The plaintiff contacted the defendant who had prepared the internet advertisement for the seller, and who provided him with the phone number of the defendant seller. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Aaron Walker v. Tennessee Department of Correction
An inmate of the Department of Correction appeals dismissal by the trial court of his Petition for Writ of Certiorari of a Department of Correction Disciplinary Proceeding. The trial court upheld the action of the Department of Correction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Demetrica Bell v. Cathy Ann Bell
Wife appeals from the trial court’s final decree of divorce, alleging various deficiencies in the proceedings. Based on the limited record before us, which includes Wife’s specific waiver of most of the issues she now raises, we affirm the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
James William Taylor v. George Little
Appellant and inmate in the Department of Correction filed a declaratory judgment action asserting various deficiencies in the judgment of the trial court convicting him of first degree murder and sentencing him to life in prison. He asserts that the murder conviction should not have been used in the calculation of his prison sentence. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant, George Little, the Commissioner of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Tommy Carl Starkey
This case involves wrongful interference with an easement. The plaintiff utility operates an underground gas transmission line. The utility had an easement for the gas line, running along thenorth edge of a large tract of real property. For the gas line to operate safely, it needed sufficient soil both on top of the pipeline and on each side of the pipeline. The defendant developer acquired the real property, subject to the easement for the pipeline. The developer then sought to develop the real property. In May 2002, the defendant developer began excavating large amounts of dirt from within the easement site without proper authorization from the utility. Despite the utility’s repeated demands to stop, the developer continued the excavation. Only when the utility threatened to have the developer arrested did he finally stop excavating dirt from around the pipeline. By this time, there was so little dirt surrounding the pipeline that there was serious danger to the public, and the utility was required to engage in immediate corrective work. The utility hauled in and spread 21,467 yards of dirt, restoring the easement site to a safe condition. The utility then filed suit against the developer, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the utility compensatory damages and punitive damages. The defendant developer now appeals. We affirm, finding ample evidence to support the award of damages. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Doris Jones and Billy J. Jones v. Susannah P. Johnson
This is a personal injury case involving the Tennessee suspension statute. On August 27, 2003, the defendant rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle. On August 23, 2004, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Todd Jackson v. Carrie Gasaway
Inmate appeals the dismissal of his "Personal Injury Suit" against the attorney who represented him in a previous criminal matter. The trial court dismissed the action finding the complaint does not state a cause of action due to the lack of any allegation of severe mental injury and that any action arising out of alleged misconduct occurring on March 9, 2001, would be barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Finding the inmate's suit wholly without merit, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
William L. Thompson v. Memphis Light, Gas And Water
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Plaintiff, former employee of Defendant Memphis Light Gas and Water Division (“MLGW”), upon determining that Plaintiff was entitled to severance benefits under “personnel policy 22-25" because revocation of the policy by MLGW’s Board was negated due to violations of the Open Meetings Act. We reverse the award of summary judgment to Mr. Thompson and award summary judgment to MLGW on other grounds. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gladys Tuturea, Individually and as representative of George Tuturea v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance
This lawsuit concerns coverage for real and personal property under three insurance policies issued by Defendant. The trial court awarded partial summary judgment to both parties and entered final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Both parties appeal. We vacate the trial court’s order entering final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 and remand. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
County of Shelby, A Political Subdivision of the State of Tennessee v. John R. Tompkins, et al.
In this administrative appeal, a Shelby County firefighter challenges the judgment of the lower court reinstating the Fire Department’s decision to terminate his employment for a conceded violation of the county residency requirement set forth in the Shelby County Charter. The Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board (Merit Board) had modified the Fire Department’s sanction from termination to suspension without pay for the time of suspension already served. The trial court, however, ruled that the Merit Board exceeded its authority by failing to heed the Shelby County Charter’s provision mandating termination. The Appellant argues that the Charter does not mandate termination; that, even if it does, he had moved back to Shelby County at the time of his termination and should not have been discharged; and that, alternatively, he is entitled to a remand to advance an equal protection argument because he was unfairly prevented from doing so in the lower court. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Danny Ray Meeks v. Claudia Bonnyman
Petitioner brought an action for mandamus in Circuit Court. The Trial Court dismissed the Petition on the grounds that petitioner did not meet the statutory requirements for maintaining an action. On appeal, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennie Martin and Roya Mitchell, Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Kathryn Martin, deceased, and Tennie Martin and Roy A. Mitchell, et al v. NorFolk Southern Railway Company, et al
Decedent’s vehicle was struck by defendants’ train at a railroad crossing, resulting in decedent’s death. The Trial Court granted Defendants’ Summary Judgment. The Estate has appealed. We affirm the Trial Court’s Judgment. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennie Martin and Roya Mitchell, et al v. NorFolk Southern Railway Company, et al - Dissenting
CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., dissenting. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Smith County, Tennessee, and Smith County Highway Department v. Dave Enoch
The operator of an automobile junkyard in Smith County appeals the permanent injunction issued against him by the Chancery Court enjoining him from maintaining an excessive number of inoperable vehicles within one thousand feet of a county road in violation of the Smith County Junkyard Control Act, Chapter 97 of the Private Acts of 1987. The junkyard operator contends the evidence was insufficient to support the findings and conclusions of the trial court. Finding the evidence more than sufficient, primarily due to admissions by the operator of the junkyard, we affirm. |
Smith | Court of Appeals |
